July 24, 2019

Vast Western intelligence gathering against Iran


Following mounting Iranian drone and naval activity against Western shipping since May 2019 (map above courtesy UK Daily Mail)) the UK and US are deploying a wide range of intelligence collection methods against Iran. 

The UK's widely advertised deployment of an Astute class SSN to Iran's region is just a very small part of a much larger Western intelligence effort - much of it existing long before this latest Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz crisis.  

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

In the Strait of Hormuz Iran would deploy undersea sensors (fixed on seafloor, tethered, and mobile (on Iranian subs and surface craft). This would likely make Western submarine movement within narrow (and shallow) waters of the Persian Gulf/Hormuz too risky. It is likely US and UK SSNs  would by stationed in the Arabian Sea near Iran. Western subs are also integral defenders of Western naval surface ships and civilian tankers.

Iran would be mindful of the extreme danger the UK's (3 active Astute and 3 still active Trafalgar class) SSNs and US SSNs pose to Iranian naval ships and tankers. Iran's admirals would fear the kind of action that led to the sinking by a UK SSN of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano in the 1982 Falkland's War. All of these UK/US SSNs (and US SSGNs) have Tomahawk land attack missiles which could destroy most of Iran's air defence and nuclear facilities. 

THE MUCH BROADER INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The UK and US SSNs and many other intercept platforms can forward Iranian voice and data intercepts via satellite to GCHQ/NSA Farsi (Iranian language) interpreters regionally, and in the UK/US, for near real time translation into English. Just about any Iranian emission on la
nd, sea and air can be intercepted. All this provides operationally actionable intelligence against Iranian threats to shipping, aircraft, Western land bases in the Middle East and further afield. The identification, cueing and downing of the Iranian "drone" that flew too close to USS Boxer may well have been at the end point of the UK/US intercept chain.


In more detail, intercepts can also be gathered by UK, US and Israeli "spy" satellites, aerial drones, manned aircraft, naval surface ships and land intercept stations. Of particular interest are a veritable order or battle (ORBAT) of "intelligence targets" to intercept including:
-  signals emanating from the center of Iranian military and political decision-making in Tehran and
   then orders from Tehran down the Iranian chain of command 

-  satellite collection of images via (radar sensors for night and bad weather) and electro-optical 
   images and signals collection from Iran's main naval base at Bandar Abbas (on Hormuz) including
   port comings and goings
-  particularly Iranian (or "unidentified") naval and air approaches to Western shipping
-  put another way, movements of Iranian naval ships (including minelayers), submarines and
   
Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) boats,
-  activity at Iranian air bases (eg. Iranian aerial drone and strike aircraft takeoffs) and airports
   (to avoid another unintentional shootdown of an Iranian civilian airliner).
-  status of Iranian medium range missile bases and coastal anti-ship missile batteries covering the
   Persian Gulf, Hormuz and Arabian Sea
-  suspicious activity in Iranian land force bases (especially IRGC), and
-  suspicious activity of Iranian "diplomats/spies" "illegals" "terrorists" and "militia" within Iran, Iraq,
   Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere (globally) including Iranian embassies.  

It would appear that Iran has been added to the list of entities in the War on Terror (that is, in addition to the Taliban, al Qaeda  and Islamic State).


Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) released this footage of their capture of UK oil tanker, Stena Impero, in the Strait of Hormuz. Their operation involved IRGC special forces (probably Quds), speedboats and a helicopter to take control of Stena Impero and its 23-man crew. This is all part of the broader West vs Iran confrontation.
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Pete

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