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The map above indicates China's
PLA-N, from its Eastern and Southern Theater commands, has a combined 32 SSKs available to
wage a hidden blockade of Taiwan. Smart mines, UUVs and undersea sensors would
act as force multipliers in this blockade.
Gabriel Honrada for Asia Times, has written an excellent article, dated August 16, 2022, which brings together many interesting points about Taiwan and Submarines.
Issues include:
China deploying some of its Yuan
and Song-class SSKs for a part submarine blockade of Taiwan. This may starve
out Taiwan’s economy in weeks as food, minerals, energy and other supplies that
come by sea are cut. In terms of energy imports Taiwan has only a “11-day
supply of natural gas and 146 days’ worth of oil”.
Use of submarines [and missiles]
could minimize the need for more vulnerable Chinese surface ships and aircraft to attack in the initial phase. In
terms of typical Chinese official secrecy and media management any destruction of
Chinese subs is easy to conceal.
My own thoughts are Taiwanese and other Western ASW surface ships would be vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. Against Taiwanese-Western ASW and other aircraft China has HQ-9 SAMs with a range of 300km. China's S-400 SAMs have an even longer 400km range. Outside air supply of Taiwan might be deterred by the threat of Chinese SAMs.
Hidden US SSNs, Japanese and
maybe South Korean SSKs are the main threat to Chinese submarines.
Australian submarines are simply based too far away to assist. Instead, Australia, as an ever loyal US ally, might feel compelled to send 2 frigates/destroyers with a supply ship. The latter ship’s cruising speed of around 15 knots would make for a slow moving flotilla – vulnerable to Chinese torpedoes and missiles. These Aussie ships may turn out to be the first Western ships China sinks.
12 comments:
Pete
I agree. I find it hard to see how Australian warships can survive in this environment. Logically China could launch an air and SCM/IRBM campaign to neutralise the Taiwanese air force first, then use its ship and submarine numbers to dominate the area. It is not obvious to me how Taiwan could maintain sea transport links (to the east coast) let alone air links.
Also FYI there were some articles in Australian press on Tuesday about the future Australian east coast sub base. Now the new government is playing the same political game as its predecessor, suggesting names of possible sub base locations to test the reaction.
Now Gladstone in Qld and Western Port Bay in Victoria have been added. Neither seem optimal. Western Port Bay would put the submarines another 1500km further away for every deployment compared to Brisbane. Gladstone would be very close to operations, but is in a very shallow bay enclosed by sand islands. It takes large ore ships now thanks to constant dredging. There is a lot of heavy engineering industry in the city though, which might be useful.
https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/gladstone/mayor-backs-push-for-gladstone-naval-base/news-story/06710dab77183e0ad768e8feff5b33be
Hi Anonymous @Aug 17, 2022, 9:04:00 PM TAIWAN
On Taiwan I was pleasantly surprised that China's 32 SSKs (from its Eastern and Southern Fleets) do not represent an overwhelming dominance in subs for Taiwan operations. Those 32 might reduce to 20 due to additional responsibilities such as defence of the Hainan nuke sub base - defence of Hong Kong, Shanghai and other naval and commercial ports.
Against that Japan might deploy 12 superior SSKs and the US 10 SSNs in the Taiwan theater.
MISSILES
But it is in missiles China probably enjoys dominance in numbers and benefits in
un-attackable(?) mainland based disposition. China may be mass producing missiles to overwhelm the anti-missile defences of Taiwan and the anti-missiles of Western rescue fleets.
Hi again Anonymous @Aug 17, 2022, 9:04:00 PM
Australian Politics can never be divorced from East Coast nuclear sub base choices.
It is predictable there are new options for East Coast SSN Bases under a Labor Federal Government.
- Western Port also suffers from being too close to (Labor-Green) Melbourne which may be the most anti-nuclear city in Australia.
- Gladstone might be too far forward-exposed to China's future missile, air and naval bases in the Solomons.
Also East Coast base choices ared influenced by "bastion support" from preferably close by Australian air and surface naval ship bases. Port Kembla still looks best against all those issues, followed by Newcastle.
In years to come China could also "buy" bases in East Timor and PNG, rendering Darwin and Katherine poor sites for existing Aus army, naval and/or air bases.
++++++++++++++
One worry for all base choices is in the runup to blockade/conflict.
This is about the possibility that a Chinese ships could effectively scuttle themselves - blockading the mouth of an East or West Coast SSN base rendering such bases useless for months.
Regards Pete
Australian SSNs would be very helpful in the Taiwan theater. Even 4 Australian submarines for example would add appreciably to the US and Japanese forces.
