Latest on the Love Sub - revealed as HMS Vigilant

Following Submarine Matters article of October 2, 2017 on ship/submarine romances more details of the SSBN likely remonce have been revealed.

Drawing from an article by Ben Farmer, Defencne Correspondent, (UK) Telegraph, October 2, 2017:

“Royal Navy submarine commander removed over claim of 'inappropriate relationship' with female officer” 

HMS Vigilant Commander (Cdr) Stuart Armstrong, UK Royal Navy (RN) “has been removed from his vessel amid claims of an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate."

Cdr Armstrong was taken off HMS Vigilant a 16 x Trident D5 missile armed Vanguard class SSBN submarine and relieved of his duties as a precaution while naval chiefs investigate the allegations.

"Naval sources said the investigation had been launched amid suspicions Cdr Armstrong’s relationship with an unnamed female officer was “closer than it should have been”.

It is understood the 41-year-old commander faces “a full range” of disciplinary measures if found guilty of any wrongdoing and could lose command of.”

HMS Vigilant, “one of Britain’s four Trident submarines, was not on nuclear deterrent patrol at the time and the Ministry of Defence said operations were not affected.” 

[Pete Comment - it may be that HMS Vigilant was restocking its Trident missiles at Kings Bay, Georgia, US nuclear submarine base or training at higly calibrated test ranges near that base.]

“Navy rules forbid any relationships between sailors in the same chain of command for fear it would lead to favouritism and undermine orders.

Relationships outside the chain of command are allowed, but there is a strict “no touching” rule during deployments.

Sources said the rules were considered particularly critical on submarine missions where sailors work in cramped conditions underwater for months at a time.

A source said: “This investigation is part of our duty of care to everyone on board, because of the possibility that command could be undermined by an inappropriate relationship.”

HMS Vigilant SSBN "Captain" (Commander) Stuart Armstrong. No George Clooney, but he was the most senior officer on the boat! (Photo courtesy Royal Navy, via The (UK) Times) 

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Pete

The Love Sub

Based on a October 1, 2017 report by Mikey Smith of the (UK) Mirror, October 1, 2017.

The UK Royal Navy (RN) has suffered two vessel love affairs in recent years, one relating to a frigate, the other to a submarine. Intimate relationships of any kind on a RN ship or a submarine are banned. 

Details of the possible frigate affair go back to 2014 when Sarah West (above), the RN's first female warship captain, was removed from her command of the frigate HMS Portland, with the RN just citing an "internal matter". She was reassigned to another post.

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The submarine affair is current and more serious because the Vanguard class sub involved is an SSBN specifically designed to launch the nuclear weapons on board. 

Senior naval officers have been sent to the SSBN, deployed in international waters, to deal with claims there was an “inappropriate relationship” between a male and female officer. The female officer is apparently innocent of wrongdoing. RN woman were banned from serving on submarines until the rules changed in 2011.

COMMENT

My limited knowledge is that the Royal Australian Navy works on a less formal "don't ask, don't tell" basis, with far less publicity.

Pete

SSKs then SSNs: Continuing the Australian Future Submarine Debate

In response to many of the points raised in comments on the previous article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2017/09/report-suggesting-two-future-australian.html:

Basic plan: the Australian solution could be 6 x 3,000 ton SSKs to be built 2030-2040 and 6 x 5,000 ton SSNs after 2040. These SSNs may carry small ballistic missiles - the precursor to a nuclear deterrent.

More Detailed Explanation:

If at least 4 Collins hulls (number of deep dives defines submarines that are too "old") can last until 2035 then I think an interim submarine will effectively become the next generation Future Submarine (FSM) which the Government has decided is the Shortfin SSK.

Alternatives to the Shortfin SSK could be 6 SSKs of at least 3,000 ton (surfaced)) with LIBs and maybe AIP, They might best be one of:

-  an enlarged (more fuel and batteries, AIP) 3,000 ton Scorpene currently known as SMX 3.0 see

   Submarine Matters' 2016 article and Naval Group's 2016 Press Release.

-  an enlarged Type 218 (could call it 216) (already has advanced fuel cell AIP)(has time to 

   incorporate LIBs)

-  a Soryu Mark 2 or 3 (which would already be developed for LIBs)

The 6 submarines could also utilize highly developed Autonomous Underwater Vehicles to extend capability into the more dangerous (by then China dominated) waters of the South China Sea and near China's future Indian Ocean naval bases.

