I publish on subs, other naval, nuclear weapons & broad political issues. Aussie sub changes are slow: talk rather than actual new subs. The 1st Collins LOTE (ending 2029) may mainly concern the US Combat System. Trump may decide to cancel the AUKUS Virginia offer due to USN advice it needs all operational SSNs through to the 2040s. My colleagues Shawn C, Gessler & Ghalib Kabir are welcome to publish while I grieve a death in the family. Pete.
"The new flotilla will add capacity and build capabilities to protect Singapore's territorial waters and respond to expanded maritime security threats. The MSRF will be equipped with new purpose-built ships. As a start, the flotilla will operate four Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MSRVs) and two Maritime Security and Response Tugboats (MSRTs) to enable more calibrated responses."
The Singapore Maritime Security and Response Flotilla (MSRF) begins with four ex-Fearless classpatrol vessels(PVs), which
have been renamed Sentinal-class [Sentinel-class table below from the Fact Sheet]
Shawn actually wondered why, when the LMVs were announced, they
had new build 76mm Oto Melera guns, instead of refurbishing and refitting the
ones from the PVs, and though it was so that the retired PVs could be sold on.
The new 'Sentinal-class' look like they have a new 25mm RWS [like this?], LRAD?? plus
additional armour, but no longer carry anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
Following the article “Netherlands New Sub...” of January 19, 2021, Anonymous kindly commentedon the estimation of cost of fuel cell AIP for submarine.
Note 1: the costs seem low, because they are wholesale/producer component costs only. The cost customer navies (especially foreign ones) would pay would be much higher due to such variables as: - producer (company and selling navy) manpower costs - revenue - profits - training of key officers, petty officers and technicians and in producer's port(s) and subs - training (including document translation and simulators) - spare parts - integration (if customer wants something very non-standard) and - cost of LOx and Hydrogen propellents.
Currency: There are about 100 Yen to the US Dollar.
Assumed cost of fuel cell system is consisted of (i) cost of
fuel cell, (ii) distribution cost of fuel cell including anti-shock and safety
system such as hydrogen leakage, (iii) price of metal hydride, and (iv)
distribution cost of metal hydride cylinder (cylinder structure, gas/medium
distribution, flow meter, heat sensor, heating system, anti-shock,
non-magnetism, corrosion resistance, adiabatic, thermal insulation etc.)
As there are no data on (ii) and (iv) which are not
so serious in Stirling generator, (i) and (iii) are estimated on other
information.
(i) unit price per power of fuel cell is nearly same as that
of Stirling generator. As price of Stirling generator (240kW) is 2 billion price
of fuel cell (480kW) is 4 billion yen.
(iii) Price of commercial metal hydrogen cylinder [size
81mm(diameter) x 270mm (length)] is 200,000 yen.
Estimated metal hydride cylinder for Type 212A: size 60cm
(diameter) x 350 cm (length) and 32 sets?.
Then estimated price of metal hydride for Type 212A is
4.5billion yen [=(60/8.1)^2 x 350/27 x 200,000 x 32]
Cost of fuel cell system = (i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) = (ii) +
(iv) + 8.5billion yen (US$8 million).
Judging from technology level used and severe requirements, (ii) and (iv) are
considerably expensive.
The JL-3, China’s latest submarine launched ballistic
missile (SLBM), is designed for use in China’s future Type 096 SSBN .
TYPE 096 SSBN
The Type 096 is likely to be a larger derivative of China’s existing Type 094 SSBN. Larger in part to accommodate 12-16 longer and/or larger diameter JL-3s. The 096 will also be larger as it will likely have a larger, quieter, longer fuel life nuclear reactor all pointing to a longer, heavier, reactor space. The 096 may be launched and commissioned in the mid 2020s with integration of JL-3’s taking an extra 2-3 years. Hence China may have a mature 096 - JL-3 weapon system by 2028 (or later).
THE JL-3 SLBM
Unlike the preceding
JL-2 SLBM each JL-3 is expected to have multiple MIRVed warheads. The number of warheads per missile often begins with 3. The first JL-3 test launch was in 2018.
In contrast to the JL-2’s
range of around 7,200 km the JL-3 may have a range more than 10,000 km. One US source estimates a longer JL-3 range of 12,100 km - although that figure may be an effort to claim that the JL-3 (with presumably reduced load - maybe one warhead) has a
longer range that the US Trident D5’s 12,000+ km range (with reduced load - maybe one warhead).
