Some intriguing situations Pete and Intel Family Members experienced

You may have noticed I've been writing little on this Submarine Matters lately.

I have been very busy commenting on other fora. Specifically

-  the Aussie's On Line Opinion with me commenting 2-3 times a day as plantagenet
   here is the list of my 4,000+ comments since 2005.

and

-  US Intelnews commenting 1-2 times weekly as Pete

You'll notice an undeniable mindset aimed at (internal, external and sigint) intel collection and analysis, but mainly from-security-intel-angle.

Much of this has been inspired by 3 Americans on the  game: A. in cyber security; B. mainly the security one with access to the 2 most famous bureau (mid level) and agency (an ex DD (Analysis); and C. in border protection. That was since 2005 until 3 years before Operation Neptune Spear, noting. Earlier, in 2006, I commented to a US contact (D) that bin Laden would not rely on electronic communications with bin Laden's network, but instead rely on hardcopy message couriers to-from  bin Laden.

Since 2005 my communications have been closely monitored by 2 Five-Eyes. Fear not, I only consider traveling to Five-Eye-Safe Aus, NZ and UK, and telegraph my movements. I only use the same long term mobile and ISP accounts for ease of the established monitoring.

Also inspired by a lifetime of reading intelligence biographies, autobiogs, fiction and non-fiction (books, articles, websites, Youtubes, movies, TV series and newspapers). 

Several family members being a broader part of the game:

-  One, Grandad I never saw, on my Father's side, in then British run New Delhi, working with
   electrical aspects of ULTRA and MAGIC intercept support in the early 1940s. Then UK tank 
   development. Later honoured with an OBE in 1961 "see George Leopold Albert COATES, Esq.,
   Engineer I, Military Engineering Experimental Establishment, Christchurch, [UK] War Office." 

-  Another, Grandad on my Mother's side, (paid by US or Australian DoDs?) to regularly fly into
   Alice Springs to provide orthodontic services to Pine Gap staff and their families (1960s-70s).

-  the last, my Dad, from Vietnam 1970 (counter-insurgency tactical intel) up to (access to
   everything) Defense Attache to the US to mid 80s. Me often being told way too much by family on
   the game.

Also by experinces triggered by such articles as this, this , this and this. In 2008 I scored a visit by a Chinese male "student" to my very small remote town. A "student" with an unenviable task as my town (where no Chinese lived...) was way out of the permitted Chinese diplomatic travel radius from Capital City. Aforesaid Chinese "student", of the thin cover carrying a camera (in his words "to take a picture" of my 90yo little old lady neigbour's old house...!) in retrospect, placed a GPS tracking device on my car. So when I visited Capital City in 2009 I was boxed-in by a Chinese team of 4 single, fit, chaps of around 30 years old. The 4 were just peaceably applying "here we are" pressure, thank goodness. The 4 had no plausible reason to be "window shopping" half an hour before the shops of the very cold Capital City opened. 

So after all this I'm being encouraged to wean off the intel mindset with more about other genres, eg. crime thrillers (good, not far different from spy thrillers) and even fantasy (but the fantasy genre will never happen :)

I'm also writing more poetry (see https://petercoatespoems.blogspot.com/ ) and non-fiction with an emphasis on political satire, which will one day be funny

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On another matter :

Thankyou /Kjell

For directing me to a glaring defect in my blog software. 

I have found over 350 comments in my Pending Comment bin that never went through to my email - some as far back as 2017. After removing around 150 SPAM comments I have just published all the Pending Comments, about 200. 

My apologies to commenters, whose comments were, for a time, lost, hence not responded to - which I'll do over the next few days.

About 500 comments did get through to my email since 2017. I published them on the day received. 

Cheers

Pete

Comment on The Costs of an Independent Nuclear Submarine Deterrent

See former UK Royal Navy nuclear submarine Commander, Robert Forsyth's 's excellent essay of July 31, 2019 at ASPI's The Strategist website, at

 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/counting-the-costs-of-an-independent-nuclear-deterrent/

Comment

Inspired by the essay an independent (of France, the UK or US) Australian nuclear deterrent (using submarines) would be totally unaffordable with Australia's much lower technical, financial and personnel resources than the 6 SSBN/SSN powers. And also considering the UK dependently used/uses US designs and build methods for its nuclear (submarine) reactors, all the SLBMs (Polaris through to Trident D5) and the SSBNs and SSNs themselves.

Necessities for an independent Australian nuclear deterrent

-  developing (maybe A$200 Billion?) and building 4 ultra modern, discrete, SSBNs, with a SSBN 40
   year program life cost of another A$300 Billion?

