Future Dutch Submarine RFQ: "3,200 tonnes"

Submarine Matters has been monitoring the Netherlands' Future Dutch Submarines (aka Walrus-class submarine replacement) process since 2015.

All credit to a (likely) Dutchman (codename “Kevin”) and more recently non-Dutch /Kjell for describing the Netherlands submarine needs and the replacement process. See this overview of the process.

On November 16, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release (reproduced by Naval News) indicated:

Today, as previously discussed with the House, the Ministry of Defense has [issued a Request for Quotations (RFQ)] for 4 new submarines from 3 candidate shipyards. The candidate yards are Naval Group , Saab Kockums and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. They are expected to submit their bids around the [northern summer - June to August] 2023.

Defense then needs a number of months to analyse the detailed bids. Based on predetermined requirements and award criteria, the Ministry of Defense decides which yard is allowed to build the boats. One of the award criteria is the participation of Dutch companies in the development, construction and maintenance of important systems of the boat. Defense also wants as much Dutch involvement as possible to strengthen the technological and industrial base. The winning yard must sign an agreement for this with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy.”

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On November 27, 2022 /Kjell identified the Naval News Youtubes, with the intrepid Xavier Vavasseur, interviewing the 3 bidders and Dutch DMO to the extent possible, including:

Naval Group - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Naval Group's Conventional Barracuda” 1:25 maybe pumpjet, benefitting from France’s Barracuda SSN [and maybe Attack-class  SSK] programs. Mediterranean, Caribbean seas, Atlantic, Indian oceans, seabed capable. All quieting technologies included https://youtu.be/B3Agdn7_CJA

SAAB Damen - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Saab C71 Submarine (based on A26)” Offering Multi-mission Portal, UK Sonars offered. Can have modular extensions, Dutch technical/maintenance autonomy important. https://youtu.be/oaRwYfxRpJA

TKMS - Youtube around Nov 25, 2022 “Type 212CD E” ie. the 212 Common Design, Extended Range sufficient to transit Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean several weeks on station, then transit back. Maybe 3,200 tonnes submerged. At 1:40 what look like 10 vertical launch doors are apparent https://youtu.be/91OaZFdprTY

Dutch DMO Requirements - Youtube around Nov 23, 2022 “Dutch Naval Programs at NEDS 2022: Submarines” Dutch Admiral (Director Defense Materiel Organisation (DMO)) saying new subs will need to have all capabilities of the Walrus class [implicitly range, so same/more diesel fuel, so higher displacement likely] https://youtu.be/vj_oFLqsfww . Portion on subs is at 1:40 to 7:10.

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The Nov 16, 2022 Press Release was foreshadowed in an earlier, September 30, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/09/30/belangrijke-mijlpaal-vervanging-onderzeeboten-offerteaanvraag-gereed indicating ability to carry “long range missiles” is a requirement.

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Pete Comment

It is unknown whether the Dutch Navy requires Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) and/or AIP for the future subs. Some past commenters have considered Naval Group and TKMS less likely winners because the Dutch don’t like being dominated by these large neighbours. Then again, having lost the Australian order Naval Group’s SSK Division might be very hungry – thus maybe offering the lowest price. But who knows?!

SONARS and POWER USAGE

Where "C" wrote on Nov 25, 2022 "I'm no sonar engineer, but I'm still baffled why a sonar system in passive mode would consume upwards of 75Kw - active is different for sure - those are BIG numbers."

I'm also no sound engineer, but I would say:

A passive sonar uses a lot of power to amplify very weak sounds and for massive processing of signal tasks to make sense of sounds, esoecially identifying the precise source. See what Aaron describes in 2 below.

SSKs and SSNs (all attack subs) are more famous users of spherical active and passive sonar uses for ASW and anti-ship work.

However attack subs also use very weak, discrete beam, active/passive navigation/movement sonar pulses to image the seafloor, seamounts and other obstructions that the sub would otherwise risk banging into. Again these are very weak pulses undetectable by enemy sonars/seafloor hydrophones but are received on a constant basis by the sub's active/passive bow sonar.

