October 22, 2019

2017 South Korea sought Submarine Reactors from US, RUSSIA.

In Submarine Matters’South Korean and Japanese Nuclear Submarine Propulsion” October 21, 2019 Pete assessed that South Korea saw its land based SMART nuclear reactor as a technological dead-end for submarine use.

Building submarine reactors is the most expensive and technologically challenging part of building nuclear submarines. Hence better to buy than reinvent. 

South Korean politicians, officials and scientists appear prepared to cross longstanding alliance lines in seeking reactors from Russia. 

US

Professor Frank von Hippel provides details in his excellent academic paper titled “Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs” Pages 133-150, Published June 27, 2019 at Taylor Francis Online https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1625504. Here is a paragraph with references:

[von Hippel] “South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, has declared an interest in building or buying nuclear attack submarines. During US President Donald Trump’s November 2017 visit to Seoul, the two leaders reportedly discussed the possibility of South Korea purchasing a US nuclear attack submarine.

Further details see “Nuclear-Powered Subs, JSTARS Make South Korea’s Wish List” Defense News, November 8, 2017 at https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/11/08/nuclear-powered-subs-jstars-make-south-koreas-wish-list/ 

"Moon had indicated an interest in nuclear-powered submarines even before his election in May, and the topic was reportedly discussed during his meeting with Trump. However, details of those discussions were not revealed, and the Trump administration has not indicated that it is open to that idea.

South Korea’s interest in nuclear-powered submarines has been stoked by North Korea’s development of ballistic missile submarines capable of firing the KN-11, also known as the Pukguksong-1, submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has undergone testing during the North’s recent spate of missile tests.
... Should South Korea acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines, either through an unlikely direct purchase from the U.S. or more likely through the development and production of an indigenous design with U.S. technical assistance, it would represent a significant shift in the country’s defense posture and stoke concerns with nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.

But significant obstacles to these ambitions remain. South Korea is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Asian nation is also prohibited from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel for military purposes under a deal signed with the U.S. in 2015. The U.S. has also not sold nuclear-powered submarines and has not transferred such technology even to allies [Pete - Except to the UK for decades – see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_US%E2%80%93UK_Mutual_Defence_Agreementand it is likely to loath doing so out of nonproliferation concerns.

[Pete Comment - US submarine reactors use “Bomb Grade” 93% to 97% U-235, another reason for the sensitivity of their design and export. See page 20 of https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif124.pdf]

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

RUSSIA

[von Hippel continues] Russia’s premier designer of naval propulsion reactors, OKBM Afrikantov, has made public the fact that, in 2017, it had discussions with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute on the possibility of providing the design of a new Russian icebreaker reactor as a “reference design” for a South Korean “maritime propulsion” reactor.”
[endnote 9 "An email communication to the author [Frank von Hippel] from a South Korean government official on 9 August 2018 stated that the Moon administration was no longer actively pursuing the idea of a nuclear-powered attack submarine."]

Further details see “Russia May Help South Korea to Build Nuclear Reactor for Maritime Vessels.” Sputnik International, August 7, 2018 at https://sputniknews.com/asia/201808071067008274-russia-south-korea-nuclear-reactor/ 

MOSCOW (Sputnik) - Russia may help South Korea to build a ready-to-operate nuclear power plant for maritime propulsion using the RITM-200 reactor as a basis for its design, JSC Afrikantov OKBM, a subsidiary of Rosatom nuclear corporation, said in a 2017 annual report made public on Tuesday.

"In November 2017, during a meeting in Nizhny Novgorod [Russia], representatives from the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute [KAERI] said that the Korea is considering the possibility of developing a concept for a new reactor with a capacity of about 150-200 MW for sea-faring vessels and is viewing the RITM-200 reactor as a possible reference design," the report says.

According to the report, Moscow expressed readiness to cooperate with Seoul in the production of a turnkey reactor plant after receiving an official request for cooperation from South Korea and obtaining appropriate approval from the Rosatom State Nuclear Corporation.

JSC Afrikantov OKBM is the main developer of nuclear reactor cores for Russian naval vessels."