It is expected the JL-3’s
range will be insufficient to hit the US mainland (contiguous 48 states) from a
South China Sea launch point. However, from 096s operating out of China's Southern Theater naval bases (see map below) in the South China Sea JL-3s could hit 3 of China's potential enemies. That is provide a secure second strike capability against India andRussia and also psychologically threaten Australia.
094s already operate from Yulin, Hainan SSBN base, Southern Theater Navy, providing access to the South China Sea. In a “bastion” naval strategythese 094s are protected by Chinese air and surface ship bases, SSNs and SSKs in Southern bases. These defenses are augmented by sensors sited on and between China's newly built islands. Future 096s operating in the South China Sea will continue to get this protection, particularly if they are noisy, like the 094s.
China also recognises its current submarine bases continue to be hemmed in by the First Island Chain sensors and forces, including Western fixed sensors (SOSUS open sea and smaller chokepoint nodal sensors) and mobile
sensors (aircraft, ships, subs and satellites which still patrol and dominate).
To permanently break through the First Island Chain China would need a "forward operating base" for some of its SSBNs or a neutralised ex-Western alliance archipelago. A base in the eastern Philippines or a neutralised Philippines archipelago might be ideal. Only after breaking through to the Pacific east of the Third Island Chain will a 096 - JL-3 combination be able to hit all 50 of the United States.
In part assisted by a quicker COVID recovery, by 2028, as China's nominal GDP begins to surpass the USA's, China will be able to afford the 096, JL-3 and new bases. China then will approach dominance regionally in the Western Pacific, while US naval power is diluted by US global responsibilities.
A friend from Texas has drawn my attention to the underwater assault rifle below. Every gun owner (with a swimming pool) should have one. No telling when an intruder will take a dip.
The video here and below struts the Soviet/Russian developed and still (perhaps restricted export) APS Underwater Rifle. This baby, with its 26 round magazine, fires bolts which work better underwater than conventional nose bullets. Range (5m deep) is advertised as 30m - and in the air, 100m. It also works much better than spear-guns.
Other countries make generally shorter barrelled, submachine gun or pistol sized underwater weaponslike the Heckler & Koch P11 pistol. Shorter barrelled weapons do have an 2 advantages - being lighter and quicker/easier to swing around. The latter is a major issue given water resistance when more slowly swinging around a longer weapon, with a large magazine.
Following this January
11, 2021 article Anonymous kindly commented [with editing and photo/artwork added by Pete]:
Siemens has developed a
new AIP PEM fuel cell module, known as “BZM evo”. The BZM evo combines the advantages
of the BZM34 (34kW) module and the BZM120 (120kW) module. The BZM evo module further
optimizes power density [1,2].
A TKMS Type 212A
submarine is equipped with nine BZM34 modules (ie. 8 x 34kW = 272kW and 1
backup). If a future Type 212CD is equipped with 12 BZM evos (ie. 12 x 40kW =
480kW), then a 212CD may show improved
underwater performance compared with the current 212A [in terms of fully submerged speed
and/or longer time fully submerged].
In section 2 of Moersch’s
presentation he writes “A single BZM evo provides a nominal power of 40 kW.
Future plants consisting of several single units will supply a maximum power of
320 – 480 kW into the grid without exceeding the footprint of an existing BZM34
or BZM120 plant.”
In section 4 of Moersch’s
presentation he concludes: “The BZM evo is a further optimized system from the
SINAVY Fuel Cells family/series and already Siemens` 4th generation after
utilizing the first 3 generations on the German submarine FGS U1, HDW class
U212A, TKMS class 214, Dolphin AIP and others.
Finding its place both
on conventional submarines and on future applications like UUVs or AIEPs [air independent emergency propulsion] what is an "AIEP"?] will
be Siemens’ utmost concern for the naval market.
The BZM evo is designed
to fulfil the requirements of new systems and retrofits of older AIP plants
and should be available on the market from 2023, or a year earlier for UUV
integration.”
Fig. 1. The well proven fuel cell module BZM34. ---
Fig. 3. Siemens’ land based demonstrator inside a UUV
application. ---
(and finally) Fig. 4. Live demonstration running certain mission profiles. ---
[2]Type
212As are equipped with 9 x BZM34s without a pressure vessel and 2 x BZM120s with pressure vessel, respectively. Therefore Wiki article https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine where it states “2 HDW/Siemens PEM fuel cells each with
120 kW [on] U32, U33, U34” is wrong. That is in the “General characteristics” section and in the right
sidebar.] _______________
Pete Comment
On balance it appears Type 214s use 2 x BZM120 modules (previously called FCM 120 modules).