A submarine tender ship is probably unviable for Western Australia north of Fleet Base West because of the lack of viable ports:

-  Exmouth port is only an uneconomic 700nm north of Fleet Base West

-  the Port of Darwin, run by a Chinese company, also has a naval base with tide/channel limitations 

   largely restricting it to small patrol boats and also is only minutes by fast jet or cruise missile from

   likely future Chinese air bases in East Timor

After these 6 SSKs are built in Australia it will be 2040 and by then Australia (to have regionally superior subs) will have needed to buy/build 6 SSNs. This is because regional countries (China, India, Russia already have SSNs) and by 2045 North Korea, South Korea and Japan will likely have developed SSNs, likely mounting SLBMs.

So the Australian solution could be 6 x 3,000 ton SSKs to be built 2030-2040 and 6 x 5,000 ton SSNs after 2040. These SSNs may carry small ballistic missiles - the precursor to a nuclear deterrent.

Scale model of the 3,000 tonne concept submarine, SMX 3.0, on display at the DCNS stand, at Euronaval 2016. The SMX 3.0's external shape seems to owe much to the current DCNS 2,000 tonne Scorpene. More details. (Photo courtesy Navy Recognition)

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Pete 

Report Suggesting Two Future Australian Submarine Types

A most interesting report commissioned by businesman Gary Johnston has been released today (September 27, 2017).

The report Australia’s Future Submarine Getting This Key Capability Right (September 2017) (Media Release and whole Report(PDF 12MB)) was written by Australia’s Insight Economics consultancy.

The report was launched by ANU Professor Hugh White and also by Michael Keating (former Head of the Australian Public Service) at the National Press Club, Canberra ((September 27, 2017). A transcript of the Press Club launch may follow tomorrow.

Some central issues in the report include:

1.  capability gap - any midlife upgrade of the 6 Collins subs might only make them useful until 

     around 2030. But the future submarine "Shortfin" may only be operational in 2040. Hence

     Australia may lack submarines for 10 years.

Suggestions:

2.  rather than extend Collins, take urgent steps to acquire 6 off-the-shelf submarines, modified to

     extend their range and built in Adelaide. At the National Press Club it was suggested 2 submarine
     builders be asked to submit interim (but already operating) submarine designs. They are Germany
     (maybe TKMS’s Type 212s/214s/218s/Dolphin 2s) and France (Naval Group’s Scorpenes) 

3.  because of the long transits to the Navy’s areas of operations, acquire a submarine tender (ship)

     forward based in Australian waters.

4.  the 6 interim subs and tender might cost under $10 billion.

5.  hold a review on whether Australia should either acquire more off the shelf 

     submarines; or build the Shortfins; or acquire nuclear subs [eg. Barracudas]

PETE COMMENT

Suggestions that Australia's interim and/or future submarines have Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) could delay either build by 10 years. AIP is less problematic. 

An order of 6 interim submarine Scorpenes with AIP, built in Adelaide, would make the most sense as:

-  legal problems of already signed agreements (with Naval Group) would be minimised

-  many Scorpene submarine parts, supply chains, personnel and operating methods would be

   common to the later Shortfins

-  engineering and legal continuity with Lockheed Martin integrating the combat systems into
   Scorpenes could more easily carry over to the Shortfins 

-  Naval Group is the only Western supplier that can offer both (conventional) SSKs and then

   6 (nuclear) SSNs. That is if Australia genuinely wants "regionally superior" attack submarines

   by the 2040s.

Pete

India May Want to Buy Japanese Submarines

Might Japan one day sell India a for export specification submarine similar to Japan's Yushio-class design - with pressure hull steel equivalent to High Yield HY120 and air independent propulsion (AIP)? (Photo via Wikipedia).

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Japanese Prime Minister Abe's Indian visit in mid September 2017 raised the issue of a possible future sale of Japanese submarines to India. The sale would be under Project-75(I) to supply the Indian Navy with 6 AIP submarines. The re-issued and extended RFI might be steadily giving Japan a better chance of winning. Japanese Soryu submarines have been mentioned, but they may be too highly classified and expensive. Hence a for export specification Japanese design might be more likely.