[von Hippel continues] “The Russian icebreaker reactor, the RITM-200, was designed to use LEU fuel,”

Further details see IAEA. 2016a 180Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments, A Supplement To: IAEA Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS).” at https://aris.iaea.org/Publications/SMR-Book_2016.pdf.

[von Hippel continues] “but apparently will use HEU fuel.”

Further details see “New Russian Icebreakers Will Use HEU Fuel.” International Panel on Fissile Materials, November 29, 2017 http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2017/11/new_russian_icebreakers_w.html.
Despite the earlier plans to use LEU fuel in reactors that will power its new icebreakers, Russia has apparently decided to develop HEU fuel for these reactors. The "integrated propulsion unit" with a nuclear reactor, known as RITM-200 [new link added by Pete] was developed by the Afrikantov OKBM design bureau in Nizhniy Novgorod. The unit will be installed on icebreakers of the Project 22220 series (referred to as UAL, Universal Atomic Icebreaker, in Rosatom documents). The lead ship of this class, Arktika, is expected to enter service in 2018, followed by two more ships, Sibir and Ural...”

Frank von Hippel [another reference] is a Senior Research Physicist and Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. He was a founding co-chair of the Program and of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. During 1993–94, he served as Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

October 21, 2019

South Korean and Japanese Nuclear Submarine Propulsion

South Korea (SK) has carried out research on building a nuclear powered submarine (aka KSS-N, KSSX-N and SSX) since the 2003 (codename) “362 initiative” if not longer ago. But that 362 initiative was officially (perhaps not actually) terminated in 2004 once it became public - under ( likely) US, Chinese, Japanese and Russian, pressure.

The lead time and technical hurdles for SK to develop a submarine reactor, and specialised submarine to use it, are huge. Only the US, Russia, China and France (with much larger defense budgets than SK) have fully designed and produced submarine reactors. To avoid the huge cost even a big player (the UK) used/(still assisted by) US designs and India uses Russian.

Early speculation that SK would shrink and modify its existing small land-based SMART reactor seems misplaced. SMART is unnecessarily large (for SK proposed 4,000 tonne submarine) at 350 MWt (thermal), which if developed for submarine would translate to 70 MWe (electrical). More significantly SMART uses low power/weight ratio 4.8% LEU fuel with an overly frequent 3 year refueling cycle.

Unless SK is conducting an extremely well hidden indigenous reactor for submarine effort one preliminary step might be to produce a reactor powered ship. SK’s DSME has had hints, but no details, for years. Go to the DSME technology website > hover on R&D and you will see “Nuclear Propulsion Ship” > Click on Nuclear Propulsion Ship and you will see Arctic Drill Ship. Such a ship could in future use a reactor for its ice-breaker propulsion function and for its drilling function. Neither SK nor DSME seem to provide further details on nuclear ship plans.

Instead SK has approached other countries for technology transfer assistance for a reactor and a specialized submarine to use it (the subject of my next article).

JAPAN


Japan's nuclear propelled ship Mutsu with Reactor and auxiliary machinery compartments shaded. (From Submarine Matters' June 17, 2016 article).
---

Japan built and operated a nuclear propelled ship – the Mutsu (diagram above) – from 1968 to 1992 with a reactor developed by what is now the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). From that experience Japan may have quietly conducted further design research on submarine reactors within the JAEA under the guidance of the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD). The most likely countries to assist Japan are the US and France.

Pete

October 18, 2019

South Korean Defense and Attack Strategies Against Japan

On October 18, 2019 Anonymous commented:

Japan has already noticed South Korea’s (SK’s) suspicious intentions [1, 2]. According to a representative SK paper, SK studied, in the 1990s, “the Strategy of Stinging” to hit Tokyo [3].

[1] Masahisa Sato (the Secretary General of the Japanese Diet members caucus of Liberal Democratic Party, and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs) tweeted (in Japanese) December 25, 2018:

“The basic design of the next 3,000-ton class submarine has been completed in South Korea. Scheduled to be built from late 2019. According to a South Korean announcement, the submarine will be built to respond to threats from all directions and can be equipped with six ballistic missiles with a range of 500km. Where is the main enemy of this submarine? [What is SK’s intent?]”

