PARIKRAMA's comments on submarine, torpedos, DCNS/France, India and Russia

INS Kalvari Scorpene SSK launched October 2015. India need 5 more Kalvaris, 3-5 Arihants, 6 P75(i) SSKs and 6 SSNs (twice the size of the Kalvaris).

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On August 20, 2016 PARIKRAMA commented [20/8/16 4:13 PM] on a wide range of submarine and torpedo topics involving DCNS/France, India and Russia. 

Pete has made very minor word changes for clarity and added links, where useful. Pete cautions that all this information about France-India may still be an Indian bargaining ploy to beat down the price of a German TKMS Type 214 to win India's Project-75(I or i) competition.

PARIKRAMA on:

[AIP, Kalvari and Project-75(I or i)]

DCNS is being roped to setup a shop in India via 100% subsidiary route for the fuel cell based AIP . so you are correct on the hints that you gave. Of course they initially tried to offer us a better MESMA upgrade which [Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD)] declined. 

The fact is almost 15+ months ago, it was clear that DRDO AIP may not be in a position to [be used for the last 2 Kalvari class Scorpenes] nor may DRDO be in a position to get its AIP on board the Project-75(I or i) (P75i) SSKs. So the contingency plan was [to rope in the] French side into multiple things.

[Linkages With F21 Torpedo and Shortfin and Indian SSN]

Here are a few examples of the DCNS/French products India aims to buy:

1. Instead of the Blackshark heavyweight torpedo (HWT) it will be [mainly French developed] F21 for Scorpenes, Arihants and future P75i SSK with derived technology going into India's Varunastra HWT to make it more lethal.

2. The winning SSK in all probability under P75i will be the Shortfin because India is very keen to get a part of the subcontract for the Australia deal and also wishes to use the technology of Barracuda in its first 6 [Indian] SSN Project. The SSN project is basically a amalgamation of Russian known tech with us and upgrading it with Barracuda tech particularly for noise, stealth and reactor  compartment and shielding.

The Amur 1650 or Lada Russia proposed is not cutting much ice with the Indian Government. In fact [India’s] Reliance Defence and Engineering Ltd had submitted a proposal to build 12 Kilo 636 in Pipavav [Shipyard, Gujarat, India] with first 2 being built in Russia and next 10 in India. GOI did not even look into it till this date.

The reason is straight and simple, the product line which comes in P75i should have features which are the latest technology available in the market and which can be fed into Indian SSN/SSBN programs.

French and Indian cooperation will be unprecedented. I am sure you will see a lot more of a new Australia-France-India troika in submarines.

PARIKRAMA also commented on India's second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC2) and aircraft (MRTT and IL76/78) issues but Pete will write a separate article around these and also Indian SSN reactors later this week.

PETE’S COMMENTS

So India appears to be wishing to buy DCNS/French SSK technology (and perhaps Russian VLS) technology to use in India next 6 x SSK P75i and also in its 6 x future SSNs.

Part of this interest in France is India wants more recent SSN hull ideas than the 25 year old Akula I (INS Chakra) that India is longterm leasing from Russia. Also the Akula is probably larger (at 8,140 tonnes surfaced) than India would want in its first class of SSNs.

So it seems India wishes to obtain hull ideas from France’s Barracuda SSN (due to be launched for the French Navy in 2017) or from the Shortfin SSK variant (both are a more economical 4,765 tonnes (surfaced)). 

It is unclear whether:

-  India and DCNS expect the Shortfin to be sold to India OR

-  India just receives 6 x P75i AIP Scorpenes but with transfer of some technology from the

   Shortfin/Barracuda overtly or quietly included in a deal.

A NOTE OF CAUTION - TKMS?

Pete cautions that all this information about France-India may still be an Indian bargaining ploy to beat down the price of a German TKMS Type 214 to win India's P75i competition. After the decade long Indian negotiations over the Kalvari contract and fifteen years for the MRCA France may well be cautious about transferring substantial AIP and Barracuda SSN technology to India. France would expect a great deal of money.

India has a pattern of not buying subs from the same country twice - not having bought from Germany since the 1980/90s. It is also TKMS that is likely to have the mature fuel cell AIP that India wants for P75i. So beating down the price of 6 Type 214 (or 218s) from TKMS for P75i may be India's long term objective.  