1. On what happens when this imaging system doesn't work or isn't efficiently used see my November 2021 reporting on the Seawolf class sub USS Connecticut's major accident hitting a seamount:

1A - here https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-sub-did-hit-seabed-projecting.html

1B - especially the diagram here https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/11/uss-connecticuts-sonar-navigation-wasnt.html

2 Aaron, a former USN Los Angeles class SSN and Ohio class SSBN Sonarman,  does discuss how sonars/sonarmen work in detail here and on his "Sub Brief" Youtube website https://www.youtube.com/c/subbrief

Aaron's (aka Jive Turkey's) description is interesting:

2A - 2min45secs into "The Ping" https://youtu.be/24uLeEKma5g It sounds like Aaron was using a great deal of energy for his Active (anti-sub or surface ship) "Ping".

2B - 20min into "USS Connecticut South China Sea Collision" https://youtu.be/5VKQPBhu0z0  eg. avoid collision "tools...that they will not make public" which Pete suspects is navigation sonar mode.

A Seawolf-class bow sonar arrangement (photo courtesy USN via The Drive 2020.)

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2C - 1:36 into "USS Connecticut Damage Update..." https://youtu.be/vB-eSTpvKgs shows what I think is the half spherical active sonar - it is so positioned (mainly downward) to send weak navigation pulses, picked up by the much larger spherical passive sonar. (photo above)

So much for us all to learn on the edges of guesswork.

AUKUS SSNs "could cost A$10 Billion each"

In an exclusive Andrew Tillett for the Australian Financial Review (AFR), on November 25, 2022, reports a whole range of new (possible) issues titled:

“Warning that nuclear submarines could cost $10b each”

"C" on Submarine Hotel Load Power Uses & Amounts

“C” on Nov 23, 2022 made a long comment on submarine hotel load power uses.

It’s a comment well worth turning into the following article:

"Replying to Anonymous's very interesting response [of Nov 16, 2022 here]  to my Hotel load point: the comment from Fleet Command Kobayashi [scroll down here for his photo and bio] is revealing and useful in confirming my suspicion that submarine commanders are likely judicious in what systems they run during endurance exercises.

I would add that the Thales VELOX-M8 Intercept Sonar example I gave (which is one of the very few examples I have found in literature where the vendor has given a power value) was 400W, or 0.4Kw, which is not a lot in the bigger picture of hotel load computations, which seem to waffle between 50 and 200 KWh. This is an intercept sonar, ie. a relatively small item of kit, an adjunct auxiliary to the primary arrays mainly used for classifying a received tone (sound electronic support measures (ESM) [intelligence gathering] essentially). The processing unit takes up about 6U of rack-space, and I'm not sure the array size, but intercept sonars are typically very small, the British type 2019 "nipple" being iconic [scroll half way down the very informative "The History Of British Submarine Sonars" for "SONAR TYPE 2019 DOME"].

Nonetheless the point that designers actively have tilted away from certain system layouts typical in nuke boats because of power consumption is good to have confirmed.

Here's my extremely rough cut of load for a medium-large boat with a crew of c. 60, and these are, in my view, very generous:

ENVIRONMENT

12KW for Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) (rough guide of 5 people per KW)

1KW for lighting (incandescent lighting should be long gone, LED's are so vastly superior in sub context its not funny)

FOOD

3Kw for refrigeration (A 30 cubic-meter cold room will draw about this)

5Kw for food preparation (this will flux according to usage, but this will power an oven an 4 hot plates at full tilt, but I use this number as an "average")

2Kw for misc (kettles/boilers etc, also an average as will flux)

OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY (OT)

This is trickier and depends on degree of automation on board, I work in Mining OT space so by way of comparison, all the OT control systems of a large processing mill, with around 250 devices draws, for CONTROL purposes, between 2 and 8 Kw, depending on how many things are in state-change at any point in time. This feels a reasonable starting point, so...

