March 31, 2025

Darwin Port hosts a US SSN & US Submarine Tender

Since the preceding article SSN USS Minnesota docked outside the breakwater of HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin harbour. I don't know where Collins SSKs dock in the HMAS Coonawarra complex. Apparently inside the breakwater only patrol boats with a draught of 2m (in any tide) can dock. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_Coonawarra#Facilities_and_operational_units

USS Minnesota, a Guam based Virginia-class SSN, visited the Chinese run [1] Port of Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia, in late March 2025. [2] 

Along with it in Darwin was submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) the US Navy reports [3] on March 25, 2025. 

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Darwin#Privatisation 

[2] https://en.as.com/latest_news/us-nuclear-submarine-emerges-within-meters-of-a-controversial-chinese-lease-not-one-of-our-partners-n/

[3] https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4137812/emory-s-land-arrives-in-darwin/

March 28, 2025

Australian Sub Depot Ship. Twofold Bay? French SSNs Australia?

Regarding matters raised by Bill Seney in his comments of 15 March 2025, I respond:

The Port of Darwin is a poor choice for even temporary porting (say one month) of a Collins submarine, let alone large SSNs. This is due to its tidal changes (very shallow water a couple of times a day) and consequent inability of a small Collins to leave port for part of the day and/or reliance on creeping through very narrow channels. 

So large US submarine tenders (like the 23,000 tonne Emory S. Land class) are not suited to Darwin's inner harbour. Rather the outer harbour is deep enough for such a tender and for SSNs.

Emory-class tenders are used at US Middle East naval bases (often merely called "wharfs"), the Diego Garcia base, occasionally at HMAS Stirling, but mostly at the US Apra-Guam naval base

Things may be different for much smaller depot ships used by other countries, like the UK, which are scaled down for small-moderate defence budgets. 

Twofold Bay?

If Australia had its own small depot ship an appropriate East Coast deepwater port it could use is underpopulated, uncrowded, Twofold Bay, just south of Eden, NSW. There is already a tiny RAN facility there, which Collins submarines and other RAN warships occasionally use. 

Twofold Bay is midway between Melbourne and Sydney and doesn't suffer from the incumbent high shipping use or population overcrowding of the other three east coast sites considered for an east coast SSN base. There may be ample room to eventually build a 300,000 population city in that area, called the Far South Coast of NSW.

Australia's broader submarine tender/depot discussion frequently extends to depot ships in Australia's Christmas or Cocos Island territories. To that I say submarine depot ships and ported subs are valuable assets that must be defended by near co-located friendly warships and fighter aircraft mostly against Chinese attack.

French SSNs for Australia?

Re part building French SSNs in Adelaide - Australia would have much to do regaining French trust and offering big money to France. AUKUS Pillar One would need to be stone dead FIRST beforehand. US intelligence would know straightaway if we were chatting to the French.

Australia cannot really afford AUKUS let alone courting a simultaneous French SSN deal.

Also its bad timing. France has got its hands full being the alternate nuclear defender of NATO ever since US "diplomacy" became a Russian plaything.

It takes decades to develop an efficient, discrete submarine "reactor package". Even the UK didn't attempt it - instead buying a US S5W reactor for the UK's first nuclear sub and heavily relying on US reactor tech ever since.

100kt warheads for SLBMs are the world standard minimum. Perhaps that would also apply to future Australian submarine launched hypersonic missiles. So yes "boosted fission" or even better 2 stage thermonuclear is the go. 

Buying from Israel might cut corners. But don't tell anyone I thought it up! H-Bomb negotiations are a tad sensitive...

