January 14, 2025

Low Virginia SSN Production Coming to a Head Under Trump

Once the Biden-Harris Administration (wedded to AUKUS) lost the November 5, 2024 Election US Admirals became increasingly frank in their assessments that US industry couldn’t build Virginia SSNs quickly enough to meet USN, let alone AUKUS-Australian, needs.

Karen Middleton, Political Editor of Guardian Australia, has written an excellent article, Top admiral warns US far behind on building submarines needed to meet Aukus target, dated November 19, 2024 (ie. 2 weeks after Trump won the 2024 Election).

Middleton describes the outlook of the USN officer Rear Admiral Jon Rucker, program executive officer for Attack Submarines (PEO SSN), who is most in the know about Virginia class production limitations.

See Karen Middleton’s whole article at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/19/aukus-submarine-deal-richard-marles-on-track

[Pete Comment] Admiral Rucker's main job is to know more about Virginia SSN shipyard labor shortages and delayed supply chain realities than politicians. In the article Rucker:

“confirmed construction is behind schedule and nowhere near the rate required to supply Australia’s Aukus nuclear submarines on schedule… the US had “an exceptionally fragile” military shipbuilding base and could not meet construction rates for its own vessels this year… a materials [read supply chain] shortage had affected the sequencing order of manufacturing and slowed down the production rate."

Backing up Rusker’s warning the USN’s director of Navy reactors, Admiral Bill Houston, said:

the nature of global threats meant “there may be a need for more [high priority] Columbias [SSBNs also sharing Virginia SSN shipyards]” – appearing to signal the production pressures may only increase.

“We are not in low-rate production,” Houston was reported as saying. “We are in the highest rate of production we’ve been in as a nation [but] with an industrial base that’s less than half the size [than in the cold war]. It’s an exceptionally fragile industrial base. It’s with an industrial base that is very, very challenged.”

In the article see the declining political claims of outgoing US Defense Secretary Austin (loyal to Biden’s AUKUS Virginia offer to the end). Austin said:

he was “confident” the submarines would be provided.

“Now, we recognise that there are challenges in the industrial base and we’re doing things to address those challenges,” he said.

Austin said he had met the leaders of the companies involved [mainly GDEB and HII (also see APDR) who have publicized severe labor shortages and supply chain delays] and was encouraged by “their focus to get this done, and they will get it done”.

Australia’s part-time Defence Minister Richard Marles claimed:

 “the incoming Trump administration would honour the Aukus submarine deal, pointing to its bipartisan support in the US Congress.”

“The Greens’ defence spokesperson – and Aukus critic – Senator David Shoebridge, said Rucker’s comments proved the deal was “a mess”.”

See Karen Middleton’s whole excellent article at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/19/aukus-submarine-deal-richard-marles-on-track

Pete Comment

The US Admirals are taking a risk telling the truth. They probably aim to cover themselves because they might be compelled to share blame for low Virginia SSN production output.

However the incoming Trump Administration might listen to their advice more closely than the outgoing Biden Administration. Biden, unlike Trump, is/was politically wedded to the success of AUKUS Pillar 1.

But it will be a future President, likely in 2031, who will finally decide if any Virginias can be spared for Australia. That future President will be guided by US naval advice. The USN has advised (privately for years and now publicly) that the low Virginia production rate is a long term problem and it competes with higher priority Columbia production. Columbia production hasn't been meeting major deadlines due to the same supply chain delays experienced with Virginias.

I’m also more persuaded by the warnings of US Admirals than politicians’ references to “honour”.

January 9, 2025

PLAN Subs in US DoD 2024 China Military Power Report: AUKUS Subs?

The risk that China may rapidly build up its Type 093 and 095 SSN and Type 094 and 096 SSBN numbers needs to be accounted for by a stepped up US Virginia SSN construction insurance policy. Within the risk equation is also high quality Russian Yasen SSNs and Borei/Borey SSBNs (also see). During the First Cold War a rolling average of up to 20 UK SSNs (augmented by UK SSKs) used to assist in countering the Russian threat. But in this Second Cold War there is a rolling average of 7 UK SSNs. Unfortunately the planned part solution of Australian AUKUS Virginias in the 2030s is receding as a possibility due to the shortfall in US Virginia production.  

