Its difficult for future Australian SSNs, with weapons grade HEU reactors, to escape accusations of nuclear Proliferation. But Australia WILL need nuclear weapons by the 2030s. (Cartoon via Voice of America's POLIGRAPH(dot)info)
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China's objections, voiced to the IAEA this week, are Inconvenient yet accurate.
China's power projection south gives Australia good cause to have nuclear weapons options.
Very rapid launch of Australian nuclear missiles would improve if Australia's 8 future SSNs had vertical launch systems. Thinking
post astutely I would hope the Brits will design their own
UK RN 2040s SSN(R)s with a Virginia Payload Module (VPM) with "two multipurpose Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT)". Each VPT might be capable
of carrying 7 vertically launched Tomahawks or, better still, Hypersonic Cruise or small Ballistic missiles.
Any Australian SSN will certainly use the US Combat System (consisting of weapons, torpedo tubes, sensors, comms equipment and huge databases) that is already on the Collins. This would amount to about 33% of a RAN SSN(R). If the Brits didn't incorporate VPMs into their SSN(R)s then a RAN ONLY SSN(R) special fitout of a
VPM (around 10% of a RAN SSN(R)) would cause many knock-on
readjustments (5+%) and extrordinary added costs for a RAN SSN(R).
Australia buying-building a 50% (with
knock-ons) US content RAN SSN(R) would be probably much more
problem prone and expensive than a UK or US SSN of 2040s vintage. It would be much more logical for Australia to buy/build a US Virginia design -
Block V or VI.
However, I see a PLAN B. ie: Australian SSBNs.
Alternatively Australia might consider building
just 6 UK pattern SSN(R)s. Worldwide the top priority of SSNs are to defend ones navy's SSBNs (see "Main missions" here. Those 6 Australian SSNs could defend 4 Australian UK designed Dreadnought class SSBNs armed with Trident II (or Trident IIIs after 2040) ballistic missiles.
In the end
Australia needs its own nuclear deterrent. After the Trump experience, and real
chance of further US isolationism in future, Australia can no longer rely on a perhaps
mythical US nuclear umbrella to protect us.
By 2030 the Australian public (who already seem to
have been sufficiently scared/sensible about China - to accept Australian SSNs) might be sufficiently scared of a China gradually
power projecting south, to consider Australian nuclear weapons a serious option.
12 comments:
A nuclear propelled conventionally armed submarine is one thing, a nuclear armed nuclear submarine as a strategic deterrent is completely another thing. I don't think Australia can develop nuclear weapons having signed the NPT in 1970.
I don't think the US can provision Aussie subs with Trident SLBMs. Conditions that allowed for the tight US-UK collaboration don't exist any longer, in my humble opinion. Not to mention, megaton warhead bearing SSBNs from Australia is not something China will take kindly to.
An Incirlik style US warhead/missile storage base in the NT or North western extremities of Western Australia (somewhere between Broome and Wyndham for instance) is more likely to not fall afoul of the NPT and/or NSG rules. Personally speaking, the hurdles to possessing nukes are too formidable for Australia as things stand today....
Hi Ghalib
You'll be glad to know I had 3 Galahs on my bird feeder plate half an hour ago.
Also, as all the rain in Australia has caused a Wombat population explosion the poor Wombies have been seeking new territory in my backyard by digging holes under my fence and gate, even shifting loose bricks. I've been filling in these holes as fast as they can dig them.
Cheers Pete
Hi Ghalib
Wombats aside - back to Australian nuclear strategy.
"A nuclear propelled conventionally armed submarine's" rarely stated but main role is to protect SSBNs. The French admit it under "Main missions' here https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/focus-france-s-next-generation-ssns but the other SSBN allies (UK and US) are reticent about this main role.
If all an Australian SSN can fling at China is 20 tonnes total of conventional explosives
then China would see that as no convincing deterrent.
India has built nuclear weapons by not signing the NPT and Australia could cancel its NPT membership if Australia truely wants to protect itself against China.
