May 17, 2016

S-80 - when Program Management and Combat System Integration go wrong.

On Navantia website. "Main electric motor installed on board S-81 "Isaac Peral" February 15, 2012 when all was still well.
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Both Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have been selected to compete to be the Combat System Integrator (CSI) for Australia’s Future Submarine. Severe problems discovered in 2013 in Spain’s build of the S-80 Isaac Peral class provide a cautionary tale of what can go wrong with overall program management and presumably CSI.

Submarine Matter’s sitemeter indicated there was a lot of Australian Government interest in 2010 with Spain’s S-80.

The S-80’s construction was progressing rapidly and smoothly:

“SPAIN’S S-80: THE SEA 1000 DARK HORSE?” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, September 30, 2010 http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/90/Spain-s-S-80-the-SEA-1000-dark-horse  indicated:

“The weapons payload [of the proposed S-80] includes not only [Atlas Elektonik] DMA4 torpedoes and sub-Harpoons but potentially Tactical Land Attack Missiles such as Tomahawk – something that will be of great interest for Australia.

The S-80 seems to be the first completely indigenously designed Spanish submarine for quite some time and the company has drawn on a huge amount of previous experience to come up with a leading edge product.

…A critical part of a submarine is its combat system and sensors. For this Navantia have turned to Lockheed Martin and what seems to be a version of their Submarine Integrated Combat System (SUBICS). Lockheed Martin say that this product has been derived from the company’s experience with the USN and use a form of words suggesting that it is very similar to the combat system on the ‘Virginia’ Class nuclear submarines.” 

But by 2013 major problems, unforeseen by Navantia, such as the weight of what looks like the Combat System, including weapons, emerged.

Jose Matos, in “GROWING PAINS HIT SPAIN’S SUB FORCE, WARSHIPS International Fleet Review April 2016 edition, (hardcopy, paywalled) page 37 reported:

“…In May 2013 the first major production flaw was revealed: Technicians discovered that the submarine’s weight was [up to 100 tons] greater than originally designed and unevenly distributed.

The initial calculations were much lower than the final figures since the original figures did not account for the weight of the weapons and electronics suite [sounds like the Combat System], or features later introduced in the crew berthing areas….

[Navantia would need to] reduce the submarine’s total weight or increase its length, to more optimally distribute the excess weight. They opted to do the latter and increased the length by nearly ten per cent, from 71 to 78 metres.”

As the US AN/BYG-1 Combat System to be integrated into the Shortfin will likely be heavier than the SUBTICS? Combat System for Barracuda SSN, special care will be needed on weight and balance.


Pete

May 16, 2016

SAFT may supply Lithium-ion batteries for Shortfin

A snippet.

French battery company SAFT may supply Lithium-ion or possibly Lead-acid batteries (depending what is negotiated) for Shortfin

See Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), May 2016 edition, page 19. 

Also see a 2008 DCNS Media Release about SAFT, Lithium-ion research, and Scorpene.

Wikipedia entry.

Strategic Issues for Australia - East Timor and New Caledonia

East Timor is just north of yellow coffin shaped Zone of "Cooperation". China in 2007 was interested in placing a long range radar on the northeast coast of East Timor. 
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Australian naval assets, including submarines, might become interested in Chinese naval activities if China spreads sustained naval influence to East Timor and New Caledonia in the future.

China supplied 2 patrol boats to East Timor in 2010 but Chinese air, naval or radar facilities would be a greater worry.

East Timor (Timor Leste) is a very country (independent since 2002) just to Australia's north.

A naval and air base at Baucau, a small town with an airport on East Timor's northeast coast could be built with South China Sea like rapidity and efficiency. Baucau Airport was used by the Indonesian Air Force (1975-1999) and can take aircraft larger than 737s.

China has a record of attempting to make East Timor more of a military asset for China. In December 2007 Chinese defence “firms” approached the East Timorese Government with a suggestion that the “firms” build and operate a surveillance radar facility on East Timor's north east coast (probably in the Baucau area). East Timorese officials consulted the US and Australia before rejecting the Chinese “firms” offer.

East Timor has long been dissatisfied with the Timor Gap undersea oil/gas border and revenue sharing dispute with Australia. East Timor is increasingly vocal about this. China may be able to exploit the discontent. China could offer not only more aid but political leverage and oil/gas undersea extraction expertise assets to obtain higher oil/gas revenues for East Timor.



