Second Swedish sighting of Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV - UUV - Malsten

Location of the publically known (Swedish website) Malsten (Island) Station (with observable facilities) which operated  undersea cables joining SOSUS and magnetic anomaly sensors. Now modernised?

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See Malsten Station (blue arrow) in relation to Stockholm. Malsten's Cold War vintage equipment may have been replaced by a much more extensive wireless  "SeaWeb" style anti-submarine network in the Swedish archipelago. A modern SeaWeb network would rapidly detect and track any Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV.

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This is a continuation of my October 25, 2014 article on Sweden's first sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm in mid October 2014. That article theorised that the suspected Russian mini-submarine's close proximity to Stockholm may have indicated its mission was for a Russian agent's drop-off or pick-up or interception of telecommunications signals emanating from Stockholm. In retrospect this seems unlikely and unnecessarily complicated as any agent could cross land borders, go by air or just transmit. Interception might be more efficient within Stockholm - say equipment in the Russian Embassy there.

More likely activity in October 2014 is Russian electronic monitoring of nearby Swedish and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) naval exercises. The submarine may not have been in authentic "distress" rather it used distress messages as a ruse intended to draw "trip" more Swedish and/or NATO sensor "interrogations".

Reconnaissance aircraft indulge in a similar radar tripping activity by flying close to borders -  basically forcing a would-be adversary to turn-on its usually covert sensors. Russian Bear reconnaissance aircraft, under increasingly combative Putin, have stepped up activity against NATO allies partly for the intelligence take. It is unknown if Russian mini-submarines have been engaged in similar activities, but possible.

If such mini-subs have no crew (being large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)) the financial and political costs and risks are less. See my earlier post on LDUUVs and the discussion below.

"SECOND" SIGHTING OR LATER SIGHTING OF THE SAME SUBMARINE OR LDUUV

Subsequent (presumably) authorised leaks by Swedish and UK sources in mid January 2015 indicate that Swedish and NATO forces continued to look for suspected Russian submarine activity later in October 2014. UK concern about a suspected Russian submarine off the Scottish coast may be a totally separate (perhaps routine?) matter. A Russian attack submarine (SSK or SSN) may routinely station itself off the coast of northwest Scotland in order to intercept (or gain intelligence) concerning UK (and perhaps US) nuclear submarines entering and, more importantly, leaving UK naval base HMNB Clyde.at Faslane.

Having looked at US advances in large diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) technology I think that a crewed Russian mini-submarine is unnecessary and dangerous when a remotely controlled LDUUV could be used. This is assuming Russia is technically advanced enough to deploy developed LDUUVs? LDUUVs can include unmanned "conning towers" of the type photographed off Stockholm (see intentionally blurry image with little sense of size/scale). If Russia sent a LDUUV Russia could "trip" (activate) Swedish (and NATO?) fixed and mobile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors. The Swedish reaction against a LDUUV (Swedish corvettes, smaller craft, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) would be worth the Russian military intelligence "take" - even at the calculated risk of a LDUUV being destroyed or captured. 

Sweden alone has insufficient national power to threaten or more fully embarrass Russia. So Sweden likely feigned its inability to find the Russian LDUUV rather than admitting Sweden's limitations in exerting force on the Russian craft. The risk of a self-destruct mechanism in the Russian craft may also have played on Swedish minds. An enterprizing Russian controlled LDUUV may have also moved into the international waters or territorial waters of NATO allies in the Baltic or less likely (due to LDUUV range limitations) the North Sea. The more NATO reacts in military terms the more it reveals to Russian naval intelligence. 

Off Stockholm in 2014 the Russian submarine or LDUUV is likely to have also deployed antennas to send any vaunted "distress calls". The intelligence take (if necessary) could also be sent by UHF radio to Russian UHF receivers or by satellite relay to Russian naval intelligence. Alternatively the Russian craft could merely store the take for handing over once it reached a Russian port or mothership. 

MALSTEN STATION

In terms of Swedish fixed anti-submarine sensors Malsten Station SOSUS (and magnetic anomaly) sensors have been public knowledge in Sweden for decades. Malsten is a small island on which a small hut stands. The hut is (or was) used to power cables that carry sound (SOSUS) and magnetic anomaly sensors. The cables stretch out for a few 100 metres on two sides of Malsten island. The cables and sensors were originally decades old technology - perhaps 1950s vintage. The sensors presumably are (or were) sensitive enough to detect mini-subs or LDUUVs crossing over the cables - alerting the Swedish Navy of illegal entries into Swedish waters. Here is another link on the Malsten Station. With advances in electronics and communications there would no longer be a need for Malsten to be physically manned - other than for security. Sensor detections could (can?) be automatically relayed to Swedish naval bases or to a more centralised Swedish military HQ in Stockholm itself.

