Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program: Site-Meter "Hacking" Iranian Interest

Map of Iran's highest priority nuclear facilities. This includes the research centers at Tehran and  Isfahan/Esfahan (from which Submarine Matters' site-meter picked up Iranian reader interest in computer simulations of nuclear weapon explosions) see below. 

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The whole bomb Iran issue is dominated Israeli and US politicians-officials. Most effectively the US National Security Advisor, John R. Bolton (from the years he worked for Reagan, to the present day). 

Repetition of "when not if we should bomb Iran" commentary is usually unhelpful in the absence of first hand data. By the time data reaches these commentators it is often highly distorted and third or fourth hand. The following research and some analysis is intended to fill part of the void in knowledge.

Submarine Matters direct technical monitoring of  the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) as far back as 2006 reflects Iran's ongoing interest in nuclear weapons research as an option for Iran. The AEOI is active in many university institutes, cities and isolated sites in Iran, particularly in Tehran and Isfahan (aka Esfahan) a large city about 350 km south of Tehran.

The Isfahan University of Technology (IUT) is closely related to AEOI. IUT includes the Nuclear Technology Center (INTC) (run by the AEOI) with an estimated 3,000 scientists   http://www.nti.org/facilities/237/ . INTC has many nuclear functions including Uranium enrichment. INTC operates three small nuclear research reactors supplied by China.

Like all research communities the Iranian nuclear community uses internet searches for general and specific purposes. Internet search for sensitive nuclear topics involves inherent security risks for searching organisations - so sensitive internet searches require good reasons. One of those reasons from mid 2006 was Divine Strake. In mid 2006 the US Government announced that it intended to conduct a large, non-nuclear, high-explosive test known as "Divine Strake" at the US Government's Nevada (nuclear) Test Site. The test would use hundreds of tonnes of conventional explosive to simulate a low nuclear yield bunker buster test of the type that might be useful one day against deep dug Iranian nuclear facilities.

The prospect of a Divine Strake test created considerable interest in the Iranian nuclear community in 2006-2007. The point of interest for Iran was probably that Iran might be the likely target of US weapons. Iran might also benefit from conducting zero yield nuclear tests along with supercomputer simulations (noting the evident interest below). These simulations might be one of a number of productive avenues for Iran's own nuclear test program as they might partly avoid the need for Iran to conduct actual nuclear tests, down the line, if it wanted to. 

The Iranian nuclear community therefore began to conduct some pointed internet searches to discover what the American's were doing. Using my website and a simple, free site-meter, Submarine Matters began to detect and collect some searches by employees of Iranian Atomic research institutions. Although the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) officially canceled Divine Strake in February 2007 some interesting Iranian Google search results were gathered as detailed below. If readers are accustomed to using simple site-meters or even professional metadata collection they will have a handle on the significance of the following.

In 2006 Google revealed to commercial site-meters the words used by readers in keyword seachers. By 2016 Google began to disguise the precise keywords.  

Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) Employee Google keyword searches detected by Submarine Matters' site-meter include:

- July 21, 2006 (IP 80.191.142.11) "Esfahan", conducted Google search for "deep bunkers MOP" MOP means Massive Ordinance Penetrator  (a large US bomb useful for blowing up deep dug high value targets including nuclear facilities)
   
- October 30, 2006 (IP 217.218.11.165) "Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran" "Tehran"  employee googled "what is nuclear simulation". Comment - literally revealing "Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran" as the Iranian ISP is clearly poor security. One can now conclude that 217.218 is an "Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran" IP number even if "Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran" is disguised with bland ISP names.  

- November 19, 2006 (IP 217.218.64.202) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran disguised as "Area No 6 Partition" "Tehran", conducted a Google search for "nuclear explosion simulation".

- March 4, 2007 (IP 213.176.127.82) from - "Iranian Research Organization" employee googled key words "simulation underground nuclear explosion".

- September 9, 2007 (IP 217.218.64.202) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, employee googled information on "nuclear weapon effects computer".

- October 23, 2007 (IP 217.218.64.202) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran employee googled information on "nuclear weapon effects computer".