See "SINAVY PEM Fuel Cells For Submarines" page 5. which states: "Submarines of Class 214 – operated by the Hellenic
[Greek] Navy, Republic of [South] Korea Navy, Portuguese Navy, and in future by
the Turkish Navy – are equipped with FCM 120 modules, which
were developed in a later phase." and at page 9. "b: fuel-cell battery with FCM 120; coupling via converter at class 214
submarine".
In response to Nicky and David
Candy regarding End French Sub Deal and Sweden's latest float of a "Collins II"
future submarine concept for Australia idea.
Below concerns the French-Australian program to design, build and operate 12 future large "Attack-class" conventional, diesel-electric submarines for the Australian Navy.
The breach of contract penalties exacted by France on Australia might amount to A$500 million. Also the Australian Government most probably does not want to be involved in Submarine Controversy. That is after past Australian governments suffered embarrassment over the original Collins "I" Project and PR fiasco, in the 1990s - early 2000s.
Sweden's submarine
makers have had a long term "buy Collins II" campaign in the Australian press, but this has been less than convincing. By 2014 when Australia's DoD were
finalising their future submarine shortlist (down to France, Germany and Japan)
Sweden's submarine industry was still in disarray.
In 1999 main Swedish
submarine builder, Kockums, had actually been sold to Germany. Germany had
made sure Kockums couldn't sell submarines - including to regular Kockums' customer Singapore. Sweden/Saab legally battled to buy Kockums back in 2014.
As at 2014 Sweden had
not built a complete submarine for 18 years. Even today Saab-Kockums has not completed its only order - 2 submarines for the Swedish Navy. Back to 2014, Sweden was asking/hoping Australia would make the very large
financial risk of buying 12 new submarines designed by Sweden. In the end Australia made the prudent decision of shortlisting fully active submarine builders Germany, Japan and France in
2014.
Counter-intuitively
France won because it offered the Highest Bid in what was really a 2016
Election winning Australian Federal Government multi-Billion dollar
subsidy/promise to the key swing state of South Australia. Osborne, Adelaide,
South Australia being the shipyard that will build the 12 future French designed subs.
At a rather secret level
Australia most probably also opted for France as the extra $Billions to France are a down payment on possible long term future SSNs, SSBNs and even
nuclear weapons from France.Germany, Japan and Sweden have no experience building nuclear subs or nuclear weapons and are less "nuclear-for-money" than France. France having designed a future SSN for Brazil (SN-BR). France having built a nuclear weapons Plutonium producing reactor/plant and Jericho ballistic missiles for Israel in the 1950s-60s.
On a current level the
Australian Government has regularly voiced its displeasure with missed
milestones and cost over-runs in France's Naval Group building Australia's
futuresubmarines. French Government owned Naval Group is distracted and late in France's Barracuda SSN and future SSBN projects. Those nuclear sub projects are higher priority for France than the conventional future sub for Australia program.
Also how much the
Australian and French Governments have spent on their domestic COVID budgets
comes into it. Australia wants to deter French Government owned Naval Group from
seeing the Australia future submarine program as a revenue raising opportunity to
cross subsidize France's higher than expected domestic COVID-19 costs.
Returning to
Saab-Kockums. Sweden wants to sell 4 Collins II-like future subs to
the Netherlands. Sweden again floating a "Collins II" to Australia may give the Netherlands hope that much design work and price reductions
have been already achieved by Sweden in possible future subs for the Netherlands.
So Australia will probably always stick with Naval Group even though the Australian Governments puts on hard bargaining acts from time to time
"Police, soldiers bring lethal skill
to militia campaigns against US government"
"Thousands of police and soldiers – people professionally trained in the use of violence and familiar with military protocols – are part of an extremist effort to undermine the U.S. government and subvert the democratic process.
The hate group – founded by a former Army paratrooper after Barack Obama’s 2008 election – claimed “an improbable 30,000 members who were said to be mostly current and former military, law enforcement and emergency first responders” in 2016, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center.
The militia movement is a militarized stream of the American far-right. Its members promote an ideology that undermines the authority and legitimacy of the federal government and stockpile weapons.
