Chinese SAM missiles on Woody island beach, Not A Game Changer

In mid February 2016, a satellite image (at "A." below was publicised which revealed Chinese surface-to-air (SAM) missiles on Woody Island, in the disputed Paracel Island group, in the South China Sea. The SAMs are apparently HQ-9 surface-to-air (SAMs) (exact variant unknown) with a published range of about 125 miles (200 kms) but probably less. 

These missiles, which may be only on Woody temporarily, only augment several J-11 interceptor aircraft that have been based at Woody's airport for months and Chinese warships (armed with SAMs) which have plied the Paracels for years.

A. The satellite image "A." of the HQ-9 missiles in question (above). They may be on the north of Woody Island near the anti-aircraft-artillery "AAA" site marked on the satellite view "B." (below). 

These missiles and radars are sitting on trucks on a Woody Island beach. This would only be a temporary siting due to the wear-and-tear of sand, sun and salt on the missile casings, trucks and delicate radars. This may suggest that these missiles have been revealed by China, Taiwan and the US for political reasons coinciding with Obama's-ASEAN Sunnyland's meeting (mid Feb 2016) and to a far lesser extent Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s visit to Beijing. 

B. Woody Island South China Sea. China calls it Yongxing Island. (This satellite image courtesy Digital Globe via defencetalk(dot)net)
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Woody Island towards top. Chinese miltary aircraft from China's Hainan Island can land at the growing air base on Woody Island.
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Freedom of Navigation Operattions (FONOPs) overflights of militarised Chinese South China Sea islands by US (P-8s, P-3s, B-52s) and Australian (P-3s) will become more tense.

However there has been a threat a threat to overflights for a long time from Chinese air warfare capable destroyers (with long range HHQ-9A SAMs) and frigates  (with HQ-7 SAMs).

A newer threat to overflights has come from late model Chinese Shenyang J-11 BH/BHS fighters based at Woody Island since November 2015. The J-11s carry air-to-air missiles that could shoot down overflying aircraft. The missiles, like the J-11 jets might only be rotated through Woody Island during times politically advantageous to China and just before FONOPs overflights. Still, even temporary threats from these anti-aircraft weapons constitute a threat. Mistakes can be made. Near misses and collisions, particularly from J-11 jets, can occur.

Woody Island already sits in a highly congested strategic area bristling with weapons. So a staged show of missiles on a beach is only an additional threat, not a game changer.

Pete

Yet Another Japan - Australia Meeting - Submarines - Japan's Lead?

Australia's Foreign Minister Julie Bishop in Tokyo, February 15, 2016, responding to a question with the correct Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) form of words.
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In concurrence with Submarine Matters' articles back to September 2015 here is an excellent commentary from Australia Network News, February 16, 2016 concerning http://www.australianetworknews.com/australia-submarine-deal-america-manipulating/ :

“Australia Submarine Deal: Is America Manipulating?

Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has denied reports that the United States is pressuring Australia into buying Japanese submarines. Bishop said she was “amazed” at such reports. The foreign minister’s denial comes in the midst of reports that the US is lobbying for Japan.

Bishop’s response on submarine deal was reported by Adelaide Now. Australia is in the process of acquiring new submarines to replace its ageing Collins-class boats.

Media reports had suggested Washington’s preference for Japan in the Aussie submarine deal. The US reportedly indicated that it would provide the US Navy’s most advanced combat systems to Aussie submarines, only if Japan is handling the submarine production.

This is Japan’s trump card in the three-way race for the deal. The other two contenders are Germany and France. The estimated cost of the submarine project is more than US$36 billion (AU$50 billion).

The US believes that Japan’s Soryu submarine would offer the best inter­operability between Australian and American submarines. It would also enhance the “trilateral strategic co-operation” among the US, Japan and Australia.

The Australian reported that the US harbours doubts about Germany’s ability to protect critical defence technology from the industrial espionage of China.

The US reportedly discussed the matter with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull during his US trip in January. It also figured in the PM’s discussions with the US Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris and other military figures.

For public consumption, Washington’s official line is that it would respect any decision made by Canberra. But the rider that the decision has  a “strategic dimension” is the real code showing its preference for Japan.

An analysis by US think tank, Centre for Strategic and Inter­national Studies (CSIS) also said Australian subs have a “vital capability.” It also said “further delays in decision making” could risk serious gaps in Australian capability. The review noted that China’s massive military expansion and the cuts in the US defence budget are affecting the US capability deployment in the region.”

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Further reporting from Sky News, February 16, 2016: "Japan and Australia have signed an agreement to increase defence, diplomacy and development co-operation to support the economic future and stability of Pacific island nations.

