AI overview as at October 19, 2026 with some additional Wikipedia links and Pete's comments in square bolded [...] brackets.
"Indonesia is rapidly modernizing its military under President Prabowo Subianto through major multi-billion-dollar acquisitions spanning fighter jets, warships, submarines, and precision miissiles. [1, 2]
[Pete comment - Subianto's military career [early start in Kopassus and already a General in 1985, goes right back to the Suharto era (being Suharto's son-in-law). But Subianto, now a centrist President, has not turned into the right-wing, coup-inciting, dictator many feared would happen.
Indonesia continues its pattern of buying weapons from many countries: especially France, Turkey, Italy, Russo-Indian BrahMos, maybe from China - maybe to extract favourable offers from the US. The list below does not count the many other orders by Indonesia, arrived (eg. from Russia) or on their way from many other countries: eg. aircraft ships 103 Leopard 2s already here.
Indonesia's weapons are mainly focussed on internal security and regional competitors. Unlike Australia (with help from the US) Indonesia has no pretensions to get in a medium level fight against China.].
- Dassault Rafale F4 Fighters (France): Indonesia ordered [high end 4.5 Generation] 42 Rafale jets; the first six units (four single-seats and two double-seats) were formally commissioned into Air Squadron 12 at Halim Perdanakusuma Air Base in May 2026, equipped with MBDA Meteor missiles and AASM Hammer guided bombs. [1, 2]

Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) national combat aircraft KAAN [see TAI website - in English - takes a while to download]
---
- TAI KAAN Stealth Fighters (Turkey): Contracted for 48 fifth-generation KAAN fighter jets from Turkish Aerospace Industries with planned deliveries starting in 2032. [1, 2] [Pete comment - maybe 5th Gen but without the strike package (intelligence/sensor backup) provided to US and Israeli 5th Gen].
- J-10CE Fighters (China): [maybe 42 in future - a complex non-aligned gambit] Entered an agreement for Chinese J-10CE fighter jets to help fill immediate capacity gaps. [1, 2]
- Support & Transport Aircraft: Inducted an Airbus A400M transport aircraft and four Falcon 8X transport aircraft. [1, 2]
- KRI Sriwijaya Aircraft Carrier: Commissioned the former Italian aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi as the KRI Sriwijaya, arriving at Tanjung Priok Port, Indonesia in September 2026. [1, 2] [43 years old since launch in Italy. Only 14,000 tonnes full load. Maybe vanity flagship [but better than Thailand's] in "response" to Australia's much larger Canberra-class LHD. Just helicopter air wing, to date, like the Canberras]
- BrahMos & Astra Missiles (India): Finalized a $630 million strategic defense pact with India to acquire BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles for Sukhoi-30 integration. [1, 2] [A very dangerous Russian-Indian developed missile, depending on its flight profile.]
- Italian PPA Warships & Frigates: Taken delivery of two Italian Offshore Patrol Vessels (PPA) and contracted for Turkish Istanbul-class [light] frigates as well as domestic [PT PAL built medium-large Red White-class frigates]. [1, 2]
- [AI reports as at June 2026 Japan and Indonesia have initiated working-level discussions regarding the potential transfer of retired Japanese Navy Asagiri-class up to 5,000 tonne full load destroyers to the Indonesian Navy.]
- Submarines: Building two Scorpene-class submarines locally with French technology transfer, alongside autonomous AI-driven unmanned submarines developed by state-owned PT PAL Indonesia. [1, 2] [may be commissioned by mid 2030s]. [see Shawn C's excellent SubMatt's article on this 2 x PT PAL Scorpene Evolved (EVO) 1,600-2,000 tonne build.]
- KHAN Ballistic Missiles (Turkey): Deployed the Turkish-built Roketsan KHAN/Bora short-range ballistic missile system, giving the Indonesian Army a 300-kilometer strike range. [1, 2] [It is a puzzle what international targets Indonesia would want to hit with a 300km missile. Perhaps one answer is: Australia has a wide variety of ballistic and cruise missile with a range greater than 300km.]