By PARIKRAMA and Pete

DCNS Unlikely to Win India's Next 6 x SSK order...maybe.

As Russia wishes to sell 6 submarines to India (for Project-75(i)) Russia's Sputnik News, August 12, 2016, has been quick to report that:

 "French Firm DCNS Fails to Find Takers in India for Its AIPS Technology"

"Sources from India's Ministry of Defense say that the AIPS technology proposed by the DCNS is similar to what is being used in Scorpene class submarines.

NEW DELHI (Sputnik) — In what could be a major setback to French naval ship-building company DCNS, its proposal to set up a 100% Indian subsidiary for manufacturing air-independent propulsion systems (AIPS) for submarines is likely to be rejected by the Indian government.

Amit Cowshish, former financial adviser to the Ministry of Defense says, "They (DCNS) are offering something which is already available in India." The Defense Research Development Organization is already developing AIPs in collaboration with DCNS for Scorpene class submarines...." SEE WHOLE SPUTNIK ARTICLE

COMMENTS

This may initially effect the existing Scorpene "Kalvari" class contract that DCNS has with India. DCNS won the Kalvari contract in 2005 to build 6 (non-AIP) Scorpenes for the Indian Navy. AIP is now relevant because India subsequently indicated that the last 2 Kalvaris would have AIP. India's DRDO has maintained that it can supply the AIP, but this is highly ambitious.

It would then mainly fall to DCNS to organise the AIP for the last 2 Kalvaris. But India seems to be playing hardball. France may have offered an updated version of its existing AIP called MESMA. MESMA has been installed in 3 of Pakistan's DCNS designed Agosta 90Bs (Khalid class)  subs, not in anyone's Scorpenes (so far).

I suspect that India is really holding out for the advanced Reformer/Fuel cell AIP that DCNS may be working on.

This impasse in the already delayed Kalvari program not only effects the last 2 Scorpene Kalvaris. India and DCNS both know that India will (sooner or later) be selecting a winning tenderer for
 Project 75(i) class submarines. This is for 6 further, specifically AIP submarines. India also wants them to feature VLS for a number of India's touted supersonic Brahmos cruise missiles.

The ability to provide AIP and VLS is a tall order. Only Sweden's Kockums, Germany's TKMS and DCNS offer developed AIP (China is virtually India's enemy - so it has no hope of offering anything).

There are no countries/companies fitting VLS on production SSKs (that I know of). Kalibr SLCMs fired by the Kilo Rostov-on-Don's missile launching (on IS in Syria Dec 2015) very likely were through its horizontal torpedo tubes. This is also noting India's Kilos have been fitted to fire Klub missiles through their torpedo tubes.

So India, by rejecting France's AIP, at this stage will tend to pressure DCNS to make a low price  offer for the 6 future Project-75(i) submarines AND/OR France may be prepared to transfer more technology specifically advanced AIP to India.

RUSSIA AND AIP

Russia has had a great deal of trouble developing AIP (no working AIP I know of so far). India is well known to work closely with Russia on advanced submarine technologies . So if India acquired advanced AIP technology from anyone Russia may benefit and be eternally grateful... India typically stops-starts-stops on arms purchases (as France also recalls concerning the MRCA jet competition).

What might result is that advanced AIP is imprudently supplied to India - it finds its way to Russia - then Russia installs this advanced AIP and VLS into new 6 new Kilo / Amur / or Kalina class subs that Russia sells to India for Project-75(i).

SCORPENE BACKGROUND

What is making DCNS particularly hungry to sell Scorpenes is the low revenue turnover not only for the  Kalvari Program (signed in 2005 but only 1 sub produced so far) but also the Brazilian Scorpene program (no subs produced (ie. launched) since the 2009 commencement. See Table below

Scorpene SSKs (14 ordered)	First Sub Laid Down	Last Sub Commissioned	9 still building
2 built	1999 O’Higgins Chile	2006	No
2 built	2004 KDs...) Malaysia	2009	No
1 launched so far	2009 INS Kalvari India	2016 (maybe)  (1 so far)	5 x Kalvaris 1 per year
none completed so far	2010 SBR-1 Brazil	2020 (maybe, SBR-1)	4 x SBRs (1 per year)

Low revenue from Scorpenes also likely made DCNS all the more competitive on price and technology transfer in the Shortfin bid for Australia’s future submarine competition.