Below, the US Department of Defense (DoD) predicts "modest" growth in Chinese submarine numbers through to 2035. This is even though China has demonstrated a surprising ability to rapidly construct vessels of all types - including submarines. 

I therefore suspect this modest growth prediction may be partly for US political reasons. That is the US DoD is predicting low Chinese production to match the US's own clearly identified slow pace of Virginia SSN production. It now appears Columbia SSBN construction (with priority over Virginia production and competing in shipyard construction with Virginias) is behind schedule. 

An implication for Australia is slow pace in US SSN production may mean no US SSNs under AUKUS for Australia during the 2030s. This is because the USN may need all the SSNs it can get to face any risk of substantial growth in Chinese SSN, SSBN and SSK numbers.

On December 18, 2024 the US Department of Defense (DoD) published the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress better known as the China Military Power Report. It is at https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF

In this first article I will record what the 2024 China Military Power Report says about Chinese submarines. I've also added hyperlinks from Wikipedia partly because the don't suffer "link rot" in the longer term:

Page 48 [2] Key Takeaways
[1]
The [People’s Liberation Army Navy] PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines
[and 2] In the near term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.

Page 52 – Service Capabilities and Modernization. The PLAN has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it matures its force, integrates new technologies, and expands its shipyards. The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity. The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced ASCMs. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO

Page 53 - class SS units, eight of which can launch ASCMs. PRC shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electricair-independent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class 877EKM submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.


Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM [a later JL-3 variant or a JL-4?]. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.”

The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with LACMs.

Page 54 Eight of the PLAN’s 12 KILO class SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b [Kalibr] ASCM (120 nm). The PRC’s SONG-class SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ18, which constitutes an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM.

…The PLAN recognizes that long-range [Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles] ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to reach their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for high-fidelity targeting information for surface and subsurface launch platforms.

…In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field [Land Attack Cruise Missiles] LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and the developmental SHANG III SSGN [the Type 093B]. The PLAN could retrofit its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options, enabling the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region.

Page 56 For the PLAN and CCP, the possession of SSBNs has long been an important symbol of achieving great power status. The PRC has six operational Type 094 JIN-class SSBNs. These submarines are conducting at sea deterrent patrols. The PLAN’s JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 SLBMs, JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20), representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent. With six operational SSBNs, the PLAN has the capacity to maintain a constant at sea deterrent presence. With a range of approximately 3,900 nm, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean to threaten targets in the western half of the continental United States (CONUS) (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii to threaten targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400 nm, which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from [Bastion defended] PRC littoral waters. The PLAN’s next generation SSBN, the Type 096, is expected to enter service the late 2020s or early 2030s. Considering the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate the Type 094 and Type 096 SSBNs concurrently.

…The PLAN’s submarine fleet is similarly positioned to maintain high readiness, with an increasing focus on real-world contingency training further from shore for longer periods of

Page 57 – time. This operationally aligned training is part of regular patrols, in line with expanding maritime domain requirements to operate proficiently in near and far seas. The submarine force is aspiring toward a capability for integrated operations to enable more dynamic tasking and response to support force modernization goals.

Page 83 - PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways
• The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific region.
• The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
• The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the
FIC [expansion of “FIC” acronym unknown?].

Page 84 - The PLA’s [Anti-access/area denial] A2AD - also known as counter intervention—capabilities are the most robust in the FIC although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the Philippine Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.

