Pakistan Negotiating With China to Acquire Nuclear Second-Strike Capability?

On December 13, 2024, Drop Site News published a report that alleged that the Pakistani Government requested help from China in order to create a survivable nuclear second-strike capability. This was in return for eventually allowing the Chinese PLA Navy to build permanent basing facilities at Gwadar. Such a base would have placed China's navy in a better position to influence events in the Middle East, including protecting China's oil and gas sources. The report claimed that the Chinese side rejected Pakistan's request.

Pakistan may have requested the capability to launch nuclear-armed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Ballistic missile submarines are usually nuclear-powered (SSBNs). SSBNs would undoubtedly be ideal second-strike platforms from a survivability standpoint. But, in my opinion, the cost and complexity of such a platform would place it outside the realistic reach of the Pakistani military for the foreseeable future.

However, as South (and North) Korea have recently proved, a conventionally-powered diesel submarine platform, with or without AIP, can also be utilized for the purpose of ballistic missile launch. Such subs, without the N (for nuclear powered) are called SSBs, which are less survivable than SSBNs due to limited underwater endurance. 

However, an SSB (especially one with AIP) can still enhance a country's nuclear deterrence posture. This is achieved by discouraging adversaries from attempting debilitating nuclear first-strikes due to the increased risk factor involved in dealing with a retaliating submerged platform.

Display model of a Type 032 Qing-class SSB, used by the PLA Navy to test SLBM technologies.
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Close-up of the SLBM launch tubes on the Type 032 Qing-class.
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The one and only Type 032 submarine.
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It is not entirely clear why China may have rejected Pakistan's request (if the report is true). Might China have rejected any Pakistani request for an SSBN or SSB due to counter-proliferation principles? Or did China feel that the Pakistani offer of Gwadar as a permanent Chinese naval base was an insufficient offer in return for such a capability? 

I think it is plausible that such a deal, if and when struck, would likely involve China transferring sufficient technology, under the table, to build an SSB within Pakistan itself. The secrecy would be necessary to avoid China being seen as violating the NPT (to which China is a signatory while Pakistan is not). 

Such a transfer of technology might manifest as a continuation of the Type 039A Yuan/Hangor-class production line at Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW). Of the 8 Hangors ordered by Pakistan in 2015, 4 are being built in China and 4 in Karachi.

The Pakistani SSBs could be a larger variant of the Hangor-class. The Hangors and Chinese Yuans in general, could be seen as a design evolution of the Soviet Kilo-class SSK. A major improvement of the Yuans (and Hangors) over the Kilos are the their Stirling engine-based AIP propulsion. 

Alternatively Pakistani SSBs could turn out to be an operational variant of China's sole Type 032 Qing-class submarine (pictured above). The Qing is a diesel-electric submarine which has already been used by China to test JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs and related technologies from a conventionally-powered platform, hence the Qing can be considered as having proven itself as an SSB test submarine.

Pakistan May Already Have 5 Nuclear Weapon Submarines

Irrespective of how Pakistan-China negotiations go in future, Pakistan will not be entirely dependent on acquiring a Chinese designed SSB to launch nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has a submarine-launched version of its nuclear capable Babur cruise missile (specifically the Babur III submarine launched cruise missile or SLCM). Pakistan's 2 x conventional Hashmat-class (Agosta-70) and 3 x conventional and AIP equipped Khalid-class (Agosta-90B) submarines may be capable of launching Babur IIIs. Once the 8 x Hangor-class are commissioned they might also carry nuclear tipped Babur III SLCMs.

Babur subsonic land-attack cruise missile in flight during a test launch.
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Deployed on even conventional submarines the Babur might be a significant second-strike weapon. If it has stealthy, low flying, flight characteristics, the subsonic Babur cruise missile might be somewhat survivable against networked anti-missile systems. The Babur is believed to be powered by a Chinese engine of the same type that powers the CJ-10. The Babur could present a significant complication for any country that might seek to pre-emptively destroy Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and other high value targets. 

