January 28, 2025

Germany's Submarine Launched Anti-Aircraft Missile Under Development

Svetlana Shcherbak for Ukraine based Defense Express has written an excellent article on what is possibly? the world’s first anti-aircraft missile that can be launched from a fully submerged submarine. The article is dated January 26, 2025 and is at https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/30_years_of_idas_development_germanys_underwater_anti_aircraft_missile_to_counter_russian_helicopters_was_it_worth_it-13319.html.

Pete Comment

The submarine launched variant of the in service since 2005 
IRIS-T missile has been a long time in (mainly German) development. This may be due to years perfecting the submarine variant's necessary fiber optic cable link. This link must be able to survive the missile’s surfaced sudden acceleration and the blast of the rocket motor. Hence the submarine variant missile’s velocity and rocket blast have been reduced by the developers.

The marginal nature of IDAS as a weapon of last resort, in very shallow water, might mean a limited Baltic market (Germany, maybe Norway, with Sweden as a less likely adopter).

ARTICLE

"30 Years of IDAS Development: Germany’s Underwater Anti-Aircraft Missile to Counter Russian Helicopters – Was It Worth It?

 1813  0
Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS)
Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS)

Germany has entered the final stage of developing the IDAS submarine-launched surface-to-air missile, a project initiated in the 2000s to defend against Russian anti-submarine helicopters [and rotary wing drones large enough to carry lightweight torpedoes].

The German company [tkMS, on January 24 2025, announced] the signing of a contract with the Bundeswehr’s Procurement Department (BAAINBw) to complete the development and qualification of the Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS). This unique missile is designed to engage aerial targets while the submarine remains submerged.

The contract stipulates that development and qualification work must be completed by the end of 2029. This means that the creation of IDAS will have taken over 30 years, as initial test trials were conducted in 2003, and the first underwater launch occurred in 2008. Although the project saw active progress in the 2000s, development slowed significantly over time.

IDAS launch in 2008
IDAS launch in 2008

The new contract aims to restart active work and finally bring the project to completion, enabling Germany’s Type 212 [As and CDs] submarines to effectively counter Russian anti-submarine helicopters. Notably, IDAS is being developed by tkMS and Diehl Defence in cooperation with Norway’s Kongsberg and Nammo, as well as Turkey’s Roketsan. This international collaboration highlights the complexity of developing such an advanced anti-aircraft missile, even though it is based on a deep modification of the IRIS-T air-to-air missile.

In general, IDAS will allow submarines to engage low-altitude, slow-moving aerial targets—such as anti-submarine helicopters—at a range of up to 15 kilometers. Additionally, the system is capable of engaging surface and ground targets. However, its speed of 200 m/s is relatively low for an anti-aircraft missile. For comparison, the IRIS-T, on which it is based, reaches 1,020 m/s. Despite this, IDAS is well-suited for self-defense in shallow waters against helicopters equipped with torpedoes and sonar systems.

The IDAS missile is stored and launched from a 533-mm torpedo-sized container, allowing integration into existing submarines without major structural modifications. Each container holds four missiles, along with launch control electronics and an interface system.

Installation of the IDAS launch container on the HDW 212A U33 submarine
Installation of the IDAS launch container on the HDW 212A U33 submarine

Aerial target detection and tracking rely on the submarine’s onboard acoustic sensors. The missile has a solid-fuel engine, which activates at a safe distance from the launch platform.

Once launched, IDAS manoeuvres underwater toward its target. As it nears, it surfaces, deploys aerodynamic control surfaces, and proceeds to engage.

During its cruise phase, the missile is controlled and guided via a fiber-optic cable. In the terminal phase, it locks onto the target using an infrared seeker before striking.

IDAS operating principle
IDAS operating principle

Throughout its flight, the operator [in the submarine] can control the missile and receive live footage from its onboard camera, allowing target identification and prioritization of the most critical threats. If the fiber-optic cable is severed, the missile—depending on preset parameters—either autonomously selects and engages the most likely target or self-destructs to avoid unintended damage.

For submarines, IDAS is essentially a last-resort weapon, designed for situations where a submarine is trapped in shallow waters and unable to dive deep to evade detection. In such cases, IDAS provides a critical defense against airborne threats, ensuring that submarines are not left completely vulnerable."

January 24, 2025

Trump's New Secretary of State Begins Indo-Pacific Engagement on Day 1 - AUKUS Continuity?