A member of the Oath Keepers at a rally to overturn the 2020 election results at the U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 5, 2021.Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images
In 1923, all the Black residents of Blandford, Indiana were forced out of town to an unknown location following accusations that an African American man assaulted a young girl. The unlawful “deportation” was conducted and organized by the local sheriff, a Klansman, with the assistance of local Klan chapters.
Wade Michael Page, the U.S. Army veteran who killed six Sikh worshipers in 2014.FBI via Getty Images
The Army identified and discharged 19 paratroopers for participating in hate activities. One went on to kill six worshipers in a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin in August 2012. He died in a police shootout.
The militias’ success secretly infiltrating police departments contributed to the emergence of new far-right associations that openly recruit law enforcement, like the Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers of America.
Founded in 2011 by former Arizona sheriff Richard Mack, the group promotes the notion – contrary to the Constitution – that the federal government authorities should be subordinated to local law enforcement. It has more than 500 sheriffs nationwide. Just over half are currently in office.
Authorities may be less likely to treat them as domestic security threats, a categorization that would limit their access to firearms and sensitive locations.
A data set I manage with my team at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and used for my recent book on right-wing terror shows that militia attacks are more lethal than those of other far-right groups. The perpetrators are experienced with weapons and ammunition, and have at least some military training.
Militias are also more likely to attack secured, high-value targets like government facilities. Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, is a prime example. He was a Gulf War veteran associated with the Michigan Militia whose bomb killed 168 people at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995.
The penetration of far-right militants into the ranks of police and the military seems to be driving an increase in direct attacks on police and military targets.
Between 1990 and 2000, 13% of U.S. of militia attacks and plots were aimed at military or police installations or personnel, our data set shows. The proportion jumped to 40% by 2017.
And with their training in surveillance, intelligence collection and public safety, the dangerous activities of militias are generally harder for federal agencies to monitor and counter.
When militias recruit professionals, they are better at waging their radical crusade."
"This story was updated to reflect developing news about security at Biden’s inauguration."
Joe
Biden's Inauguration from 3am Thursday 21 January Sydney, Australia time will be screened live on SBS TV. The actual swearing-in occurs at
12noon Washington time, Wednesday 20 January.
Trump has organised 2
distractions hours before the Inauguration:
1. A military parade at
nearby Andrews Air Force Base (see map below) to which a Trumpster crowd is invited. The crowd are due to assemble from
11.15pm (Sydney Time) Wednesday 20 January. Trump may well do more crowd
incitement. Trump's timing allows several hours for this crowd to travel to central
Washington, to do their worst during the Noon (US time) Inauguration. As
Andrews Air Base is about 15 miles southeast of the Inauguration at the Capitol
Building Trumpsters could even start a riot distraction within the Andrews area
itself.
During Trump’s 6
January Insurrection many Trumpters appeared to have military training in coordinated
action. So riots drawing the attention of security forces (SecretService, FBI, National Guard and police) may be coordinated with more deadly shooting and bombing incidents.
Trump's possible next riot incitement to be held at Andrews Air Force Basecomplex (in about 11 hours time), just outside the Beltway and about 15 miles (by road) southeast of the Capitol Building where Biden's Inauguration is to be held in about 15 hours time. (Map courtesy WashPost via Twitter).
---
2. Instead of attending
the Inauguration (as is customary) Trump will fly from Andrews Air Base to one
of his palaces, just north of Miami Florida. This will establish an alibi
before the likely riot in Washington. It is also possible Trump may incite a
crowd in the Miami area.
Additional scenarios to
Trumpster violence in/around Washington are Trumpster Riots of Opportunity in
US State Capitals and other major US cities. These may happen while most US
security attention is focused on Washington.
If any violence happens
this will dominate Aussie morning news, on Thursday 21 January. The most
sustained reporting for us, is likely to be "ABC America World News"
12.30pm Sydney time, on SBS TV. This will be immediately followed, at 1pm, by
"PBS NewsHour" on SBS TV.
Well I wrote "Here's hoping nothing violent
happens." above and that was happily met.
But it seems some Far Right Extremists expected Trump to dream up some strategy to extend his Presidency. Some of them
are angry about Trump not doing that and are holding their fire potentially for
another day.
In that regard see 5 minutes 20 seconds of this PBS NewsHour
video on the Washington D.C. "Mall" hours after the Inauguration
Swearing-In: Just click on 17:40 to 23 minutes.
