Pete's response to "Steve's" comment of January 17, 2020,
Hi Steve
Noting Australia's Attack class project - from development to last sub retirement mission is around 60 years (2080), much can happen.
Likely changes may include China becoming the dominat power in East Asia, West Pacific and maybe in the Indian Ocean. This would be an outcome of relative decline in US dominance, and less US interest in defending Australia at all costs.
The long game - So Australia needs to nurture new allies, nuclear armed if possible. Nuclear armed France is an obvious choice - France having territory in New Caledonia (very much in the China blockade arc over Australia) and in French Polynesia/Tahiti.
Noting Australia's Attack class project - from development to last sub retirement mission is around 60 years (2080), much can happen.
Likely changes may include China becoming the dominat power in East Asia, West Pacific and maybe in the Indian Ocean. This would be an outcome of relative decline in US dominance, and less US interest in defending Australia at all costs.
The long game - So Australia needs to nurture new allies, nuclear armed if possible. Nuclear armed France is an obvious choice - France having territory in New Caledonia (very much in the China blockade arc over Australia) and in French Polynesia/Tahiti.
Australia also re-nurtured its military relationship with the nuclear armed UK by choosing the future UK designed "Hunter-class" ("Type 26" in the UK) frigate.
So French strategic assistance was a good aspect to buy in the Attack class sub deal.
Also, France (unlike Germany or Japan) can offer nuclear powered "Attack class" (ie. Barracuda SSNs). France is already assisting Brazil's much delayed SSN program https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2014/01/brazil-future-ssn-dcns-assistance.html .
If the China threat becomes severe enough France (unlike Germany or Japan) can-might also assist Australia in developing nuclear weapons. Such assistance might quietly begin from the 2030-2040 timeframe. $Billions for the Attack class helps.
So French strategic assistance was a good aspect to buy in the Attack class sub deal.
Also, France (unlike Germany or Japan) can offer nuclear powered "Attack class" (ie. Barracuda SSNs). France is already assisting Brazil's much delayed SSN program https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2014/01/brazil-future-ssn-dcns-assistance.html .
If the China threat becomes severe enough France (unlike Germany or Japan) can-might also assist Australia in developing nuclear weapons. Such assistance might quietly begin from the 2030-2040 timeframe. $Billions for the Attack class helps.
France may have assisted
apartheid era South Africa develop crude nuclear weapons "The possibility of South Africa collaborating with France[5] and Israel in the development of nuclear weapons was the subject of speculation during the 1970s.[6] South Africa developed a small finite deterrence arsenal of gun-type fission weapons in the 1980s. Six were constructed and another was under construction at the time the program ended.[7]
France certainly helped Israel. See https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm "...ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS" by (then active) Lieutenant Colonel Warner
D. Farr, U.S. Army:
"Abstract
This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources. Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and reprocessing."
see subheading "II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation"
Shimon "Peres secured an agreement from France to assist Israel in developing a nuclear deterrent...."
subheading "III. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project to Completion"
"...The joint venture with France gave Israel several ingredients for nuclear weapons construction: a production reactor, a factory to extract plutonium from the spent fuel, and the design. In 1962, the Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964 or 1965. The acquisition of this reactor and related technologies was clearly intended for military purposes from the outset (not “dual-use”), as the reactor has no other function..."
France, through the company Dassault, also assisted with Israel's nuclear warhead delivery system in the shape of the Jericho I ballistic missile:
"Initial development was in conjunction with France, Dassault provided various missile systems from 1963 and a type designated MD-620 was test fired in 1965. French co-operation was halted by an arms embargo in January 1968, though 12 missiles had been delivered from France.[7]"
PETE COMMENT
If Australia discussed with France the proliferation of SSNs and nuclear weapons know-how then that may induce longer term allies (the US or even the UK) to make pre-emptive counter-offers of nuclear assistance to Australia.
"Abstract
This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources. Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and reprocessing."
see subheading "II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation"
Shimon "Peres secured an agreement from France to assist Israel in developing a nuclear deterrent...."
subheading "III. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project to Completion"
"...The joint venture with France gave Israel several ingredients for nuclear weapons construction: a production reactor, a factory to extract plutonium from the spent fuel, and the design. In 1962, the Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964 or 1965. The acquisition of this reactor and related technologies was clearly intended for military purposes from the outset (not “dual-use”), as the reactor has no other function..."