A Pakistani ship or submarine launched nuclear-tipped missile of any type comes with significant command and control risks. Surface warships in particular that are capable of firing Baburs are hijack risks, as a previous attempt was already made (linked above), helped by elements within the Pakistan Navy who were loyal to extremist causes. However these might be risks the Pakistani National Command Authority considers worth taking to improve the chances of national survival.

As an aside, on December 19, 2024 the US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer stated that Pakistan intends to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with the ability to reach the United States. On December 18, 2024 the US announced further sanctions on agencies and companies involved in Pakistan's missile program, which DNSA Finer labelled an "emerging threat" to the US.

Existing (as of 2021) Pakistani missile systems and their reported ranges. Graphic via CSIS.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly could have begun development of a nuclear-powered submarine platform. While it remains to be seen where this project will go, it could present a future export possibility for countries like Pakistan and Iran. A cost sharing program in turn might allow all three countries to pursue a truly survivable second-strike capability in the long term.

Aussie Christmas Song

“Santa Swapped His Sleigh For A Surfboard” An original composition by Australian singer/songwriter Craig Stewart.
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Thanks everyone who read Submarine Matters and commented during 2024. 

Wishing everyone Seasons Greetings.

Pete

US Airstrikes Target Iran Proxies & Islamic State in Syria

At https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II#Operational_history

“On 29 November and 3 December 2024, USAF A-10s were used against targets in Syria to defend US forces in eastern Syria as part of the ongoing Syrian civil war. The USAF said the strikes destroyed vehicles, mortars, and a T-64 tank.^[130] Concurrent with the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December, A-10s participated alongside B-52s and F-15Es in what the USAF said were "dozens" of airstrikes against over 75 ISIS targets. The strikes were intended to prevent ISIS from benefitting from the political upheaval in Syria.^[131]”

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Video here and above by Chris Cappy and Diego Aceituno (they also wrote description below) at Task and Purpose December 15/16, 2024. Edited by Syed.

"The Syrian civil war has exploded again leading to the United States Air Force executing an A-10 Warthog gun run against Iranian backed proxy militias. Just when you think the A-10 is ready to retire it comes out swinging. The strike KOed three rocket artillery trucks, a T-64 tank, an Armored Personnel Carrier, and a mortar battery.

Today I want to try to untangle this absolute cluster f--k of a situation and investigate whether the US really backed the rebels with material support to overthrow Assad. Why did Syria, Russian and Iranian forces fail to hold the line? Who is this mysterious rebel group that’s taken over the country? All these questions are important but the most important thing is that hopefully the Syrian people themselves stop getting the short end of the stick in the outcome.

According to US Central Command, These strikes were conducted “in self defense”. They claim the gun run was to neutralize an imminent attack that was aimed at the nearby [US] Military Support Site code named “Euphrate” which is a US-led coalition base that’s traded fire with both ISIS and Iranian proxies before."  

First Images of Japan's Type-12 (Upgraded) SSM, Hypersonic Missiles?

The first photos of the new version of Japan's Type-12 Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) have been released to the public by Japan's ATLA (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency).

This report from Naval News has the details (and more pictures). But broadly, the main improvement seems to be an increase in range from 200 km (on the previous Type-12) to a reported 900 km (with an eventual aim of reaching 1,200 km). This will give the Japanese Self Defense Forces a longer, stand-off reach to tackle targets.

Additionally, it appears the new airframe of the missile is designed to minimize its radar signature to make it more difficult for adversaries to detect or shoot down the missile as it approaches. This is a feature that previous-generation SSMs lacked and they could therefore be detected at longer ranges, giving more time for adversaries to prepare defences.

This previous SubMatts article from January 2022 by Pete, with information mainly from Anonymous, goes into the details of how the Type-12 missile achieves these enhanced capabilities.