Malsten may have been modernised and re-activated (since the Cold War) to meet the resurgent Russian threat. Possibly Malsten and other Swedish SOSUS arrays have been replaced by a much broader undersea and islet-rock-mainland wireless network of the SeaWeb type that may cover much of the Swedish Archipelago. Whether Sweden would coordinate its network with any larger NATO "SeaWeb" network is unknown.

So in conclusion there is much (probably Russian) undersea activity in the Swedish archipelago. Much would happen that is not admitted publically by Sweden, NATO or Russia. When a member of the Swedish public spots a Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV there is some embarrassment in  Sweden. Sweden's defence efficiency is called into question (by Swedish politicians and the Press) due to an evident inability to stop encroachments or (in theory) identify who or what is encroaching.

The Swedish Government feels obliged to reveal some of what it knows - but only a small portion due to diplomatic and security reasons. The UK and NATO might reduce Swedish embarrassment, while increasing Russian embarrassment, by mixing in headlines about what is probably regular detection of Russian submarines off the Scottish coast. The press is happy. The public is reassured - perhaps, and specialist submarine blogger-journalists have more to write about :)

Pete

Combat System for Australia's Future Submarine?

Some of the components of the Collins US made AN/BYG-1 Combat System. The AN/BYG-1 will very likely be integrated into Australia's Future Submarine.

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Much information and many links have been kindly provided by MHalblaub. 

A combat system is a system of sensors (SONAR, electronic warfare, air-surface detection, navigation systems, communications) databases, for decision making, close-in steering and targeting. The combat system interacts with and includes all of a submarine's weapons.

The combat system Australia has already chosen is the:

- the evolved GENERAL DYNAMICS AN/BYG-1 Tactical Control System (TCS). As well as General Dynamics (another website)  Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are systems integrators for AN/BYG-1 - making the AN/BYG-1 even more of a multi-corporate responsibility proposition than SUBTICS.  

Australia is very accustomed to the AN/BYG-1 and the US and Australia are constantly refining it. The AN/BYG-1 is apparently used on all US SSNs (Seawolf Class with AN/BYG-2 upgrade) and SSGNs as well as SSKs from:

Spain (S-80)
Brazil (Tupi Class (Type 209))
Canada (Victoria Class)

The AN/BYG-1 is closely integrated with the Collins weapons including the American made Mk 48 torpedoes, Harpoon missiles. The Collins is (US Tomahawk SLCM capable. The mines are UK made.

The AN/BYG-1 is designed to work closely with the SeaWeb surveillance system.  For possible positions of the SeaWeb as it covers East Asia see Submarine Matter's How to Trap the Chinese Dragon - SeaWeb's Fixed Undersea Array, September 4, 2015.

SOURCES POINTING AT PREFERENCE FOR US

It is widely believed that (around 2000?) the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and Submarine Capability Team recommended the RAN acquire the ISUS 90 system. However the Australian Cabinet favoured US systems.

See  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/a-new-australian-submarine-with-aip.html In October 2009 Australia's then Minister of Defence Material Greg Combet, speaking still current RAN views, indicated  that the US would play a big part in developing Australia's future submarine. The Sydney Morning Herald recorded what Mr Combet said on October 6, 2009. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/us-to-play-key-role-in-new-aussie-subs-20091006-gky2.html: "US 'to play key role' in new Aussie subs" October 6, 2009...

"Australia wants the assistance of the United States as it looks to replace the Collins class submarines, junior defence minister Greg Combet says.
"...I expect that Australia will look to learn from companies like General Dynamics Electric Boat and Lockheed Martin in designing and developing the Collins class replacement," he said in a statement.
"...US technology is likely to be an important facilitator of this capability," he said.

See http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/06/australias-future-submarine-selection-s.html of 20 January 2014 - Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/

"...The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system as the reference system for future design work.  The early definition of a combat system is a feature of a successful submarine program.  It allows the submarine design to proceed utilising more accurate projections of space, weight and power requirements."

Also see  SEA 1439 PHASE 4A - COLLINS CLASS REPLACEMENT COMBAT SYSTEM http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm concerning an upgrade process of the AN/BYG-1 combat system conducted jointly by the US and Australia up to 2019 “in conjunction with the Replacement [amounting to upgrades of the US Mk 48] Heavyweight Torpedo (Project SEA 1429)” which points to future integration with US weapons.

- Some 2011 US RAND Corporation studies http://www.rand.org/topics/submarines.html concerning Australian submarine issues needs to be added.