I think the US (on top of the constant Russian nuclear threat, increasingly concerned with China's growing nuclear weapons capability) may well by the 2040s provide Australian Dreadnought class SSBNs with the same Trident II armoury that the US provides the UK.
This follows the equally surprising US willingness to provide SSN technology to Australia, where only the UK was given this technology previously.
China is already not taking "kindly to" a future Australian SSN capability. Australia can't please everybody, even its No.1 potential enemy.
Yes an arrangement like the US air dropped nuclear weapons sharing with Western European governments and with Turkey might be viable, especially if Australia buys B-21 bombers https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/08/b-21s-may-be-good-idea-further-thoughts.html
Alternatively Australia could buy nuclear bombs from Israel, a country less likely to reverse a decision than the US. After all, the most likely NEXT US President still remains the Trump threat - see https://www.sportsbet.com.au/betting/politics/us-politics/us-presidential-election-2024-5479667
So after 2024 the US might even renege on the AUKUS sub deal.
Regards Pete
"Australia could cancel its NPT membership".
Cancelling the NPT and building nuclear weapons afterwards is going to be diplomatically very difficult. After all if Australia is allowed to cancel its NPT memebership and build nukes without being sanctioned then what is stopping other states from doing the same.
A better approach for Australia (and Japan) might be to build nuclear weapons in secret (with test data/ designs from friendly countries) and not officially acknowledge them.
Australia could also build submarines (either conventional or nuclear powered) with VLS cells
that are dual use for both cruise missiles or SLBMs.
Hi Pete. Based on the article you posted I think about how SSNs are built to defend SSBNs, a could leverage the limited AUKUS shipyards to build SSBNs and the French could build us Nuclear powered versions of attack class as SSNs. Naval group seem to have space to build export Barracuda's to Egypt and India. It would he a good idea considering how cheap they're offering 6 barracudas to Egypt for €5B.
https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2022/09/07/inside-story-on-talks-over-e5bn-naval-group-submarine-sale-to-egypt,109810259-eve
France offers four submarines to Australia despite the stab in the back of AUKUS https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/september/12202 "The provisional government" incompatible with long-term strategy...
Hi Pete
Naval Group has no capacity in Cherbourg (and in the suppliers ecosystem)for the next 15 years as the LPM (Loi de Programmation Militaire reviewed after Ukraine)will call probably for additional (Suffren class SSN moving from 6to 8 units ?,while 4 are still in various stages within the yard) and the 4 SSBN NG on the line
The request by Egypt has had a cool Fr response if you read the article/rumor on Afr/Intell.
The potential supply to Aus has been met with skepticism in France including in the OPEX article, source of Naval News.Serious or provocation ?(typical Macron )or both "Hi guys I understand you are looking for subs!May be we could help you !"
In the Fr press , one year on,it is the Autralians which are really the victims, the Naval Group trade Union are satisfied that the "Snafu" does justice to Naval reputational risks.
The rumours are more to rely on India and Brazil yards to fill the the potential orders , Indonesia, Ph, Marocco..(even joint Fr/Dutch sourcing in the NL if Barracuda selected..!)Naval is said to be pleased with India/Mazagon performance, which has open capacity as of next year
With the last 3 referendae in New Caledonia ,the joint support of Vanuatu... France and Australia need to get along as before,facing chinese pressure ,as in the Salomon
In order to make precursors for a nuclear force it will be politically and diplomatically too challenging to do that without having a premise of owning more advanced/comprehensive nuclear processing equipment i.e civil infrastructure as a cover up. Any other option is pure hubris to think we can do so.
Navantia (Primary program partner/codeveloper), Sepetiba Brazil and Magazon dock looks to be the the shipyards that France will be outsourcing to produce export Scorpenes for Indonesia and Philippines. Sharing ToT with countries was a genius move to free up more work in cherbourg to produce more SSNs.
I dont see how France is less capable to have more manufacturing capacity for export SSNs considering how openly USA and UK openly state how they have no capacity to even build AUKUS subs.
It would be in Australia's best interest to source both the UKUS and France. I did watch a France24 interview about it and France seems to be able to deliver by 2030, which isn't much longer than waiting for SSKs. France and USA have deals to make their equipment compatible and cooperable with each other. We will be able to find out how serious Macron's offer would be by November with his official visit to Australia.
