China's strategic dominance over "Tech Metals" - Rare Earth Elements.

Australia is emerging as an alternative source of tech metals/rare earth elements including Lithium. 

Yet it seems China is doing most of the investing in tech metals/rare earth elements in Australia, as economic amounts are discovered in Australia. 

Most “tech metals” overlap with the more established term “rare earth elements”.  ABC advises “There are 17 rare earth elements on the periodic table, falling into the heavy rare earths or light rare earths depending on their atomic weight." Tech metals are essential for making mobile phones, solar cells, large battery autonomous vehicles, submarine batteries? and large on-site batteries to store renewable energy (eg. solar, wind and hydro).

It is important economically and strategically that China is not the dominant supplier of tech metals “rare earth elements” to the Western world. 

PHOTO: Vanadium "redox" flow battery, Vanadium, is a tech metal found in Australia  (Photo courtesy Vanadium Australia). 

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Lithium, vanadium and cobalt are all available in Australia and useful for “redox flow batteries”.

Might such large batteries be used in South Australia to store renewable energy?

Melissa CHAN :) at 3:30 in the Youtube seems quite happy China runs the world rare earths supply!
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China, already dominating international supplies from its own Chinese mines, should not have  supply and pricing control over Australia's emerging "tech metal" rare earth element mines.

Pete

US & Japanese ABM - BMD forces slowly approaching North Korea

The Carl Vinson Group's display of military hardware is hopefully increasing the pressure on China to be more creative in restraining North Korea's nuclear and missile test march toward nuclear blackmail of:

-  South Korea

-  Japan

-  US forces in the region, and 

-  (I hope not) other regional country targets. 

Military Hardware

Near North Korea (NK) the Carl Vinson carrier group, to which Japanese destroyers have been added, is an interesting power-projection development which prompts many questions.

The Carl Vinson Group probably/currently consists of Arleigh Burke Destroyer Squadron 1 (USS Stockdale, USS Sterett, USS Gridley, USS Higgins, USS Benfold and USS Russell.) It also may consist of destroyers USS USS Michael Murphy, USS Wayne E. Meyer and missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain. The US cruisers and destroyers in the Carl Vinson Group are Aegis SM-3 equipped.

Submarine-wise one SSN or two (with Tomahawk land attack missiles) would normally accompany the Carl Vinson Group. To enhance the option of a first or second strike of Tomahawk SLCMs onto NK targets a US Ohio SSGN might also be on hand in the region. Submarine fired Tomahawks all have the advantage of a greater element of surprise because they can emerge from unexpected undersea launch points.

The aircraft on Carl Vinson itself and destroyer launching Tomahawks would be better suited as air defense and follow-on strike platforms for a wide range of targets that no longer are defended by radar and SAMs.

The Japanese destroyers deployed to cooperate with the Carl Vinson Group are:

-  JS Ashigara (DDG-178) an Atago Aegis class destroyer. It can fire SM-3s to shoot down
   threating NK missiles, and

-  JS Samidare (DD-106) which is a Murasame class general purpose (anti-air, ASW and anti-surface
   warfare) destroyer .

How China and NK react are crucial issues.

1.  Even though China may see NK as a problem child does China still think NK is valuable as a

     buffer zone preventing SK and US ground forces advancing north to the Chinese border?

2.  If so how might China react to the current US and Japanese naval actions?

3.  If NK fires even test missiles could South Korea (SK), the US or Japan shooting them down

     indicate to NK that NKs nuclear missiles might be useless in future. 

4.  Might such percieved NK missile ineffectivenes tempt NK use nuclear tipped missiles first (on
     less provocation) while they are still effective?

5.  Alternatively iff US, SK and Japan fail to shoot down an NK test missile/missiles might this signal
     to NK that NK nuclear tipped missiles probably would get through and be effective?

6.  Might an NK approach of destroying ABM defences in SK using NK artillery or NK cruise 

     missiles decapitate SK/US ABMs including THAAD? and

7.  Does NK have a chance that one of its ballistic missile submarines could move close enough to

     the continental (48 States) US to fire an SLBM (say at San Francisco, LA or San Diego?).

Even North Korea's long tested Rodong (or Nodong) missiles have sufficient 1,500km range to reach all of Japan.

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Highly relevant Youtube (dated 8-9 April 2017) about the Carl Vinson carrier group slowly approaching the Koreas.
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Pete

April 2017 Report to Donors: Indonesian Sub Buys a Puzzle

Indonesia's new sub KRI Nagapasa - with Pennant Number 403.

It is an Improved Chang Bogo (Type 209 variant).

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Hi Donors

I've just emailed Submarine Matters' April 2017 Report: Indonesian Sub Buys a Puzzle out to you, as a WORD attachment. 

Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

Was the main problem of the Collins submarines in their construction?

While Australia is in the design phase of a revolutionary submarine class
 it may pay to avoid the pitfalls of the past.

The following is an edited version of a very interesting and much longer Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) article by James Harrap, REFLECTIONS OF A COLLINS SUBMARINE CAPTAIN written in Perth, published May 4, 2012.