China may be able to exploit any New Caledonian disruption. New Caledonia is an island just to the northeast of Australia (see map). Many of the indigenous "Kanaks" are dicontented with French rule. Australians are largely ignorant of political happening in New Caledonia.

An Independence Referendum in nickel rich New Caledonia is expected in 2018.    

-  There is concern about violent disruption 2018 onwards. A possible precedent is independence of the nearby New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) in 1980 which become quite violent - including French planters in New Hebrides' larger northern island of Espiritu Santo trying to organize a Francophile Separatist Rebellion.

For white residents and nickel interests in New Caledonia there is concern about policies of any "Kanak" dominated independence government after 2018.

Australia and New Zealand would be concerned about events in a post 2018 New Caledonia, particularly which outside powers would come to influence an independent New Caledonia.

The concern is China may see East Timor and New Caledonia as military assets with air, radar and naval base facilities in the same way it is treating such South China Sea islands as Fiery Cross, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef.

Pete

May 13, 2016

Nuclear Propelled Australian Submarines (work in progress)



How can Australian submarines, conventional or nuclear propelled, influence the strategic problem of the South China Sea disputes, if at all?  (Map courtesy Mike Nudelman/Business Insider)
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Australia has a wide area of interest. Submarines are often about places where interests are concentrated... "In peacetime, tension and war they can collect intelligence and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, clandestinely and a long way from home - knowledge is power". etc - see http://sea1000.gov.au/submarine-essentials/faqs/
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This is an issue with some comments by readers already made, but the nuclear propulsion issue will always remain unfinished. The fact that the Shortfin concept is based on a soon to be launched  nuclear Barracuda SSN (Suffren in 2017) continues to draw nuclear propulsion interest. 

In Australia there will be a five year design phase (about 2017 to 2022) which, for the public will mainly be about discussion, inevitably much on nuclear propulsion. 2029 may see a renewal of discussion as suggested in paragraph 4.29 of the 2016 Defence White Paper (PDF of 10 MB):

4.29 "During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."

SO MANY QUESTIONS ARE RELEVANT - INCLUDING:

1.  What technical problems may occur with Australia and DCNS converting a nuclear submarine (Barracuda SSN) into a conventional diesel-electric submarine (Shortfin SSK)?  

a.  the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Collins caused/cause major operational and availability problems. As some of the players may be the same, the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Shortfin may again cause major problems.

b.  Australia has chosen in such a way that it may be denied the advanced AIP of TKMS and probably mature, tested Lithium-ion Batteries of the Japanese option. Will the Shortfin be discrete/stealthy enough to face more thickly laid, more sensitive anti-submarine defences? This may not only include China and Russia but nations that recieve improved anti-submarine technology from those countries. 

c.  Submarine Matters is not alone on Question 1. Robert Gottliebsen in The Australian, May 13, 2016 states: “…there can be no nuclear option at the moment but if the [Shortfin design conversion goes badly over the 5 year design phase] clearly there could be a nuclear option. I accept that no one talked about the nuclear option in the [Australian] cabinet and during decision-making discussions but I am equally sure it was discussed among defence chiefs. Certainly it should have been.”

2.  What changing strategic conditions (opponents and friends) might drive the Australian Government to consider an SSN?

a.  Improved opposing sensor and weapons improvements are major strategic variables (like 1.b). China has only just begun its South China Sea island/shoal/reef military bastion building program.

b.  the US has naval and air bases (Diego Garcia, Guam, Japan/Okinawa, Hawaii, US West Coast) which are far from Australia. But emerging strategic threats to Australia may be much closer, in a Chinese exploited East Timor and New Caledonia. See more detail in the next Sub Matters article.

c.  Srategic changes can exist in terms of changing threats but also in changing, or declining, alliances. Denial that Trump is really serious and his chance at the Presidency will wane just keeps on rolling as his chances improve. So there may be US alliance instability caused by a President Trump who may strip ANZUS down to "cutting the deal". China may be encouraged by what it perceives to be US isolationism. 

d.  Nuclear Tipping Points in Northeast Asia, caused by US isolationism, the China and North Korea threat, may trigger a proliferation trend (weapons first, propulsion later if relevant) that Australia might be forced to address.  writing in ASPI Strategist, May 13, 2016 has succinctly written [Trump's] "suggestion that Tokyo and Seoul might need to start protecting themselves, via proliferation if necessary, contradict half a century of US foreign policy. Trump’s remarks saw some pundits justifying the value of those commitments and others considering the merits of his argument.

