Due to popular demand here is the poor Norwegian frigate story. The situation is more complex than a kneejerk reaction "navies with frigates/destroyers based on the Navantia F100 design are hiding safety design flaws."
November 8, 2008 - Collision
"Latest update: 29.11.2018"
On November 8, 2018, Helge Ingstad collided with the 250m long tanker Sola TS (escorted by tug Tenax) in Norwegian
waters. Helge Ingstad was severely damaged in the collision, began taking on water and intentionally beached itself to avoid total sinking and allow for the evacuation of the crew. Seven Helge Ingstad sailors were injured.
On November 13, Helge Ingstad sank where
she had run aground, with only smaller sections of the superstructure remaining above water. Perhaps Helge Ingstad will not be operational again and might only be partly reconstructed to research why she sank so quickly. She was built by the Spanish shipbuilder Navantia
in Ferrol, Spain, based on Navantia's Álvaro de Bazán (aka F100) class design.
Sola TS left Norway's Sture Oil Terminal (see blue dots). Helge Ingstad was moving southwest through the strait while Sola TS was moving north. Those on watch in Helge Ingstad may have not visually registered Sola TS as moving collision threat because Helge Ingstad did not notice Sola TS's navigation lights were moving (rather than being stationary at Sture Oil Terminal). Did Helge Ingstad fail to notice Vessel Tracking Service (VTS) instructions, Sola TS tracker satellite map beeping, or espcially Sola TS's large radar image? (Map courtesy MaritimeBulletin.net via FleetMon.com).
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It is possible the Norwegian accident investigators are overstating any Helge Ingstad design errors instead of Norwegian Navy human errors. For example, did Helge Ingstad's crew follow the complete safety procedures of closing all water-tight hatches between compartments (to prevent flooding)?
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Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad (high tide beached November 8, 2018 before it sunk more completely on November 13, 2018)
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November 29, 2018 - Preliminary Norwegian Accident Board Report
"...29 November 2018 the [Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN)] publish[ed] a preliminary report on the accident and two interim safety
recommendations.
This preliminary report is published to communicate the
information obtained during the initial phase of the ongoing investigation. The
purpose is to provide a brief update on how the investigation is progressing as
well as a preliminary description of the sequence of events and disseminate
safety-critical issues identified at this stage of the investigation.
This
preliminary report also identifies areas that need further investigation and
describes lines of investigation that will be followed up."
"Latest update: 29.11.2018"
"... The accident was a complex one, involving several
individuals, bridge crews, vessels, a VTS and the interaction between them. The
investigation is therefore demanding in terms of time and resources. The AIBN stresses that this is a preliminary report and that it may consequently contain
some errors and inaccuracies. Because of considerations relating to the duty of confidentiality,
classified material and the investigation process, the AIBN does not publish all its information at
the present time...."
The long collision hole made in the Helge Ingstad. How many compartments were initially holed? How far did the hole extend below the waterline?
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Appendix:
Interim safety recommendations 29.11.2018 "To start with, flooding occurred in three watertight compartments on board 'KNM Helge
Ingstad': the aft generator room, the orlob deck's crew quarters and the stores room. There was
some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aftmost compartment, was also
filling up with water. Based on this damage, the crew, supported by the vessel's stability
documents, assessed the vessel as having 'poor stability' status, but that it could be kept afloat.
If more compartments were flooded, the status would be assessed as 'vessel lost' on account of
further loss of stability.
Next, the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage. Based on the flooding of the gear room, it was decided to prepare for evacuation."
see the Comments for more on Human Error vs Design
Next, the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage. Based on the flooding of the gear room, it was decided to prepare for evacuation."
see the Comments for more on Human Error vs Design
16 comments:
Once again its the hours around dawn. This collision was at 4.01am local time. The City of Bergen nearby only has daylight on 8 Nov between 8:20 a.m. – 4:23 p.m. Twilight maybe 2 hours each side of that
https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/norway/bergen
Regarding the ship design.
"The AIBN has found safety critical issues relating to the vessel's watertight compartments.
This must be assumed to also apply to the other four Nansen-class frigates. It cannot be
excluded that the same applies to vessels of a similar design delivered by Navantia, or that the
design concept continues to be used for similar vessel models. The AIBN assumes that its
findings are not in conformity with the required damage stability standard for the Nansenclass
frigates."
