Above is Russia's state defense orders in 2014 and 2015. (Graphics from Russian Defense Ministry, then published by TASS.) While submarines are analysed below there is a wealth of data on non-submarine strategic systems.
GRAPHIC AND EXTRA DATA
Adding to the small amount of submarine data in the graphic. Note that orders for:
- Improved Kilo Project "636" [likely 636.3 restricted to Russian Navy] SSKs occur at the rate of
2 each year [see later build data 2016 & 2017 for 636.3s]
- 1 or 2 Borei/Borey Project 955 SSBNs occur each year [see later year data out to 2026 for Boreis
955s, 955As and 955Bs (the As and Bs are due to be fitted with 20 SLBMs instead of the existing
16 in the first 3 x 955s (right click mouse to translate this).
- Yasen Project 885 SSGNs in contrast are ordered intermittently (in 2014 but not in 2015). See later
year Yasen data out to 2023. Note, despite Russian denials, Russia is likely to need to keep on
building Yasens past 2023 to replace retiring Oscar SSGNs and Akula SSNs until
"cheaper, smaller" Huskies or "Khaskis" (in Russian) SSNs and SSGNs become commissioned
(likely not in early 2020s) but in the 2030s .
Russia will have financial trouble sustaining continuous build of Boreis, Yasens and Kilos while meeting the high costs of developing Huskies.
With the one exception of Seawolf to Virginia rarely do replacement submarines become "cheaper and smaller" because of industrial revenue interests and naval profession/capability interests.
Maybe it is useful to see the expensive, high specs, Yasen/Severodvinsk Project as a delayed, Russian response to the first launched in 1995 expensive, high specs, Seawolf (?). Also Russia, with its defense financial downturn of the 1990s and early 2000s, was paradoxically unable to cancel the already begun expensive ("too big to fail") Yasen Project.
Some major defense Projects have their own momentum that cost more in money and careers to shelve and start again
easier to delay and pass off blame