Further questions:

3.  For the above strategic changes does submarine propulsion system matter that much? 

4.  Are surface ships adequate for strategic changes or do they need help from submarines?

5.  In what scenarios might an SSN be advantageous for Australia?

With relevance to Questions 3, 4 and 5 "KQN" (in Comments, 14/5/16 1:59 AM) indicated along the lines.

My view of an SSN is it has an inherent persistent tactical speed (at which it can still detect other silent enemies) that is much higher than any SSK. A higher tactical speed allows shorter silent transits as well as a much more effective underwater search outcome.

A potent naval force with a sustainable presence is essential to enforce one's claims and to make a point (for example FONOP in the South China Sea) against other nations' claims that you may feel to be unjustified. FONOP is not effective at periscope depths, but needs visible naval surface ship and/or aircraft. A potent submarine force keeps the opposition guessing, and guessing can be a good deterrence to war in peace times.

If we look back at the emergence of regional powers or global powers in the past 1000 years, it all started with naval power followed by victories at sea.

6.  How could Australia acquire 4 to 6 nuclear propelled submarines?

CONCLUSIONS

Australia has an abundance of shallow waters to patrol and lots of narrow straits (well suited to SSKs) but it also has long distances requiring fast transit (Fleet Base West to Fleet Base East (Sydney).

I think Australia can only justify nuclear subs in the longer term eg. after 2035 if there is a sufficient intensifying of strategic problems (eg. stronger and more hostile Chinese Navy, with a US Navy declining in relative power).

US SSNs and SSGNs do visit Fleet Base West (Rockingham, near Perth, Western Australia) which is more secure from northern air and cruise missile attack threats. Darwin (as discovered in WWII bombing by Japanese aircraft) is too exposed to air attack and Darwin Port is owned by a Chinese company... There have been talks about more frequent US use of Fleet Base West - a possibility if the US feels it needs to withdraw from more exposed submarine bases at Guam and Japan.

So for the short-medium term (say, until 2035) conventional Aus subs only are justifiable.

Pete

May 11, 2016

Jeumont Electric's poorly timed Media Release on Future Submarine Propulsion?

Is the following the first public relations problem involving the DCNS win?

There may be no Design Contract signed between the Australian Government and DCNS until 2017 but naval-technology.com is carrying a Media Release by Jeumont Electric, May 10, 2016 http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/electrical/jeumont-electric/pressjeumont-electric-australian-submarine-programme.html : 

"Jeumont Electric One of Top Five Suppliers in Australian Submarine Programme

Jeumont Electric announced today that it has been selected as a major supplier in the Australian government's Sea 1000 Future Submarine Programme, French naval defence and energy company DCNS [now Naval Group] is the Australian government's exclusive partner on the programme.
The contract covers the construction of 12 submarines to replace the fleet's six current Collins-type submarines and also includes the transfer of stealth technology, production, and the combat system, plus maintenance throughout the submarines' lifetimes.
Jeumont Electric, a recognised expert in rotating electric machines for more than a century, had been working on the technical and business aspects of the bid since October 2015, earning a position among the programme's top five largest and most strategic suppliers.
Jeumont Electric will supply the propulsion pack, which includes manufacturing permanent-magnet synchronous motors and the associated power electronics cabinets, and will also provide maintenance training.
"We are pleased that the Australian government has entrusted DCNS with this contract," said Daniel Marlot, Director of Sales, Marine Industry at Jeumont Electric.
"We are working closely with DCNS and with most of the other suppliers involved in this exciting programme. Our teams in France had demonstrated the quality of their work on several previous projects.
"We are pleased to bring our know-how to this demanding and far-reaching new programme. We plan to build a close working relationship with the Australian government to ensure their full satisfaction."
COMMENT
Australia's Collins submarines notoriously had/have problems with unreliable propulsion. Parts of the Collin’s propulsion (see right-sidebar) are:

3 × Jeumont-Schneider generators (1,400 kW, 440-volt DC), and

1 × Jeumont-Schneider DC motor

Has Jeumont jumped the gun with an early Media Release? Might it be part of an unreliable propulsion system(?) years down the track? 

As at 1pm (Australian Eastern Time) May 11, 2016 there has been no Australian Defence Minister Media Release confirming Jeumont Electric's victory. 

To do this situation justice the Australian Govenment is now constrained by pre-election  "Caretaker Conventions" which, on page 3, require:


"1.3...the conventions are that the government avoids:..