Australia's 3 AAW frigates are of a similar design by Navantia- however they are built in Australia, hopefully to higher standards
It clearly finds that watertight compartments didnt exist.
"the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room
via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room,
the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes
in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than
indicated by the original damage. "
The total loss now of the vessel doesnt seem to have been as a result of 'any failure to close watertight doors'
https://www.aibn.no/Marine/Investigations/18-968
from the 'Interim Safety Recommendations'
And what of the Human Error of all those:
- Norwegian Navy engineering officers
- Norwegian defence acquisition agency bureaucrats, and
- Norwegian commercial contractors
who all approved the design plans and signed off on each stage of frigate construction?
One need only read https://web.archive.org/web/20090203153628/http://www.mil.no/fregatter/start/fakta/
"Facts about Nansen Class frigates" of which Helge Ingstad is one:
- "The frigates are built to be very robust for ocean-going operations" ALMOST NO NEED TO SAY MORE...
- [again] PLATFORM
"The new frigates are built to be very robust for marine operations..."
- ZONE DIVISION
"In order for the frigates to be able to operate, even if they enter a nuclear contaminated area, for example, or cause other [DAMAGE], the vessels are divided into different zones. That way, parts of the vessel are caught even though other parts are out of order.
"Suspended zones: The vessel is divided into 13 watertight zones (12 shots)"
All this HUMAN ERROR in Norwegian certification and acceptance?
Hi Ztev Konrad
Indeed the 4.01am time of the collision seems to be significant. Where officers of the watch and crew looking at sensor screens are most tired, judgement most impaired (at mixing up approaching ship lights and static port lights).
Also most of the crew (asleep) would be least efficient at counter-flooding procedures (maybe even hatches left open...no final word on that yet).
I wonder if parts of the lighting system failed as that would disorientate jolted awake officers and crew. Captain's action if awake?
Yes the AIBN is very quickly pointing to ship design
"It cannot be excluded that the same applies to vessels of a similar design delivered by Navantia, or that the design concept continues to be used for similar vessel models."
Yes Australia's Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers are based on a slight evolution of the Navantia F100 class, known as the heavier F105 class"
Interesting document here "The Hobart Class - Differences from the F100 Class
Navantia’s F104 ship design is the basis for the AWD. The F104 baseline is being updated for AWD to include; Key F105 features..." [see https://www.ausawd.com/content.aspx?p=97 ]
But unfortunately the differences don't seem to include "survivability"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobart-class_destroyer yes hopefully Adelaide, Australia built is to "higher standards" than Spanish built. But joint design counts.
I wonder how the accident report would read if Navantia wrote it?
"The total loss now of the vessel doesnt seem to have been as a result of 'any failure to close watertight doors'
https://www.aibn.no/Marine/Investigations/18-968 from the 'Interim Safety Recommendations'"
Yes the Recommendations are Interim and may be protecting Norwegian careers.
The frigate did not transmit its AIS and it is not known if the frigate was set up to received AIS. If yes, the watch crew should have seen the tanker AIS (which was broadcasting) and that it is on a collision track, as per the repeated radio warnings from the tanker. According to the preliminary report, the frigate was moving pretty fast in a crowded fjord, which is not a safe nor wise navigation practice.
In ship design, you have waterproof bulkheads. Since you need to bring through those bulkheads many things, from cables, to pipes, shafts, stopping water ingress can be problematic. That said, the report is a warning flag, but its conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt. There were photos and the damages on the frigate are extensive, large and very long (I recall estimating 35-40% the length of the ship's hull on its starboard). I suspect water came in on many compartments, not just a few, and that likely compromised its stability in any case.
KQN
Hi KQN
Yes the Automatic Identification System (AIS) data https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:-5.1/centery:52.9/zoom:4 makes it plain the ship traffic is highly congested around the Sture https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ports/13383 near Bergen area.
Don't know whether when a frigate leaving an exercise would/should deliver full AIS data or whether there is some inadequate reliance on radar positioning images.
I've put up a photo of the hole in the frigate as well as some relevant details in the Appendix of the compartments allegedly flooded.