India's non-aligned status, and rising wealth, helps make it a shrewd and unpredictable arms buyer.

CORROBORATING COMMENTARY

Here's interesting corroborating commentary of August 19, 2016 regarding another stalled weapons' purchase: 

“Back in 2006 the Indian Air Force decided to buy six Airbus A330 MRTT…The Indian military procurement is notorious for its unpredictability, indecisiveness and sluggishness…Ironically there is less political opposition to inferior Russian weapons and equipment in part because the Russians are much less likely to expose corruption…”

Pete

Why fewer SLBMs in each of the US and UK SSBN Replacements?

What I'm researching now, for publication in Submarine Matters tomorrow, is Why are fewer SLBMs being planned in each of the US and UK SSBN Replacements?

US 24 SLBMs down to 16 per sub.

UK 16 SLBMs down to 12 or 8 per sub.

So far variables I've taken as relevant are:

1. improvements in CEP?

2.  improvements in SLBM reliability?

3.  increases in numbers of penetration aids (eg. decoys)?

4.  that the number of SLBM slots in the US Ohios and UK Vanguard SSBNs were always/usually excessive and/or under-used - so the reduced SLBM numbers are a rationalisation downwards.

5.  are there only so many targets you need to hit to acheive an optimal deterrence?.

6.  are arms limitation treaties relevant? Something I don't keep across of - as I would assume that its not only the US and Russia needing to agree these days. I also assume agreement (a political issue) would be a function of technical advantage or disadvantage.

7.  are the planned reductions initial low-ball estimates, for domestic financial reasons or to keep opponents guessing?

8. A combination of variables. There will be increases in the number of MIRVs and penetrations aids per SLBM and connected with that lighter and more accurate (CEP wise) warheads/reentry vehicles.

Pete

Taiwan not serious about Paying Market Prices for Submarines

Taiwan’s 1940s US-built ex-Tench class Hai Shih (foreground) is the world’s oldest serving (but not truly operational) submarine. Taiwan has another 1940s vintage sub. The two ex-Dutch submarines in the background are “new” by comparison. Taiwan wants eight replacements – virtually for free.

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It is beyond doubt that Taiwan relies on a Taiwan Lobby of old American rightwingers and younger paid lobbyists to hopefully pressure the US Government. Taiwanese Cold Warriors hope that the US will return to near conflict with China. China is, however, too important economically to the US, now days. Since the 1970s the US One China policy steadily shifted to the PRC not Taiwan (including the US's weapons' policy).

After WWII the US donated many old Tench and Balao class subs to countries in Latin America, Europe and also Taiwan. After receiving the old US subs, renamed Hai Shih and Hai Bao in 1973,  Taiwan seems to be the only country that still expects such donations from the US. Taiwanese "headlines" like "Establishing a Submarine Development Center" are more a US-Taiwan Lobby lever on the US Government than a Taiwanese intention to foot US$Billions for a whole class of new submarines.

In order to get the Taiwan lobby off his back, in 2001, President George W. Bush made a policy decision he could not keep and never intended to honor. That decision was the US would, by some means, organise the supply of conventional submarines to Taiwan. The central problem, then, as now, is that the US does not build conventional submarines - this is for military, commercial, political and career reasons that are dear to the US.

Tellingly, even in 2001, Taiwan was unwilling to pay market prices to the US or a third country for submarines. Instead Taiwan decided to rely on the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. FMS for submarines - large weapons systems the US did not actually produce - was a non-starter from the beginning.

Also Taiwan wanted medium to large conventional submarines. It would not settle for submarines of less than 1,000 tonnes - more than adequate for Taiwan Straits defense against China...

As well as not paying for the submarines Taiwan had and has ludicrous ideas on how to acquire them. These ideas all involve the US taking on the financial, political and technical burdens upfront and presumably for ongoing upgrades. For example potential scenarios like:

-  the US buys old submarines from Australia and custom upgrades them for Taiwan.

