S Korea Hedging with its KSS-3 Ballistic Missile Submarines

In response to Sung Chan Lee's comment of July 6, 2021  

I, of course, agree with you Sung Chan Lee.

South Korea (SK) deploying its KSS-3 ballistic missile submarines shows an intention to eventually arm the ballistic missiles with a deterrent warhead - which can only be nuclear.

SK is also signalling the US that it is essential the US maintain the "nuclear umbrella" - a continuing willingness to defend SK with nuclear weapons.

If the SK warheads remained just conventional high explosive this would confuse North Korea (NK) (and everyone else) as to why SK is building ballistic missile submarines of 3,500-4,000 tonnes armed with ballistic missiles with a TOTAL high explosive throw-weight of only 6 to 10 tonnes. 

Even if a tonne of a SK conventional warhead equalled 2 tonnes of old fashioned TNT (TNT being the standard for measuring nuclear yield equivalent ) then a one tonne SK warhead would have a yield of only 0.002 kilotonne.

Meanwhile a single NK SLBM warhead (weighing one tonne) may have a yield of 100 kilotonnes (the usual 2 stage "Teller-Ulam"  thermonuclear weapon minimum) and maybe up to 500 kilotonnes = half a Megatonne.

So SK is hedging. If the US does not plainly indicate it will defend SK by nuclear means (principally against NK but also against China and Russia) then SK's KSS-3s constitute a very viable nuclear weapon delivery platform.

Regards

Pete

S Korean Pontoon SLBM Test: Only Nuclear Armed Makes Sense

Pete Comment

Following a series of North Korean submerged, static pontoon tests of SLBMs (intended to be exclusively nuclear tipped) South Korea has just done a similar test. South Korea reportedly successfully tested a variant of the usually land launched Hyunmoo 2B missile with an estimated range of 500km.

All nuclear weapon states, which eventually developed SSBNs (from decades ago to more recently) went through a preliminary submerged pontoon test stage for their nuclear intended SLBMs. Their SLBMs were never intended to be merely tipped with a high explosive warhead. From pontoons the SLBMs graduated to the technically more difficult step of experimental SSBN or SSB test launches which can occur when the submarine is stationary or moving slowly (say 4 knots).

Significantly South Korea is the only non-nuclear weapon state to test a SLBM. The implication being South Korea feels it needs to make preparations to nuclear arm its SLBMs. This would make strategic and deterrent sense given the severe unstoppable nuclear threat South Korea experiences from North Korea.  Basically the Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines South Korea is gradually deploying would be uneconomical and irrational if used to merely launch high explosive SLBMs from their 6 silos. Uneconomical and irrational is if each of the 6 SLBMs have a one tonne high explosive warhead, equalling only 6 tonnes total throw-weight. This is less than the 7.7 tonnes of bombs/air-to-ground-missiles of a South Korean F-16 or more significantly 8 tonnes delivered by a South Korean F-35A (23 in service, so far).

SLBMs are only economical and act as a deterrent (their main purpose) if they are nuclear armed. Otherwise North Korea could feel comfortable first or second striking with its nuclear tipped SLBMs, land based missiles and free fall aircraft dropped nuclear bombs against Seoul and other critical targets in South Korea. And in any case the Law of Nuclear Ambiguity means that North Korea must assume that all South Korean SLBMs on their way to North Korea would be nuclear tipped and deserve a nuclear response.  

For more details see NavalNews very useful July 4, 2021 report which adds:

"The first ship of the Dosan Ahn Chang Ho-class [aka KSS-3 (or no hyphen) or III (with or without a hyphen). South Korea desperately needs standardized weapons' designations!] is fitted with 6 cold launch VLS (vertical launch systems) reportedly capable of launching both the Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBM and a submarine launched land attack cruise missile (SLCM) known as Hyunmoo 3C with a range of 1,500 Km. The follow-on class, known as KSS III Batch 2, will be fitted with up to 10 of those VLS" [still only 10 tonnes total high explosive - less than 2 F-35As].

Naval Group and LOTE Still Best Sub Solutions for Australia

I am writing in response to Lee McCurtayne's comment of July 4, 2021 regarding future submarine options for Australia.

One problem the Ausralian Government (AusG) has if it wanted to work with SAAB to build a Collins 2 is Australia and Naval Group (NG) have already signed legal contracts to design and build Australia's future Attack class subs. 

The AusG is accountable to taxpayers and voters. As Australia moves toward a Federal Election (on or after August 7, 2021 or on or before May 21, 2022) the AusG does not want to be seen as vacillating over South Australia's very electorally sensitive submarine building industry. Furthermore A$500+ million has already been paid to NG. If a contract was terminated by the AusG then NG could demand at least a A$500 millions breach-of-contract compensation penalty with attendant bad press. Not a good look for the AusG.

In contrast political instability would rule if a Collins 2 was started at this late stage. Nothing has been signed with SAAB-Kockums (or Japan of Germany's TKMS for that matter). Non-NG negotiations, contract signing, design work, construction and testing of a Non-NG future sub might still mean delivery to the RAN after 2030 (maybe simultaneously or even after NG's Attack class).