I'm wondering if the the holes made in hithertoo waterproof compartments were:
- larger than necessary
- not subsequently sealed (with rubber, plastic, cement, solder etc) and
- whether extra (not covered by design plans) holes were made after the frigate left the Navantia shipyard in Spain
Also did the frigate suffer a "freak hit" in the collision and could Navantia and/or Norway make that an excuse.
Regards
Pete
Pete. regarding the passing of cables or pipes through the main bulkheads. This was mentioned in the prelim report, under 'stuffing boxes' , the usual nautical term.
The process of the sinking, seems to follow the reasoning in the AIBN report, which would indicate a quick flooding of a few directly damaged compartments and then slow flooding, via the methods described, into further compartments which compromised the overall stability and meant the crew abandoned the ship some time after the collision. Even so there was time for tugs and support vessels to arrive.
Naval vessels are like passenger ships, any watertight doors have sensors to the bridge or central damage control station to indicate if they are left open. The slow flooding of further compartments doesnt indicate large doors left open. Even when the tugs grounded the vessel the flooding continued through out the ship , with only the very upper works and masts remaining above water. Again an indication all the water tight bulkheads were compromised, not just one or two or one door open.
The RAN with two major classes designed by Navantia and including components small and large specified during the design must be having an 'hair on fire' moment. I would be concerned not only with the water tight bulk heads so easily compromised, but that a Nato navy crew didnt seem to have sufficent methods of damage control , mainly pumps to overcome the 'slower' flooding.
As for protecting careers, I would think on based on how the collision occurred, the naval crew would be entirely responsible and the careers of senior crew are toast. Another consideration however would be financila responsibility. If the ships design is faulty Norway may have a claim for most of the cost of a , say $800 mill, frigate against the designers/shipyard.
As it seemed to be an 'off the shelf ' purchase where the Norwegian navy relied on the expertise of the designers, and dont have their own construction staff who can be involved enough in the construction to vet any part of the ship.
Hi Ztev [at 7/12/18 12:03 PM]
It would be career ending for many in the Norwegian Navy + Defence civilians if they claimed that Norway's 5 most powerful ships were bought without sufficient Norwegian expertise to know if the ships were collision seaworthy.
Indeed Australia's Navy and Defence civilians would be generating many reports (over the Xmas Holiday period) for their political masters, assuring that Australia's Navantia designed:
- 3 Hobart class AWDs,
- 2 Canberra class LHDs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canberra-class_landing_helicopter_dock AND
- 2 Future Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AORs) http://www.defence.gov.au/spi/Docs/Public%20AIC%20Plan%20-%20SEA1654-3%20Auxiliary%20Oil%20Replenishment%20Vessels%20-%20Navantia.pdf
are NOT suffering the Navantia Norwegian Frigate Unseaworhiness desease.
Most of these ships are/will be based in Sydney Harbour Fleet Base East and it would be tragic if a collision sunk one.
Unfortunately the Norwegian accident boards have only provided a Preliminary Report which leaves too much out to make definite conclusions. The Final Report may be a long time coming, may be in a redacted short public form with a comprehensive Classified form that we can't read.
Regards
Pete
I’m really surprised by the tone of this conversation. I wonder what makes Australian ASC workers, with little practical experience in building ships better than their Spanish conrades working in Ferrol which had quite a bit more experience in shipbuilding. Nor does Australian construction standards differ from Spanish ones as the ships are designed and built under widely used international standards for both civilian and military ships.
On the Norwegian incident, maybe we’re obviating the fact the frigate was hit by a 140.000 ton oiler when doind 17 knots. I wonder how other ships in the same class would have fared.
The crew had left the ships 11 min after the impact, so looks like no major damage control efforts may have been performed.
On the Norwegian imput in the construction phase, all the ships were inspected and certified by the Norwegian navy team detached in Ferrol and the watertightness of the ships was specifically tested as requested by the customers, the ships also being subjected to shock tests. All the tests were passed without any issues and approved by the Norwegian team. The watertightness tests were exhaustive and all the points from the Norwegian team, some in excess of the acepted construction standards, were passed.
