Mainland China blockading then invading independent Taiwan could involve economic sanctions, missiles, aircraft, cross-Taiwan Strait amphibious landings, sea-mines, UAVs, UUVs, cyber attacks and many other aggressive China/PRC strategies-tactics. (Photos and artwork courtesy The Sun UK newspaper, June 16, 2022).
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A Donor who rightly sees mainland China's ongoing military threat to independent Taiwan as a litmus test on what China may do elsewhere in the region, has requested a discussion. This is along the following lines in bolded red:
A major crisis scenario for the AUKUS is China imposing a blockade on Taiwan, and whatever follows.
Four questions:
1. What are likely Chinese preparations for such a situation?
Pete's response: Since 1949 mainland China has discussed and prepared for a blockade and subsequent takeover of Taiwan. China has planned economic sanctions and built warships, submarines, UAVs, UUVs, sea-mines, aircraft and conventional warhead missile forces to blockade and/or invade Taiwan.
More recently China has developed cyber warfare, fixed undersea sensors, smart-mobile-sea-mines, satellites and nuclear armed medium range missile capabilities to isolate, hit Taiwan and to block or destroy genuinely democratic taskforces (like those of the US) who attempt to come to the aid of Taiwan.
2. What should AUKUS (and other "friendlies")
preparations be?
Pete's response: Continue to advise Taiwan to stockpile fuel, food, ammunition, buy useful defensive weapons (including anti-tank, anti-air and anti-ship missiles) other staples, and lay smart sea-mines, to resist mainland Chinese aggression until relief forces and actions can come to the aid of Taiwan. This builds on the lessons of stockpiling and weapons acquisition undertaken by Ukraine.
3. What should AUKUS do when such an event occurs?
Pete's response: The US has moved from strategic ambiguity in defending Taiwan to a more active defence policy under President Biden. Medium sized powers Australia, Japan, South Korea and Singapore very much rely on the lead of military superpower, the US. The US should lead the way in countering conventional and nuclear armed military superpower China. This could be in terms of a close-in counter blockade against China (eg. widespread smart-sea-mine laying of Chinese commercial ports and naval bases).
The US should lead a Western worldwide political and economic sanction response against China in similar terms to the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
As with Ukraine direct fighting between AUKUS, ANZUS, and the QUAD against China should be avoided as direct fighting would mean WW3, which could escalate from conventional to nuclear war.
4. What role (if any) for Australian submarines or Australian navy in general?
Pete's response: An Australian conventional submarine would use up all its fuel transitting to-from Fleet Base West (Australia) to Taiwan or China leaving no time for operations there. If future Australians SSNs eventuate they could spend 73 days on station in the China vs Taiwan environment.
However our submarines, like Singapore's and India's, can surveil or stop Chinese (SSKs, SSNs, warships and merchant shipping) transiting the Indian-Pacific ocean Indonesian archipelago if a war escalates.
Japanese, South Korean and US submarines are in geographical positions to support Taiwan.
Australian fighter/attack and maritime patrol aircraft would be the first Australian forces that could cover Chinese vessels transiting the Indian-Pacific oceans (if a war escalates that far).
Two Australian destroyers/frigates supported by an Australian naval supply ship might take 3 weeks to form part of a US led naval coalition supporting any close in counter-blockade against mainland China (if a war escalates that far).
I suppose our options range from issuing very strong diplomatic condemnations to World War 3, but political hesitancy will still be an issue, indeed I am sure China is counting on that.
Pete's response: Very true.
What are your views Pete [and other commenters]?
Pete's response: My comments (in black) are above.
I open this discussion to other comments. Pete.
7 comments:
Good start, but I think more development needed:
A Chinese start with just a blockade would cause many in AUKUS to resist "getting involved, " Just as in Ukraine. I remember the German's opening bid in February was 15,000 helmets. What's the least we can do so the public doesn't punish us in the next election?
My view is that the China facing front line states need more autonomous deterrent capability, such as Taiwan getting the means to counter blockade China on its own (smart mobile mines?) as well as some capability for Philippines, Indonesia, etc. to protect near shore waters.
I am worried that China may try to win by coercing small isolated states, who would doubt AUKUS support. (And rightly so.)
Public pressure will be against AUKUS involvement if China keeps level of visible violence down, but pressure is likely to favor involvement if first line small states are involved in a major war, putting up brave resistance. (See Ukraine example again.)
In general, I think AUKUS public would prohibit AUKUS escalation, AUKUS must set up situation to force China to force the desired AUKUS response. Without this, organized AUKUS resistance becomes politically impossible. I can easily imagine someone like Macron demanding that AUKUS avoid "humiliating" China. This may have been one factor in cancelling the French submarine contract. I fear the French make good submarines, but not so good allies.