[2] “South Korea’s epoch-making defense budget of 50 Trillion won [US$42.4 Billion], “North East Asia budget” to check neighboring countries”, SK's JoongAng Ilbo (in S Korean) August 29, 2019 https://news.joins.com/article/23565170

“South Korea's defense budget is expected to exceed 50 trillion won [US$42.4 Billion] for the first time. The South Korean government explained that it will greatly increase its defense spending to prepare for the conversion to wartime warfare. It was confirmed that there was also [an intention to build a military capability] to keep in check neighbouring countries such as Japan and China.”

[3] “South Korean Government Self-Defense Strategy New Version [Against] Pyongyang Bay? Beijing and Tokyo”, SK's JoongAng Ilbo (in S Korean), September 22, 2019, https://news.joins.com/article/23583206

“Another concept of independent defense against neighbouring countries is the Strategy of Stinging. An SK government source, asking for anonymity, said, “At the National Research Institute of the 1990s, we studied how to fight in disputes with neighbouring countries under the [code] name of “Key Research”. [The Strategy of Stinging involved the possibility of stinging the core of neighbours]. In other words, the Strategy is to neutralize the command or major facilities in Beijing or Tokyo.” (Only SK version)

Anonymous

October 17, 2019

Future South Korean Nuclear Submarine Seen As Threat to Japan

On October 17, 2019 Anonymous provided the following useful and timely comment with links.

The South Korean (SK) Navy officially admitted it is making efforts to secure a nuclear submarine [1].

On October 10, 2019 the Chief of Staff of SK Navy officially announced that an SK nuclear propelled submarine is the most convenient way to follow and destroy North Korea (NK) submarines that are capable of firing nuclear tipped submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). 

The Chief of Staff of SK Navy also stated  that an SK nuclear propelled submarine could be a "useful deterrent" against neighbouring countries. [Pete Comment: By "deterrent" the Chief of Staff of SK Navy is presumably meaning SK missiles with nuclear warheads as a handful of missiles with  conventional warheads would be no deterrent (particularly to nuclear armed NK)]. 

The Chief of Staff of SK Navy explained that an SK nuclear propelled submarine is not restricted by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or Safeguards Agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

The Japanese government will interpret “neighboring countries” to mean NK and Japan and that SK Navy considers Japan as a virtual enemy [2]. This is because the SK Navy would never attack heavily nuclear armed China and Russia.

[1] South Korean Navy "Efforts to secure nuclear submarine ... convenient for North SLBM", Radio Free Asia, October 10, 2019 (in Korean - right-click mouse to translate)
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/ne-hw-10102019083107.html

[2] “Development of an SSN starting in SK before Japan [builds an SSN]” by Jun Kitamura, October 17, 2019, [Japan's] JBpress, (in Japanese) https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/57942?page=4 which displays the SK SLBM range map (below) to hit Japanese territory:

SK Navy submarine attack posture simulation [against Japan] (Map courtesy [Japan's]
-  "SSK" [or SSB?][conventional sub]: SK Navy KSS-III batch-2
    [or Batch II already designed
launch point to fire SLBMs [at Japan] 
-  "SSN" [or SSBN?]: SK Navy launch points to fire SLBMs [at Japan] 
"Red fan is SLBM range"

Pete Comment - The South Korean SLBMs may become a longer range variant of the land based Hyunmoo-2B (range with 500kg warhead 800 km in 2012?) or of the future Hyanmoo-4 (likely to have a range, with 500kg warhead, well over 1,000km).

