January 20, 2016

Additional Data - One Japanese estimate, Build + Maintain 10 Australian Submarines

COST FORMULA

S has made an interesting comment as follows:

“[S] analyzed cost of Soryu based on budget, and [S] concluded that Australia can build and maintain 10 submarines for 30 years (total cost 1,600B Yen) [= approximately A$20 Billion] under a proper management system. 

Modification cost of 29SS to Aus 1 [per submarine for Australia] is 5 B Yen [A$62 million].

Adoption cost of US combat system is not high.

Premium [build] cost in Australia is 10B Yen

30years- operation cost is double of building cost.

Life cycle cost for 30 years = {basic cost (65B) +US combat (0B)+ modification (5B)+ premium (10B)}x 2= 160B Yen [= approximately A$2 Billion per submarine]

[S] January 18, 2016 at 1:15 AM”

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

The figures above in square […] brackets are in Australian dollars where
1B = 1 Billion Yen = 12.4 million Australian dollars (A$) at January 18, 2016 exchange rates.

Building and maintaining 10 submarines for 30 years (at total cost 1,600B Yen) [approximately A$20 Billion] appears to be an attractive all up price.

1. However if:

Building cost is {basic cost (65B) +US combat (0B)+ modification (5B)+ premium (10B) = 80B Yen = aproximately A$992 million 

and 

"30 years operation cost is double of building cost" = 2 x A$992 million = A$1.984 Billion

Then wouldn't total for "Building and maintaining 10 submarines for 30 years" = A$992 million + A$1.984 Billion = A$2.976 Billion per submarine = approximately A$3 Billion per submarine?

Making Total for all 10 approximately A$30 Billion?

Actually A$30 Billion is much lower than a September 2015 estimate of $40 Billion ($14 Billion "Build" + $26 Billion "Maintain").

2.  I assume that the Maintain costs would not include personnel costs for (Navy + Defence civilian) pay and updating Combat System costs?

ADDITIONAL DATA - FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE FORMULA FROM S

On January 19, 2016 S provided further comments:

LCC, Software and Labour Costs etc

“Life cycle cost (LCC) means total cost including design, building, operation/maintenance and abolishment stages. The Japanese MoD reports LCC of submarines based on the actual data every year. I estimate LCC is twice of building cost in the case of 30 years, it means LCC of one submarine is 160B yen [A$ 2 Billion].

Hardware of command system is not so expensive, but the US license fee for US [mainly Combat System and Weapons] software should be considered. The torpedo tube [electronics and software updates and hardware replacements] is expensive, but I think US torpedo tubes costs may be cheaper than Japanese, [because the US can spread the cost of tubes over large existing fleet of SSNs  and Ohio subs and the 2 to 3 Virginia SSNs per year that the US is building].

For a new Australian submarine modification of fuel tanks, improvement of endurance and hull lengthening will be conducted, but they are not bigger modification than between the Oyashio-to-[currently being built late model Soryu Mark 2s] (+8B yen). Improvement for the earlier Soryus Mark 1s included hull lengthening, [Anechoic tiles] and installation of AIP.

[Of the 65B Yen per submarine – see above formula] 30B yen, amounting to about 50% of Building cost is labour cost. I considered the GDP per capita ratio between Japan and Australia (= 0.6), then premium becomes 10B yen (= 30B yen x 0.5/0.6).

1600B yen LCC for 10 subs may be tough, but 2400B yen [800B Building cost + 1600B LCC for the whole Australian  submarine fleet] I think is very achievable.”

Delete
SPECIFIC COSTS FOR 23SS 

As an example. 23SS launched October 2014 – to be commissioned March 2016.

[Pete Comment - Much of the costings below can be considered elements of the Japanese Combat System. This Combat System is likely to have many commonalities with the US AN/BYG-1 Combat System, given Japan uses the Harpoon missile, (Mark 48 similar) Type 89 torpedo and the Japanese Navy operates closely with the US Navy. Both the Japanese Main (including half the submarine fleet) Fleet and US Seventh Fleet ar based at Yokosuka thus likely to share many C3 - Command, Control & Communications (hardware, software and personnel “wetware”)].