As soon as Donald Trump's newly-appointed Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, took the oath of office on 21 January 2025, his first scheduled international engagement (the same day) was with the Foreign Ministers of the other three countries of the QUAD. The QUAD is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - comprising the US, Australia, India and Japan.

A short joint QUAD statement was released following the meeting, echoing all the same talking points as established during the Biden administration's term, signalling a degree of continuity. 

The text of the joint statement included: "...strengthening a Free and Open Indo-Pacific...[and promoting]...economic opportunity..."

So the joint QUAD statement, via the US State Department, could be seen as promoting free trade which is in contradiction to the Trump Administration contemplating major tariffs against all foreign countries including QUAD members Australia, India and Japan.

L to R: QUAD Foreign Ministers Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Penny Wong. (Photo courtesy NDTV)
---

After the joint QUAD session, Secretary Rubio held one-on-one bilateral meetings with the three Foreign Ministers. In the meeting with Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Penny Wong, the following statement was made regarding AUKUS:

"...Both discussed efforts to continue security cooperation through AUKUS and bilateral defense initiatives..."

This fell short of reaffirming the US would supply Virginia submarines to Australia under AUKUS. Also Trump's nominee for Secretary of Defense, who could be seen as having major carriage for the QUAD and especially AUKUS, has not yet been given Senate confirmation.

It is too early to decide which way the Trump administration might go with regard to initiatives like AUKUS or QUAD as President Trump is unpredictable. However, the  State Department's early engagement with the QUAD members and with Australia under AUKUS sends the message that the INDOPAC might be the primary focus area of Trump's foreign policy. All three Ministers were among the handful of foreign representatives invited to the Trump inauguration. This may indicate the Trump Administration sees the INDOPAC as more important than Europe (and within it NATO). In Europe Trump is calling for a quick end to the conflict in Ukraine by placing pressure on Putin for a peace deal.

January 21, 2025

Strava May Be Useful to the Government: 2018 Disclosures

Hopefully the US Government has sent a National Security letter to the owners of US company Strava Inc due to Strava's security and foreign intelligence value.

Real time or retrospective Government use of Strava data, mixed with other government AI technology might be of US domestic security value and value collecting foreign intelligence.

These angles were, of corse, not highlighted in the latest security breaches by French submariners at the ILE LONGUE SSBN Base in Brest, Brittany, France in 2024-to January 2025 [1] [2] and [3].

The security and foreign intelligence values were more obvious in the 2018 series of disclosures [4] and [5]. For example Wired [4] noted on January 29, 2018:

"But addressing the security risks highlighted by Strava will require much more than simply updating a few policies. A world dominated by the rise of social media, the growing availability of commercial satellite and drone imagery, and increasing usage of smartphones [now miniaturized to Smartwatches] necessitates an entirely new cultural mentality."

Due to advances in very small microphones, WiFis, mobile tower and GPS tracking any watch may now be a potential security risk. This of course includes smartwatches, but also standard/"dumb" battery watches and even old fashioned non-electric watches (in which an incredibly small battery and microphone may have been secretly inserted).

Those at risk may be those with access to the most sensitive information. If targeted any watch they bring to international, Cabinet or TS level meetings may be a "bug" and/or tracker. 

But it is easy to claim "a watch might not have the transmitting power" to send information to intelligence receivers.

However, think about your cell phone. If doctored (even by transmitted spyware), along with your watch (spyware or physical insertion) your cell phone may be the receiver/booster of your watch's real time or subsequently downloaded weak signals. This can happen outside the usual public software/app parameters. 

So, if you have access to sensitive information your watch-cell phone combination might be a security risk. 

The solution? Not only should you not bring your phone to a sensitive meeting but don't bring any type of watch. Best if any type of watch you have, is regularly swept (alongside your phone) for odd electronic emission activity.

[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/videos/article/2025/01/13/stravaleaks-dates-of-french-nuclear-submarine-patrols-revealed-by-careless-crew-members_6737005_108.html

[2] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/strava-fitness-app-leads-to-massive-security-breach-on-french-nuclear-submarines-7474295

[3] https://www.eurasiantimes.com/french-nuclear-submarines-stealth-mode/

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases

[5] https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-bases-fitness-trackers-privacy/

January 16, 2025

Hamas-Israel Ceasefire Deal: Biden's Questionable Swan Song

President Biden has been taking the credit for the latest Hamas-Israel ceasefire deal. The deal constitutes Biden's outgoing swan song after more than a year of failed ceasefire deals.