Japan expects to field the improved Type-12 missile in operational units by around 2026. The Type-12 (Upgrade) is reportedly designed primarily for aircraft and ship-based usage but ground-based launchers might also become viable to use once the full range envelop is realized.

Given the presence of what appears to be a small air scoop/inlet on the underside of the missile (see first image from top), it would seem that the new missile is indeed powered by an air-breathing engine, a turbofan. The turbofan (below) is actually identified in January 2022 SubMatts article. 

Turbofan Engine (a jet) of improved Type-12 SSM.
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Subsonic Missiles to Supersonic, even Hypersonic

This would mean that the new Type-12, like its predecessors, would primarily or wholly travel at subsonic speeds (below Mach 1). Such a slow speed might be unable to defeat the suite of SSM-countermeasures used by China's PLA Navy. Japan may need to develop supersonic missiles like the Indian-Russian BrahMos or even hypersonic missiles to compete with Russia's hypersonic Zircon, emerging Chinese missiles and future North Korean developments.

In order to increase its survivability, the new Type-12 would have to rely almost entirely on its stealth characteristics - which is in line with the strategy employed by the United States' LRASM missile.

Japan, much like the US and other countries is pursuing gradual development of hypersonic weapon systems like the Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) program (tested earlier this year). But the results of these technology-demonstration efforts might take much longer to emerge in the form of operational weapon systems.

Until then, the Type-12 (Upgrade) would likely become Japan's go-to SSM for Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW). It might remain the mainstay even after some hypersonic missiles or gliding projectiles are inducted. Hypersonic missiles are expensive and difficult to develop - and to replenish once used.

Japan might need to rely on the US to fully develop hypersonic weapons in reasonable timeframes. Japan might then eventually secure licensed production rights to reduce reliance on US supplies.

SYRIAN Civil War - Sunni HTS Victory Bodes ILL

It looks like NATO and Israeli intelligence agencies have their work cut out clarifying what is happening to the Russian bases and what deals Russia is making with Turkey’s ambitious President Erdoğan. The agencies need all sources and methods: informants in the region, SigInt and satellite imagery.

Turkey’s apparent power over Syria’s new Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime gives Turkey considerable power and latitude. Turkish forces have invaded large parts of northern Syria without HTS resistance (or US complaints?) – in order for Turkey to destroy the Kurds to the extent possible.

HTS’s advance south from Aleppo was so rapid and efficient it is reminiscent of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS‘s) conquest of large parts of Syria and Iraq in 2014. At worst ISIS elements might be the real power behind HTS.

Like the Arab Spring in 2011 any optimism that the Sunni Jihadist HTS takeover of Syria will bring lasting peace and Western style democracy should be tempered by reality. While most Sunnis (74% of Syria’s population) want peace, the HTS regime are liable to round up and eventually kill many of the Shiites (13%) who dominated ex-President Assad’s old regime. Also the 300,000+ Syrian Christians are under threat. Shiites and Christians may be trying to escape over Syria's borders in large numbers.

Generally a bleak picture. One hopes HTS might surprise with continuing moderation. But we shouldn’t bank on it.

K-4 SLBM Launch from Submarine & Indian Hypersonic Program Updates

On the 17th of November 2024, a test launch of the medium-ranged K-4 SLBM was conducted from the recently commissioned Indian nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arighaat. I had previously written about the commissioning of this boat which is also known as S3 or by its pennant number SSBN-81.

INS Arighaat is the second submarine in the Arihant-class, which comprises four SSBNs total - the first two (S2 Arihant & S3 Arighaat) with 4 x SLBM launch tubes and the last two (S4 & S4*, not yet named) with 8 x SLBM launch tubes.

It's being reported that this was the first test of the K-4 SLBM from an actual submarine (though some analysts in the know suspect this was just the first 'public' test from a submarine), all previous tests of the missile being from a submerged pontoon test platform.