In 2012 James was leaving the RAN “...having completed almost 20 years in the Royal Australian Navy, 15 of them as part of the submarine force, culminating in Command of submarines HMAS WALLER and HMAS COLLINS.

[THE GOOD]

"Military and naval capability is not, as many believe, resident only in the specifications of the hardware employed. Capability is a much more complex equation depending on: weapons, equipment, personnel, communications, command infrastructure, training and experience to name but a few.

Despite the problems I [will highlight below] our submarines deliver a significant capability and that this is because of the whole package, not just the platform but all other components as well. This could not happen without a solid commitment and strong leadership by government and the most senior levels of defence to sustain the capability. 

[THE BAD]

Submarines are highly complicated machines and being a submariner has always required a skilled blend of operator/technician unique within naval service; but the Collins Class has taken the technical arguments to a whole new level. The planned maintenance requirements are onerous enough but the constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome. The submarines have maintained an operational capability for most of the past 15 years, but that is often despite many aspects of the submarine’s design rather than because of it.

[AND JUST PART OF THE UGLY]

“Lack of available stores inventory, increased equipment failure rates and submarines living with reduced capability is something I expect will persist for the remaining life of the [Collins] Class.

... The seagoing workforce currently consists of three submarine crews with a desire to stand up a fourth as soon as practicable, each crew consists of about 60 officers and sailors of various skill sets and experience levels. 

...  Skills shortages here also impact on submarine maintenance schedules, work quality, availability and ultimately capability.

 Some components of the submarine are either not able to be changed or to do so would carry a prohibitive mix of risk and cost. The Collins Class has many components that we are simply stuck with for the life of the platform. For example the diesel generators fit into this category because of their size; unfortunately they are quite possibly the least reliable diesel engines ever built. They have been problematic throughout the life of the class and, despite some design modifications and improvements, are only kept running by ingenuity and sheer determination of the crews at sea and supporting contractors alongside. Because of components and immutable design issues such as these, Collins has a finite service life.

numerous advances have occurred in batteries, electric motors, air-independent propulsion, sonars and electro-optics – all of which have revolutionised submarine design even further...most advances can’t be retrofitted and the boat will most likely be so technically obsolete by 2022 that the credibility of the capability it offers will be seriously eroded.

China continues to build submarines at a rate unmatched anywhere in the world whilst the quality and capability of the Chinese submarine fleet increases faster than the nation’s GDP.

I don’t believe that the Collins Class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad. Though sustaining what we currently have is essential until we can get a replacement class of submarine commissioned.

Lack of platform reliability is the single most limiting factor for the Collins Class, let’s never repeat that mistake.”

See the whole ASIA-PACIFIC DEFENCE REPORTER ARTICLE by James Harrap.

James Harrap (Photo courtesy Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter)

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COMMENT/QUESTIONS

1.  Could constructing the Collins better in Adelaide have made a difference?

2.  Can their propulsion systems ever be fixed effectively?

3.  Is it true ASC workers during the Collins construction years (1993-2003) suffered no major
      accidents or incidents? 

Pete

Part 1: LABs: Hypothetical Snorting times, Crew shifts & Battery discharge schedules

Below Anonymous has constructed a hypothetical Table and Figure for situations involving lead-acid batteries (LABs).  

Later this week (probably on April 5 and 7) Pete will publish Tables and Figures involving AIP and LIBs which Anonymous constructed.

By Friday this will amount to three articles which I will run together. This is noting that the blog publishing capacity does not appear technically able to publish 4 or 5 high capacity tables/figures in a stable way.

Table 1 (below) - Routines over 24 hours for a LAB-submarine:

-  "Time/Snorting" The four coloured rows represent: 2 hours (in green) to snort at night - 

    when it is a dark night. Then 1 hour of snorting (in green) when it is still a dark night.

    Purple represents fully submerged operation on LABs. 

-  The row "Shift" represents a three shift work system

    In this system, each shift of submariners works for 6 hours then rests for 12 hours.

    (red = shift A, yellow = shift B and blue = shift C)

Time/ Snor ting	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18- 24
00- 06
06- 12
12- 18
Shift

The Green Snorting times in Table 1 (above) coincide pictorally (as closely as I can get them!) with the times in Figure 1 below).

MW
10.05
10.00
9.75
9.50
9.25
9.00
8.75
8.50
8.25
8.00
7.75
7.50
7.25
7.00
6.75
6.50
time	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17

Figure 1 (above) represents a LAB capacity of 10MW.  

-  For a LAB an average discharge depth might be down 35%. [Discharge depth means 

   ratio of discharged capacity to capacity of batteries. A discharge depth of 35% means that

   35% of energy of battery is released. In LABs, a deep discharge depth such as 70% would

   cause irreversible damage to the batteries. For LIBs a deep discharge depth may be as

   far down as 90%]

-  Just before the first recharge, high speed performance is limited by the shortage of 

   capacity of the LABs. Timing of snorting will be affected by large waves or storms

   [Pete Comment - The need for greater flexibility in snorting times is a major reason why

   Japan has developed snorkel generation equipment for higher "sea states" = larger waves

   or more severe storms. Such a new snorkel may be included in 29SS, the first submarine of

   a new class after the Soryu].

Anonymous and Pete