Expect more Far Right Extremist activity once US
Security's guard drops a notch.
Following the January 11, 2021 article - on January 16, 2021 Anonymous kindly commented (with edits by Pete for improved English and clarity) that:
Sweden's SAAB (with a submarine entrant based on the A26) and Germany (with the TKMS Type 212CD E (see video below) are competing for the Netherlands Walrus replacement program. The cost of the submarines is, of course, one of the decisive factors in the tender. Cost (for each of 4 new submarines) is estimated very roughly on the design/material of pressure hull, AIP and combat system. The A26 entrant may be considerably less expensive (perhaps as low as a 1,000 million USD?) than the Type 212CD E.
As Germany's Siemens Fuel Cell AIP technology does not generate carbon dioxide it is not restricted in diving depth (in the sense water pressure would prevent carbon dioxide being emitted). [Pete comment: This is in contrast to Swedish Stirling AIP which does suffer the carbon dioxide emission restriction]. But, fuel cell AIP and its peripheral technologies (metal hydride for hydrogen source, hydrogen/oxygen
storage and supply system, etc.) seem to be very expensive (more than 100
million USD in a future Type 212CD E?).
Strength of pressure hull steel relies on Yield Strength (given a number) and on the strength contribution of other support structures. This may be:
- magnetic steel (see Sweden's "Strenx700" at Table 1") maybe based on the existing design of the Gotland/Blekinge class for the A26 entrant
versus
- Germany's non-magnetic stainless steel (see 1.3964 or 1.3974 at Table 2.) maybe a new design? for the Type 212 CD E.
Pressure hull material, if 1.3964 or 1.3974, is much more expensive (30million USD in a 212CD or more) than Strenx700
(1). [Pete comment: However the non-magnetic nature of the German steel should make it harder to detect.]
AIP: Stirling generators vs fuel cell 30 million USD for Stirling generators versus around 100 million USD for fuel
cell? (2)
(1) Price of Nitronic 50 (=1.3964) plate is 1,500INR/kilogram
(20USD/kilogram) and assumed 1500ton of 1.3964 stainless steel is used for
212CD. Judging from composition of steel, 1.3964 stainless steel seems to be 10
times expensive than Strenx700.
(2) Four Stirling generators four x Kawasaki
Kockums V4-275R for the Soryu class submarine cost 20 million USD, where costs
of alloy for LOx tanks and other systems are excluded.
Video uploaded December 2, 2020. Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’ (TKMS) proposal for the Netherlands Submarine Replacement
Project: the Type 212CD E (Expeditionary). “The video shows the general...212
CD E design characteristics without sharing details due to security
classification matters.” ---
The SkyGuardian (aka Sky Guardian) might turn out to be cheaper than relying on sonobuoys only dropped from manned P-8s. See this DefenseNews report of January 18, 2021.
Australia
has selected the Sky Guardian UAV. Presumably the US military would also buy it, if its a successful sonobuoy
dropper, fixed sensor and (maybe) weapons carrier.
Artwork of future Sky Guardian dropping a sonobuoy. It appears to be networked with a P-8 in the upper left corner. (Courtesy DefenseNews) ---
Reading between the lines it appears Taiwan is behind the beatup (over the last week) that Chinese nuclear submarines are newly, or in the last 12 months, berthed at China's Yulin/Longpo Naval Base Complex. Yulin/Longpo, China's southernmost submarine base, is on China's Hainan Island (see Map below).
To give newly a bit of US credibility Taiwan seems to have ascribed the information to US site, GlobalSecurity. See two such reports at VOA here and "WW3 fears..." here.
This beatup appears specifically timed as a "crisis" for the incoming Biden Administration.
The problem is the widely respected, accurate strategic website, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reports, on its Type 094 SSBN nuclear submarine page:
"In late 2007 or early 2008, the first TYPE 094 deployed to Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea."
Meanwhile the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief July 21, 2017 advised:
"Most recently, geospatial analysis conducted by AllSource Analysis has recently revealed four Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at Longpo [Yulin complex] Naval Base on Hainan Island...". (see image below)
Photo of a Type 094 SSBN (nuclear submarine) at Yulin/Longpo Naval Base complex, Hainan Island from the 2017 report. (Photo courtesy Google Earth with one image going as far back as 2013, via Jamestown Foundation) ---
Infographic: Maritime Security and Response Flotilla courtesy MINDEF January 26, 2021.