S said “According to official data, costs of 23SS (total cost 54.6B yen) are as follows:

Command System (2.5B yen):

C2T (Command and Control Terminal) & MTA (Maritime Terminal Adapter), LCS (Launch Control System), NICI (Navigational Instruments Connection Interface), TDBS (Target Data Base Server) and TDS(Tactical Display System)

Weapon and Sensor System (10B yen):

Electro-optic mast, 13m Periscope, Submarine sonar system, Jamming system, Radar system, 53cm Torpedo tube, Harpoon launching system, Submarine decoy, Sound device for submarine decoy


[Upgrades to Torpedo and Harpoon missiles? (1.5B)]

Communication System (0.4B yen):

Radio communication device, Secure &Encryption device, Bridge information display, Submarine signal flare, Antisubmarine morse signal, Rescue signal generator for submarine

Propulsion, [LAB] Batteries, Generators and Building Costs (40B yen):

Submarine electric motor, Stirling AIP, Submarine building, Diesel generator, Main batteries, Condenser of cooling units.”

S and Pete

January 19, 2016

Israel's Dolphin Submarines, Naval Bases and SigInt Network

At Haifa Naval Base , in mid September 2014, missile boats and civilian yatchs welcome entry of  Dolphin 2 class, INS Tannin or Rahav? Note how its blue hull and fin camoflage it against the Mediterranean Sea and sky.
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The Israeli Navy (including the Submarine Service/Flotilla and the largest, corvette sized, surface ships are mainly based at Haifa in northern Israel. Haifa is Israel’s third largest city and the country’s largest port

Israel's TKMS built Dolphin Submarines

The most important part of the Israeli Navy is the submarine service of 5 Dolphin class submarines. They are most important in overall tonnage, intelligence acquisition value, conventional weapons capability and the submarines are the only part of the Israeli Navy with nuclear weapons. The Dolphins are developments of TKMS's Type 209 and 212As

The German Government (maybe cross-subsidised by the US Government) has paid about one third of the cost of the Dolphins. This is a post Holocaust German donation to Israel. 

The Dolphin 1 class (early history) consists of three submarines:

-  INS Dolphin (delivered 1999)
-  INS Livyathan (in English "Whale" delivered 1999)
-  INS Tekumah ("Revival" delivered 2000)

AIP Dolphin 2 class: The Dolphin 2s have fuel cell air independent propulsion (AIP) probably to allow them to sit on the seafloor. 

The principal "SSBK" mission is to provide a first or second strike using "Popeye Turbo" missiles against Tehran. This may involve sitting on the floor of the Arabian and/or Mediterranean Seas for 2 to 3 weeks. Interestingly the Dolphin 2s (and maybe Dolphin 1s) have Triton anti-helicopter missiles.

The Dolphin 2 class consists of two submarines delivered and one (INS Dakar) on order: 

-  INS Tannin (Crocodile, delivered in 2012)
-  INS Rahav (in English "Splendour" or "Prostitute"? delivered in 2014)
-  INS Dakar ("Grouper fish" or "Swordfish" ordered 21 March 2012, expected operational 2019) 


In (map above) see Israel's Naval Bases from north to south:

-  Haifa (the main and largest base) located in northern Israel. As well as the submarines Haifa hosts 3 corvettes (Israeli Navy's largest surface ships) and smaller boats - all in the Missile Boats Flotilla. The corvettes are 1,200 ton Sa'ar 5-class (commissioned in 1994-95),

The Naval Training Base is also at Haifa, containing submarine operations school, missile boat operations school and naval command school. The naval training base also functions as the Israeli Naval Academy. Israel is a small place so most things are packed in together and most people know one another way back!

-  Atlit Navy "SEAL" Base is 20 km south of Haifa. The "SEAL" unit might be called "Shayetet 13".

-  Tel Aviv (Navy HQ) and likely navy supported SigInt and military intelligence center. Tel Aviv is Israel’s second largest city (after Jerusalem). 

-  Ashdod (Patrol Boats Squadron 916) is 30 km south of Tel Aviv, 

-  Eliat (patrol boats and maybe submarine replenishment, in south) is on the Gulf of Aqaba - with access to the Red Sea and then Arabian Sea (the SSBK station against Iran).


Haifa Naval Base is just on the land side of the breakwater to the left of "HAIFA PORT" as marked on the map. (Map courtesy Orange Smile maps)
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Israeli Signals Intelligence (SigInt)

Navies are more than vessels (subs and ships) and "spit and polish" shore establishments. Communications and intelligence are equally essential.

The “Israeli NSA” (with the typically bland cover name “Unit 8200”) is manned by Israeli Defence Force (IDF) service members (including Navy) as well as by civilians. The Israeli NSA staff are mainly programmers and university graduates in engineering, computer science and other technological professions.