- November 13, 2007 (IP 217.218.64.202) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran employee googled information on "underground nuclear explosion"

- November 22, 2007 (IP 217.219.18.13) a reader from Isfahan/Esfahan University of Technology, Tehran campus, detected as reading information on Submarine Matters concerning "Indian and Pakistani nuclear missiles".

- June 3, 2010 (IP 83.147.213.101) a reader in Isfahan/Esfahan Googled Submarine Matters for information on the SILEX laser uranium enrichment process.

Information collected above on Iranian interest in "nuclear weapon effects computer" prompted me to do further research on supercomputer upgrades at the Isfahan University of Technology. In 2011 the then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly unveiled a supercomputer at Isfahan University of Technology - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isfahan_University_of_Technology#Research_and_facilities . 

A supercomputer has many uses including complex physical and chemical reactions that occur in nuclear explosion simulations. Such simulations demand the enormous speed and capacity of supercomputers. By 2011-2012 the Iranians are likely to have conducted nuclear explosion simulations using the supercomputer.More on Iran nuclear - see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_facilities_in_Iran  

PETE'S COMMENT

Since 2014 Iran has been at or near nuclear weapon breakout status - with the three components being:

- substantial stocks of semi-enriched uranium (LEU or MEU), which could become bomb grade (90+%) HEU within a couple of months using Iran's thousands of centrifuges and possible hidden laser enrichment capability.

- delivery means - in the form of Sejjil http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sejjil solid fuel IRBM and the  Shahab series liquid fueled IRBMs, and

- enough nuclear device plans and components acquired from Pakistan's A. Q. Khan network to have constructed crude fission devices (minus the HEU and/or Plutonium explosive) around 2006.

see https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/

SAUDI NUCLEAR PROGRAM?

Iran has been building a nuclear weapon program because regional opponent, Israel, has developed nuclear weapons since the mid 1960s. 

Shiite Iran's Sunni opponent Saudi Arabia has had the potential political and financial muscle to buy nuclear weapons and missiles from Pakistan and China since the 1980s. The Saudis bought Chinese inaccurate-hence-nuclear-specific-use CSS-2 IRBMs in 1987.  The Saudi's also reportedly bought from China more advanced nuclear-use DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBMs in 2007. See the Newsweek article and http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-backed-secret-saudi-missile-purchase-china/.

A more detailed map of Iran's nuclear sites.

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Pete

My Ancestor the Captain's Ghost in Adelaide

(Note the trip was partly to check out the home of Australian submarine building at Osborne (up from Semaphore) Adelaide. And a non-poetic security aspect)

Two sunny days drive

Good sense denied

Stay awake

Stay alive

Long, scrubby road

Medication adjusted

Sleep interrupted

Navigation corrupted

Inland drought a Lawson-esque story

A sad sight Narrander[y] 

Town centre’s dead

Grey shops long closed

Nary McDonalds nor KFC colour exposed

South Australia confronts

Drought in Barossa, 11mm rain in 4 months

A weekend escape

Wine tastings le grape

Ten days on Adelaide’s Semaphore shore

Leads to my ancestors' door

Sun dancing on sea

Nostalgia for free

A plaque by the statues

carries the accolade

To those gallant sea-captains

who visited Adelaide

List of sea-captains on plague starts: “Capt. William Begg”

Begg is/was my great-great Grandfather,

Dour Scot of warm heart

His 2 legs in a storm broke apart
But he walked on canes still
On slippery docks and uphill

From Glasgow to Adelaide, he sailed 1855

Then settled in Adelaide 1870s alive

Harbour Master of Port Adelaide, before dying 1889

With his Ghost I communed with a glass o’wine.

Of my ancestors 7/8ths Protty Iro-Scots watch out!

Were born in Adelaide, rarely devout.

And 1/8th? A Jewish Grandmother, an outsider

Her existence suppressed. Memories denied her.

Adelaide's shipbuilding din.

Would take me too far from my kin.

So I blissfully return to my humble home

Where whales fly and wombats roam

A place of optimism, warmth and friendship for free

Where I commune with ghost Captain’s love of the sea.