Would be even more unaffordable for Australia as a whole system of support forces and communications are required, including:

-  developing and building our own nuclear (submarine) reactors (even France has major problems
   doing that), SLBMs, associated space-launch system, nuclear warheads, specialised satellites for
   navigation, targeting and communications systems. (A$300 Billion?).

-  a more isolated new west coast Australian base (A$20 Billion? minimum) or at least heavily rebuilt
   submarine base (at HMAS Stirling, Fleet Base West, Rockingham) would be required.

-  due to the distance to Australia’s east coast, strategic redundancy, and possibility of SSBN or SSN
   breakdown a new secondary east coast submarine base may need to be built (being politically
   realistic it would probably be in Queensland, A$15 Billion?). 

This is because the current secondary base in Sydney Harbour would be unsuitable. This is due to lack of space (for nuclear submarines AND nuclear weapons) and especially due to reactor leak safety concerns and the inevitable public/political rejection of nuclear propelled, nuclear armed submarines in the harbour of Australia’s largest city.

To protect each of the 4 SSBN being rotated an SSN, at least one surface ship and maritime patrol aircraft would be required. 

-  this requires (development and building) a force of at least 6 ultra-modern SSNs.(A$500 Billion?)

There would also be consequent huge and growing strains on the conventional forces of the Australian Navy and also a major drop in financial and personnel resources for the Australian Army and Air Force. 

Conclusion

So due to development time and the astronomical figures above an independently developed and built Australian nuclear deterrent using nuclear submarines is impossible. 

If Australia were ever to have SSBNs, SLBMs and SSNs they would need to be developed and most probably built overseas, with the only choices being France, the US or UK.

Pete

PLA Threatens Tiananmen Square...Against Hong Kong Protesters

On July 2, 2019 I wrote an article "Coming Military Crackdown in Hong Kong?" which included:

"So damage to the Hong Kong Parliament may provide a pretext for a paramilitary police and then a military crackdown. Perhaps a broader circle of democracy activists in Hong Kong will also be arrested.

The Beijing Government can suspend the legal convention that the [Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)] cannot interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs. This is because the PLA has always had an underlying or active role in internal security for all regions of China. 

The 6,000 PLA troops based in Hong Kong can quickly be reinforced with several brigades of armoured vehicles from the mainland. The PLA's Hong Kong Garrison is under the direct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission and under administrative control of PLA's SouthernTheater Command."

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Now not so subtle Chinese military (PLA) threats (on July 31/August 1, 2019) to intervene in Hong Kong seem to be making my earlier expressed concerns a reality. 

The main threat is a 3 minute video posted July 31/Aug 1, 2019 on the Hong Kong PLA garrison's official Weibo social media account (now on Youtube here and below):

In scenes intentionally evoking the Tiananmen Square Massacre the Video/Youtube includes:

0 to 40 seconds in - dark, forboding music, footage of PLA troops firing assault rifles, aiming a
                   handgun, firing sniper's rifle

40s - 58s - anti-riot drill against student-like "protesters"

58s - 1m25s - armoured cars (can be called "wheeled armoured personnel carriers") crushing 
                  barricades, barbed wire, water canon, protesters herded under guard, 14.5mm heavy
                  machine guns, more armoured cars

1m25s - 2m - off on tangent showing PLA's naval, attack helicopter, artillery-missile and
                  anti-aircraft might

2m2s to the End - happy music, the peaceful alternative of military parades in front of appreciative,
                  patriotic, cheering crowds and PLA civil assistance roles, raising flag, goose-stepping.

All stating clearly You Choose Your Fate (Being Crushed or Peace) Protesters!

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying, when asked about the video, said at a briefing in Beijing on Aug 2(?), 2019:

"We believe that the Hong Kong garrison of the People's Liberation Army will continue to become a stabilising pillar for Hong Kong's long-term prosperity and stability..." 

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Conflicting reports of a troop buildup on the Chinese mainland Hong Kong Border.

August 1, 8.54am - "The White House is monitoring the sudden “congregation” of Chinese forces at the border with Hong Kong, according to reports, following another night of unrest and clashes between protesters and police."

On Aug 1, 2019 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said: 

"I'm not aware of the [PLA gathering near the "boundary" between Hong Kong and the mainland.]"

At Aug 2, 2019 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying  did not directly repond to press question.

"Q: According to reports, some Hong Kong civil servants will gather at the Central District tonight to call for the cancellation of the amendment bill to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance.