As for Australian and other friendly navies, an additional role could be participating in joint Freedom of Navigation exercises.
Not that I hope for war, but without credible threat, China is unlikely to be deterred.
I hope others have more ideas.
Pete
Naval analysts could write books answering these four questions on a China Taiwan clash or blockade. I’ll have a go.
1. What are likely Chinese preparations for such a situation?
One of my fundamental concerns about a PLAN blockade of Taiwan is how hard it will be to avoid escalation from blockade to war.
Most Taiwan ports are west coast. Numerous PLAN missiles and ships in the Taiwan Strait makes blockading them easy.
Main port of Kaoshung is in the south and Hualien is on the east coast. Blockading both is critical for a full blockade.
China would therefore seek to occupy Taiwanese islands in South China Sea and Philippine islands in Luzon Strait to blockade both. Philippine (Batane) islands have a population of 20,000, so that is an escalation risk.
2. What should AUKUS (and other "friendlies") preparations be?
I agree with Pete re USA supplying SSMs and SAMs to Taiwan to stockpile.
Other nearby friendly friendlies should build up SSM and SAM defences on their islands that may be occupied for a blockade.
3. What should AUKUS do when such an event occurs?
UK can do almost nothing and Australia not much. It all depends on US policy and commitment.
Response of the Philippines and Japan north and south of Taiwan would also be critical. If they defend their islands it is a lot harder for PLAN to blockade Taiwan but that also risks escalation to a wider war. Should Japan be in AUKUS? I think so.
4. What role (if any) for Australian submarines or Australian navy in general?
RAN ships can do little to intervene in the scale of this contest. Our AWDs and frigates would be outnumbered 10 to 1. Suicide.
IMO Australia’s greatest assistance would not be in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, but blockading Chinese oil imports through Indonesia. Oil imports are China’s achilles heal. Aussie (or Indian) subs could be very effective stopping Chinese oil through the Molucca and Sunda straits.
If China mounts an effective blockade, Taiwan can only survive if China runs out of oil before Taiwan runs out of food.
Incidentally, if blockades and counter blockades affected the oil trade, Australia is also very vulnerable, due to our long term failure to build a local oil reserve. IEA rules require 90 days reserves. We have less than 30 days supply of oil. So buy that EV when you can afford one… Australia imports almost 90% of its oil.
Question: I suppose our options range from issuing very strong diplomatic condemnations to World War 3, but political hesitancy will still be an issue, indeed I am sure China is counting on that.
Yes. In this regard Australia’s recent attempts to improve relations with Indonesia and India are very sensible. We should also aim to build trade with countries in SE Asia to increase our value to nations that might assist. Australia’s coal and gas exports also give it some leverage. Thinking about these scenarios, Australia should shift towards more two way trade with India. It is very hard for China to disrupt. A much safer long term prospect than any other Asian country for us.
I think that, while its wise for Taiwan & its friends to think about what Taiwan should do in the event its blockaded by the Chinese, I think it's also important for Taiwan's friends (and the rest of the world at large) to start thinking about what THEY should do in the event Taiwan is blockaded.
Taiwan is perhaps the world's most important supplier of cutting-edge semiconductors, a disruption of this supply could lead to stagnation or even collapse of several industries tied to Information Technology (IT) or any field that requires high-end computational power to function.
In a world where the biggest enterprises & some of the largest employers are all Tech companies, that could translate into an economic loss of trillions of dollars, across the world, and all the social unrest that could bring...forcing several countries*** to take a re-look at their policies with regard to the China-Taiwan equation. And that's only considering the blockade, if the war results in the fabrication infrastructure being destroyed (very likely), it could take a decade or more for the world to fully recover.
Re-mapping the supply chains of critical technologies is one of the QUAD's central goals, but this is something that can only be addressed over the long term.
It's a good thing that China's plans for overland trade routes (BRI) and overland energy routes (Russian pipelines) are still in relatively early stages. But once those are in place & fully operational, the world has considerably less leverage against the CCP.
***especially those that have a huge domestic market to cater for, but don't necessarily have a dog in the Pacific fight and who's security interests are not directly threated by China, such as the various European countries.
Cheers
Thanks Anonymouses and Gessler
From the length and sophistication of your comments China vs Taiwan
which could escalate to China + Russia vs Taiwan + the West = WW3 is a huge topic.