-  the US organises for Japan to build the Soryu submarines for Taiwan and then Lockheed Martin
   integrates the US highly secret combat system into the submarines

-  that the US pressures Australia to participate with Taiwan in a joint purchase of Shortfins from
   DCNS

-  that the US assists Taiwan in building a submarine production line (in effective competition against    Japanese, South Korean and European submarine makers)

To achieve this Taiwan expects that the US (not Taiwan):

-  obtains submarine blueprints and organises technology transfer (perhaps from Japan? Russia?

    DCNS? Australia? TKMS?).

-  “clones” or "reverse engineers" more of Taiwan's existing two 1960s technology Dutch built 

     Zwaadvis-class design so the US can help Taiwan build more, 

     and/or

-   the US returns to building conventional submarines, but tailor-made, to Taiwan's specifications.

More details in a subscription-only Diplomat article.

Hence even accepting that China is putting up economic obstacles to any US or third country supply of submarines to Taiwan, Taiwan will still not receive submarines. 

1.  As I've said Taiwan needs to be prepared to pay international prices by contract for submarines. Israel, equally unpopular internationally has managed to organise Germany as a long term provider of TKMS Dolphin submarines. Israel is now reputedly paying full prices - including for maintenance. If Taiwan were serious Taiwan would not be waiting for the US to magically give Taiwan submarines.

2.  Countries also need to be confident any submarine secrets passed to Taiwan do not find their way to China in the medium to long term (in any political settlement with China).

3. There is no way around Taiwan building its own - the smaller (for defense) the easier to do.

Pete

F-35s facing more mature Distributed Sensors - Two

Above is an illustration of a country's concept of using distributed sensors to detect and target threats from stealth aircraft and also from attacking missiles. In this case the defending country is Japan, which sees possible threats from Russian and Chinese stealth aircraft and missiles from North Korea, Russia and China. (Diagram courtesy of Japanese defense agency ATLA)

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In response to very useful Comments arising from my previous article F-35 heat signature: Chink in its Emission Armor - One, August 14, 2016.

Air Defense Networks

Infrared sensors, like other categories of a distributed air defense network, have some physical limitations. But it is the whole network including aerial, space and ground based radars (more broadly sensors, database, decisions and weapons) that makes for effectiveness.

Countermeasures against a defense network (such as knocking out nodes and releasing IR decoys/flares) my become less effective the more distributed the defending network becomes. 

The main concern is the top "predators" Russia and China incrementally filling out the quality and quantity of sensors. An early success story for Russia and China was assisting North Vietnam to build its air defense system against the US - with most impact in that theatre in the 1960s-early 70s. 

Anticipating the routes that an enemy's air armada may come from is of major importance. The armada can also include eg. stealthy Tomahawk range missiles, not only stealth fighter-bombers crossing borders. 

Israel (in limited territory and the US (with Western allies aruably being global) have achieved over the last 30+ years have built deep air defense networks that Russia may want to re-emulate and China emulate.

Actual air defense campaigns also included offensive portions eg. 

-  Israeli versus Syrian Airforce, 1982 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mole_Cricket_19 and 

-  US+Allies, First Gulf War, 1991 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War#Air_campaign

Israel, US and main NATO allies heavily invested in air defensive/offensive technology from a high base.

Russia had high base expenditure, but it has problems maintaining the tempo of modernising the network. China has the money but is still building from a low base.

Problems of initial detection of F-35s/B-2/F-22s approaching and then database-decision making and passing to actual SAM or AAM targeting will force the Chinese to build a deep/intense network. 

As China extends its militarisation into the South China Sea this may over-extend its air defences or deepen the network. Its hard to discern which trend.

Creeping F-35 Evolution

The software delays for the F-35 doesn’t diminish the severity of these delays. This is given getting software up to scratch is taking years. The dynamic of Russia working with China (and also perhaps Indian electronic know-how) to build sensor countermeasures against stealth (eg. F-35s) should not be under-estimated. 

Radar Cross Section (RCS) materials were not such a delaying factor because they were demonstrably well understood on the F-22s by 2005 when the F-22s became operational.

Lockheed Martin (LM) trying to get all the F-35 features to work certainly contributes to the “too big to fail edifice” that LM has built for the US and foreign customers. The F-35, as the only new horse in the race on quality has an unlimited development budget beneficially yielding an unlimited revenue stream for LM. Good on LM :)

A President Clinton II is unlikely to alter this LM F-35 edifice but a President Trump might revisit The Deal and be more inquisitive.