The Israeli Navy SigInt feeder network to Israeli NSA would come from naval bases (especially from Matam technology park, Haifa?) and from submarines and ships tasked with electronic intelligence gathering missions. Non-military inputs would also come from Mossad and Israel's FBI like "Shin Bet/Shabak".

The Israeli NSA would be co-located with the IDF's command, communications and all source military intelligence functions. All of them within Tel Aviv's IDF HQ at HaKirya. As aficionados of SigInt know SigInt is all about targeted collection and computer processing all serving customer analysts.

The Israeli NSA's main target would be terrorism. Russian operations (including Tartus) over the border in Syria would be another major target. Close relations-sharing  with other NSAs are likely.

The Israeli Navy is one of the customers and larger vessel operations might be assisted by NSA work in real time.

An Israeli Dolphin (1 or 2?) submarine and a US Arleigh Burke class destroyer at Haifa Naval Base, northern Israel. Great location, but shame about all the conflict and terrorism nearby. (Photos via Foxtrot Alpha)
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Israel's main naval base is at Haifa. (courtesy). One can theorise where the nuclear "Popeye Turbo" missiles are stored and fitted into Dolphin submarines.
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See previous Submarine Matters articles on the Dolphin Submarines: here (nuclear missiles), here (Israeli "218"), and here (some good out of water hull photos). Using "Dolphin" in search box reveals other Dolphin articles in Submarine Matters.

Here is an interesting February 12, 2016 article on Israel's Dolphin submarines, their weapons, other specs and operating/transit issues: http://www.globalresearch.ca/israels-nuclear-armed-submarine-fleet-in-mediterranean-threatens-europe-and-middle-east/5507364 .
Pete 

January 17, 2016

Analysts indicate US hopes Australia buys the Soryu

An earlier meeting of Prime Minister Turnbull and President Obama, This was at the APEC Meeting in Manila in mid November 2015 where Obama unexpectedly invited Prime Minister Turnbull to Washington tomorrow (on January 18,  2016) (Photo courtesy AAP via SBS Australia).
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In the influential US National Interest website American academic and policy analyst Micheal J. Green and Australian academic and policy analyst Andrew Shearer have written an excellent analysis of January 17, 2016. This is concerning Australian Prime Minister Turnbull’s visit to Washington on January 18, 2016. Washington DC is 16 hours behind Sydney time - so a 3pm meeting in Washington (Jan 18) might only be reported Sydney time around 8 or 9 am Tuesday (Jan 19)! Parts of their analysis, most relevant to Submarine Matters, include the following. I have bolded the submarine part:

"On Monday, Australia’s new Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull makes his first official visit to Washington, D.C.

The two countries’ interests, values and perspectives are largely aligned, and support for the Australia-U.S. alliance is strong and bipartisan in each.

The Australian government supported the recent U.S. freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, and recently a Royal Australian Air Force plane flew through contested maritime territory. Yet the administration was blindsided by news that a Chinese company would be given a long-term lease over strategically important commercial port facilities used by the U.S. military in Darwin; according to American officials, the matter was not raised by the Australian side at ministerial talks that took place immediately before the deal was announced.

Another area the leaders should discuss is how Australia and the United States can work more closely with Japan in light of Prime Minister Abe’s recently passed security reforms. The three countries have a track record of close cooperation—for example, in stabilization operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, in responding to natural disasters such as the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and in shaping regional institutions. But the relaxation of constraints on the Japanese military’s right to exercise collective self-defense, and on the export of Japanese defense technology and equipment, opens up significant opportunities to strengthen trilateral security cooperation and the ability of the three militaries to operate together.

The most pressing of these [opportunities] is the replacement of Australia’s current fleet of aging diesel electric submarines. Appropriately, the administration has been careful not to take sides in the intense competition among France, Germany and Japan to partner with Australia in the development of the new submarine. But senior U.S. officials and military officers are in no doubt both as to the superior capability of the Japanese Soryu class and to the long-term strategic benefits to the United States and the region of an interoperable fleet of Australian and Japanese conventional submarines equipped with U.S. combat systems—particularly in an increasingly contested maritime environment in which undersea warfare will be critical”

January 15, 2016

Aus Future Submarine Program, Yen in, Dragons out

OYASHIO - SORYU TABLE (latest as at January 19, 2016)