Anonymous (some Pete comments)

October 14, 2019

3 Submarines by L/D ratios. 2 Subs by I Ratios, eg. for Netherlands. India?

On October 12, 2019 Anonymous provided the following useful comments and calculations which compare: (A) Naval Group, SAAB and TKMS submarines against Length (L) / Diameter (aka Beam) (D) ratios, and (B) SAAB-DAMEN and TKMS submarines against Indiscretion Ratios (IRs). 
--

(A)  Length (L) / Diameter (aka Beam) (D) ratios

Naval Group, SAAB and TKMS have proven submarines with similar dimension:
-  Scorpene AM-2000 (displacement 1,870 tons (t); length (L) 70m; Diameter (D) 6.2m, L/D = 11.2) 
-  A26 (1,930t, 63m, 6.4m, L/D9.8) and
-  Type 218SG (2,200t, 70m, 6.3m, L/D11.1), respectively. 

To achieve a larger submarine (say for the Netherlands) with a displacement of 3000t (if required?) with a simple hull extension (aka plug) the estimated L/D = 15-18 considerably deviates from the optimal L/D = 7-10 [1]. SAAB and TKMS proposed new submarines with bigger beam (to achieve an optimal L/D) presumably based on the existing (Collins-class) or mature paper designed submarine (Type 216). Unless Naval Group can offer submarine with optimal L/D, a successful bid will be a long shot.

(B) Indiscretion Ratios (IRs)

On the basis of rough estimates [2] the Indiscretion Ratios (IRs):
-  large SAAB-DAMEN A26 (3 x MTU diesels, LIBs, Stirling-AIP) = 3.8/% 
-  large 212CD (2 x MTUs, LIBs, FC-AIP) = 4.2%

So the IR of the SAAB-DAMEN A26 is slightly smaller than the 212CD's thanks to the A26's 3 x MTU diesels. These IRs are far superior to IRs of LAB-submarines (around 12%).

There are two strategies to achieve a low IR by using LIBs:
-  one is a combination of diesels and AIP, and 
-  another is the adoption of high power diesels. 

To achieve 4% of IR without AIP, SAAB-DAMEN needs 5 x MTU diesels [with LIBs] or 2 of the latest KAWASAKI diesels [with LIBs].

[1] “Optimum L/D for Submarine Shape”, by M. Moonesun and others. Indian Journal of Geo-Marine Sciences, vol.45(1), Jan/2016, pp. 38-43 at
(Conclusion is on page 42) The main achievement of this paper is the suggestion of an L/D = 7-10 as the optimal range for cylindrical middle body submarines.

[2] Assumption: AIP is used for 50-days submerged surveillance in a 70-day mission. Power consumed per hour is 0.2MW (c = hotel load 0.15MW + propulsion input 0.05MW). Then, total energy to be consumed for the surveillance is 240MW (e=c*24 hours*50days) consisting of an energy supply from AIP (d = c*24hours*submerge period by AIP (a) = 4.8*a) and that from diesel 
(j = 240MW-d). IR is related to daily energy supply (g = j/50days) from diesel with electrical output (b), namely, IR = 100*g/(24*b).

Where:
- SAAB-DAMEN: a=20days, b=3*MTU=3.12MW, d=96MW, j=144MW, g =2.88MW, IR=3.8/% and
212CD: a=28days, b=2*MTU =2.08MW, d=134.4MW, j=105.6W, g=2.11MW, IR=4.2%

Submerged period by AIP, hotel load and propulsion input are estimated in various articles.

Pete Comment - Naturally many other technical, cost and Dutch content variables will be part of the Netherlands' future submarine decision. Also, as Submarine Matters October 11, 2019 article records, Netherlands' domestic political factors and international relations with supplier countries will also influence the selection. India is also considering the selection of 6 Project-75I AIP submarines.  

Mainly Anonymous (Pete some editing, comments)

October 11, 2019

Dutch Navy Document Clarifies Dutch Future Submarine Competition

Anonymous has identified an excellent Dutch article that, to an extent, clarifies the issues of the Walrus Replacement Program (ie. Dutch future submarine competition). The article is centered on a Dutch Navy document.

The article is by Olof van Joolen and Niels Rigter in the Dutch language De Telegraaf,
October 2, 2019 titled “Angling fishing for submarines” at

(Pete has translated it into English, bolding some parts and adding the links)

"THE HAGUE - The four new submarines for the Navy must be of Dutch origin as much as possible. The large trade unions and the employers' organization VNO-NCW advocate this at the [Dutch] House of Representatives and the Cabinet.