The South Korean submarine force would also be very useful but I'm not sure if they would be willing to fight alongside the Japanese against the Chinese.
Do you think Russia would be willing to deploy substantial forces to aid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Russia has a significant SSN force at least on paper.
Also would the UK or France be willing to deploy SSNs alongside the US?
Hi Rai
As Aus SSNs probably won't likely be commissioned until the late 2040s Taiwan may more likely be absorbed by the PRC way before then.
Also as South Korea shares the mainland with China (bringing up the longterm threat scenario of possible Chinese tank invasion) - this may keep South Korea out of a protect-Taiwan conflict.
I don't expect Russia will be directly involved in invade Taiwan.
Russia/Putin could further express an increase in nuclear SSBN readiness against US, UK and French nuclear forces. Russia increasing the nuclear threat is already committing NATO SSNs and NATO SSBNs over usual tasking levels.
Russian SSKs and SSNs might also act as substitutes freeing up Chinese Northern Fleet subs to move south to blockade-invade Taiwan operations.
Rai
Regarding UK and French SSNs, it is worth noting that, until the last two Astutes are completed (due 2024 and 2026) UK will only have 5 SSNs and France 6 SSNs. As Pete said, by the time they allow for SSBN escort and patrolling for Russian SSBNs, there are not any European SSNs left spare.
Best case under AUKUS, UK may station one SSN in Perth, but not permanently.
Depending on how politics plays out over the next decade, I think there is a better chance USA could get support from Indian subs, not UK or French. India sent a warship on a South China Sea freedom of navigation exercise for the first time in 2021. The Chinese border assault in the Himalayas in 2020 that left 20 Indian soldiers dead is still a very sore point.
https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-deploys-warships-south-china-sea-part-act-east-policy-2021-08-04/
Pete
On the question of Chinese bases, the debt trap plan is proceeding to phase two in the Solomon Islands.
China (Hiawei) signed a deal loaning $97 million for mobile phone towers with SI today. That is 7% of GDP!
They have no chance of paying this back. It is the Sri Lanka playbook again.
India does not really have enough submarines and they would probably need to build SSNs in order to deploy effectively in the Taiwan theater given the distances involved.
India could conceivably build a SSN derived from the Arihant-class relatively quickly; probably sooner than an Aus built SSN. However I'm not sure how good such a submarine would be against Chinese submarines.
However India does not need to deploy any military assets in Taiwan theater directly to be helpful in a Taiwan invasion. Even stationing more military forces on the border would force China to deploy more forces in Tibet and away from Taiwan. Every Chinese rocket force or Chinese SAM system deployed against India is one that is not deployed against Taiwan.
Hi Rai @Aug 19, 2022, 9:08:00 AM
I think India would do well to buy a design, design software and technical advisers from Russia. This may be for SSNs with capabilities approximating the latest Akula variant. Russia probably won't make newer Yasen SSN designs available and even if it did it would likely be too expensive.
India's already scheduled leasing of a newer Akula will help.
Russian help should include the latest reactor variant used on Russian Akulas.
India should try to complete the first Indian Akula within about 14 years or India may experience an Australia like attack submarine gap.
Regards Pete
Hi Anon @Aug 18, 2022, 11:11:00 PM
Thats bad news that the Solomons appears to be taking on a Chinese debt trap loan equivalent to 7% of Solomons GDP for a mobile phone network that Chinese (military and businesses) might use more than the actual Solomons poeple.
Hi Pete,
We've discussed the difficulties of an actual land invasion before.
But a blockade and forcing surrender is a much more practical and doable method. It already has enough submarines, missiles and front line naval ships to enforce this, though simply using submarines would possibly be more practical, allowing for a small amount of deniability (can't see them, so no proof), and difficult to counter. In addition, China subs actually almost outnumbers both the US and Japan combined. And if NK attacks SK, to stop any SK participation, then Taiwan is simply going to starve to death. It'll be a relatively non violent method. Of course, if China does this, Taiwan might start missile attacks on the mainland naval ports and even Beijing, so who knows.
Andrew
Hi Andrew @Aug 22, 2022, 3:04:00 PM
What you comment is true.
Also if China heavily uses subs what may be heavy Chinese sub losses to US SSNs can be covered up by water and selective CCP reporting. Not good for Xi's image if there are Western TV and satellite images of Chinese cruisers and destroyers being sunk (like Russia's "Moskva") by anti-ship missiles.
Yes China could ask NK to turn up the heat on SK by incidents in the DMZ and maybe another Cheonan Incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROKS_Cheonan_sinking
Popular Opinions surveys in Taiwan seem to indicate many Taiwanese are apathetic to the stepped up China threat or maybe resigned to it.
Regards Pete
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