SAAB's medium sized extended range (ER) A26 is only a paper design. The early ER concept is also likely much smaller (just over 80m long and 3,000+ tonnes) than the large 97m, 4,500 tonne (surfaced) (likely 4,800 tonne submerged) future submarine Australia wants and needs. 

No conventional sub, even an Attack class or Collins 2, would be “Regionally Superior" for Australia. That would take an SSN - with only Naval Group in a position to sell SSNs, in the medium-long term, to Australia. This is  specifically the NG Suffren-Barracuda SSN which has a lower proliferation sensitivity LEU (on dangerous HEU vs LEU scroll 1/6th way down) reactor. 

Meanwhile the only other viable SSN sources, the US and UK, have expressed no serious interest in supplying SSNs to Australia. SSNs are locked up by F-22 like US not-for-export-extreme sensitivity rules. UK reactors based on a US design and US reactors themselves are not for export as they are nuclear proliferation blocked due to their 90+% (bomb grade) HEU fuel cores.

Australia can't afford any "dual build" of Attack class and Collins 2s or to build Attack class while spending the 7+ years to buy an "interim submarine". We can barely afford the Attack class by itself and only have the submarine building facilities for one class at a time. 

As I have said in the past, a viable interim solution is the AusG's long held solution, which will also harness SAAB-Kockums expertise. That is the delayed "life of type extension (LOTE)" which is still not easy or cheap. The LOTE "...will ensure there is no capability gap before the Attack class submarines enter service in the...2030s."

Excellent Video: Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer

The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer is the, non-submarine, backbone of the USN. 

An excellent July 2, 2021 Youtube is here and below.

China develops underwater surveillance networks in Indian Ocean, South China Sea

Old but interesting - click here 

Chinese Submarines: Big Modelling Intelligence Gap

Hi everyone (particularly wispywood2344 and Anonymous)

China's dictator Xi Jinping, by his actions and statements, makes China increasingly the enemy of Japan, Australia and the US. Today Xi "hit...at unspecified “foreign forces” and said any external attempts to subjugate [China] would result in “heads bashed bloody against a Great Wall of steel.” Xi said this to the Chinese people and the free world during an hour-long address marking the ruling Communist Party's centenary of its founding.

Thank you for your views in the article Total Cost Table for Japanese Submarine Main Batteries of June 3, 2021 (to which I added the Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei Table) and thank you for your comments below the article. 

We've done good work over the years detailing Japan's submarines, especially their battery formulas, numbers of batteries and their battery arrangements.

As China wants to be increasingly our enemy I'm wondering if we could:

1. Increasingly research and describe China's submarine battery formulas, number of
    batteries and their arrangements

and

2. Build Chinese conventional and nuclear submarine tables (eg. like the Oyashio-Soryu-
    Taigei Table.) 

With America's vast secret and top secret intelligence resources I'm certain the CIA, DIA and NSA would have done 1. and 2. - but I've never seen it. With the open source intelligence available to us we could also do Chinese submarine batteries and submarine tables. These are many Chinese submarine details already available in Submarine Matters articles and the US DoD China Military Power Report 2020 (20MB .PDF) (next one out in September 2021)  which would have much information and pointers to more information. Also many other Chinese submarine details need constant compiling and discussion. 

Additional "intelligence requirements or targets" are Chinese pressure hull steel, electronics, weapons, crew efficiency (on Youtubes), impact of Covid on crews, command arrangements including CCP commissars, nuclear chain of command (re SSBNs), diesels, reactors, seafloor sensors, smart mines, UUVs and much more.

In future more information on the Chinese Yuan-class will leak out from Thailand and especially Pakistan as they will be receiving export variants of the Yuan and their security standards are more relaxed than China's.

There is fortunately much more detail on Russian subs that could be researched and tabulated in parallel.

-----------------------------

As one activity I wonder if calculations could be modelled on the likely battery numbers and arrangements for Yuans with (LABs + AIP) and also LIBs (on the latest Yuans).

Looking at the Table below. For the standard Chinese Yuan variant (with LABs + AIP) this could be based on the Soryu Mk.1's known 480 LABs by comparing submerged displacements of those Soryus and Yuans. This, of course, needs to assume Chinese LABs have the same weight as Japanese LABs.

Japan's Taigei only lists surfaced displacement - so I will not use it in calculations. Assuming LIBs only Soryu Mk.2s have the same submerged displacement as Mk.1s can be used in estimating LIB numbers in future all LIB (no AIP) Yuans. I assume strongly that the Chinese are trialling an all LIBs Yuan or Song class submarine as a technology testbed.

The following is the first attempt at:

Estimating Number of Yuan LABs by Looking At Soryu Mk.1s  

Submarine Type/Variant	Displacement (submerged)	Number of Batteries
Soryu Mk.1 with LABs + AIP	4,134 long tons/480 LABs = 8.61 long tons per LAB.	480 LABs
Yuan with LABs + AIP	3,500 long tons/8.61	406 LABs
Soryu Mk.2 with LIBs only	4,134 long tons/? LIBs = ?.?? long tons per LIB	??? LIBs
Yuan with LIBs only	3,500 long tons/?.??	??? LIBs

Much modelling with comparisons to Japanese submarines can be used in approximately estimating Chinese submarine characteristics.

Regards

Pete