PRC messaging to Indo-Pacific countries probably seeks to cast the United States and its allies as untrustworthy external actors interfering with internal affairs, hegemonic regional aggressors, and violators of international law. Beijing likely uses official government statements, state-run media, and online disinformation to promote a narrative that Washington seeks to initiate a new Cold War by pressuring Indo-Pacific countries to ally with the United States and strategically encircle the PRC. The PRC’s Indo-Pacific messaging efforts further recast Washington’s regional engagements and partnerships, including the Quad and AUKUS, as hegemonic efforts to effectuate bloc-based regional confrontation and undermine regional stability… Earlier in 2023, PRC official statements and state media sought to inaccurately characterize the AUKUS partnership as a hegemonic nuclear-powered submarine cooperation agreement that undermined the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

Page 88 - In the “Deep Sea” domain, the PLAN would use submarines - including conventional and nuclear armed - to achieve deterrence while being able to strike the enemy’s surface and shore targets, strike and destroy enemy submarines, and destroy the enemy’s maritime lines of communication. To this end, submarine-launched variants of the YJ-18 anti-ship missile are likely installed on the nuclear-powered SHANG SSN as well as the SONG and YUAN class submarines. The recently launched SHANG III SSGN will further enhance the PLAN’s surface warfare capability by providing a stealthy, land-attack option if armed with LACMs.

The PLAN provides a sea-based strategic deterrent with its SSBNs. The JIN SSBN can carry up to 12 JL-2 SLBMs with a range of 3,900 nm. By the early 2030s, a newer, multiple-warhead [JL-4?] SLBM with a range of 5,400 nm could be developed for the next generation Type 096 SSBN.

Page 128 - New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority in the FIC and deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict

Page 150 - Naval and Shipbuilding Industry. The PRC, the top commercial ship-producing nation in the world by most industry measures, has sufficient capacity to produce any required numbers of naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. The PRC has developed unmanned underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019.

Page 153 - PRC ARMS EXPORTS As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment, including UAVs, MANPADS, submarines, naval surface vessels, SAM systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

Naval Combatants. The PRC is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by Pakistan’s 2015 purchase of eight YUAN class submarines for more than $3 billion. Thailand purchased one YUAN class submarine in 2017. In 2024, the PRC accepted Thailand’s proposal to purchase two offshore patrol vessels or one frigate. As of April 2024, the PRC had not delivered any Yuan submarines, although it had delivered two MING class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 and 2018, the PRC sold two frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan, respectively. In September 2019, the PRC made its first-ever sale of a landing platform dock ship to Thailand. In April 2023, Thailand received a new frigate to serve as a submarine tender.

Page 165 - TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, NAVAL FORCES 
Totals                                                For PRC              For Taiwan
Attack Submarines (SSK)                 47                         4
SSNs                                                 6                           0

SSBNs                                              6                           0 

++++++++++++

Another useful reference is Wikipedia's PLAN Submarine Force which contains a vast number of embedded hyperlinks.

December 21, 2024

Pakistan Negotiating With China to Acquire Nuclear Second-Strike Capability?

On December 13, 2024, Drop Site News published a report that alleged that the Pakistani Government requested help from China in order to create a survivable nuclear second-strike capability. This was in return for eventually allowing the Chinese PLA Navy to build permanent basing facilities at Gwadar. Such a base would have placed China's navy in a better position to influence events in the Middle East, including protecting China's oil and gas sources. The report claimed that the Chinese side rejected Pakistan's request.

Pakistan may have requested the capability to launch nuclear-armed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Ballistic missile submarines are usually nuclear-powered (SSBNs). SSBNs would undoubtedly be ideal second-strike platforms from a survivability standpoint. But, in my opinion, the cost and complexity of such a platform would place it outside the realistic reach of the Pakistani military for the foreseeable future.

However, as South (and North) Korea have recently proved, a conventionally-powered diesel submarine platform, with or without AIP, can also be utilized for the purpose of ballistic missile launch. Such subs, without the N (for nuclear powered) are called SSBs, which are less survivable than SSBNs due to limited underwater endurance. 

However, an SSB (especially one with AIP) can still enhance a country's nuclear deterrence posture. This is achieved by discouraging adversaries from attempting debilitating nuclear first-strikes due to the increased risk factor involved in dealing with a retaliating submerged platform.