March 25, 2025

Heightened US ITAR Regs Blocking AUKUS: Also SK, NK, Japan, Canadian & Singaporean nuclear issues

In response to Shawn C’s comment of March 10, 2025, I (Pete) say:

Very true and disturbing about the possibility the US may retrospectively heighten ITAR regulations to block Australian access to US and US (via the UK) AUKUS technology. That may see the US reneging on AUKUS Pillar One (Virginia SSNs) and even Pillar Two "AI, cybersecurity and Quantum computing" including US Anduril and Australia DoD/RAN developed GHOST SHARK XLUUVs

Also the US could force the UK to block Australian access to US content/inventions the US passed to the UK eg. in UK reactors for SSN-AUKUS submarines intended for Australian in the late 2030s to 2050s.

I've been looking at the possibility of South Korea (SK) developing a nuclear powered submarine (variously called KSS-N, KSSN and KSSX-N) in several articles since 2012. See https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=kss-n  which yields:

"South Korean...Nuclear KSSX-N Option"
of Feb 22, 2012 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2009/09/south-korea-has-bought-six-more-u-214.html

and

"South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential"
of 16 April 2015 at
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/04/south-korean-submarines-3000-ton-kss.html

What I suspect is currently an NK “nuclear submarine” mock-up or animation at http://www.hisutton.com/North-Korea-Nuclear-Submarine-OSINT.html  may partly be NK responding one better to South Kora’s https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/korean-smr-powered-container-ship-design-revealed

The US has always actively prevented Canada from obtaining SSNs – see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada-class_submarine#American_opposition . This is due to US-Canadian national competition regarding Arctic sea lanes and resources and the US desire to retain its nuclear submarine ownership monopoly in “America’s Western Hemisphere”. Warming of arctic waters, freeing up shipping and submarine access, will only increase US determination to be the SSN monopolist of the Western Hemisphere.

Delays in SK being a potential SSN supplier to Australia includes the 20-40 years SK might take to produce a stealthy SSN design. It has taken the super or great nuclear powers decades to develop quiet SSNs.

Also SK (if unprotected by the unreliable US) is extremely vulnerable to land invasion or "nuking" by neighboring NK, China or Russia. Unlike France, SK has no nuclear deterrent to defend its future SSN shipyard and no current second generation Suffren class SSN already in the water.

Without the US protecting SK, SK's nuclear armed neighbours might take extreme steps to stop SK developing nuclear weapons, SSBNs or SSNs. The same goes for Japan. Japan modifying its 1970s-90s Mutsu nuclear ship reactor into  a submarine reactor https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=mutsu might be violently stopped by Japan’s authoritarian neighbours.

Interesting about Singapore's SMR studies. https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/case-made-for-smrs-to-be-built-underground-to-protect-from-military-and-natural-threats-25-11-2024/ of Nov 12, 2024:

“Small modular reactors (SMRs) should be built underground, including in city centres, to protect them from military attacks, seismic activity and other natural hazards, according to a new academic study. The recommendations come from a paper written by Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) senior fellow Alvin Chew. Academy of Engineering Singapore fellow and International Society for Rock Mechanics and Engineering (ISRM) fellow Zhou Yingxin co-authored the paper.”

March 21, 2025

Rapid US-Russia Friendship Changing Nuke Sub World: France

Now that Russia is tending not to be seen as a threat by the US there may be  fewer US SSNs in the Atlantic Ocean facing Russian SSNs and Russian SSBNs, in the medium-long term. The Atlantic US SSNs may be relocated, with the main US SSN effort being against China (in the Pacific and Indian oceans) and against North Korea.

Whether Russian Pacific Fleet SSBNs, SSGNs and SSNs work in alliance to the Chinese submarine fleet is another uncertainty.

But as US forces and reliability as an ally desert Europe, the Russian threat is rising against the UK, France and the rest of Non US (NUS) NATO. 

The age old Russian Intelligence aim of splitting the Western, especially NATO, alliance is succeeding under Putin, a former KGB officer and FSB boss.

The splitting off of the US from NATO, might make accelerated production of SSNs and SSBNs for the French Navy and also UK Royal Navy a high priority. 

Instead of the planned 6 x SSNs of the Suffren class for France and 7 Astutes for the UK Royal Navy 2 more might be built of each.