With a stated range of 3,500 kilometers with a 1-ton (nuclear) payload, the K-4 serves a deterrence purpose by holding major Chinese targets like Beijing and Shanghai within its reach if employed from the northern portions of the Bay of Bengal.

Below is an older video of the missile from one of its previous pontoon-based tests.

However, having to launch from a very specific part of the water in order to reach those targets presents the Indian defence planners with a problem as those waters could be patrolled and/or monitored by Chinese PLA Navy SSNs, which are known to visit the Indian Ocean Region and India's periphery increasingly often. This is why India continues to pursue development of longer-ranged SLBMs like the K-5 and K-6, which supposedly have intercontinental ranges.

The K-5 may find application on the S4 and S4*, while the K-6 appears to be offering a definitive capability that would only equip the future S5-class SSBNs.

Artistic impression of the K4 SLBM; Sourced via overtdefense.com

A nominal range of at least 6,000 kilometers while carrying a MIRVed payload is necessary in order to attain credible deterrence value against the People's Republic of China - and that definitive capability appears to be India's eventual goal with its SSBN & SLBM programs. But this might only be achieved at some point in the next decade (2030s).

But what the K-4 also symbolizes in the meantime is an ability to ensure a truly survivable deterrence against India's other nuclear-armed adversary, Pakistan. The K-4's increased range over the previous K-15 SLBM would mean that India's SSBNs operating in the Bay of Bengal would now be capable of rapidly carrying out launches against major Pakistani counter-value targets like the capital Islamabad and the largest city Karachi without having to spend a considerable amount of time (several days) travelling from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea in order to bring at least Karachi into range (Islamabad would have still been out of reach for the K-15).

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Another interesting development out of India is the test of a Hypersonic missile reportedly called the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile or LRAShM (pronounced L-Rashem?) on 16 November 2024. The configuration of the weapon appears to be a Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicle (HBGV) sitting on top of a large solid rocket booster which is estimated to have the same diameter as the K-4 SLBM.

The only officially stated number about this weapon seems to be its range - a reported 1,500 kilometers - and the fact that it travels at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 or above) throughout its flight envelop, which might include several maneuvers/altitude variations considering it has the flight control surfaces to affect such movement.

LRAShM during its maiden public test; the object on top is the 'lid' of the sealed canister from which it was launched, it remained stuck on the nose cone for a short while after the ejection

No official figure is stated as to its maximum speed capability - with various analysts speculating it could be between Mach 6 and Mach 9. All that said, it could represent a capability similar to China's DF-17/DF-ZF which also employs a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV, not the same as a HBGV) payload employed over a similar range (1,600 km).

If deployed in ground-based launchers in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, the LRAShM can pose a significant threat (over and above what the extended-range BrahMos already represents) to any Chinese PLAN surface task force and/or Carrier Battle Group attempting to traverse the Malacca Strait.

3D Model of the LRAShM by artist Kuntal Biswas, sourced via Twitter; the nose cone & the leading edges of the 'control fins' appear to be coated in a material that's tolerant of extremely high temperatures expected in hypersonic flight

If the Arihant-class ends up being relegated to a comparatively less demanding conventionally-armed SSGN role following the commissioning of the S5-class in the nuclear deterrence role, the LRAShM might also end up being carried by the Arihant-class boats. Just 4 to 8 of these weapons (considering they have a booster that is the same size as K-4's first stage) with conventional payloads wouldn't cause much damage to a land-based target, but can be potentially devastating in a long-range anti-ship/carrier-killing role.

The smaller upper stage (the HBGV itself), with an estimated diameter of 0.6m, might also be carried independently (without the booster, or with a smaller booster of the same diameter as the upper stage) for greater magazine depth (12 to 24 missiles, triple-packed in the silos just like the 0.74m diameter K-15 SLBMs) but with an understandably shorter range of perhaps around 500 to 700 kilometers.

Interesting things to look forward to.