4 French SSNs is not meant to replace the 6 Collins SSKs but to supplement the SSBNs. I don't think it's a good idea to have a mix of SSKs escorts for SSN/BNs considering their lower speed, depth capability and acoustic signature difference means they're not able to catch up and probably risk the detection of the major SSN assets. AUKUS doesn't have the luxury to source SSNs and SSBNs at the same time which is why I think Australia definitely needs France in the mix
Pete
I have previously expressed my reservations about a nuclear deterrent for Australia. Apart from being illegal under both Australian and international law, I believe it would create a nuclear arms race in SE and East Asia. It would be used as a justification by multiple countries to that end. In my view that is not in Australia's interests.
I do however share your concern about Trump and consider that, as per Hugh White's comments about Australia needing a credible independent defense policy, USA is only one election away from not being a reliable defense partner for Australia. To that end I consider that under AUKUS, the US Virginia Class is not a wise choice for the RAN.
Coincidentally, I stumbled across an entry at the Global Security website on the new UK SSNR that was very interesting. It has updated the likely timing for design and frst construction of this class. The revised dates are much more attractive for an Australian build, with a 3 year design period 2021 - 2024 and first construction starting 2026. AUKUS is listed as a factor in this. The source of the data is not listed; this could be supposition. If so it is by someone with some knowledge and I consider this is a plausible way to deliver AUKUS, given Marles' recent travels.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hms-ssnr.htm
Hi Anonymous @Sep 20, 2022, 11:43:00 AM
Fair enough for your first 2 paras.
I think you put it well in your third paragraph when remark of https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hms-ssnr.htm that "The source of the data is not listed; this could be supposition."
I'd also add there are large number of spelling mistakes in https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hms-ssnr.htm and more importantly, lack of precise sources (with links needed).
This makes me suspect https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hms-ssnr.htm is a rapidly written personal view hinged on "Based on this chronology, the first SSNR would need to be laid down in 2026 and launched in 2032."
Without extensive citations https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/hms-ssnr.htm would be news to the UK, US and Australian governments.
So we are back to what is more likely, and is supported by references with links, ie:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Boats_in_the_class with Agincourt "Expected 2026[55]"
- then UK's following high priority for its limited nuclear shipbuilding resources is completing 4 Dreadnought SSBNs during the 2030s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dreadnought-class_submarine#Boats_of_the_class
and
- then citations supporting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Successor :
"The new class of submarine is expected to replace the Astute-class during the 2040s.[24]"
Further supported by https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSN(R) which includes the key sentence:
"The SSN(R) is likely to be delivered through the 2040s and 2050s."[10]"
Regards Pete
Acquiring SSBN’s is definitely a line that Australia doesn’t want to cross.
If the concern is that the SSN’s won’t be able to throw sufficient HE, then a better alternative would be to acquire a squadron of B21’s - able to respond rapidly in a lot more locations.
Hi Anonymous @Sep 22, 2022, 2:41:00 PM
As the prospect of Aussie SSBN’s could only be realised after Aus SSNs I agree SSBNs are "definitely a line that Australia [CURRENTLY] doesn’t want to cross".
Aus SSBNs might only be a reality in the early 2050s by which time Chinese naval, air and missile bases on the Solomons, East Timor and god know where else, will have significantly altered Aussie fears and UK and broader international legal moods.
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Good idea about B-21’s and note my message of Sep 16, 2022, 5:50:00 PM above, in this thread, where I say:
"Yes an arrangement like the US air dropped nuclear weapons sharing with Western European governments and with Turkey might be viable, especially if Australia buys B-21 bombers https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/08/b-21s-may-be-good-idea-further-thoughts.html
Alternatively Australia could buy nuclear bombs from Israel, a country less likely to reverse a decision than the US. After all, the most likely NEXT US President still remains the Trump threat - see https://www.sportsbet.com.au/betting/politics/us-politics/us-presidential-election-2024-5479667 "
Regards Pete
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