September 17, 2026

Nuclear Submarine HEU Dump for Australia Extremely Problematic


Reported by Australia's Government owned ABC News. An up to A$300 Billion bomb grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) submarine reactor waste dump (see item 7 below) in Australia will forever remain controversial even if it is on Australian Defence Department land. The most likely land is the Woomera Defence Base in South Australia, which just happens to be shared with 6 Aboriginal groups. Another complicating possibility is the "Trojan Horse Risk" of the US and UK seeing Australia as an international dump for their own HEU.
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In response to Kev’s two comments of September 10, 2027, Pete comments:

1. A Bipartisan POLITICAL REALITY (for votes) for any new Australian submarines is that they be built at Osborne Shipyard in South Australia (SA), NOT overseas (except for a prototype or 2). This is no matter how much more expensive (and risky as a project) Osborne built subs will be compared to foreign built subs.

2. And the whole Australian ECONOMIC lobby (Federal Government, SA Government, ASC, SA economy, Employers, Unions, sub-contractors, equipment suppliers, consultants, nuclear lobby, Adelaide public) agrees with Osborne built.

3. Because of the China threat, and Chinese skill at saturating the seas around Australia and to the north of Australia with mobile and fixed Anti-Submarine sensors new Australian subs that have very noisy diesel generators are obsolete. Conventional subs without diesels that only rely on AIP and/or Lithium-ion batteries lack speed/range.

4. The two or more classes of large Australian UUVs (eg. Ghost Shark and Speartooth) being developed can perform all of the peacetime SECRET missions the Collins are currently performing. Also Australian large UAVs, manned aircraft and satellites are available for reconnaissance and sigint. All of the above and secret fixed Australian sensors dotted all over the place can do anti-sub and anti-surface warfare work.

5. Long range anti-shipping strike traditionally allotted to Collins can be increasingly performed by aircraft, current long range missiles and, in future, variants of Gilmour Space ( DF-26 like) anti-ship and land attack IRBMs.

6. AUKUS Pillar 1 may turn out to be unaffordable. Australia has earmarked about A$40 Billion so far for deposits to highly profitable US and UK submarine industries and for SA and Western Australian naval infrastructure. Australia is handicapped by the standard Australian Big Project Inefficiency rule of thumb, ie. taking twice the time for three times the estimated cost. So the mere A$368 Billion estimated for AUKUS Pillar 1 may morph into A$Trillion over 60 years to acquire 8 SSNs that may be too large and crew hungry for Australian needs. 

7.  In addition to A$1 Trillion there have been no precise costings for disposing of the HEU reactors from Australia's future nuclear submarines - a task that must occur in Australia under AUKUS. One authoritative estimate is up to A$300 Billion - mainly for an HEU dump that must be defended (in practical terms) forever by highly armed security forces. This HEU dump security is treated internationally with the same stringency as defending active nuclear warheads.

2 comments:

Anonymous said...

Long-time lurker first time poster - just saw that CAMECO will buy all the output from the SILEX plant in Kentucky
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/cameco-in-offtake-agreement-for-us-laser-enrichment-plant
Maybe a way to reduce the amount of contact that the plant or its people / output have with the external environment

Pete2 said...

Hi Anonymous at 9/17/2026 7:07 PM

De-lurking now commenting :) Thanks for https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/cameco-in-offtake-agreement-for-us-laser-enrichment-plan The artwork of the SILEX plant depicted shows the huge nature of the project.

Advise from the US, eg. from Los Alamos, was that SILEX was "small scale" compared to preceding cascades of Gas Centrifuges but the huge scale of the building might suggest massage storage under one roof of tailing and of the 5 to 10% HALEU) enriched Uranium https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium#High-assay_LEU_(HALEU)

Enriching uranium to 10% U-235 represents roughly 35% to 45% of the total effort required to reach weapons-grade material (usually defined as 90% U-235).

See https://www.google.com/search?q=10%25+enrichment+is+not+a+linear+measure.+It+may+represent+a+higher+number+of++20+to+30%25+of+the+effort+required+towards+bomb+grade+U.&sca_esv=8886e09268ba5536&sxsrf=APpeQnstsQzRZP-FKBAXK2qmaFIDuQ5agg%3A1789712469230&ei=VdisarHMDZve2roP0oy6eA&biw=1280&bih=598&uact=5&oq=10%25+enrichment+is+not+a+linear+measure.+It+may+represent+a+higher+number+of++20+to+30%25+of+the+effort+required+towards+bomb+grade+U.&gs_lp=Egxnd3Mtd2l6LXNlcnAigwExMCUgZW5yaWNobWVudCBpcyBub3QgYSBsaW5lYXIgbWVhc3VyZS4gSXQgbWF5IHJlcHJlc2VudCBhIGhpZ2hlciBudW1iZXIgb2YgIDIwIHRvIDMwJSBvZiB0aGUgZWZmb3J0IHJlcXVpcmVkIHRvd2FyZHMgYm9tYiBncmFkZSBVLkgAUABYAHAAeAGQAQCYAQCgAQCqAQCwAQC4AQPIAQD4AQL4AQGYAgCgAgCYAwDiAwQYACBd4gMEGAAgXuIDBBgAIF_iAwQYACBg4gMEGAAgYeIDBBgAIGKSBwCgBwCyBwC4BwDCBwDIBwCACAE&sclient=gws-wiz-serp

Cheers Pete