France, through the company Dassault, also assisted with Israel's nuclear warhead delivery system in the shape of the Jericho I ballistic missile:
"Initial development was in conjunction with France, Dassault provided various missile systems from 1963 and a type designated MD-620 was test fired in 1965. French co-operation was halted by an arms embargo in January 1968, though 12 missiles had been delivered from France.[7]"
PETE COMMENT
If Australia discussed with France the proliferation of SSNs and nuclear weapons know-how then that may induce longer term allies (the US or even the UK) to make pre-emptive counter-offers of nuclear assistance to Australia.
19 comments:
Hi Pete,
Okay off-topic in this post.
Some more info about the Netherlands B letter, it seems that it do downgrade the requirements but not totaly clear to which extent.
"Faber nevertheless listed a series of downgrades . Compared with variant A, the B variant has:
• a smaller torpedo storage space "that offers less flexibility but is sufficient to support multiple mission types during deployment"
• a 10 to 25% smaller hull
• limited crew size
• less sensor capacity
• smaller range
• less storage capacity for operations with Special Forces ("but that remains possible")
• less space for underwater sensors
• less workspace
• less accommodation"
/Kjell
Thank you for your reply.
If Oz needed nuclear weapons I would say a more likely source is the UK or US.
I am aware of these covert nuclear shenanigans. Even in a multi-polar world unless the US goes a long way down the isolationist route there will still be a US presence in the region. Patrolling the South China Sea may be useful in 'peace time' for a variety of reasons such as intelligence gathering and being seen to support regional allies. But if war came defending the north would be more important.
I can't see Oz procuring SSN's. All I can see is Canberra allowing USN and RN to be based in Oz on a temporary basis in an extreme situation.
(I have been wondering about very large conventional submarines in the region of 6k to 7k tonnes displacement submerged. See, Russian Indian class.)
China's interest is in making sure natural resources from Africa can flow thru Indian Ocean and past Singapore to China. Australia is another source of natural resources for China. Only when these are very seriously threatened will China go to war-- a cut off of natural resources is an existential threat to them. War is not in China's interest; wealth and prosperity do interest them. As for nukes, I see no reason why the US or anothr allied power would'nt simply give Oz a few nuclear 155mm artillery shells on the sly if a very real chance of war materialized.
Pete, how do you view the future of Australia's cooperation with other countries in the region like New Zealand, India & Singapore? In a Navy/military context, of course.
More likely that US might do a temporary Incirlik and place N weapons on an Aussie base...The thing with n weapons is that it is hard to set actual believable red lines as to what would trigger their use. Case in point being the USSR-PRC Ussuri conflict in 1969. Despite overwhelming military disparity, in reality it was the Soviets who had to make most of the or nearly all of the concessions to Mao and his mates. From a practical geopolitical game theory perspective, the hurdle to actually using nukes and indeed actual value of deterrence is more grey than black or white.
Australia will face a massive hurdle in terms of n-weapons. Assuming they make the unlikely decision of going nuclear, it will take decades to develop a credible sea based deterrent, and deciding to mate nukes to SLBMs onboard and allowing patrols is not such a straightforward decision. Even the Chinese most likely sail their Jin SSBNs without mating warheads....Most likely Indian SSBNs will also sail without the warhead mated (at least till the Government can suitably fix the Vajpayee era rules in that respect like a 4 man rule PM-> Defence Minister -> Sub Captain/Flotilla Commander -> Sub Deputy Captain/Captain)).. frankly I don't see that happening in Australia....Uranium-Plutonium ENR, weapons design, SLBM design etc may be doable with money... the political will backed by acceptable threat level justification for the same will not be forthcoming and might well be impossible to forge... Even In India, where the threats are very clear and are a present danger, the decision has been devilishly difficult to make...