An excellent source on Combat Systems generally and by system-maker is Norman Friedman The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems 5^th edn, 2006, pp. 133-156, text online

Germany's TKMS-HDW also has experience in integrating the AN/BYG-1 with Brazil's Type 209 submarines to take the US Mark 48 torpedo and US Harpoon missile. Therefore HDW should have no problem integrating AN/BYG-1.  German designed submarines are compatible with the US submarine Harpoon missile in several countries (South Korea (in Australia’s region) Greece, Turkey, and Israel). 

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Other Combat Systems not chosen:

Components of the ATLAS ELEKTRONIK's 

 Integrated Sensor Underwater System - ISUS 90 (or the more advanced ISUS 2000) one likely contender for Australia's Future Submarine

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- the ATLAS ELEKTRONIK ISUS 90 (or the more advanced ISUS 2000) with ATLAS is owned by ThyssenKrupp and Airbus DS. ThyssenKrupp owns Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) the world's largest conventional submarine builder. The prospect of the one major company, TKMS, through HDW and Atlas offering the submarine and combat system (respectively) to Australia makes sense. ISUS means Integrated Sensor Underwater System

ATLAS ELEKTRONIK's ISUS 90 sales statement http://www.atlas-elektronik.com/what-we-do/submarine-systems/isus90-combat-system/ includes:

"ATLAS ELEKTRONIK is the undisputed technology and world market leader in command and weapon control systems for non-nuclear submarines. Our “Integrated Sensor Underwater System” (ISUS) is based on many years of experience, is tried and tested, is always at the latest technological level and, thanks to its modular structure and open system architecture, can easily be adapted to suit individual customer requirements and diverse operational scenarios. It enables the submarine crew to fully perceive their surroundings and to analyse the situation in detail, permitting a rapid and reliable response...The quality, reliability and performance of this system is unparalleled worldwide. And this technology lead is highly valued by our clients: ISUS is well-established at more than ten navies around the globe; our sonar systems are in service with over two dozen navies."

The ISUS 90 is on many of HDW's all export Type 209 and 214 submarines

For more ISUS 90 details see http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/43/ISUS-90-Powers-Ahead
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A dramatised (eg. periscope raised) animation of an attack using DCNS SUBTICS Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System.

- SUBTICS or Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System, offered by DCNS. System developed by Thales Underwater Systems-naval submarine division (Thales owns 25% of DCNS) and UDS Internatonal (all very complex and mixed up French corporate and government share holding-ownership - beyond comprehension). SUBTICS varies according to performances and integration level, in utilising sensors and weapons. It is used on all French Navy SSNs and SSBNs and has been chosen to equip next SSN generation Barracuda. 

On export markets, it is selected to equip every new submarines of Agosta, Scorpene and Andrasta types and to modernize submarines such as the Type 209. 

• Submarines are increasingly faced with various missions including littoral and blue-water operations, stand-alone missions or within a naval force. SUBTICS indicates it can offer:
• Efficient acoustic sensors including low frequency arrays and scalable data processing offering outstanding detection abilities of distant targets at high speed; 
• Efficient non acoustic sensors on the surface and at periscope depth offering a high level of discretion; 
• Communication facilities (from VLF to SHF), noiseless and fully integrated allowing submarine to interact in real time within a force;
• Data synthesis from every sensors (optical, optronic, R-ESM and C-ESM, radar);
• Advanced, automatic and interactive target motion analysis Tracks identification and classification functionality;
• Track fusion and association through an interactive track management tool; 
• Tactical, command and engagement aids with regard to geographical and tactical environment 
• Tactical Data Links operation; and
• Fire and weapon control Torpedoes : F17, SUT 266, TP617, Black Shark, F21 Missiles : SM39 and land-attack capability

SUBTICS provides systems for more than "40" vessels from 9 different Navies (including France).

• Brazil (4 Scorpene being built) 1 SSN (to be built)
• Chile (2 Scorpene, 2 Type 209)
• Ecuador (2 Type 209)
• India, (in the 4 Type 209 “Shishumar” class?)
• Malaysia (2 Scorpene)
• Pakistan (Agosta 90B, Khalid Classes),
• Singapore (4 Challenger, 2 Archer Class) Type 218SG will not be using the French SUBTICS - instead using an Atlas Elektronik and ST Electronics designed system.
• Venezuela (2 unserviceable Type 209)

CONCLUSION

Australia is very accustomed to the US AN/BYG-1 and several conventional submarine companies have experience in integrating the AN/BYG-1 with conventional submarines. Also the US is Australia's most important ally.

