China's SSBN Submarine Force and Strategy Matures

Greg Torode and David Lague, edited by Peter Hirschberg) have written an excellent REUTERS article of May 2, 2019 “Special Report - China's furtive underwater nukes test the Pentagon”. This is on China’s Type 094 Jin class SSBNs, their missiles, the Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, southern China (map below) nuclear sub home and broader strategy/tactics for their use. 

Also see the superb interactive version of the article with a vivid satellite-eye-view of  Sanya and Yulin Base. The whole article is 2,282 words. Below are extracts amounting to just 593 words:

"In a January [2019] report, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency said the Chinese navy would need a minimum of five Jin-class submarines to maintain a continuous nuclear deterrence at sea. China now has four.

To maximize its second-strike capability, China’s missile subs would need to be stealthy enough to go undetected as they sail to their patrol areas in the open ocean. U.S. and other foreign naval analysts say the Jin-class submarines are a sharp improvement over China’s earlier efforts, but they remain less stealthy than their U.S., Russian, French and British counterparts [and compared to India's 2 Arihant SSBNs?]

The 11,000-tonne Jin-class submarines are stationed on the southern coast of China’s Hainan Island, close to deep water channels leading into and out of the South China Sea. The geography of China’s coastal waters has forced Beijing to base its missile submarines in this [South China Sea] area, astride one of the world’s most important shipping lanes.

In the north, the Yellow Sea (see map above) is too shallow to conceal big, ballistic missile submarines.

The East China Sea is deeper but it’s confined by the Korean Peninsula, Japan’s island chain and Taiwan.

And Japanese and U.S. forces can deploy advanced anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft based in Japan to closely monitor these waters and the channels [eg. Japanese subs patrol the Bashi Channel / Luzon Strait] that pass out into the Western Pacific, where the [Chines] submarines are ultimately headed. The Chinese need to reach these waters to be in a position to fire on the United States.

The South China Sea, by contrast, is much bigger and in parts deeper, making it more suitable for concealed submarine operations, according to Western submariners with extensive experience of patrolling in this area.

China would need to get its submarines out of Hainan, past surveillance and into seas east of the Philippines for their missiles to be in striking range of the United States.

This is a key reason why China has gone to such lengths to reclaim and fortify islands and reefs in the South China Sea that are expanding Beijing’s control over this area, according to Western submariners and military attaches.

The [Chinese] sub fleet’s vulnerability to detection also explains China’s extreme sensitivity to the [ship and aircraft] surveillance operations  of the United States and its allies in these waters. [China suspects US and allies ships and aircraft FONOPs are an excuse for conducting anti-submarine surveillance]

China [“now appears to be” has long been] on guard against foreign subs attempting to detect and shadow its ballistic missile fleet. As China’s Jin-class vessels put to sea, they appear to be flanked by protective screens of surface warships and aircraft on station to track foreign submarines, according to military officers and analysts familiar with allied surveillance of the Chinese coast.

China has also installed an array of sensors, antennas and satellite communications installations on islands in the Spratlys, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.”

The submarine base near Sanya is now under direct control of the Central Military Commission, the top military decision-making body, chaired by Xi Jinping himself. The new communications installations in the South China Sea have helped knit together the new command structure, allowing tighter control from Beijing, right down to individual vessels.

In 2017, Beijing appointed a veteran submariner, ViceAdmiral Yuan Yubai, to head [now heads] the Southern Theater Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea. His promotion was a clear indication of the importance China attaches to supporting nuclear sub operations, according to Chinese naval experts. Yuan is the first naval officer to head a command of this type, a promotion that’s part of a sweeping overhaul of the military structure by Xi Jinping.

See the WHOLE EXCELLENT REUTERS ARTICLE

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Separatley:

A to scale comparison (Jin second from top) of all the latest SSBNs, except India's 2 Arihant class mini SSBNs (aka Baby Boomers) whose specs are 6,000 tons, 112m, 11m beam, 12 K15 mini SLBMs, 6 torpedo tubes. The diagram comes from csis .org's China Power’s December 2015 article “Does China have an effectivesea-based nuclear deterrent?”

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How the Quietness or Acoustic signature, of the Nato designation "Jin" Type 094, compares to  China's:

-  Xia, Type 092 SSBN

-  Han, 091 SSN

-  Shang, 093 SSN 

-  projected Type 095 SSN (with the signature computer modeled as at 2015) 

and to Russia's:

-  Akula, Akula II SSNs and Oscar II SSGN

-  Borey/Borei class "Dolgorukiy" SSBN, and

-  Yasen class "Severodvinsk" SSN

Pete