PS: btw, in related news, looks like the K-4 took one more step in getting launch issues ironed out. So likely the first two SSBNs might collectively carry
One random question:
Did the Germans offer Poland 2 used 212s as a gap-filler solution and CDs for their Orka programme later? I saw this mentioned in an article but it was not like the swedish offer that we know for sure they offered 2 used A17s and A26s for Orka.
Do you think the Swedes won this competition because the Germans didnt have a gap filler solution or they did offer used 212s but the Poles decided to go with the Swedes for their own resons?
Thanks /Kjell [at January 17, 2020 8:29 PM]
Re Netherlands Walrus replacement https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Volgende-fase-onderzeeboten-is-knock-out-ronde-150120.html "listed a series of downgrades . Compared with variant A, the B variant has: ..."
As https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Volgende-fase-onderzeeboten-is-knock-out-ronde-150120.html goes on to record:
"The big question, of course, is what exactly those variants entail. Is the A variant a kind of mythical super submarine that scores 100 points in all areas? Or is it a modern Walrus? The House asked half of it (about the range and costs of the A variant), but those questions could not be answered due to confidentiality.
"Here you are going to make it clear to people who don't know about submarines how it works? I think it's foggy. Big fog," says Carel Prins. "This is not a clear statement. Great if you say I'm going to inform the House with figures and it's confidential, then I can still understand that. But this is not a technical explanation? It's a chat by the hearth. Where is it at The Chamber should just take it. I would be very unhappy about this as a Member of Parliament. "
And that it is a top submarine? A quantum leap? These are the most new submarines currently being built by Western countries. The only question is which submarine is the best for Dutch duties and the Dutch budget."
Hi Steve [January 18, 2020 at 6:29 PM]
As China saturates the East China and South China Seas with cheap fixed and mobile anti-sub sensors Western subs will have fare greater difficulty "Patrolling the South China Sea".
I think US sub basing exclusively in the Noorthern Hemisphere (on the US mainland coasts, Hawaii, Guam, in Japan, Middle East bases and Diego Garcia) are more orientated to defending sealanes and nations far to the north of Australia, than Australia.
The USN shelved ideas to have any US submarine basing in Australia after WWII to the present day. eg. there was a shelved USN idea of having Fleet Base West at HMAS Stirling near Perth as a site for changing over Blue/Gold crews of US SSNs and SSGNs. But it was decided to keep the changeovers occuring on US territory.
If all other RN and USN submarine BASES were destroyed in a nuclear war there are fallback plans for basing their nuclear subs in Australia on a permanent basis - a la "On the Beach" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Beach_(1959_film)#Plot
Building 6k - 7k ton conventional submarines would suffer the extreme development costs and reduction in stealth that Australia's 5k Attack class subs are estimated to cost with declines in stealth they will experience...
All things being equal, the bigger the sub the less stealthy it is and the fewer shallower and narrower places it can operate...
Russia's conventional 2 submarine (NATO designation) "India" class were highly specialised to seabed, Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles (DSRVs), and special forces ops. Functions 1 or 2 Russian nuclear subs perform now. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India-class_submarine
World's largest conventional sub is China's 6,600 ton one-off Qing submarine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing-class_submarine . This is used to test technology eg. "combustion powered torpedoes, compartments for special forces, underwater unmanned vehicles, new SLBMs, new cruise missiles, new anti ship missiles, new SAMs, and a new escape pod which are applied to the Type 095 and Type 096 submarines" see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing-class_submarine#Design
Regards
Pete
Hi "Mr. Kowalski" [at January 20, 2020 at 4:34 AM]
Your statement of the circumstances under which China may decide to go to war may be relevant to the present time frame out to 2025 but military planners look at and compare all contingencies thought possible out to longer timeframes.
Hence Australia paying over a credible budget for the 60 YEAR Attack class submarine project after considering scenarios past 2080.
Noting that the Attack class is overtly a conventional version of a nuclear submarine.
Noting also the submarine supplier is France - a country with a record of supplying nuclear weapon precursors to 1 and maybe 2 customers. In Israel's case the French built Dimona reactor, the co-located French built nuclear reprocessing (Uranium and Plutonium separating) factory and nuclear warhead specific, French supplied, Jericho I ballistic missile delivery system.