The ceasefire is scheduled to begin on Sunday January 19, 2025. Hopefully It will last past Trump's Inauguration which occurs the next day - January 20, 2025. 

The standard advisor prediction approach is glass half empty, meaning be slightly pessimistic - rather than an optimistic fool. 

Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Melbourne, Australia, advised on January 16, 2025 “Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire. It doesn’t guarantee a peaceful end to a devastating war.” See all of Marika Sosnowski’s excellent article at https://theconversation.com/israel-and-hamas-have-agreed-to-a-ceasefire-it-doesnt-guarantee-a-peaceful-end-to-a-devastating-war-247338

Marika Sosnowski is implicitly pessimistic when she notes:

“In structure and content, this ceasefire closely resembles numerous others that have been proposed over the past year, including the 7+2 day truce agreed in November 2023.”

“As US President Joe Biden said, this agreement “is the exact framework of the deal I proposed in May” [2024].

“During the first phase, there will be a temporary suspension of military operations by Israel and Hamas, as well as the withdrawal of Israeli forces east towards the border between Israel and Gaza and away from densely populated areas.”

“There will also be a temporary suspension of air activity (for military and reconnaissance purposes) in the Gaza Strip, particularly when hostages are released.”

“Over the past 12 months, Hamas has agreed to the text of a ceasefire a number of times only to have the terms altered by Israel and no agreement reached.”

“Hamas has tried to alter the ceasefire’s terms too.”

“But because of the power differential, it [Hamas] has been relatively unsuccessful in pressuring Israel to agree to its demands.”

“…But it is telling that in the past, Israel has simply arrested other Palestinians or re-arrested many of those released under similar deals.”

“…there are currently no written assurances the ceasefire will continue beyond the first phase if there is no agreement reached for the second phase.”

“For similar deals that were previously on the table, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear he would continue the war to destroy Hamas after the initial phase.”

The war between Hamas and Israel is of course not over. This ceasefire simply marks the start of a new phase.”

See all of Marika Sosnowski’s excellent article at https://theconversation.com/israel-and-hamas-have-agreed-to-a-ceasefire-it-doesnt-guarantee-a-peaceful-end-to-a-devastating-war-247338

January 14, 2025

Low Virginia SSN Production Coming to a Head Under Trump

Once the Biden-Harris Administration (wedded to AUKUS) lost the November 5, 2024 Election US Admirals became increasingly frank in their assessments that US industry couldn’t build Virginia SSNs quickly enough to meet USN, let alone AUKUS-Australian, needs.

Karen Middleton, Political Editor of Guardian Australia, has written an excellent article, Top admiral warns US far behind on building submarines needed to meet Aukus target, dated November 19, 2024 (ie. over a week after Trump won the 2024 Election). See Karen Middleton’s whole article at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/19/aukus-submarine-deal-richard-marles-on-track

Middleton describes the outlook of the USN officer Rear Admiral Jon Rucker, program executive officer for Attack Submarines (PEO SSN), who is most in the know about Virginia class production limitations.

[Pete Comment] Admiral Rucker's main job is to know more about Virginia SSN shipyard labor shortages and delayed supply chain realities than politicians. In the article Rucker:

[on November 13, 2024] “confirmed construction is behind schedule and nowhere near the rate required to supply Australia’s Aukus nuclear submarines on schedule… the US had “an exceptionally fragile” military shipbuilding base and could not meet construction rates for its own vessels this year… a materials [read supply chain] shortage had affected the sequencing order of manufacturing and slowed down the production rate."

Backing up Rusker’s warning the USN’s director of Navy reactors, Admiral Bill Houston, said:

the nature of global threats meant “there may be a need for more [high priority] Columbias [SSBNs also sharing Virginia SSN shipyards]” – appearing to signal the production pressures may only increase.

“We are not in low-rate production,” Houston was reported as saying. “We are in the highest rate of production we’ve been in as a nation [but] with an industrial base that’s less than half the size [than in the cold war]. It’s an exceptionally fragile industrial base. It’s with an industrial base that is very, very challenged.”

In the article see the declining political claims of outgoing US Defense Secretary Austin (loyal to Biden’s AUKUS Virginia offer to the end). Austin said:

he was “confident” the submarines would be provided.