The F-100s were also subjected to these same tests ehen they were being built as were ships buil previously like the F-80 frigates built using the FFG-7 design.
As the ship is still underwater, looks like the members of the investigation commission are making some accusations without access to all the evidence. Reading the reports in the Norwegian press, looks like the Norwegian Navy isn’t as keen to finger pointing as the commissioners.
I think just about every navy in the world is waiting on the Norwegian reports. There is little doubt the collision is the fault of the frigate & the tanker did everything it could. It even made some directional changes & still had a pilot aboard. I can’t see that it could have done much more without risking a more expensive disaster of a 100k ton full loaded tanker running aground. You have to ask why was the frigate running at 17knts, AIS turned off, crowded fjord, in the dark. The oil terminal is well known. Why did not the AIS signal overlayed with the radar signal & well known fixed position of the oil terminal not warn the frigate? The tanker was in regular radio contact with Norwegian shipping authorities to the fact of its movements & it noticed the frigate & wasted valuable time with the authority trying to identify said frigate, all over radio frequencies the frigate should have been listening to. Why was not the frigate aware the tanker was on the move between it & the terminal just based on radio chatter? Why no attempt to at least slow down when told by a tanker turn or you will hit us? Is having the situation room physically separated from the bridge part of the problem (ie too many layers between operators & the bridge, slowing down the speed of relevant information & making it harder to judge what is relevant)?
One of the problems with naval ships is we have not had any modern ones sink for a while with people to tell us what was happening. Even non Navantia designs may be affected by any design or component failures. Just like the car & truck industries, many sub components are supplied by a relatively small number of manufacturers. The Navantia frigate design in question has the F100 as its parent design, which was itself based on an earlier design based on a US design. If it is a design problem (rather than a build problem), then how far back does it go & what other designs may be affected? Is it a frigate problem or a general Navantia problem, or a component supplier problem, or a NATO standard problem or a Norwegian maintance problem? Could this problem been around for a long time, but because ships used for target practice tend to get a heavyweight torpedo if they don’t sink after a couple of hours, we have been unaware?
The F-100 is a original design by Bazan/Izar/Navantia and is not based in any American design, although it follows US Navy standards for building and damage control. The design for Norway was known as F-85 as it was 85% the size of the F-100.
First images and video footage from the sunken frigate:
https://sysla.no/maritim/se-de-forste-undervannsbildene-av-skadene-pa-knm-helge-ingstad/?fbclid=IwAR2HWXbb9B6wb-2Nqz9DkmXnqYWSJ4A5EO2oMORCM-UY9xt9FdXK5QEd7y8
Thanks Gorka
The underwater photos and videos https://sysla.no/maritim/se-de-forste-undervannsbildene-av-skadene-pa-knm-helge-ingstad/?fbclid=IwAR2HWXbb9B6wb-2Nqz9DkmXnqYWSJ4A5EO2oMORCM-UY9xt9FdXK5QEd7y8
display the scale of the disaster to Norway's small-medium sized Navy
- removing 20% of its main combat power in one collision.
Hi Pete,
Here you have some more Norwegian to read
"The Armed Forces notify legal steps about Helge Ingstad Towards the Spanish shipyard" February 18, 2019 at https://www.tu.no/artikler/forsvaret-varsler-rettslige-skritt-om-helge-ingstad/458261
/Kjell
Hi /Kjell
As you can see I have put your Helge Ingstad comment/reference:
"The Armed Forces notify legal steps about Helge Ingstad Towards the Spanish shipyard" February 18, 2019 at https://www.tu.no/artikler/forsvaret-varsler-rettslige-skritt-om-helge-ingstad/458261
UNDER the main Helge Ingstad article/thread.
After right-click mouse translating https://www.tu.no/artikler/forsvaret-varsler-rettslige-skritt-om-helge-ingstad/458261 to English it seems Navantia has refused to claim responsibility, but wishes to hold talks with the Norwegian Government Defense Materials administration.
Interestingly https://www.tu.no/artikler/forsvaret-varsler-rettslige-skritt-om-helge-ingstad/458261 indicates that due to difficult weather conditions Helge Ingstad has not been refloated and is still mostly underwater in Hjeltefjorden in Hordaland, Norway.
Regards
Pete
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