In 15 years China will have many more strategic options including a lower bar to threaten blockade. Partly with blockade potential in mind China is gradually economically dominating East Timor and Pacific Islands in Australia's reason for economic AND STRATEGIC reasons.
Artillery shells with nuclear warheads (range only around 50km) lack the (missile and aircraft provided) multi 100-1000km range for credible nuclear delivery. Hence all nuclear weapons countries shelved nuclear artillery decades ago.
Australia could not simply buy nuclear warheads for Tomahawk missiles that could be fitted to Collins and Attack class subs. Most-all nuclear weapons need regular maintainence by expert nuclear weapon technologists and regular access to radioactive facilities, etc.
Cheers
Pete
Hi Anonymous [January 20, 2020 at 9:44 AM]
Re your question "Pete, how do you view the future of Australia's cooperation with other countries in the region like New Zealand, India & Singapore? In a Navy/military context, of course."
Answer - I view in ways too numerous to mention. I'd need to write a book. In formal terms ANZUS covers relations with NZ, the Quadrilateral includes relations with India, Australia has numerous official (military exercises, and Singaporean training bases (eg. "Oakey"/activities in Australia) and Singaporean unofficial.
For mentions in my articles, best that you place each country name in the left top search box of Submarine Matters at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/
To capture mentions in comments below article Google gentleseas and "country name"
Regards
Pete
Hi ghalibkabir [at January 20, 2020 at 1:56 PM] and Anonymous [at January 20, 2020 at 2:13 PM]
After so much replying today I'll reply to you guys tomorrow.
Cheers
Pete
Hello Peter,
Re USN/RN SSN basing in Oz, I meant in extreme situations. Not in peace time. I think the Australian public would in those circumstances just have to accept it.
I know the India class were specialised boats.
Hi Steve
I addressed "extreme situations" when I said at January 21, 2020 at 12:28 PM above:
"If all other RN and USN submarine BASES were destroyed in a nuclear war there are [RN and USN] fallback plans for basing their nuclear subs in Australia on a permanent basis - a la "On the Beach" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Beach_(1959_film)#Plot "
Where you say "the Australian public would in those circumstances just have to accept" [such basing]. The rapidly spreading nuclear fallout (on Australia) cloud and radioactive seawater would also play on Australian minds.
Not cheerfully
Pete
G'day Ghalibkabir
What with renewed fire dangers and buying a lawn mower to mow my new house yard yesterday I could not reply yesterday. Soooo
Yes the US (Sec of Defense Esper) in 2019 floated the idea of placing Intermediate range forces missiles in Australia. Such missiles of that range/basing could have nuclear warheads. Australia rejecteded the idea https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-05/defence-minister-linda-reynolds-rules-out-us-darwin-missiles/11382852
No suggestions (that I know of) of Aussie jets carrying US shared nuclear bombs - in the way US shares such bombs with some NATO countries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing#NATO
Yes red lines (when to use) are difficult.
Also how many nuclear weapons, of what type would Australia need to field to deter China in all situations? This is assuming Aussie conventional forces could not deter China. Indeed, how many levels (and who) of Aus command chain would make the "use nukes" decisions?
Would Australia risk total destruction when it had far fewer nukes than great powers like China or Russia? This is a problem smaller nuclear powers, like France and Israel faced/face vis a vis Russia.
If only some Aus Attack class subs fielded nuclear tipped Tomahawks that would mean dangerous ambiguity. Also such subs could not boldly carry out many SSK duties (eg. getting in close torpedo of ship positions and special forces dropoff) if they were carring nuclear weapons.
I noted India's recent successful undersea pontoon launch of a K-4. So may INS Arihant and Arighat deploy K-4s in about 6 years?
Regards
Pete
Hi Anonymous [at January 20, 2020 at 2:13 PM]
Where you asked:
"Did the Germans offer Poland 2 used 212s as a gap-filler solution and CDs for their Orka programme later? I saw this mentioned in an article"
Yes - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine#Development "Poland announced in December 2013 they will not buy, but (MAY) only lease, two U212A's, on account of not meeting "requirements of tactical and technical equipment developed by the military, including in particular the propulsion system, missile weapons and rescue system".[8]
"...Do you think the Swedes won this competition because the Germans didnt have a gap filler solution or they did offer used 212s but the Poles decided to go with the Swedes for their own resons?"