The extent that Japan may also draw on US combat system technology is unknown but an indicator  Japan may use something like the US combat sytstem comes from the weapons the Soryu is known to use. The Soryu uses a heavy weight torpedo thought to be very similar to the Mark 48 used by the US and Australia. The Soryu uses the US Harpoon short-medium range cruise missile and Japan is probably in early talks with the US concerning the longer range Tomahawk cruise missile (a missile Australia also wishes to acquire).

Pete

US Navy's Seaweb Undersea Warfare Network

(Diagram courtesy of the US Navy Undersea Warfare magazine http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_30/art.html )
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Connect this Submarine Matters post with more explicit official confirmation of October 26, 2014 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/10/seaweb-undersea-and-broader-naval.html .

For possible positions of the SeaWeb as it covers East Asia see Submarine Matter's How to Trap the Chinese Dragon - SeaWeb's Fixed Undersea Array, September 4, 2015.

What ever happened to the wireline SOSUS networks of the Cold War used to detect Russian submarines? They've been replaced by the much more extensive "Seaweb" intranet based wireless network with a vast range of communications and surveillance capabilities. US and other Western  submarines provide input into and communicate via the Seaweb network. A highly detailed powerpoint presentation of Seaweb’s capabilities is here .

The vast Seaweb network uses many sensor technologies and host platforms from US and other Western defence forces. Seaweb requires a vast amount of data memory and processing power mainly provided by the US Navy. Diagram sourced from http://www.docstoc.com/docs/146099687/Seaweb )

Barbara Honegger republished this US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey, California article on May 16, 2014 article (with some updates from an earlier 2010 NPS article). The involvement of America’s four other Anglo allies under The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), a five-nation defense R&D collaboration, is mentioned (at the bottom of the article). The article is at http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-Pioneers-Seaweb-Underwater-Sensor-Networks.html.

"NPS Pioneers “Seaweb” Underwater Sensor Networks"

Article By: Barbara Honegger
May 16, 2014

"The Naval Postgraduate School is on the cutting edge of through-water acoustic communications technology enabling distributed autonomous ocean sensors to operate as an underwater wireless wide-area network.

Through a decade of engineering experiments and sea trials in diverse maritime environments, NPS and its research partners have advanced the “Seaweb” system to a point where it now routinely demonstrates capability for maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), oceanographic sampling, instrument remote-control, underwater navigation, and submarine communications at speed and depth.

“Seaweb is a realization of FORCEnet in the undersea battlespace,” said the program’s Principal Investigator and Physics Research Professor Joseph Rice.

The system uses through-water acoustic modems to interconnect a scalable quantity of underwater network nodes, linking them to a gateway node typically located at the sea surface. The gateway node is equipped with some form of radio modem permitting bidirectional real-time digital communications between the underwater Seaweb domain and distant command centers.

“Seaweb is the product of interdisciplinary R&D [research and development] involving underwater acoustic propagation, sonar systems engineering, transducer design, digital communications, signal processing, computer networking and operations research,” explained Rice, an electrical engineer. “Our original goal was to create a network of distributed sensors for detecting quiet submerged submarines in littoral waters where traditional ASW surveillance is challenged by complex sound propagation and high noise. But as Seaweb technology developed, its broader overarching value became evident.” 

For example, in a 2001 Fleet Battle Experiment, a U.S. fast-attack submarine serving as a cooperative target for Seaweb ASW sensors was itself equipped as a Seaweb node. Thus instrumented, the submarine was able to access the deployed autonomous nodes as off-board sensors, and while transiting at speed and depth was also able to communicate through Seaweb with the command center and even with a collaborative maritime patrol aircraft. 

“In effect, the Seaweb network served as a cellular communications and sensor infrastructure for the submarine,” Rice said.

  

According to Rice, a major advantage of an undersea wireless network is the flexibility it affords mission planners and theater commanders to appropriately match resources to the environment and mission at hand. For example, fixed sensor nodes can be combined with mobile Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) nodes, which has been demonstrated in a number of Seaweb experiments. “The UUV can serve the fixed nodes as their deployment platform, their gateway node, or as a mule for delivering and recovering large volumes of data,” Rice noted. “In turn, the fixed network can support UUV command, control, communications and navigation.” 

A further example of heterogeneous Seaweb networks is the combination of surveillance sensor nodes with METOC sensor nodes to improve the performance and relevance of both. The wireless architecture means that ASW sensors can be sparsely distributed to cover a wide area or densely distributed to create a tripwire or to monitor a chokepoint. In a current international project, Seaweb is interconnecting undersea sensors from NATO nations as a single integrated network.