•  making major policy decisions that are likely to commit an incoming government;
•  making significant appointments; and
•  entering major contracts or undertakings"

Parts of the future submarine propulsion systems, costing $100s millions (in total), might be seen as "major".

May 10, 2016

Why DCNS Won - Some reasons not yet covered in the media.

This diagram reflects the difference in detail between DCNS bids and publically assumed details. For example: Many people would be happy with "Weight 4,500 tonnes" but those closer to submarine issues would expect two figures eg. "displacement surfaced" and "displacement submerged". Some closer to DCNS insist the eventual Shortfin length will be "94" meters, not "97" meters. Also all figures are likely dependent on the results of a three year design contract that might be finally signed-off as late as 2020. (Diagram courtesy Financial Times).
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"BK" in https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=3317250524802114105 [7/5/16 2:49 PM] asked a question along the lines:

The difference between the DCNS and TKMS bids were said to be significant, others spoke of marginal. What is your take on that - was there really such a big difference in the two bids (apart from nuclear of course)?"

If I had the CEP Assessment Team's access to the TKMS and DCNS extensive bid documents, and unrecorded verbal assurances between senior negotiators (and politicians), I could more easily identify the big differences. This is also noting DCNS and TKMS would have offered the CEP Team vastly more detail than will ever be publically available. Some major DCNS/TKMS response specifications may vary significantly from the published specifications for the Shortfin/Type 216 concepts.

That said the following may be major reasons why DCNS won:

In terms of due diligence (with taxpayers money) there would be attention to whether DCNS offered the lowest upfront bid to build 12 subs or maybe for the first batch of 6.  
-  Australian Senate Commitees would object to revelations that any French bid was many $Billions higher than TKMS or Japanese bids.
- It is possible the French Government will (or has promised to) cross-subsidise DCNS to achieve the lowest bid. Money can be recouped (with internal "loan" repaid) through sustainment charges (eg. spares) placed on Australia down the track.

As the April 26, 2016 announcement that DCNS won is a Pre July 2, 2016 Election announcement for the Turnbull Government then Turnbull would need to feel confident that South Australian voters (and broader Australian voters) would like the announced choice. 
-  Turnbull would need to be confident DCNS Australia and DCNS Internatonal, would not make any significant public relations mistakes before the Election.

TKMS advantages of an advanced air independent propulsion (AIP) system and small crew may not have been valued highly by the CEP assessors.
-  this is noting there is little evidence Australia values AIP, since the 1980s to the present day, and 
-  there appears to be an assumption, probably valid, that the long missions (7 weeks?) Australia subs go on require large crews (about 60) to avoid sleep disrupted exhaustion.

The larger size of the DCNS Shortfin (compared to the TKMS Type 216) sub provides for greater capability upgrades, more fuel for greater range at 12 knots(?) snorting, more "heavyweight" (torpedo and missile) shots, more special forces in addition to the 60 crew.
-  this is not discounting the difficulty of converting a nuclear sub into a conventional one (with diesel propulsion and fuel tanks (with many buoyancy adjustments))

A major technical difference is that DCNS will in 2017 be able to point to the very similar Barracuda SSN hull as a vehicle for sonic and electronic emissions/stealth tests about a decade before such tests could be made on a TKMS 216. 

Also a TKMS 216 could only be tested in the same way AFTER Australia had bought 216s.

DCNS is dedicated to the very similar Barracuda SSN hulls so, Australia in buying Shortfins, won't have yet another ORPHAN submarine the Collins (for testing and spares) turned out to be. 

It still needs to be said that TKMS can offer no nuclear option if Australia changes its mind and (say, in 2025) actually wants "regionally superior" submarines, especially if China and/or Putin become threatening. 
-  This might mean Australia would want the Barracuda SSN for the first batch of 6 (2030 - 2040) and/or for a second batch of 6 (2040 - 2050) Nuclear Barracuda option for second batch.
-  putting complacency aside, an isolationist US alliance posture could emerge under yet another geo-political threat - one President Trump (see Trump's most detailed speech on foreign policy, of April 27, 2016)

I'll describe some lesser known reasons Japan didn't win next week 

Note a crew of "33" (possible for a one week (on average) mission for such a large sub) probably did not offer TKMS a competitive advantage. 33 is very likely smaller than Australia wants. (Diagram courtesy Financial Times)
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Pete