- Anti-Drone & Air Defense: Received new domestic and foreign anti-drone mobile jammers ([domestically developed] Maung MV3 Mobile Jammer systems) and expanded ground-based air-defense radar systems. [1, 2]"
5 comments:
Indonesia’s defense procurement is mainly based on securing loans, which leaves the country very vulnerable to variable interest rates. https://ojs.umrah.ac.id/index.php/jmps/article/download/8775/3325/38544
Note the KFX saga, which still has not concluded, even as the first production fighter enter RoK service. https://www.idnfinancials.com/news/62693/prabowo-pushes-kf-21-fighter-jet-project-sends-team-to-south-korea
Thanks Shawn
For https://ojs.umrah.ac.id/index.php/jmps/article/download/8775/3325/38544
I'm under the impression Indonesia used to rely on "soft" loans. But they were at times Russia had considerable oil/gas profits and the US wasn't totally embroiled in Israel's wars.
Indonesia nowadays seems to make many deals with many countries (commission-itus?) then doesn't come through with full payments.
It struck me that there may be a lot of common specs between the future two jet 4.5 to 5G SK KAI KF-21 and Turkish TAI KAAN. Maybe Indonesia is "paying" through expediting informal technology transfer between KAI and TAI. noting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KAI_KF-21_Boramae#Indonesian_engineers'_alleged_technology_theft
Cheers Pete
I find it a bit odd that the indonesians procure so many different competing ecosystems. Usually countries stay within the same ecosystem for interoperability. Maybe Indonesia is satisfied with their personnel talking to each other over the radio, or segregating units running different hardware ecosystems to different areas and roles?
The AI left out the KFX (as shawn mentioned), arrowhead 140 and possible mogami frigate.
The KFX and arrowhead 140 have technology transfer and local production elements to them.
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2026/10/new-indonesian-weapon-buys-europe-and.html
The mogami offer is a bit precarious of australia depending on the state of our relationship. If the relationship is good then there may be interoperability between the frigates, as well as scale and data benefits for the whole class. On the other hand if the relationship sours, then we'll have an adversary with deep information on 11 of our frigates (though probably not aegis and vice-versa). https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/05/indonesia-confirms-mogami-frigates-and-submarine-offers-from-japan/
My personal opinion is that Indonesia wants hardware at an affordable price while also wanting technology transfer and local content. This looks kind of like India's method of procurement, which can backfire if they're too demanding (india ssk tender). Personally if I was an arms dealer I would assume they'll use the transfer technology to compete with my own products 20 years down the line (german submarines to SK).
Sorry I pasted in the wrong link for the arrowhead 140
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/02/indonesias-merah-putih-class-frigate-what-you-need-to-know/
Hi Kev at 10/22/2026 2:01 PM and 10/23/2026 6:49 PM
I long held suspicion of analysts is Indonesia's widespread corruption explains why so many relatively small arms deals from so many countries/companies?
The official salaries of all Indonesians military/naval officers, officials and politicians are so LOW that they need to take turns taking percentage commissions as middlemen from foreign countries/companies for each oof many small deals.
With these commissions they can survive + top-up the salaries of there employees + pay upwards to their mentors for future promotions.
See result of https://www.google.com/search?q=is+corruption+high+in+arms+sales+in+Indonesia&sca_esv=33009a9d8e2a24cc&biw=1164&bih=544&sxsrf=APpeQntyQB5mfVoRYxnQieS66YX8Q5DVxg%3A1792825408832&ei=QFjcavWhMq2Ovr0Pm4mcoQU&uact=5&oq=is+corruption+high+in+arms+sales+in+Indonesia&gs_lp=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&sclient=gws-wiz-serp
"Yes, corruption risks in Indonesia's arms sales and defense procurement are high.
Key Factors Driving High Corruption Risks
• Opaque Budgets and Weak Oversight: Defense spending and military procurement processes suffer from limited transparency, minimal legislative oversight, and poorly defined monitoring systems.
• Active Middlemen and Brokers: Commercial brokers and intermediaries frequently operate throughout international arms deals, creating significant pathways for kickbacks and the distortion of contract awards—from initial requirement settings to final selections.
• Transparency International Ratings: Watchdog evaluations, including Transparency International's Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, have consistently ranked Indonesia in high-risk or very-high-risk categories (such as a 'D' rating) regarding defense sector accountability.
• Internal Diversion and Illicit Sales: Beyond official international imports and massive multi-year modernization budgets, smaller-scale corruption and illegal arms trading (such as military personnel selling weapons to insurgent or rebel groups in regions like Papua) have also drawn official military crackdowns."
This is not to say that post career corruption (expecting high paying corporate jobs) of Australian senior military/naval officers, officials and politicians is not substantial as well. eg. Andrew Peacock https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Peacock#After_politics "President of Boeing Australia"
Post a Comment