Pete

Brazil extinguishing any Submarine Arms Race with Argentina

There are so many inconguities concerning Brazil's offer of old Tupi Type 209 submarines to Argentina.

Brazil and Argentina, over the last decade and a half, have placed submarine building and maintenance as lower budgetary and political priorities than in previous decades when each country considered the other a strategic opponent.

Put another way, two decades ago there was a mild, ongoing, Brazilian-Argentine submarine arms race. This is no longer the case.

“The creation of the Union of South American Nations, in 2008, was a landmark in the new foreign policies of Brazil and Argentina. [Earlier in] another sign of mutual trust, since 2003, diplomats from both countries occupy a single seat in the United Nations Security Council when either of them hold a non-permanent seat.” There is Brazilian-Argentine military cooperation across most areas.

Hence Brazil has chosen a novel, but strangely logical, action of offering some the components of the past arms race (2 to 4 Brazilian submarines) to Argentina.

Aside from the old arms race Brazil's and Argentina's submarine forces are too weak to be seen as viable guardians of their national independence against nuclear submarine powers. Their submarine forces are simply too weak to be  asymmetric responses to the overwhelming US and UK/Falkland nuclear submarine forces that patrol the South American region. Also the US defence forces have long countered major military threats to the "Western Hemisphere" which includes Argentina and Brazil.

Perhaps the only other serious owner of conventional submarines in South America is Chile, with 2 modern Scorpenes and 2 older Type 209s. Argentina shares a long land/sea border with Chile enjoying good relations.

The most valuable function of Latin American submarines may be anti-drugs and against other organised crime. But this does not make 1,000+ tonne submarines efficient or justifiable solutions.

Santiago Rivas, for Jane's Defence Weekly, June 10, 2019, reported
 https://www.janes.com/article/89163/brazil-to-transfer-type-209-submarines-to-the-argentine-navy

"The Brazilian Navy has agreed to transfer two Tupi class submarines – Type 209/1400 – to Argentina, following a meeting between Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and his Argentine counterpart, Mauricio Macro. 

The deal includes a potential future transfer of an additional two boats. The first two could be transferred during 2019 and the ships would then receive some "minor" repairs at Tandanor shipyard in Argentina before entering service in 2020.

The Tupi class of four vessels was commissioned between 1989 and 1999 and is slated to be replaced by the four Tonelero-class submarines of the Scorpene type in the near future..."

BACKGROUND

Following ARA San Juan's accidental sinking in November 2017 Argentina's now has just one very old, semi-active submarine, ARA Santa Cruz, which was commissioned way back in 1984. In the following paragraphs Submarine Matters is directly citing some Portuguese-Brazilian language sources.

Meanwhile Brazil 5 Tupi class subs are reportedly non operational with S Tupi (commissioned 1989) being cannibalized for spare parts. Brazil's S Tikuna (S-34), arguably a Tupi, was commissioned in 2006, and may not be offered to Argentina. So far just one of Brazil’s new class of Scorpene submarines (S Riachuelo (S 40)) has been launched and even it may not be commissioned until 2023.

Given the sporadic state of repairs the 3 available Tupi's (S Tamoio (S-31) commissioned 1995, S Timbira (S-32) 1996 and S Tapajó (S-33) 1999) have aged quickly and are in need of extensive repairs and upgrades. 

Argentina’s naval shipyard (Tandanor) chief Jorge Arosa (unlike other Argentine admirals and officials) is not enthusiastic about the Tupi deal as he believes the Tupis are far less capable/smaller than ARA Santa Cruz. Arosa also says he has is no idea of the true cost of repairing and refurbishing the Tupis.

The end of the Brazilian-Argenti

Pete

Lithium-ion Batteries May Make Australia's Attack-class Submarines Superior

Australia's Derek Woolner and David Glynne Jones have written an excellent article for The Strategist. 

That is "Future-proofing the Attack class (part 1): propulsion and endurance" June 14, 2019 - at

 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/future-proofing-the-attack-class-part-1-propulsion-and-endurance/

Which begins:

"A major challenge in the decades-long program to build the Royal Australian Navy’s new submarines, the Attack class, will be ensuring that they incorporate emerging transformational advances in propulsion technology.