“Now, we recognise that there are challenges in the industrial base and we’re doing things to address those challenges,” he said.

Austin said he had met the leaders of the companies involved [mainly GDEB and HII (also see APDR) who have publicized severe labor shortages and supply chain delays] and was encouraged by “their focus to get this done, and they will get it done”.

Australia’s part-time Defence Minister Richard Marles claimed:

 “the incoming Trump administration would honour the Aukus submarine deal, pointing to its bipartisan support in the US Congress.”

“The Greens’ defence spokesperson – and Aukus critic – Senator David Shoebridge, said Rucker’s comments proved the deal was “a mess”.”

See Karen Middleton’s whole excellent article at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/19/aukus-submarine-deal-richard-marles-on-track

Admiral Rucker conveyed the warnings at the US Naval Submarine League’s Annual Symposium and Industry Update, in Arlington, Virginia on November 13, 2024. See the US National Defense website.

Pete Comment

The US Admirals are taking a risk telling the truth. They probably aim to cover themselves because they might be compelled to share blame for low Virginia SSN production output.

However the incoming Trump Administration might listen to their advice more closely than the outgoing Biden Administration. Biden, unlike Trump, is/was politically wedded to the success of AUKUS Pillar 1.

But it will be a future President, likely in 2031, who will finally decide if any Virginias can be spared for Australia. That future President will be guided by US naval advice. The USN has advised (privately for years and now publicly) that the low Virginia production rate is a long term problem and it competes with higher priority Columbia production. Columbia production hasn't been meeting major deadlines due to the same supply chain delays experienced with Virginias.

I’m also more persuaded by the warnings of US Admirals than politicians’ references to “honour”.

January 9, 2025

PLAN Subs in US DoD 2024 China Military Power Report: AUKUS Subs?

The risk that China may rapidly build up its Type 093 and 095 SSN and Type 094 and 096 SSBN numbers needs to be accounted for by a stepped up US Virginia SSN construction insurance policy. Within the risk equation is also high quality Russian Yasen SSNs and Borei/Borey SSBNs (also see). During the First Cold War a rolling average of up to 20 UK SSNs (augmented by UK SSKs) used to assist in countering the Russian threat. But in this Second Cold War there is a rolling average of 7 UK SSNs. Unfortunately the planned part solution of Australian AUKUS Virginias in the 2030s is receding as a possibility due to the shortfall in US Virginia production.  

Below, the US Department of Defense (DoD) predicts "modest" growth in Chinese submarine numbers through to 2035. This is even though China has demonstrated a surprising ability to rapidly construct vessels of all types - including submarines. 

I therefore suspect this modest growth prediction may be partly for US political reasons. That is the US DoD is predicting low Chinese production to match the US's own clearly identified slow pace of Virginia SSN production. It now appears Columbia SSBN construction (with priority over Virginia production and competing in shipyard construction with Virginias) is behind schedule. 

An implication for Australia is slow pace in US SSN production may mean no US SSNs under AUKUS for Australia during the 2030s. This is because the USN may need all the SSNs it can get to face any risk of substantial growth in Chinese SSN, SSBN and SSK numbers.

On December 18, 2024 the US Department of Defense (DoD) published the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress better known as the China Military Power Report. It is at https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF

In this first article I will record what the 2024 China Military Power Report says about Chinese submarines. I've also added hyperlinks from Wikipedia partly because the don't suffer "link rot" in the longer term:

Page 48 [2] Key Takeaways
[1]
The [People’s Liberation Army Navy] PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines
[and 2] In the near term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.

Page 52 – Service Capabilities and Modernization. The PLAN has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it matures its force, integrates new technologies, and expands its shipyards. The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity. The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced ASCMs. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO

Page 53 - class SS units, eight of which can launch ASCMs. PRC shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electricair-independent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class 877EKM submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.


Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM [a later JL-3 variant or a JL-4?]. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.”

The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with LACMs.

Page 54 Eight of the PLAN’s 12 KILO class SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b [Kalibr] ASCM (120 nm). The PRC’s SONG-class SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ18, which constitutes an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM.

…The PLAN recognizes that long-range [Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles] ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to reach their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for high-fidelity targeting information for surface and subsurface launch platforms.

…In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field [Land Attack Cruise Missiles] LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and the developmental SHANG III SSGN [the Type 093B]. The PLAN could retrofit its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options, enabling the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region.