Even if restricted to China vs Taiwan, Western anti-China economic sanctions and cessation of Taiwanese semi-conductor supplies could tip the highly interdependent/Globalized world economy into Depression. Mass refugee crisies, starvation, international and civil wars would result.
A. An Appeaser's viewpoint might be "Let's surrender Taiwan to China hoping that this will satisfy Xi".
and
B. At the other extreme are rightwing US military-industrial complex Covert circles whose view may be "Lets take on China militarally and block its worldwide trade while US conventional + nuclear forces + US economic size are still superior to China's".
But in the end its the autocrats' Putin's Russia and Xi's China who are the most active and/or potential aggressors.
Until China actually blockades, invades or just lives with Taiwan the multifaceted debate will continue. In the Halls of Western Civilian and Military intelligence there are probably vast multi-agency China vs Taiwan Working Groups, constantly collecting, analyzing and revizing what may happen.
In the past there were vast Working Groups of "Expert" Russian Speaking Kremlinologists who got it totally wrong on how Eastern Europe's/Russia's Fall of Communism would turn out in the late 1980s/early 1990s.
But were they wrong in the end? The First Russian Cold War did end around 1991. But the Second Russian (now adding China) Cold War did resume in the 2010s.
Our "amateur" views are as good as any.
Regards Pete
Hi Anonymous [at Jul 6, 2022, 9:56:00 PM]
Very true:
"In this regard Australia’s recent attempts to improve relations with Indonesia and India are very sensible. We should also aim to build trade with countries in SE Asia to increase our value to nations that might assist. Australia’s coal and gas exports also give it some leverage. Thinking about these scenarios, Australia should shift towards more two way trade with India. It is very hard for China to disrupt. A much safer long term prospect than any other Asian country for us."
ALP and Green climate change policies would be against Australia building 2 or 3 oil refineries. But we need more refineries so we aren't as dependent on sea lanes to Singapore's refineries on which we rely.
Even the hint of Chinese naval or air threats to Australia-Singapore tankers would close down that lifeline.
So yes, India with a massive and growing population and aim to increase living standards will increasingly need Australia's oil, gas, Uranium and coal energy.
India's nuclear propelled-nuclear armed Navy can protect Australia-India sealanes against Chinese depredations.
And Hey if China blockades Australia's Pacific sea lanes with the US. This will clarify an AUKUS choice of UK SSNs, via the Pacific and Indian oceans, automatically.
Regards Pete
Pete
Regarding Australia’s oil supply vulnerability the problem is mainly storage. We now i port almost 90% of our oil (100% of jetfuel) because most Australian oil fields have closed (Bass Straight) or are in decline (Santos onshore, some Timor Sea). So we need local storage capacity not refineries. It would really be in our interest to move away from oil use as far as possible now, because all our potential suppliers are potentially disruptable.
Otherwise yes, I think India Australia two way trade and closer military cooperation makes a lot of sense for both countries. It may be attractive for India to get reliable gas and uranium supply from Australia as well. India has domestic coal.
And yes this is a huge topic - economic, technological and military interactions create many scenarios. Invading Taiwan will be incredibly difficult because the west coast has very few good landing sites. But a blockade is an obvious alternative strategy, easier, less risk, and potentially highly effective, since Taiwan is only about 35% self sufficient in food. A blockade could win.
Hi Anonymous [at Jul 7, 2022, 11:22:00 PM]
Overall I agree with you.
But for your first para too few Australian oil refineries are part of the complex problem.
Checkout https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/apr/21/over-90-of-australias-fuel-imported-leaving-country-vulnerable-to-shortages-report-says
"Part of the issue has been the decline in domestic production capacity. In a decade, Australia has gone from 20 operating oil refineries to two. According to the report, Ampol’s Lytton refinery and Viva’s Geelong refinery have capacity to produce less than a quarter of the volume of petroleum products consumed by the country in 2018-19."
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Para two - True that Australia should diversify its trade balance with less reliance on China and more with UK, Europe and India.
One possible complication with India is its close strategic and economic relations with Russia. Russia's closer economic and strategic alliance with China is also a growing worry - shades of neo-Communist monolith, now better labeled as tending to Putin-Xi autocratic monolith-ism.
++++++++++++++
Para three - Yes Taiwanese-Western Smart Mines in a close-in counter-blockade of China is an increasingly controllable proposition. This is because such mines can be pre and re-programmed to arm, switch on, off, and be diasarmed remotely from (say) Taipei, Washington DC or CINCPAC Honolulu. Software in such mines can concentrate on particular PLA-N warships/subs, ignore Chinese and foreign civilian vessels and ignore non-China/PRC warships/subs.
Regards Pete
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