Display model of a Type 032 Qing-class SSB, used by the PLA Navy to test SLBM technologies.
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Close-up of the SLBM launch tubes on the Type 032 Qing-class.
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The one and only Type 032 submarine.
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It is not entirely clear why China may have rejected Pakistan's request (if the report is true). Might China have rejected any Pakistani request for an SSBN or SSB due to counter-proliferation principles? Or did China feel that the Pakistani offer of Gwadar as a permanent Chinese naval base was an insufficient offer in return for such a capability? 

I think it is plausible that such a deal, if and when struck, would likely involve China transferring sufficient technology, under the table, to build an SSB within Pakistan itself. The secrecy would be necessary to avoid China being seen as violating the NPT (to which China is a signatory while Pakistan is not). 

Such a transfer of technology might manifest as a continuation of the Type 039A Yuan/Hangor-class production line at Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW). Of the Hangors ordered by Pakistan in 2015, 4 are being built in China and 4 in Karachi.

The Pakistani SSBs could be a larger variant of the Hangor-class. The Hangors and Chinese Yuans in general, could be seen as a design evolution of the Soviet Kilo-class SSK. A major improvement of the Yuans (and Hangors) over the Kilos are the their Stirling engine-based AIP propulsion

Alternatively Pakistani SSBs could turn out to be an operational variant of China's sole Type 032 Qing-class submarine (pictured above). The Qing is a diesel-electric submarine which has already been used by China to test JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs and related technologies from a conventionally-powered platform, hence the Qing can be considered as having proven itself as an SSB test submarine.

Pakistan May Already Have 5 Nuclear Weapon Submarines

Irrespective of how Pakistan-China negotiations go in future, Pakistan will not be entirely dependent on acquiring a Chinese designed SSB to launch nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has a submarine-launched version of its nuclear capable Babur cruise missile (specifically the Babur III submarine launched cruise missile or SLCM). Pakistan's 2 x conventional Hashmat-class (Agosta-70) and 3 x conventional and AIP equipped Khalid-class (Agosta-90B) submarines may be capable of launching Babur IIIs. Once the 8 x Hangor-class are commissioned they might also carry nuclear tipped Babur III SLCMs.


Babur subsonic land-attack cruise missile in flight during a test launch.
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Deployed on even conventional submarines the Babur might be a significant second-strike weapon. If it has stealthy, low flying, flight characteristics, the subsonic Babur cruise missile might be somewhat survivable against networked anti-missile systems. The Babur is believed to be powered by a Chinese engine of the same type that powers the CJ-10. The Babur could present a significant complication for any country that might seek to pre-emptively destroy Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and other high value targets. 

Pakistani ship or submarine launched nuclear-tipped missile of any type comes with significant command and control risks. Surface warships in particular that are capable of firing Baburs are hijack risks, as a previous attempt was already made (linked above), helped by elements within the Pakistan Navy who were loyal to extremist causes. However these might be risks the Pakistani National Command Authority considers worth taking to improve the chances of national survival.

As an aside, on December 19, 2024 the US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer stated that Pakistan intends to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with the ability to reach the United States. On December 18, 2024 the US announced further sanctions on agencies and companies involved in Pakistan's missile program, which DNSA Finer labelled an "emerging threat" to the US.


Existing (as of 2021) Pakistani missile systems and their reported ranges. Graphic via CSIS.


Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly could have begun development of a nuclear-powered submarine platform. While it remains to be seen where this project will go, it could present a future export possibility for countries like Pakistan and Iran. A cost sharing program in turn might allow all three countries to pursue a truly survivable second-strike capability in the long term.

December 20, 2024

Aussie Christmas Song


“Santa Swapped His Sleigh For A Surfboard” An original composition by Australian singer/songwriter Craig Stewart.
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Thanks everyone who read Submarine Matters and commented during 2024. 

Wishing everyone Seasons Greetings.