Between 2025 and 2030, the continuing rapid evolution of lithium-ion battery [LIBs] technology will enable the Attack-class boats to stay fully submerged on low-speed patrols for up to 40 days without recharging. By 2035, that could increase to up to 60 days. And by 2050, it’s conceivable that the next generation of light-metal batteries will enable the boats to go on an 80-day long-transit mission without the need to resurface and recharge..."

Please read the WHOLE ARTICLE 

PETE POINTS INSPIRED BY THE ARTICLE

All this depends on Australia choosing LIBs rather than older style lead-acid batteries for the Attack class... 

The oft criticised slow rollout of the future Attack class may be beneficial in being able to encompass and fully exploit mature LIB technology. This is especially true if total battery size could be around 1,200 tonnes within the very large 4,500 tonne size of the Attack class. This is noting the Collins total lead-acid battery size is 400 tonnes.

1,200 tonnes is also possible due to much less need for full loads of diesel fuel. If an Attack class sub can complete its whole mission on battery far less diesel fuel will be required. Diesels will primarily become return-to-port emergency propulsion - similar to the emergency diesels on all nuclear propelled submarines.

For example the future French Barracuda SSNs, on which the future Attack class are based, carry two emergency diesels. Also lower range 600 kW MTU 12V 4000s may already serve as emergency backup/return-to-port diesels on nuclear powered UK Astute class SSNs (see right sidebar).

Australia's economy and naval budget will remain too small for the alternative option of  nuclear propulsion. Even with much higher GDPs India's indigenous Arihant class SSBNs and Brazil's  indigenous future SN-BR SSN have experienced severe delays/problems in building and/or proper maintenance.  

US-Australian advances in large land based power grid-LIB technology will accelerate development of Attack class LIBs.

Security Observations: Osborne Shipyard & Edinburgh RAAF Base, Adelaide

Aerial view of part of Osborne Naval (Ship and Submarine) Yard, Adelaide, South Australia. Osborne and North Haven residential suburbs can be seen at left upper corner. (Photo courtesy Ship Technology .com.) 

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Over the last 2 weeks Pete has been checking out housing and facilities round about Osborne Naval Shipyard in northwest Adelaide, South Australia.

Pete's Security Observations

There is a boom in Osborne's construction, upgrades and maintenance of Australia's: Hobart class destroyers; Arafura class offshore patrol vessels; future Hunter class frigates; and Collins and future Attack class submarines. Osborne has therefore become a high value intelligence hotspot. 

Another hotspot is the Edinburgh RAAF Base in Adelaide - quietly (except for the noisy AP-3Cs and P-8As) researching and operating much military air, sea and terrestrial surveillance/cyber warfare high tech. 

Hence, in response, predictable in hostile intelligence gathering, growing in terms of:

-  size and number of China's consulate-general (basically a mini "embassy" - perhaps  housing MSS "diplomats" and PLA intel defence attaches who collect military intelligence in Adelaide). 

-  Russia's consulate-general is another threat.

-  in numbers of foreign engineering/scientific academics and graduate students capable of collecting intel (see the US 30/8/2020 experience)

-  Chinese cash is establishing lasting sensitive friendships at Adelaide universities including Adelaide's Confucius Institute

and

-  of course, harder to detect non-official-cover "illegals" (not only Russians and Australian "agents/informants/moles" working for hostile intel agencies.

Institutional awareness of physical security (aided by the isolated nature of Osborne facilities) looks reasonable. Edinburgh, in contrast, is deep in suburbia, so may be easier for hostile intel agencies to penetrate.

Threats also come from aggressive foreign sigint/cyber hacking which can nullify facility security and even the personal security of smartphones, tablets, home PCs and even smart TVs.

"Good" humint approaches can also persuade bosses, employees and contractors to divulge Top Secret information - maybe less likely at beginning of careers. More likely coercion and/or inducements can persuade some to divulge increasingly sensitive information that they gain access 5+ years into their careers. 