What it means for Australia?

The evolution of the F-35 to acceptable standards may take so long that Australia's RAAF may need to buy another tranche of 24 Super Hornets. This is particularly in view of high usage of existing legacy Hornets and existing Super Hornets in the current air campaign over Iraq and Syria.

Australia may not buy all 72 F-35s intended or the 72 may be bought over an extended time (several decades). Australian defense officials, RAAF enthusiasts and politicians are of course deeply embarrassed they caved into LM and US Government pressure to put 100s of $millions of prepayments for the F-35s over a decade before these jets will be ready. Against this embarrassment is the jobs LM provides for retired senior officers - a recent example.

Australia's purchase of 12 Growler Super Hornet variants were to be most beneficial to "blind" an enemy while F-35s "snuck in" to bomb the enemy. But the Growlers will still be useful working with Super Hornet bombers, before the F-35s are ready.

A subsequent National Interest, article of Aug 18, 2016 “America's F-22 and F-35 Stealth Fighters vs. Russia's S-300, S-400 and S-500: Who Wins?” seems to come to the same conclusions.

Pete

F-35 heat signature: Chink in its Emission Armor - One

The Global Hawk sized (and altitude) Chinese Divine Eagle UAV (above) can look (with broad spectrum radar and infrared cameras) at long range for approaching US stealth aicraft. This UAV could in future be armed with air-to-air missiles to deal with such aircraft.

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The chink that China has detected in the LM F-35's armor is heat signature. Detectable by a great wall of cheap unmanned aerial vehicles with high gain infrared cameras that China can deploy.

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It has been many years since Lockeed Martin's (LM's), customers (including the US taxpayer) started to fund LockMart's US$100,000,000s per year F-35 commercial risk. LM's grand vision to gain revenue from customers a decade before delivery was faultless, in a US Power Sell, sense. 

However, advancing (Russian-Chinese) detection technology is now gradually negating stealth assumptions. Technically LM's focus on radar-stealth (as a replacement to the 1980s-2008 F-117 radar signature minimisation) has suffered what will amount to 2 decades of delay. The F-35 with its cannon and other software delays will only be truly operational for foreign customers in the 2020s.

If the superior 2 engined F-22 had been available to non-US customers from its 2005 operational commencement foreign customers would have F-22s that would have superiority over detection technology. The delay to field the F-35 in 2025 will mean F-35s will have fallen behind (Russian and Chinese) detection even before the F-35s are fielded.

Detection Technology

Unlike radars (which require high electrical power) infrared can be miniaturized and only require low power - so can be mounted on a mass basis on cheap to build and field UAVs.

China's rising ability to mass produce UAVs covers:

-  low (up to 1km) altitudes (infrared camera)

-  medium 15km altitudes Reaper sized (radar and infrared), and

-   up to 25km Divine Eagles (SubMat article) high altitudes (infrared camera and broad frequency

    radars)

China is developing its own high-tech detectors and can increasingly buy technology from Russia (that needs the money due to low oil/gas revenues). High power distributed radar on the ground and manned aircraft will complement to Russian and Chinese UAV detectors.

BACKGROUND

Defense World reports, August 12, 2016:

“Stealthy F-35 Is Visible To Thermal Imagers”

The much-touted ‘stealth’ features of the Lockheed Martin F-35 making it nearly invisible to radar, could be negated by a pronounced ability to be detected by infrared devices.

The heat signature released by the aircraft engines and other power consumption devices such as the radar could negate gains main by its stealthy characteristics aimed at remaining invisible to radar.

Fighter aircraft add-on devices such as the infra-red scan and track (IRST) sensor which several European and Russian aircraft are equipped with for certain missions, can easily detect the F-35 in beyond-visual range engagements, a defence website said.

A video released by FLIR Systems which specializes in the manufacture of infra-red sensors shows the heat signature of the plane in clear detail. The sensor used is the FLIR Star SAFIRE 380-HDc and tracking the heat signature has been done from a rather close range.

Nevertheless, it could be a potential chink in the armor for the US Air Force and other countries which have put billions of dollars in buying the F-35 whose main USP is its stealth capability."

Pete