Page 56 For the PLAN and CCP, the possession of SSBNs has long been an important symbol of achieving great power status. The PRC has six operational Type 094 JIN-class SSBNs. These submarines are conducting at sea deterrent patrols. The PLAN’s JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 SLBMs, JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20), representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent. With six operational SSBNs, the PLAN has the capacity to maintain a constant at sea deterrent presence. With a range of approximately 3,900 nm, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean to threaten targets in the western half of the continental United States (CONUS) (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii to threaten targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400 nm, which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from [Bastion defended] PRC littoral waters. The PLAN’s next generation SSBN, the Type 096, is expected to enter service the late 2020s or early 2030s. Considering the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate the Type 094 and Type 096 SSBNs concurrently.

…The PLAN’s submarine fleet is similarly positioned to maintain high readiness, with an increasing focus on real-world contingency training further from shore for longer periods of

Page 57 – time. This operationally aligned training is part of regular patrols, in line with expanding maritime domain requirements to operate proficiently in near and far seas. The submarine force is aspiring toward a capability for integrated operations to enable more dynamic tasking and response to support force modernization goals.

Page 83 - PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways
• The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific region.
• The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
• The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the
FIC [expansion of “FIC” acronym unknown?].

Page 84 - The PLA’s [Anti-access/area denial] A2AD - also known as counter intervention—capabilities are the most robust in the FIC although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the Philippine Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.

PRC messaging to Indo-Pacific countries probably seeks to cast the United States and its allies as untrustworthy external actors interfering with internal affairs, hegemonic regional aggressors, and violators of international law. Beijing likely uses official government statements, state-run media, and online disinformation to promote a narrative that Washington seeks to initiate a new Cold War by pressuring Indo-Pacific countries to ally with the United States and strategically encircle the PRC. The PRC’s Indo-Pacific messaging efforts further recast Washington’s regional engagements and partnerships, including the Quad and AUKUS, as hegemonic efforts to effectuate bloc-based regional confrontation and undermine regional stability… Earlier in 2023, PRC official statements and state media sought to inaccurately characterize the AUKUS partnership as a hegemonic nuclear-powered submarine cooperation agreement that undermined the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

Page 88 - In the “Deep Sea” domain, the PLAN would use submarines - including conventional and nuclear armed - to achieve deterrence while being able to strike the enemy’s surface and shore targets, strike and destroy enemy submarines, and destroy the enemy’s maritime lines of communication. To this end, submarine-launched variants of the YJ-18 anti-ship missile are likely installed on the nuclear-powered SHANG SSN as well as the SONG and YUAN class submarines. The recently launched SHANG III SSGN will further enhance the PLAN’s surface warfare capability by providing a stealthy, land-attack option if armed with LACMs.

The PLAN provides a sea-based strategic deterrent with its SSBNs. The JIN SSBN can carry up to 12 JL-2 SLBMs with a range of 3,900 nm. By the early 2030s, a newer, multiple-warhead [JL-4?] SLBM with a range of 5,400 nm could be developed for the next generation Type 096 SSBN.

Page 128 - New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority in the FIC and deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict

Page 150 - Naval and Shipbuilding Industry. The PRC, the top commercial ship-producing nation in the world by most industry measures, has sufficient capacity to produce any required numbers of naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. The PRC has developed unmanned underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019.

Page 153 - PRC ARMS EXPORTS As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment, including UAVs, MANPADS, submarines, naval surface vessels, SAM systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

Naval Combatants. The PRC is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by Pakistan’s 2015 purchase of eight YUAN class submarines for more than $3 billion. Thailand purchased one YUAN class submarine in 2017. In 2024, the PRC accepted Thailand’s proposal to purchase two offshore patrol vessels or one frigate. As of April 2024, the PRC had not delivered any Yuan submarines, although it had delivered two MING class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 and 2018, the PRC sold two frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan, respectively. In September 2019, the PRC made its first-ever sale of a landing platform dock ship to Thailand. In April 2023, Thailand received a new frigate to serve as a submarine tender.

Page 165 - TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, NAVAL FORCES 
Totals                                                For PRC              For Taiwan
Attack Submarines (SSK)                 47                         4
SSNs                                                 6                           0

SSBNs                                              6                           0 

++++++++++++

Another useful reference is Wikipedia's PLAN Submarine Force which contains a vast number of embedded hyperlinks.