...[Foreign Minister Bishop] is in the region as part of a four-day tour of Japan and China.

She is expected to meet with Chinese officials tomorrow and urge them to do more to rein in North Korea, which launched a long-range rocket this month in defiance of international laws."

COMMENT

With the undercurrent of US preferences and joint Japanese-Australian concern about China it would be very surprising if the technological merits of the French and German submarine contenders are enough.

In the Pacific alliance system, as in the EU's multilateral defence procurement and NATO, alliance loyalty and political realities count for much.

It will be interesting if any criticism comes out of China over the next week concerning Australia - Japan strategic friendship or China's fear of encirclement.

Pete

DF-21D "Carrier Killer" and AirSea Battle Targets

As far as I can see - the US defense forces AirSea Battle doctrine began in 2009-10. The wiki entry explains:

"AirSea Battle officially became part of US grand strategy, when, in February 2010, the US Department of Defense's [long PDF! 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review] stated [on pages 32 and 33]:

"The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to US freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations."

By 2012 increasing interest in China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile provided focus on an actual Chinese "wonder weapon" nicknamed "Carrier Killer".

In an AirSea battle, assuming it is US/Japan/maybe Australia versus China (hopefully not Russia as well) the red dotted line ........ represents the likely range of the DF-21D. See description and assumptions on the map of a battle. (Map courtesy WashPost, August 2012)

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Locating ships (eg. carriers) in favourable conditions then cueing the sensors, including Chinese subs, to accurately fir the missile. The wiki entry contains many good points.

As indicated in the Youtube (above of March 2012) the US or Japan could counter the DF-21D by:

-  Frigates, destroyers or cruisers using SM-3 missiles to shoot DF-21Ds down

-  Electronic warfare aircraft (eg. "Growlers"), ships and maybe LEO satellites to jam DF-21D guidance/sensors

-  use of decoys or electronic lures (from the above platforms) to make the DF-21D "think" the target is where the target is not.

The bigger picture of Chinese ballistic missile ranges - from short range (SRBMs) to hit Taiwan to the longest range ICBM launched in central China to hit the US (US Government CSBA via China Mike) 

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In the DF-21D China has an effective asymmetric weapon to face the superiority of combined US, Japanese and Taiwanese surface ships. China would probably justify its use against major warships in "defence" of China, including "defending China's province of Taiwan".

DF-26 "Guam Killer"

To solve the DF-21D’s inability, from the Chinese mainland, to hit the US air and naval base at Guam, China, in 2015, began to field the DF-26 “Guam Killer”. The DF-26 with a 3,000 - 4,000 km range is reportedly capable of hitting land, large and medium sized ships. Like the DF-21D it is conventional or nuclear capable and it can be partly cued by Chinese remote sensing satellites like the Yaogan satellites.

DF-21D AND DF-26 SUFFER FROM NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY

As the DF-21D (equally relevant to the DF-26) is a ballistic missile (with some cruise missile maneuvre characteristics) the DF-21D suffers from nuclear ambiguity. While cruise missile, like the Tomahawk, are assumed to be conventional high explosive, deserving a conventional response, using a ballistic missile against a nuclear power might receive a mistaken nuclear response.

The risk that the DF-21D's use may be seen as a nuclear attack may be one reason why the US has not developed a similar weapon. Perhaps the US sees the Tomahawk anti-ship missiles (TASMs) and upgrades) or LRASMs as avoiding the nuclear ambiguity risk and being cheaper for lower, more common, conflict.

Also China's use of a DF-21D, merely costing several $million, may not be seen by the US as a legitimate weapon against a US aircraft carrier cost several $billion and potentially 1,000s of sailors lives.

Submarines

Against submarines, the DF-21D may also have a large depth-bomb (conventional or nuclear) or lightweight torpedo capability. The DF-21D could also hit submarines in their mooring at the joint US and Japanese naval base at Yokosuka Japan and Japanese submarines at Kure naval base, Japan. 

The US Submarine Squadron 15 of SSNs at Guam naval base would also be high on the list of Chinese targets.

On left is a DF-21 (not necessarily a 21D) and on right a DF-31 ICBM (Courtesy Armscontrolwonk, Feb 5, 2016)
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DF-21D in a container perhaps used mainly for parade? Or no actual DF-21D in it? Or its fair dinkum. (Source)
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Since 2012 China would have improved the accuracy, reliability and surprise-value of the DF-21D. China's smaller anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles have also become more effective. The cruise missiles also don't suffer from ambiguity. 

A good desciption of DF-21D functioning is in the second half of Strategy Page article Artillery: The Long Reach Of China, February 18, 2016.