Such information could include secrets originating from the US eg. via the Raytheon office at the shipyard and via Lockheed Martin's Adelaide office offsite at Mawson Lakes, UK and French via Naval Group (on and offsite at Keswick Adelaide) and Saab's office in Adelaide. 

Also see “Chinese Intelligence Activities in Australia” June 6, 2017 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/11/chinese-intelligences-great-job-in.html

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See "My Concerns About Adelaide Naval Security Vulnerability Vindicated" August 17, 2020 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2020/08/my-concerns-about-adelaide-naval.html 
which records:

The subsequent ABC News report “Defence Department warns that 'highly active' spies pose 'extreme threat' to Australia's shipbuilding plan” August 16, 2020 at
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-16/defence-warns-active-foreign-spies-threaten-shipbuilding-plans/12562536 which states in part:

"...Defence has declined to nominate which foreign actors it believes are responsible for targeting Australia's naval shipbuilding industry but, privately, national security figures believe the Chinese Government is the main culprit.

The growing concerns about Chinese espionage are prompting politicians from across the political divide to call for the closure of the sizeable Chinese consulate in South Australia, or a reduction in the number of diplomats based there.

In 2016, Beijing opened a new Consulate-General office in the Adelaide suburb of Findon for around 10 staff, located on a site that also includes the headquarters for the Overseas Chinese Association.

"It hasn't escaped me that the consulate was stood up in the same year that a significant naval shipbuilding program was announced by the Coalition Government," Senator Patrick said.

His concerns about the large Chinese diplomatic presence in a state which hosts considerable defence industry and space research is shared by members of both the Federal Government and Opposition.

"It's clear that the numbers in the Adelaide consulate are overweight — they should be reduced, preferably by negotiation," South Australian Labor MP Nick Champion said.

Liberal senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells says ASIO records show similar tactics were used by Soviet spies during the Cold War to target military research in Australia.

"It comes as no surprise that Beijing has overcompensated the 'diplomatic' requirement to serve in Adelaide," Senator Fierravanti-Wells told the ABC."

Pete 

US's Zero-Yield Nuclear Tests - Russia Blamed for Doing Similar?

Lieutenant General Robert Paul Ashley Jr, Director, US DIA, is not saying much when he asserted late May 2019:

"The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero-yield standard."

This is given the US successfully performed a "zero-yield nuclear" tests in Nevada, 2017 to the present day:

“Scientists at Sandia National Laboratories claim to have successfully tested an upgraded version of the B61-12 nuclear bomb.

The US has been working on the B61-12 for several years, and government officials say the latest tests are vital to refurbishing efforts.

An F-16 from Nellis Air Force Base in March successfully dropped a zero-yield version of the bomb over the Nevada desert. It left a "neat hole" and crews were able to dig it out of the dirt for further study.

Sandia Stockpile Resource Center Director Anna Schauer said, "It's great to see things all come together: the weapon design, the test preparation, the aircraft, the range and the people who made it happen."

Scientists will spend the next several months analyzing data gathered from the test flight.

Officials say the US is planning more test flights over the next three years, and the B61-12's first production unit is scheduled to be completed in 2020.

The current B61-12 consolidates and replaces four older versions in the nation's nuclear arsenal.”

Youtube: Testing of the B61-12 nuclear bomb in mid 2018. Narrative kicks in at 20 seconds. Bomb device technical details very interesting from 2 min 37 secs.
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The official legal - technological definitions of nuclear weapons testing are highly complex, ambiguous, even contradictory and include:

“"zero yield" safety tests of warheads, whether the test is successful (there is no nuclear yield) or the test is unsuccessful (there is a nuclear yield). It does not include hydronuclear, cold or subcritical tests because no nuclear explosions are possible, even in failure. In these sorts of tests there may be small amounts of chain reaction occurring, but they stop before materially adding to the chemical explosion that causes them. 

The line here is finely drawn, but, among other things, subcritical testing is not prohibited by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, while safety tests are...”

Maybe Russia like all other legal and illegal nuclear nations (India, Pakistan, North Korea, not to mention Israel) continues to conduct “zero-yield” nuclear tests?

Pete