Nothing is certain until Swedish subs are actually leased to Poland.
This is noting https://defence24.com/poland-to-acquire-second-hand-submarines-from-sweden-head-of-the-mod-confirms-the-negotiations-in-progress of Nov 28, 2019
"Poland is currently involved in talks pertaining to procurement of second-hand submarines from Sweden. The acquisition is aimed at obtaining a gap filler, until the Orka new generation submarine procurement programme is finalized. We have found out, unofficially, that the talks concern two A17/Södermanland Swedish submarines."
Anonymous, do you have more certain information than "involved in talks" and "We have found out, unofficially"?
Also if Poland leased Swedish A17s that may not automatically mean Poland buying A26s.
Cheers
Pete
Hi Pete,
G'day Mate.. yes the K-4 has probably got one of its last issues ironed out. The Arihant might get a few K-4 Mk-1s much sooner than 6 years. The Arighat..well might take a bit more... but the problem is conventionally armed K-4s (similar to 'likely' conventionally armed JL-2s) maketh not a deterrent... so Modi and Co need to iron that 'chain of command' issue for a n-armed SSBN which will need to have mated SLBMs (MIRVed ideally) to handle the unlikely situation of nuclear escalation by CN or PK. Initial K-4 warheads are likely to be a single 50 kT type medium warhead replaced later by hopefully 3 or 4x50 kT MIRV cones.
For Australia, the irritating part will be the 'project creep' or 'project below boiling point' sphere of influence expansion by China where red lines are not possible to set and the justification for a land or sea based n-arsenal will be quite difficult to make. Intermediate range SLBMs will be quite useless as a deterrent and nuclear SLCM armed SSNs (if Aus can ever come around to that) will be seen 'justly' as 'provocation' by China. Below 'threshold' situations are hard to rationalize in terms of red lines or 'defined hostility'... china and its underlings pakistan and NK are very good at this art of 'jab and run' and rinse/repeat tactics...
Without clarification as to what an n-armed SSN might do or how it might help, Aus. cannot go to the next step of deciding the role of the SSN. a conventional SSN will still be easy to justify as a legitimate naval tool... a n-armed boat won't be... if hunter-killer SSNs are inducted, then a broad tactical change will be needed as ocean going SSKs, UUV and other mobile sensor deploying ASW frigates will be needed in the light of the 'distributed network' equivalent tactics by China moving forward... no one will want a 10 billion dollar boat sunk by a dormant 20,000 $ value light torpedo carrying UUV...
while the image as been available for a while, the 2020s might be the decade when naval warfare enters a new era in practical terms. conventional naval tactics married to newer 'swarm tactics', AI/Robotics abled tech might end up re-writing the naval ops handbook...
China is already proving that this is not some tom clancy like fantasy...
Yes, they will lease (and eventually take possession) and upgrade 2 A17s and Sweden will find the money to repair their 3rd A19 and order 1 more A26.
But i think Germany could only lease 1 T212A. Thats probably the reason Poland opted for swedish submarines. Its a VFM choice imo.
But for the real Orka programme, i think T212CD will be the winner.
Hi ghalibkabir [at January 23, 2020 at 6:32 PM] and Swedish submarine Anonymous [at January 24, 2020 at 9:34 AM]
I'll fully respond to your comments during the week.
Regards
Pete
I can't imagine India allowing proliferation of nukes to Australia. It'll set off a chain of events that no one wants.
Best bet would be to make basing options available for Indian Naval and Air forces, tie Australia in between US & India. Of course, the current ethnic europe originating demography would feel more comfortable with fellow ethnicities populating brit & france (as can be observed), but the old memories of Ottoman colonization shouldn't color all Asian entities & prevent Australia from making rational, mature decisions & plans. If anything, the current majority population in Aus & India have both common issues to worry about, including the historic forces of barbarity that damaged both cultures, but if traumatic memories manifesting in insecure ethnic nationalism constricts Australian peoples ability to join the forces of progress and make common sensical choices (superior jap. subs?), then that would be tragically ironic.
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