The main job of these SSNs are to protect their own navy's SSBNs (leaving and entering port and maybe on patrol). Whether the rolling average of 4 SSBNs in each of the French and UK navies increases is unknown. The 4 new ones planned are the 4 x SNLE-3Gs and 4 x Dreadnoughts.

The reason Britain owns its current Vanguard-class SSBNs are as nuclear weapon platforms. But troublingly the warheads rely on regular US Tritium injections and the warhead guidance systems come from the US. Meanwhile the "UKs" Trident missiles are rented/leased from the US and the Trident's regular maintenance only takes place at King's Bay in  the US. So Britain really needs total Trident system autonomy to operate in Trump's Russian influenced brave new world. 

At least France's SSBNs,  M51 nuclear missiles and M51.1 TNO nuclear warheads are not reliant on a senior ally.

What all this means for Australia's possible basing of US SSNs in Australia (low  likelihood of UK SSNs being based here) and Australian SSN acquisition from the US, the UK or France, is difficult to predict. 

France's increasing need to strengthen its own SSN defences against Russia means French SSNs for any foreign customer is very unlikely. But this does not preclude France from renewing the conventional Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A (Attack-class) deal with Australia.

Russia, unopposed by the US, threatens Russia's European west and also Russia's Siberian east. The latter may present a higher threat to other countries (South Korea and Japan) that might conceivably supply conventional subs to  Australia. This may now make South Korea and Japan hesitant to supply submarines (conventional or, in future, nuclear) to Australia.

Low morale in the Australia's Infant Nuclear Sub Sector

No wonder there is low morale in Australia's infant nuclear submarine sector https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/05/australian-submarine-agency-morale-crisis-asa-nuclear-submarines The pay is high though.

The newly minted UK trained RAN nuclear engineers might find themselves largely side-lined - waiting 20 years till UK built SSN-AUKUS are available. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/aussie-submariners-qualify-as-royal-navy-nuclear-engineers/ There being no Aus Virginias likely. 

With the America first policy US Virginias might not be based in Australia's Fleet Base West after all. Instead Guam, Hawaii and even Diego Garcia might remain more frequented bases.

There are too few Astutes even for Northern Hemisphere service in the Royal Navy with permanent Astute basing in Fleet Base West or even substantial rotations never a serious prospect.

Current RAN nuclear engineers might serve out their career on Royal Navy subs - less likely on US subs - if Australia is "fired" as a US ally. 

March 16, 2025

Updated Japanese Submarine Table: 4th Taigei Commissioned

INTRODUCTION

Japan uses a continuous build (1 new submarine per year) system. New classes (the Taigeis are the latest) are created every 10 years or so. Production is shared between Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). There are gradual improvements (often in diesel, snorkel and sensor systems) within classes and between classes.

Also see SubMatt's Updated History & Photos of Japanese Submarines After WWII of January 17, 2015 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/01/history-of-japanese-submarine-after-wwii.html It contains a vast amount of Japanese originated information on Japanese submarines. From the end of WWII (September 2, 1945) to June 30, 1960 Japan had no operational submarines. 

From December 1957 Japan restarted submarine production based on US experience (eg US Gato class) and based on long institutional experience building advanced submarines for the former WWII 
Imperial Japanese Navy.

The latest news, in the Table below, is the commissioning, on March 6, 2025, of the 4th Taigei-class submarine named Raigei "Thunder Whale"  at KHI's shipyard. It may have between 640 and 960 "SLH" (a semi-secret designation) LIBs which are charged by 2 x 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (total 4,240kW of power)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

TABLE

This Table is unique to Submarine Matters mainly created by "S" Anonymous and Pete.

Japan's Diesel-Electric Classes of Submarine (SSKs)

The Second Oyashio class-Soryus-Taigeis as at March 8, 2025. 