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)

The US strategic concept "AirSea Battle" underwent a name change to "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)" in January 2015. See the National Interest's useful November 25, 2015 article on JAM-GC. JAM-GC seems to be an as yet not fully formulated attempt to avoid AirSea Battle's over specificity to the China-Western Pacific theatre - hence more global - including the recently rising Russian tensions. 

However, lets hope China and the US (and allies) never come to blows.

Pete

Vietnam's Strategic Relations Countering China

Vietnam's main naval bases and the major vessels in them (above). The Navy consists mainly of Russian built smaller craft. The (potentially Klub missile armed) Gepard class frigates and Klub armed Improved Kilo submarines are the most powerful units. The TT-400TPs gunboats and Molniya corvettes are locally built. The Navy is orientated toward  low-end Chinese actions (Chinese coast guard, naval militia/trawler, contentious oil rigs and verbal threats) in the South China Sea and periodic clashes with China.

Vietnam's Naval Regions - slightly out of sequence, north to south, due to numbering adhering to political importance of Regions 1 and 2. Hai Phong Region is 1 as it contains the capital Hanoi. The Nhon Trach Region is 2, containing Ho Chi Minh City (was Saigon). (Artwork on wikipedia courtesy dokientrung).

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Nhon Trach Naval Base (Regional Command 2), just up the river network, is the home port for (2 new Molniya derivative of Tarantul) class corvettes built in Vietnam.

The two Region 2 Molniya corvettes carry the numbers HQ-377 and HQ-378 (photo above), max speed 70 km/h, range ~3000 km) and carry a heavy armament for ships that size - including Klub missiles. I am advised these modern boats could serve as back-up for Region 4 naval vessels to patrol the Spratly Island group.

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Russia's delivery of five Improved Kilo submarines to Vietnam over the last few years has been very efficient. In early February 2016 the fiftth Kilo HQ-186 Da Nang was delivered to Vietnam's major naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. The sixth, final, submarine, HQ-187 Ba Ria - Vung Tau, is expected to be delivered later in 2016.

Here is a full list of the 6 Vietnamese Navy Kilos with Vietnamese accent markers:

-  HQ-182 Hà Nội
-  HQ-183 Hồ Chí Minh City
-  HQ-184 Hải Phòng
-  HQ-185 Khánh Hoà
-  HQ-186 Đà Nẵng
-  HQ-187 Bà Riạ-Vũng Tàu

The last sub is currently under sea trial and scheduled to be delivered mid 2016. Most likely, it will be delivered on schedule, since the delivery record for previous subs by the Russians has been impeccable.

Vietnam (having an unfortunate northern border with China) maintains relations with several regional powers to counterbalance China's power. Singapore sits just above the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint easily mined or submarine blocked against opposing sea trade. Vietnam's long coast on South China Sea puts it in a good position to disrupt or threaten Chinese sea trade.

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Unlike other Southeast Asian/ASEAN countries Vietnam has defended itself from large outside powers and beaten them in the last 50 years. This has contributed to a rational defence posture that has not been tainted by the regional norm of inefficiency.

The methodical, focussed nature of Vietnam's defence force is only equaled in Southeast Asia by Singapore. Singapore recognises it is dwarfed by its Indonesian and Malaysian neighbours so Singapore has bought high tech weapons from the US and Western Europe. In return Singapore has tangible support from the US military.

Vietnam's purchase of six Russian submarines is just part of Vietnam's commercial and strategic relationship with Russia. Here were tentative early days of the submarine deal. This relationship is not an alliance but Vietnam realises that when it again is threatened by China (as in 1979-1990) Russia and to some extent the US can exert political and economic pressure on China. 

On land Vietnam can inflict high casualties on encroaching Chinese forces - as Vietnam did in the 1979 Border "Sino-Vietnamese" War. That 1979 Border War was large, with more than 100,000 Chinese troops and militia killed. But Vietnam realises it cannot beat China alone. 

Vietnam's submarines can do major damage to China through putting China's sea trade (especially oil and LNG supplies) at risk. Vietnam's submarines are armed with Klub missiles that have a land attack capability. Chinese leaders and military would lose considerable face if Vietnamese missiles hit such major Chinese cities as Guangzhou and Shanghai. Militarily China's Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island might get some missile attention in a war. Vietnam's frigates and corvettes are also being  fitted with Russia's newly proven ship launched Klub/Kalibr with land attack capability.

In addition to Russia and the US Vietnam has close relations with such regional powers as India, Japan, South Korea and Australia. 

Although there is the strategic threat from China Vietnam has close economic relations with China. 

Australia also has the conundrum of close economic relations but frosty strategic relations with China.