Ever since Pakistan introduced MESMA AIP into its latest 3 Agosta submarines India has been intent on also acquiring AIP for its own submarines. China also has (Stirling) AIP (locally developed or bought from Sweden) in its Yuan submarines.

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has long been developing a fuel cell AIP technology, but this is a very difficult - so much so that Germany is the only demonstrably successful fuel cell AIP developer.

Recent border friction with China and increased Chinese submarine activity in the Indian Ocean has underlined to India that it needs more powerful conventional submarines quickly. India's perpetually delayed Project 75(I) AIP submarine selection project is therefore being accelerated.

Chances that Japan is now a serious contender in Project-75(I) may be increasing. Japan builds highly capable large submarines (which can carry more missiles, torpedoes and mines) and has long experience with Stirling AIP (probably bought from Sweden). Japanese sale of Stirling AIP to India would likely require involvement of Sweden. Stirling AIP is likely superior in quietness and low heat signature to MESMA AIP. A submarine purchase from Japan would also boost a key regional strategic friendship against India's and Japan's strategic competitor, China.

Regional friendship is something Project-75(I) competitors (Germany, France, Sweden) in distant Western Europe, cannot deliver. Northeast Asian nations, (Siberian) Russia and South Korea, also competing for Project-75(I) are both careful not to antagonise China.

Japan's large 2,900 ton (surfaced) Soryu submarines might be uncompetitive as they may be priced at US$1.5 billion each. This is in comparison to US$1 billion for 1,800 ton 75(I) competitors.

Japan does not want its most tightly held submarine secrets finding their way to China - so Soryu technology may be too sensitive. Japan would be wary of India's exchange of submarine high technology with Russia in the form of Kilos, naval reactors and SSNs. Russia also shares submarine technology with China.

Due to these security concerns Japan is unlikely to offer its Top Secret high yield pressure hull steel. That steel is Japanese NS110 grade - equivalent to US High Yield HY156 used in the Oyashio and Soryu classes.

Instead Japan might supply lower specification for export submarine technology - particularly pressure hull steel used in Japan's older Yushio-class design ie. Japanese NS80 grade (equivalent to still advanced US High Yield HY120 steel - see the Table on Submarine Matters).

When eventually decided India's Project-75(I) competition will be a major win for any of the competitors.

Pete

Australia (with US cooperation) Active in LIBs Research for Submarines

Thermal runaway in Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) in submarines 

 has been a serious problem as US testing in November 2008 (see below) revealed. The above artwork concerns destructive phases through heat buildup in LIBs in hearing aids. (Courtesy Hearing Health & Technology Matters)

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Many countries (from Europe to Northeast Asia and the US) are carrying out Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) research for submarines.

Australia is also active in research on LIBs for submarines. Australia’s Department of Defence’s multi-faceted research organisation, the Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group is active in LIB safety research. 

In one of the activities DST's Defence researcher, Kane Ivory, is establishing DST’s LIB Safety Research Facility - on DST's website see an article Powering the Future of Submarine Fleets of 

5 September 2017 https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2017/09/05/powering-future-submarine-fleets:

The US Navy and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) had bad experiences with LIBs way back in November 2008 under the now cancelled Advanced SEAL Delivery Vehicle (ASDS) program. The prototype (ASDS-1) "was having its lithium-ion batteries charged Nov. 9 when an explosion started a battery fire that burned for about six hours. No one was aboard the 60-ton craft, which was on shore at its base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii...The incident came at a key time for the [ASDS] mini-sub program. The ASDS was to have deployed in November [on top of] the guided-missile submarine [USS Michigan (SSGN-727)] — the first SSGN deployment for the [ASDS mini-sub]." 

As well as LIBs for mini-subs and UUVs the US Navy may want to eventually use LIBs as backup batteries in nuclear submarines. 

US-Australian cooperation in defence research is revealed by a US Navy document regarding Ken Ivory’s secondment, in 2016 to the US, under the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP). The US document indicates:

"Kane is here working with us on understanding how that safety program works and the types of tests and approaches to testing we have to see what is applicable to Australia," Fuentevilla said. "One common area of interest for Australia and the United States is early fault detection for lithium battery failures. Normal battery management systems will detect a fault or failure as it's happening, but not necessarily with sufficient time to prevent system-level hazards. We're looking at technologies that would provide additional early warning so that you can effectively implement hazard mitigation solutions to prevent a small problem from becoming a bigger problem."

Pete