SS
No.
Diesel Type
Motor
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved
Ministry of
Defense Budget
in Billions of
Yen (¥B)
LABs +
AIP:
or LIBs
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Comm
i
ssion
ed
Built
By
5SS + 6SS
now training

Oyashios
8105 +
8106 Oya
shio
¥52.2B FY1993
2 x 12V25/25S 
diesels for all
Oyashio class
(each diesel
2,000kW)
LABs only
1994 & 1995
1996 &
1997
Built
at
KHI
7SS-15SS
8 active Oyashios 
10 subs
SMC-7?
8107
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 15SS Feb
2004
15SS
Nov
2006
15SS
Mar 2008
MHI
&
KHI
16SS
12
Active

Soryus/
Dragon
class  Mk I
8116
Sōryū
means
dragon
2,900 tonnes
surf-
aced
SS-501
¥60B FY2004 
Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki 
+ a SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
Built
at
MHI

Home
Port
Kure
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
Kure
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
Kure
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
Kure
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
Yokosuka
21SS LIBs Concept
Research
Project
No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
   


22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
Yokosuka
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
Kure
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
KHI
Kure
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
12 Oct   2016
MHI
Yokosuka
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
last SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
2014
6 Nov 2017
KHI
Kure
27SS a Soryu
"Mk II" as it
has LIBs. 1st
Soryu
Mk II 
8126
Oryū
11th
Soryu
SS-511
¥64.4B FY2015 
with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,240kW) 
SMC-8B motor. [Wispy & 
Anon
agree it has 640 LIB/SLH modules], other improvements
LIBs only
(SLH type)
Nov
2015
4 Oct
2018
2020
MHI
Kure
28SS Soryu
Mk II, 12th &
final Soryu
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
"2,950t" surfaced
12V25/25SB 
diesels
[
Wispy & Anon 
agree
 it has 640 LIB/SLH modules],
LIBs
Jan 2017
KHI
Yokosuka
29SS
1st
Taigei
Class

means
Whale
3,000 tonne
(surfaced)
8128
Taigei
"Big 
whale
"

Used as
a test
sub. Not
opera-
tional
SS-513
¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29)
Higher ¥76budget 
may be due to 1st of class many changes. 
2 x
4,240kW)[Wispy 
says 640 LIB/SLH modules, 
Anon says 720.]
SLH
LIBs
maybe
960

14 Oct
2020
 
9 Mar 2022
MHI

Home
Port
Yokosuka
30SS 
2nd Taigei Class 
8129
Hakugei
"White
whale
"
First
opera-
tional
Taigei

SS-514
¥71.5B FY2018 
(Heisei 30)
says 640 LIB/SLH modules, Anon says 720.]
SLH
LIBs
KHI

Home
Port
Kure
01SS 
3rd
Taigei Class
8130
Jingei
"Swift
whale
"
SLH
LIBs
maybe
960+
8 Mar
2024
MHI
02SS 
4th
Taigei Class 
8131
Raigei
Thunder
whale
SS-516
Impro
ved SLH
LIBs
26 Mar
2021
Mar 6
2025
KHI
03SS
4th or 5th?
Taigei Class
SS-517
LIBs 
19 Apr
2022
March
2026?
MHI
04SS
SS-518
LIBs
2022?
KHI
05SS 
8134
SS-519
LIBs
2023?
2025?
2027?
MHI
06SS
8135
SS-520
¥95.00FY2024 
enhanced detection
capabilities to
effectively conduct
info gathering
warning &
surveillance
page 24  
[1]
LIBs 
2024?
2026?
2028?
KHI
07SS 
8136
SS-521
¥B? FY2025
LIBs
2025?
2027?
2029?
MHI
08SS 
8137
SS-522
¥B? FY2026

LIBs
2026?
2028?2030?
KHI
Key to Table: Table information provided by S = Anonymous to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B
 = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 
---

[1] Japanese “Ministry of Defense Progress and Budget in Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities: Overview of the FY2024 Budget” page 23 
at 
https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/20240607a.pdf

From the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD): "Defense Budget" List going back to Financial Year FY2020 at https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html