6KW for onboard OT. (eg. raising a mast will require a controller that draws only a few watts constantly, but the actual Variable speed drive (VSD) which is driven by it, that does the actual hoist, will draw mush more for the few seconds its working)

SONAR, COMBAT, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC

Well this is the big hole. I don’t know. So far everything else has come in at about 30KW, which, if numbers like 100KW for hotel are taken, leaves a ball-aching 70KW in mostly computational activity. Its plausible, but thats roughly equivalent to around 100 mainstream IT servers, which feels excessive. Each terminal station, if it includes a pair or large LCD screens, networking and computation will likely draw 0.5 to 1KW, so a boat with 8 such terminals means there is 8KW up front.

I welcome adjustments/insights/amendments to this, as at the moment its just not adding up, unless current systems are just woefully inefficient and using 90's era or older systems - which may very well be the case.

C”

Pete Comment

For further reading relevant to submarine propulsion and non-propulsion (hotel load) electrical uses see Marine Insight's "Different Systems on a Naval Submarine" of April 17, 2021 at https://www.marineinsight.com/naval-architecture/different-systems-on-a-naval-submarine/

AUKUS SSNs With Nuclear Weapons

I’ve long argued that its of little use Australia has SSNs as a China deterrent. 

This is if our SSNs are merely armed with torpedoes, Harpoon and/or Tomahawk subsonic SLCMs and mines. These would only add up to a total “throw weight” of 25 tonnes of high explosive, maximum. Land attacking China merely with high explosive, subsonic, SLCMs would result in many/most being shot down, fail to deter China, but just make China more angry.

Australian SSNs need sufficient vertical tube versatility to be armed with hypersonic missiles of various sizes, or even ballistic missiles.

So it is by good fortune that the US SSN(X) debate is publicly leaning (on Nov 10, 2022) towards larger (therefore more costly) 9,000 tonne Seawolf sized SSNs/SSGNs. The Seawolf Mark I’s beam/diameter is 12m permitting a longer/taller missile than the Virginia’s diameter of 10m.

Hypersonic Missiles on Block V Virginias & SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark IIs

There appear to be plans to deploy Hypersonic Missiles on Block V Virginia SSNs and presumably on not yet diameter designated SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark IIs (but likely of 12m-13m diameter).

Looking at USNI News (Nov 3, 2022) it seems the USN sees it possible that 3 x  Common Hypersonic Glide Bodies (C-HGB) and their boosters could fit in each of 4 Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs) of 2.2m diameter, behind the sail, by 2029. That is 12 x C-HGBs per Virginia, Block V (the first being USS Oklahoma (SSN-802)).

As hypersonic submarine cruise missiles are new weapon categories under development there is no concrete doctrine (yet) as to whether they can be assumed to have conventional or nuclear warheads.

Meanwhile, the 2 VPTs in front of the Block V's sail may not have the versatility/position to be lengthened - so may be still restricted to subsonic Tomahawk SLCMs.

SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark IIs Capable of Taking 4 Trident IIs?

The 2.2m diameter of VPTs originated from the 2.2m diameter of the originally Trident II silos on the 4 Ohio-class that became SSGNs. Those silos were then converted to each take 7 x Tomahawk missiles. The 7 Tomahawk accommodating diameter was then carried over as VPTs to Virginias.

It is highly likely the VPT will be carried over to the SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark II.

So Trident II SLBMs, at 2.11m diameter, can horizontally fit into a 2.2m Virginia Payload Tube (VPT), but not vertically (yet). 

But vertically? Where I'm going with this is if a Seawolf Mark I’s hull diameter of 12m is only increased by 1m for an SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark II that would make a diameter of 13m.

13m just happens to be the diameter of an Ohio SSBN and planned 13m diameter of a future Columbia SSBN. These, of course, can/will vertically fit a Trident II’s 13.58m height owing to their slight hump.

This would give SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark IIs of 13m diameter and with 4 VPTs the capability to accommodate 4 x Trident IIs.

This might be a future capability much valued by Australia - if its 8 future SSNs happened to be US SSN(X)/Seawolf Mark IIs. Fear of China has made possible the unprecedented AUKUS SSN offer. Increasing fear of China (say, in 2030) may swing the Australian public in favour of an Australian nuclear deterrent.