They are doing this just before the matter is raised at the central political structures at The Hague [The Hague is the seat of the Dutch Cabinet, the States General, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State.]. From an internal comparison that De Telegraaf was given insight into, the Dutch / Swedish combination Damen / Saab seems to have the “best papers” for the multi-billion euro selection but the French Naval Group is chasing the consortium.

The unions, including FNV, CNV and De Unie, have already put agreements with Damen on paper that the shipbuilder use Dutch personnel, Dutch knowledge and development and production sites on Dutch soil as much as possible. The unions have also made agreements with the yard about internships, flexible staff and the remuneration of freelancers. “The parties will sign the agreements next week.”

This means that those involved anticipate things. With the Swedish Saab, Damen is only one of the four candidates to develop and build the replacement for the Walrus submarines now in use by the Navy.

Rough

However, the purchase of the four new submarines is not going smoothly. Ministries involved all want something different. Moreover, there are concerns about the risks of the multibillion euro project.

Pros and cons. An internal candidate comparison document written by the Dutch Navy shows which of four yards (in the race to build the future submarines) has the best characteristics. Saab / Damen scores best for Dutch industry and for maintaining strategic knowledge. The Swedish-Dutch consortium can also show sufficient projects (frigates and submarines) to inspire confidence in the piece that De Telegraaf was given access to. A 'risk management plan' is essential. Not unimportant for a project that costs at least 3.5 billion euros.

Injection

The [Dutch Navy's] candidate comparison shows that the role of the Spanish submarine builder Navantia “has been played out.” [eliminated?] The German TKMS is second to last in the ranking. The French Naval Group is chasing Saab / Damen. If the [Dutch] navy were in charge, the choice had already been made. The Netherlands would have Saab design the new submarines, have them built at Damen, with a pendulum of Dutch companies on board. After all, a good injection for Dutch industry and the Netherlands as a knowledge country. Moreover, Dutch defense would remain hooked on the very latest military technology and get exactly the boat it wants.

But the Navy is not in control. And the Ministry of Defense cannot decide independently. The Department of Economic Affairs and Climate is also on board and seems sensitive to the Dutch industrial map that Saab / Damen have drawn. But Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs are also involved. They want something different. An "initiate" [insider]  summarizes it as follows:

"Broadly speaking, the

Defense organization wants a state-of-the-art submarine quickly,

Department of Economic Affairs and Climate wants a boost for the Dutch defense industry,

Finance wants as cheap as possible,

Home Affairs (with D66 minister Ollongren at the helm) wants TKMS, because it is European, and

Department of Foreign Affairs wants to maintain a good relationship with the French. ”

Prime Minister Rutte would also be sensitive to this.

The decision about which party or parties will continue to the next round therefore becomes more a political than a technical decision. It should have been decided last year. It is now expected in the coming weeks.

The postponement is due to a change in direction of this government, in which the importance of Dutch industry became more prominent, followed by a strongly intensified lobby by two participating parties. The German TKMS promising to place the construction of the Dutch submarines with the naval company in Den Helder and the French teaming up with the Dutch dredger IHC builder.

Risk

Since the 1990s, Damen has built all large ships for the Navy, but not yet a submarine. This is a  risk. Moreover, making boats that are completely tailored to the wishes of the Navy is much more expensive. The fact that the defense budget is not rising as fast as expected means that a new submarine built on Dutch soil is far from certain.” ENDS

Pete Comment

So the competition continues to be undecided. The decision timeline is still vague. Being “more a political than a technical decision” (a reality suffered by submarine selectors in many countries) adds to uncertainty. 

If risk is a worry then an enlarged version of a submarine that does not yet exist (eg. the A26, S-80 Plus and Type 212CD) is risky. The Dutch may see a large version of Naval Group's Scorpene as less risky than a small version of the not yet developed conventional Shortfin Barracuda.

Other major issues include do the Dutch require Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and/or Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) or neither?

Next week Pete will describe Naval Group's progress in developing second generation AIP.

Anonymous and Pete