SS
No.
Building
No.
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi-ssioned
Built
By
5SS
8105
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B
FY1993
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios
10 subs
8106
-8115
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 Feb 1994
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS Soryu
Mark 1
8116
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No
21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
Mar 2013
Nov 2015
Mar 2017
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
Oct 2013
Nov 2016
Mar 2018
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
LABs + AIP
?
?
Mar 2019
KHI
27SS
Soryu
Mark 2
8126
SS-511
¥64.3B FY2015 new: snorkel, sonar, floating deck & G-RX6 torpedo
LIBs only
?
?
Mar 2020
MHI
28SS
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
LIBs only
?
?
Mar 2021
KHI
29SS
?
?
 1st of New Class
LIBs only
?
?
?
?
Aus1
?
?
 Super SoryuAU
LIBs only
2023?
2025?
2027?
in Aus
Aus2 to 8?
?
?
 Super SoryuAU
LIBs only
2024?
2026
2028
in Aus

Table mainly courtesy of updates provided to Submarine Matters by Japanese sources. Note that it summarises the 11 submarines of the Oyashio Program (5SS - 15SS) then continues through the Soryu Program (16SS onwards)

* The Dragon names have been removed – while important in Japanese culture such names are not important to Australian or Americans. Instead the column is filled with Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved Budget Amounts in Yen (¥) Billions (B) (¥1 Billion = A$12 million on Jan 15, 2016). FY = First Year of Budgeting. These Yen  and FY years were provided by S to Submarine Matters for the article of January 13, 2016.

** LAB = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIB = lithium-ion batteries. 


On January 16, 2016 in the Comment Thread S explained:

“The budgets for the Soryu are 20SS (¥51B), 22SS (¥52.8B), 23SS (¥54.6B), 24SS (¥54.7B), 25SS (¥53.1B) and 26SS (¥51.7B). The fluctuation of the cost is due to a combination of yearly small modifications and a continuous effort toward cost reduction as follows:

-  the MoD investigates the flow of funds to private companies on payee, expenditure and contract for procurement of submarines, and confirms that there are no problems. The cost audit after fulfillment of submarine building has been conducted from FY2002.

-  as a result of effort toward cost reduction including use of government supply, adoption of open tender and reduction of man-hours, the executed price has gradually decreased from FY2004 to FY 2007.

The man-hours of the second batch of MHI and KHI launched submarines (18SS and 19SS respectively) is about 10% lower than for the first batch (that being MHI 16SS and KHI 17SS) achieved by reduction of man-hours. This is achieved through learning, setting of standard man-hours for similar work and through time management.

PETE COMMENT 

The broad future decisions on the Australian choice (of Japan, TKMS or DCNS) are up to the National Security Committee of the Australian Cabinet with a decision likely late 2016. Much will then depend on a managerial-industrial mix of Australian companies and the "winner" (eg. Japan) building 2/3s of the subs and US companies (Raytheon and/or Lockheed Martin (as possible integrator) for 1/3 = Combat System and Weapons). Ideally Japanese expertise/experience will have main carriage of the 2/3s + 1/3s integration as a it would be messy if all three countries were constantly negotiating throughout the Program.

Undelining that the Submarine Program would not be just an Australian-Japan affair is that politically powerful Lockheed Martin has opened a Combat System Laboratory in Adelaide. A US citizen (Rear Adm (rtd) Stephen Johnson US Navy) has already been appointed General Manager, Australian Future Submarine Program - presumably he is well placed to manage and balance US, Japanese and Australian interests. 

Regarding “Aus1 ***” in the Table the dates and places where the subs are built inevitably involves opinion. Aus1 is the first of class for Australia. It may make sense to have it built in Kobe, Japan to ease initial construction, testing and certification issues. From Aus2 the numbers only go up to Aus6 in the Table because only 6 subs might be built (based on the formula 6 + 2 (maybes) used for the Oberons and Collins). (After this Submarine Matters article the Adelaide Advertiser indicated fewer than 12 subs to be built.) Building Aus2 to Aus6 in Kobe need only be a last resort if a re-run of the Collins or Air Warfare Destroyer (see 2010 onwards) problems are developing. Such a things-going-wrong situation obviously needs to be picked up early (eg. in 2023).

Whatever happens, if Japan is chosen, the materials for the submarines will mainly be produced in Japan (mainly by MHI and KHI?) and the Combat System in the US.

As with other Japanese ventures in Australia (eg. car factories) a large number of Japanese managerial and technical advisers should be in Australia. 

The clear record of Japanese submarine building discipline should produce a positive industrial and political (Federal and State levels) experience, thus minimising anarchy.

A useful and basically new background reference on the Future Submarine (Collins Replacement) Program is here.

Pete