If Australia chooses the UK, perhaps UK SSN(R)s might have the same SSN(X)  (aka common AUKUS) dimensions enabling a Trident II capability.

This thought should not be confused with the nuclear armed Tomahawk TLAM-N debate. Tomahawks, against a nuclear armed enemy, carry with them the "is it carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead"  ambiguity-misunderstanding. There is no such ambiguity-misunderstanding with SLBMs as they are always assumed to be a nuclear tipped deterrent.

Huge Problem Nuclear Qualifying RAN: Report

Australia’s Nautilus Institute has produced a very up to date “Peace and Security Special Report”:

Titled “AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE SUBMARINES: AN EXPLAINER”

By Allan Behm, Rear Admiral Peter Briggs (Retired) and Commodore Paul Greenfield (Retired)

Dated November 16, 2022

At https://mailchi.mp/nautilus/napsnet-special-reportaustralias-future-submarinesan-explainer?e=1a4f758957

Its 33 pages contain a wealth of knowledge, that former senior naval officers are best placed to provide, about Australia’s submarine needs.

At the moment I’m focusing on the main section on nuclear propulsion, which states in part:

“Nuclear reactors also radically change the power available to submarines, their endurance underwater, the transit times and time on station, as well as the “hotel” services available to submarines and their crews. Combat system capability, habitability, air quality, water availability and general amenity are much enhanced. There is much to be said for nuclear propulsion, especially when the submarine’s survivability and that of its crew is taken into account. The cost multiplier, however, may not match the force multiplier effects.

Nuclear propulsion would also raise a host of new and imponderable issues for Australian industry, and for the RAN’s ability to support the submarine. Lacking a nuclear industry—and thus the education and associated skills streams that support such an industry—Australia would necessarily have to develop the education, infrastructure and industrial support needed to maintain the capability as part of the cost of that program. It would be important that Australia develop a sovereign capability in all these areas, as the availability of third parties in a time of tension is moot.

At present, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has no nuclear qualified personnel. The nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in service with the USN and the Royal Navy require between 40 and 50 crew members qualified at varying levels of nuclear expertise per boat, with considerable numbers of similar personnel in the logistics and support functions ashore. Maintaining the pipeline of nuclear-trained personnel in the US or the UK will be costly—approximately $1 million per person per year. Establishing and maintaining a similar pipeline in Australia will not be significantly less expensive.

In June 2022, the US House of Representatives introduced legislation that would assist the RAN to train its future submarine operators in the US: the Australia-US Submarine Officer Pipeline Act will permit at least two Australians to train in the US each year.[15] This is an important, but ultimately token, effort. The pipeline will need to be as wide as it is long to remediate the shortfall in the RAN’s skill base.

It is important to recall that the UK and USA established their SSN capabilities in the circumstances of the Cold War, drawing upon a large force of conventionally powered submarines and steam powered surface ships. This situation assisted in providing the essential manpower and skills base. Nonetheless, the task was a serious challenge for each navy.

Australia has none of these resources and will have to draw heavily on the supplier navy’s training system and seagoing submarine force to train its personnel. The availability of the necessary level of support would be a major risk for an Australian SSN program, and one that needs early resolution.

Equally importantly, the numbers and skillsets in an SSN crew are significantly different to that of a Collins crew. The training program would entail converting existing RAN submarine personnel and a substantial initial training program. Both would require long periods of training and overseas service to gain the necessary experience. Until Australia’s SSN force reached sufficient operational submarines to undertake the at sea training of trainees (say, at least six SSN) most of this training would have to be conducted overseas - and it would take about 20 years to deliver this number of SSNs after initiating the program.

At this point, RAN schools and a nuclear engineering faculty established within a selected Australian tertiary institution could finally begin to take over this task. But in the absence of any nuclear power generation industry in Australia, the cost of establishing and operating this training infrastructure would be borne by the SSN program.

The problem is enormous.”