 

“In short, Seaweb integrates undersea warfare systems across missions, platforms, systems and nations,” Rice said. 

                                                                                      

Major attributes of Seaweb’s architecture are its low cost, its rapid deployability from a variety of platforms, and its ability to autonomously self-configure into an optimal network.  Through a build-test-build spiral engineering process and rigorous sea testing of diverse configurations of underwater sensors and Seaweb modems, the effort is honing the blueprint for an environmentally adaptive and energy efficient, expendable and cost-effective, bi-directional wide-area-coverage undersea communications infrastructure.

   

“Seaweb has now been exercised in over 50 sea trials,” Rice noted. “The system has proven to be effective in shallow waters such as the Intracoastal Waterway and in waters up to 300 meters deep off the coasts of Nova Scotia, San Diego, Long Island and Florida. It has been demonstrated in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, in Norwegian fjords, and under the Arctic ice shelf.” 

The experimental method involves stressing the network to the point of failure as a means of identifying and eliminating weaknesses. Recent multi-agency trials have engaged Seaweb at the front end of the “observe, orient, decide, act” (OODA) loop, where the networked in situ sensors enhance the commander’s maritime domain awareness and complement remote sensing assets.

Last year, Rice and his students completed a two-part “Bayweb 2009” experiment using Seaweb’s undersea communications technologies in San Francisco Bay.  The goals were to demonstrate the network architecture and test system performance, while measuring the strong currents around Angel Island using networked current sensors placed near the seabed and sharing these data with oceanographers. Partnering with NPS in Bayweb were the University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Davis; San Francisco State University; the Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute; SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific; the Office of Naval Research; and the U.S. Coast Guard.

“Due to the high levels of shipping and wind noise and flow noise from currents up to four knots, San Francisco Bay presented a challenging test environment and a learning opportunity for our students,” Rice said.

Some of Rice’s students are also working on a new “Deep Seaweb” project adapting the littoral Seaweb network to the deep ocean.

  

“It’s of utmost importance to the Navy to maintain submarine communications, but all existing communication methods are severely limited without compromising either speed or depth, or both,” said Operations Analysis student and submariner Lt. Andrew Hendricksen. “Once deployed, Deep Seaweb is the one option that allows stealthy, two-way submarine communications while maintaining both depth and speed. A number of sea trials have proven Seaweb works as a detection network, which can be expanded for two-way communications with undersea assets – submarines and UUVs – in the deep ocean.  My thesis research is developing an algorithm that can show the best places to put it to get the coverage you want to achieve the purposes you want for sub detection, sub communications, tsunami warning, etc.”

 

Another student, Lt. Jeremy Biediger, is exploring the advantages of deploying Deep Seaweb hydrophones in deep ocean trenches to passively detect quiet diesel submarines, stealthy semi-submersibles carrying contraband and surface vessels. 

“The main advantages of deploying Deep Seaweb networked acoustic sensors along deep ocean trenches for barrier or tripwire coverage of submarines and of surface and semi-submersible vessels are reduced ambient noise and thus relatively high signal-to-noise ratio,” explained Biediger.  

“It’s great working with Professor Rice because he’s a research professor who’s really involved with the ASW community and the system commands, so you get to meet and work with many of the top people in those communities,” Biediger added.  “What I learned will be of great benefit to my future career as an engineering duty officer, especially on the acoustics side, as very few universities have acoustics programs and the Naval Postgraduate School is unique in acoustics with naval applications.” 

“Future undersea sensor grids will enable navigation of submarines and autonomous underwater vehicles,” Rice added.  “Seaweb technology could also support submarine communications, networked torpedo connectivity for ASW engagement from launch platforms at long standoff, communication among unmanned underwater vehicles in mine-countermeasure operations, and any undersea warfare system that requires data telemetry for command and control.”

“A goal is for Seaweb technology to support the operational community,” Rice stressed.  “In the shorter term, next year we’ll be testing against a cooperative diesel-electric submarine in the Mediterranean Sea in preparation for NOBLE MANTA 2012, the annual NATO antisubmarine warfare exercise.”  

The NPS Seaweb program’s primary sponsor is the Office of Naval Research, with additional support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. NPS Seaweb research collaborators for 2010 include SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific; the University of Texas Applied Research Laboratories; the NATO Undersea Research Centre; Canada’s Defense Research and Development Center Atlantic; the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment; The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), a five-nation defense R&D collaboration involving Canada, Australia, New Zealand the United Kingdom, and the U.S; and Teledyne Benthos, Inc.

For more information about the NPS Seaweb program, see http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GSEAS/Physics/faculty.html#jrice . "

Pete