Russia's and Japan's Closer Relations - Vilyuchinsk SSBN Base 1

The 4 Japanese "Northern Territory"/Russian "southern Kuril" islands in dispute are Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai. These islands sit between the 1885 "border" line and the 1945 "border" line. (The map, courtesy flickr, can be hugely enlarged here) 

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Prime Minister of Japan Abe and Russia’s President Putin have begun a range of discussions signalling increasing closeness. Japan’s Foreign Minister may visit Russia in October 2016. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry it is anticipated Putin will visit Japan in December 2016.

Post Fukushima Japan would prefer a wider variety of non-nuclear energy sources. Russia’s oil and gas can probably be undersea piped (maybe with Japan’s help) from Russia’s northeast Siberian island of Sakhalin to Japan (see map above). 

The pipeline would be from Sakhalin under the narrow (42km) La Perouse Strait to Japan's northern "home" island of Hokkaido. Such a pipeline would be less vulnerable to Chinese military interception unlike Japan's oil/gas supplies that are shipped through the Malacca Straits north via the South China Sea and East China Sea. The Chinese would be disinclined to cut such a pipeline (using ships or submarines) due to Russia’s military forces - forces that in total (conventional backed by nuclear) are superior to China’s.

So in this pipeline respect closer Russia-Japan relations would be a balance against rising Chinese military power.

Japan, which never signed a post-WWII peace treaty with Russia, has wanted Russia to return 4 small islands of Japan’s Northern Territory that Russia invaded in the last days of WWII. Russia for nationalist and strategic reasons considers these 4 islands (what Russia calls the “southern Kurils”) see map above, as its own territory. 

The current economic value of the islands are mainly fishing. It is likely the islands were informally  shared by Japanese, ethnic Russian and indigenous Ainu fishermen for centuries.

Of greater economic value are possible oil and gas reserves under the Kurils.

It is significant that the beginnings of increasing Japan-Russia closeness are happening when the US’s usual anti-Russian pressure is more difficult to be applied to Japan. This has 2 main reasons:

-  it is possible that Trump (who has an affinity for Putin) may win the November 8, 2016, Election,
   and, 

-  the US is currently in the pre/post Presidential election “Lameduck” Season where, by convention,
   no major US diplomatic initiatives can be launched. Lameduck Ignoring Season ends on US
   Presidential Inauguration Day, January 20, 2017.

So the US Government is not automatically pressuring Japan not to be so friendly with Russia.

VILYUCHINSK SSBN-SSN-SSGN BASE

The Kurils have much greater nationalistic and strategic value for Russia. Russia is concerned that if all 4 Kurils islands were returned to Japan this may be beginning of Russia's loss of more far east  Siberian possessions. The southern Kurils (in dispute) and northern Kurils form a buffer zone protecting Russia's SSBN Base at the port of Vilyuchinsk. This buffer prevents any closer proximity of Japanese or US missile, air or naval forces that might quicly strike surfaced submarines in Vilyuchinsk. 

Vilyuchinsk's isolation is also security strength aginst "binocular" spying and sabotage. It is almost as far into Siberia as one can go. Vilyuchinsk is a "closed town" meaning only those Russians who are authorised can visit - no foreigners (who can be shot!). Vilyuchinsk is 20kms from the also extremely isolated city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (see map below).

Russia may also be contemplating stationing naval forces further south on the Kuril Islands themselves.

On 26 September I'll do "Russia's Broader Nuclear Submarine Basing Strategy".

While Vilyuchinsk SSBN Base is closed to tourists the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, 20km away, hosts a small international airport. Some tourists are interested in Ainu culture. (Map courtesy Yakutia Airlines).

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Pete