Pete

December 16, 2024

US Airstrikes Target Iran Proxies & Islamic State in Syria

At https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II#Operational_history

“On 29 November and 3 December 2024, USAF A-10s were used against targets in Syria to defend US forces in eastern Syria as part of the ongoing Syrian civil war. The USAF said the strikes destroyed vehicles, mortars, and a T-64 tank.[130] Concurrent with the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December, A-10s participated alongside B-52s and F-15Es in what the USAF said were "dozens" of airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets. The strikes were intended to prevent ISIS from benefitting from the political upheaval in Syria.[131]


++++++++++++++


Video here and above by Chris Cappy and Diego Aceituno (they also wrote description below) at Task and Purpose December 15/16, 2024. Edited by Syed.

"The Syrian civil war has exploded again leading to the United States Air Force executing an A-10 Warthog gun run against Iranian backed proxy militias. Just when you think the A-10 is ready to retire it comes out swinging. The strike KOed three rocket artillery trucks, a T-64 tank, an Armored Personnel Carrier, and a mortar battery.

Today I want to try to untangle this absolute cluster f--k of a situation and investigate whether the US really backed the rebels with material support to overthrow Assad. Why did Syria, Russian and Iranian forces fail to hold the line? Who is this mysterious rebel group that’s taken over the country? All these questions are important but the most important thing is that hopefully the Syrian people themselves stop getting the short end of the stick in the outcome.

According to US Central Command, These strikes were conducted “in self defense”. They claim the gun run was to neutralize an imminent attack that was aimed at the nearby [US] Military Support Site code named “Euphrate” which is a US-led coalition base that’s traded fire with both ISIS and Iranian proxies before."  

December 10, 2024

First Images of Japan's Type-12 (Upgraded) SSM, Hypersonic Missiles?

The first photos of the new version of Japan's Type-12 Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) have been released to the public by Japan's ATLA (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency).


This report from Naval News has the details (and more pictures). But broadly, the main improvement seems to be an increase in range from 200 km (on the previous Type-12) to a reported 900 km (with an eventual aim of reaching 1,200 km). This will give the Japanese Self Defense Forces a longer, stand-off reach to tackle targets.

Additionally, it appears the new airframe of the missile is designed to minimize its radar signature to make it more difficult for adversaries to detect or shoot down the missile as it approaches. This is a feature that previous-generation SSMs lacked and they could therefore be detected at longer ranges, giving more time for adversaries to prepare defences.

This previous SubMatts article from January 2022 by Pete, with information mainly from Anonymous, goes into the details of how the Type-12 missile achieves these enhanced capabilities.





Japan expects to field the improved Type-12 missile in operational units by around 2026. The Type-12 (Upgrade) is reportedly designed primarily for aircraft and ship-based usage but ground-based launchers might also become viable to use once the full range envelop is realized.

Given the presence of what appears to be a small air scoop/inlet on the underside of the missile (see first image from top), it would seem that the new missile is indeed powered by an air-breathing engine, a turbofan. The turbofan (below) is actually identified in January 2022 SubMatts article


Turbofan Engine (a jet) of improved Type-12 SSM.
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Subsonic Missiles to Supersonic, even Hypersonic

This would mean that the new Type-12, like its predecessors, would primarily or wholly travel at subsonic speeds (below Mach 1). Such a slow speed might be unable to defeat the suite of SSM-countermeasures used by China's PLA Navy. Japan may need to develop supersonic missiles like the Indian-Russian BrahMos or even hypersonic missiles to compete with Russia's hypersonic Zircon, emerging Chinese missiles and future North Korean developments.

In order to increase its survivability, the new Type-12 would have to rely almost entirely on its stealth characteristics - which is in line with the strategy employed by the United States' LRASM missile.

Japan, much like the US and other countries is pursuing gradual development of hypersonic weapon systems like the Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) program (tested earlier this year). But the results of these technology-demonstration efforts might take much longer to emerge in the form of operational weapon systems.

Until then, the Type-12 (Upgrade) would likely become Japan's go-to SSM for Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW). It might remain the mainstay even after some hypersonic missiles or gliding projectiles are inducted. Hypersonic missiles are expensive and difficult to develop - and to replenish once used.

Japan might need to rely on the US to fully develop hypersonic weapons in reasonable timeframes. Japan might then eventually secure licensed production rights to reduce reliance on US supplies.