There have been claims that the Hong Kong SAR government will take this as a reason to ask the PLA Hong Kong Garrison to enforce martial law on the early morning of [Sunday] August 4. 

Reportedly they will clear the staff of American and European consulates-general and American and British passport-holders from Hong Kong. What's your response to such claims?"

Pete Comment

(Map above) "northern" Hong Kong (ie New Territories and Kowloon) shares a land border with "mainland China" providing ample road approaches (from Shenzhen, etc) for troops to provide backup to the 6,000+ PLA already in Hong Kong. Then crossing the bridges south to Hong Kong Island (Lantau and smaller islands) could be the next step. Landing troops by helicopter and from barges/landing craft can always happen simultaneously. 

The "gathering" might most obviously mean PLA troop/supply trucks and armoured cars on the road/land border. 

The PLA, as the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), explicitly follows the orders of the CCP, not the civil Beijing or Hong Kong government. 

This means that there would be a greater secrecy/opacity of CCP discussions on whether or when to send in the PLA. Hence a greater chance of Western government and media surprise.

As Sundays have become the traditional time of Hong Kong protests, Sunday August 4, 2019 (Hong Kong time) might be a time of PLA intervention. This depends on how violent/confrontational-to-CCP-order the protests get.

Pete

India's old, symbolic, submarine, INS Sindhuvir, to Myanmar

India is discussing with Myanmar the part symbolic transfer, perhaps in late 2019, of one of India’s Russian-made Kilo-class SSKs to Myanmar's Navy. To achieve a late 2019 transfer, India will need to refit (including derust) the submarine very quickly indeed at India’s usually slow east coast Vishakhapatnam/Vizag naval shipyard.

This news comes from a July 30 2019 report in India’s Economic Times. Russia, which will need to supply many essential spare parts, is in agreement with the transfer.

The submarine in question has been identified as INS Sindhuvir. Sindhuvir, launched in Russia in 1987, is 32 years old, that is, already past its 30 year use-by-date. Age means Sindhuvir will be a constant and expensive maintenance headache for Myanmar and India. A large team of Indian crewman and shore based maintainers will be needed in Myanmar for several years to transfer their skills to the Myanmar Navy. Also any major "deep" maintenance of Sindhuvir will still need to take place at an Indian naval shipyard. 

The Myanmar Navy has no experience in operating and maintaining submarines. Myanmar’s possession of just one submarine does not mean Myanmar will have an operational submarine capability. Myanmar would need 2 submarines and ideally 3 to have 1 always available for operations. Sindhuvir's age and training role mean Myanmar will need to soon order 2 or 3 new or young second hand subs to have a viable and ongoing submarine arm.

Myanmar’s most plausible future strategic opponents are Bangladesh (with 2 old ex Chinese Ming class submarines) and Thailand (which will eventually receive 3 new-build modified Yuan class submarines from China). Most of Myanmar’s tensions with Bangladesh and Thailand are now mainly over cross border illegal immigrant/refugee flows.

The other major naval powers in the region (the US, India and China) are simply too large for Myanmar to strategically face and in any case they do not have hostile relations with Myanmar.

Sindhuvir’s age and Myanmar’s lack of experience mean the Sindhuvir will primarily be a training, regime prestige vessel and symbol of good relations with India. For a first submarine Sindhuvir is very large at up to 3,100 tonnes submerged (see right sidebar). This is a large sub to operate in Myanmar's mostly very shallow (less than 200m deep) coastal waters (see the depth map below). 

Myanmar’s Navy is primarily a policing/coastguard one with 2 modern light frigates, an old frigate, 3 corvettes and a gaggle of patrol boats of various sizes and ages. 

That Myanmar is acquiring its first submarine from India/Russia instead of China (on Myanmar’s border) indicates Myanmar is balancing its relations with those 3 powers.

At top left, much of Myanmar's coastal region is very shallow (less than  200m) to operate a submarine as large as INS Sindhuvir.
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INS Sindhuvir is an early model Kilo (Project 877) class submarine (specifications above), with high maintenance needs already, due to its 1987 launch age of 32. 

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INS Sindhuvir 2 years ago (Photo courtesy The Hindu)

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Pete

COSMOS Summary piece on Orca/Echo Voyager XLUUV

It is useful to read Drew Turney's excellent article for COSMOS: THE SCIENCE OF EVERYTHING. That article is Orca will change US undersea battle-readiness, of July 29, 2019, at https://cosmosmagazine.com/technology/orca-will-change-us-undersea-battle-readiness. The following are excerpts from the article:

“...with Boeing’s new Orca we’re entering the age of the XLUUV – the Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle.