Vietnam also has long term nuclear energy aspirations - a complication not lost on China. Here is an earlier nuclear report on Submarine Matters.

Pete

Japan would benefit from US Combat System when selling Submarines to Australia

Just some of the components of the US AN/BYG-1 combat system. Australia is already using it in the Collins and will use it in the future submarine. Japan is also interested in using more AN/BYG-1 parts for its own submarines. See this image much larger and readable here.

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This diagram Australian Defence Force slide display (2015) explains the major elements of a Combat System.

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The following are snippets of an article by Greg Sheridan, Foreign Editor for The Australian, February 11, 2016. I've hyperlinked and bolded some parts:

“Japan building Australian submarines is a match made in heaven

The $50 billion-plus program to replace our six Collins-class submarines, with up to 12 new subs, may have at its heart a dynamic which has barely featured in the discussion so far. That dynamic is a Japanese interest in acquiring the US combat system on the Collins, and the related [Mark 48] heavy torpedo.

…The Japanese Soryu subs...have a capable combat system but it is not as good as the US system. From the beginnings of the strategic discussions between Canberra and Tokyo, and at the highest levels of government and the bureaucracy, there have been quiet discussions that out of this process the Japanese could eventually acquire the US combat system for their own subs.

…The Americans also harbour the greatest concern about the ability of European defence companies to keep their technology secure from Chinese industrial espionage. Partly to reassure the Americans on this score, the Turnbull government is conducting a separate limited tender between two American companies, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, as to who will be the combat system integrator on our new sub.

… given that the Soryu actually exists, whereas the German and French subs are completely new builds and exist so far only on paper, there is less technical and commercial risk with the Japanese as well…[see WHOLE ARTICLE]

COMMENT

The Australian is Australia’s most influential newspaper on national security issues – so it is impressive that it has substantial things to say about US and Japanese submarine combat systems. Combat systems are arcane to most newspapers.

The possibility of Japan adopting all of the elements of the US AN/BYG-1 combat system (not just some of them as at present) deepens the mutual benefits of a Japanese submarine sale to Australia. The extent of US influence on the submarine sale has been long covered by Submarine Matters here, here and here.

More recently see Submarine Matters Chart of Japan’s Soryu Submarine Combat System, and AN/BYG-1 Integration of January 27, 2016 where I wrote:

“If Japan is chosen in the CEP the US companies and Australian companies will need to work with Japanese companies to replace the Japanese combat system (below) or adapt parts of the Japanese combat which are already the same or similar to parts of the AN/BYG-1 combat system.”

Japan (with US agreement) using more of the concepts and technology in the US combat system makes sense. 

Japan, the US and Australia would all benefit if Japan pooled research and production resources by adopting the US Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo.

This Japanese Soryu submarine Combat System flow chart is on Japanese technologist  wispywood2344's website, passed on by S. Note that this combat system works to Japan's Type 89 heavyweight torpedo rather than the US Mark 48 torpedo. (Chart first published in Submarine Matters on January 27, 2016)

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 Pete

SMH Reports Australia Likely to Buy 12 Submarines

Australia's Defence Minister, Marise Payne, working quietly on the 2016 Defence White Paper and on the Submarine Winner Decision. (Photo courtesy AAP)
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David Wroe in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), February 9, 2016, reports http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/malcolm-turnbull-leaning-towards-fullstrength-fleet-of-12-submarines-20160209-gmpiel.html:

"The Turnbull government is leaning strongly towards building a full-strength fleet of 12 submarines rather than the reduced fleet of eight boats the Coalition was previously considering.

...But it is understood that given the advantages of creating a large and permanent submarine workforce, the need to honour the Abbott-era promise and the strategic uncertainty Australia faces in the Asia-Pacific region in the decades to come, the Turnbull government is inclined to commit to the full 12 boats in the revamped white paper.

That major defence statement, which will lay out the nation's security plans for the next decade, is [Defence White Paper] due to be released next month.

[In line with Submarine Matters expectation that the government would only announce a submarine winner after the next election] …”Senator Payne said the government would announce "this year" the winner of that contest but did not specify that it would be before the federal election….” [see WHOLE ARTICLE]

COMMENT

I would say Australia will end up with 8 x Japanese designed subs, but with an option (never taken up) of 4 more. We are working with such long lead times that long terrm government promises made in 2016 count as nothing in 2026.

A promise of "12" amounts to a good "continuous build" political promise in Adelaide.

Australia's ongoing struggles to find sufficient submarine commanders and crew for even 2 (of 6) submarines available for action at any one time certainly mitigates against making 12 submarines a viable and economical number.

Pete