...Unmanned submarines are not only deployable in far more dangerous waters, they’re ultimately disposable. And without all those life support systems, they seem to be far cheaper [than manned submarines].

Boeing, the company contracted by the US Navy to provide four craft under the Orca program, is charging just US$43.2 million...The first [UUV] was developed at the University of Washington in 1957, and since then they have taken almost every form, come in almost every shape and size, and done everything from scientific research to mapping the seafloor for oil and gas prospecting.

But the Orca will be in a class all its own. It’ll be based on an earlier craft from Boeing called the Echo Voyager, a 50-tonne missile-shaped craft the company said was a test case for further development.

Like the Orca will, Echo Voyager runs on a hybrid combination of batteries and marine diesel generators and can be deployed and recovered from a pier – removing the need for a launch and support ship in dangerous or hard-to-reach places. Land-based crews can control the fleet, issuing orders on a set-and-forget basis...[Echo Voyager, now Orca] can surface to get a fix on its position via GPS and both send and receive findings, orders and other data via satellite.

Even though Orca will be a war-fighting tool, it will use the same modular design as its predecessor. It can carry equipment weighing up to eight tonnes in the cargo bay, and there are also dongles to attach other instruments or weapons to the outside of the hull.

...Whether you’re testing the extent of an oil spill, deploying a mine in a hostile port or undertaking any number of other tasks underwater, the hardware/payload system and open software architecture means you can not only configure the Orca for very different purposes, you can redeploy it for another application quickly.

For the US Navy, that means “mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, electronic warfare and strike missions”.

That covers a lot of ground (or sea, as the case may be), from launching missiles to finding enemy ships by sonar and reporting their positions to nearby forces.

....the physics involved in underwater travel imposes several stumbling blocks. For one thing, water distorts the transmission of radio signals – if you’re in a dry airspace even a few metres down your mobile won’t work – so operators need confidence the [Orca] is following instructions (or [as an AUV] figuring out the best way to do so by itself ) without being able to communicate or report on progress. It needs the autonomy to detect and avoid contact with objects that could damage it – anything from a large rock on the sea floor to a passing whale.

...The Orca is scheduled for delivery by June 2022."

BEST TO READ THE WHOLE COSMOS ARTICLE HERE

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Separately the above 2016 Boeing Youtube on Echo Voyager is still highly relevant.
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Pete

Iranian submarine life expectancy in war very short

As indicated on July 24, 2019 Iran's main naval base is at Bandar Abbas just inside the Strait of Hormuz. See map above. But Bandar Abbas is at a chokepoint easily blockaded by US and UK SSNs and aircraft covering the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has attempted to give its navy more room to manoeuvre by building up a dual-use civilian/naval base at Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman. But the Gulf of Oman is also a chokepoint easily blockaded.

Blockade activity is expedited by mobile passive sonars on US and UK SSNs and probably the more efficient use of sonar on USN Echo Voyager extra large UUVs. Several networks of fixed undersea sensors are also likely (in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, Strait of Hormuz, broader Indian Ocean, Arabian, Red and Mediterranean Seas). UK/US mobile and bottom rising mines, SSN and aircraft dropped ASW torpedoes would provide weapons backup for all these sensors in the sinking of Iranian submarines. 

Israel and the Sunni Arab nations (especially Saudi Arabia and UAE) astride the Persian Gulf may also be prepared to make ASW contributions against Iran.  

All this means that however numerous Iran's broad selection of  submarines (3 Kilos and about 17 to 31 medium-small-minis) the life expectancy of Iranian submarines in a medium level war in and around the Persian Gulf might be 2 hours at most. 

Another factor weighing against Iranian submarine survival is the narrow and shallow seabed of the Persian Gulf (average depth 50m with a few small holes down to a mere 90m (see right sidebar and also depth map below. Additionally narrow-shallow channelisation of the Strail of Hormuz would make the movement of all but the smallest Iranian submarines highly predictable/detectable. 

Still, the sinking of a South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010 by a North Korean sub perhaps as small as 130 tons suggests that even Iran's mini-subs might prove dangerous if they fired a torpedo or two at warships or tankers. 

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This interesting English narrative (from 38 seconds in Youtube) displays all 3 of Iran's 26 year old 

Kilo class medium size subs and 3 of Iran's 14 to 23 small-mini Ghadir class (120 ton, 2 torpedo) submarines.

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The narrow, shallow, waters of the Persian Gulf area make life especially dangerous for Iranian submariners. Although the Persian Gulf's oceanography would probably keep the US and UK's much larger 7,000+ ton SSNs well away in the Arabian Sea.

 Pete