January 16, 2018

Soryu LABs vs LIBs, AIP and Indiscretion Ratios

Anonymous has provided the following comments from January 13 to 15, 2018 (with some further translation by Pete). This is on the interrelated issues of LABs vs LIBs, AIP and Indiscretion Ratios. The maths are quite challenging.

According to the former Commander of the Japanese Navy Submarines Service, Vice Admiral (retired) Masao Kobayashi, in a lead-acid battery (LABs) submarine, one hour-ventilation by using a diesel generator (DG) is needed after battery charging to release hydrogen generated by the charging process. 

Based on this information, the indiscretion ratio of the five following submarine Cases/scenarios have been reviewed and very roughly estimated for Japanese submarine missions of 70 days. This is where the surveillance period is 50 days and transiting period is 10 days x 2 = 20 days) and the DG output (hotel load + propulsion) is 250kW:

The lower the Indiscretion Ratio (IR) (the snorkeling period per 24 hours) the better.

Case I   (submarine length 84m, LABs, powered 100MW (or is that 100 kW?) - air independent
             propulsion (AIP), 2 x 2MW-generators, model Soryu MK I, IR =7%;

Case II  (length 84m, lithium-ion batteries (LIBs), 2 x 2MW-generators, model Soryu MK II)
              see Table below) IR=6%;

Case III  (long range Soryu proposed for Australian Future Submarine (AFS), length 90m, LIBs, 
               4 x 2MW-gnerators) IR=2.5%;

Case IV  (AFS, length 96m, 100MW-AIP, LIBs, 4 x 2MW-gnerators) IR=2%;

Case V   (AFS, length 96m, 100MW-AIP, LABs, 4 x 1MW-generators) IR=7%.

Comparison of Cases I and V shows that IR is determined by slow charge rate of LABs in a LAB-submarine. Comparison of Cases II, III an IV shows that output of the DG shows critical effects on IR for LIB submarines.

Performance at low speed means IR is Case IV>= Case III >>Case II >Case V = Case I.

Performance at high speed, which depends on batteries, is Case III>= Case IV >>Case II >Case V = Case I.

The facts that:

-  using up stored liquid oxygen (LOx) ends the usefulness of the Soryu’s Stirling AIP, and
-  LIBs are better than LABs

shows the flexibility of operation of each cases: Case III>= Case II >Case IV> Case V=Case I.

The superiority of AIP and LIBs, or simple LIBs, depends on a submarine’s mission. DGs play a critical role in both LIBs-submarines (Cases II and IV) within certain diesel power output ranges.

Anonymous thinks the future of LABs-submarines (Cases I, III and V) are limited with or without AIP and recent the tragedy of Argentina’s ARA San Juan shows LABs are not automatically safe.

More mathatically IR was very roughly estimated as follows:

Over 24 hours the balance of energy supplied [Es] to batteries and energy consumed [Ec] form batteries and AIP is described in equation (1)
(1)   Es = Ec
(2)   Es = Energy from diesel generator [Ed] + Energy from AIP [Ea]
(3)   Ec = Energy for propulsion [Ep] + Energy for hotel load [Eh]

The Indiscretion ratio (IR) which is the snorkeling period [ts] per day (=24h) is described in eq (4)

(4)   IR = ts/24 x 100 (%) = (tg + th)/24 x 100 (%)
(5)   ts = snorkeling period for diesel generation [tg] + snorkeling period for hydrogen release [th
        This is where, th =1h for LABs with hydrogen generation, and th = 0h for LIBs without 
        hydrogen generation.

Charge of batteries (capacity X (MWh)) with Y of C rate, Ed for ts is described in (6)
(6)   Ed = 1000XYtg  This where C daily energy from Z (MWh)-AIP for 50 days-opertion is 
        described in (7)

(7)   Ea =1000Z/50 =20Z
(8)   is derived from (2), (6) and (7), Es =1000XYtg + 20Z
(9)   If 250 kW of energy is consumed in an hour, then, Ec = 250 x {24-(tg + th)} ---
(10) is derived from (1), (8) and (9), 1000XY tg+ 20Z = 250 x {24-(tg + th)}
(11) is derived from (4) and (10), IR =[1-{(1000XY tg+ 20Z)/(250x24)}]x100=(tg + th)/24 x100 .  
       Where, tg = (250 x24-20Z-250 th)/(1000XY+250)  IR is from eq (11)

10MWh-LAB, non-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 2MW-diesel: X=10, Y=0.2, Z=0, th =1, IR=14.8%
10MWh-LAB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 2MW-diesel: X=10, Y=0.2, Z=100, th =1, IR=11.1%
20MWh-LIB, non-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 4MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.2, Z=0, th =0, IR=5.8%
20MWh-LIB, non-AIP, 0.4 C rate, 8MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.4, Z=0, th =0, IR=3.0%
20MWh-LIB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 4MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.2, Z=100, th =0, IR=3.9%
20MWh-LIB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.4 C rate, 8MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.4, Z=100, th =0, IR=2.0%

ANONYMOS’s CONCLUSION (LIBs Over LABs)


Though the estimates are based on many assumptions and are rough, the results clearly show the superiority of LIBs over LABs. Anonymous believes LIBs are indispensable to maintain the regional superiority of a conventional submarine.

 TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at January 16, 2018 

SS
No.
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥
Billions FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi
ssioned
Built
By
5SS Oyashio
8105 Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B FY1993
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios
10 subs
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 15SS Feb
2004
15SS
Nov
2006
15SS
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS
Soryu Mk 1
8116
Sōryū
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No 21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
12 Oct   2016
Mar? 2018
MHI
26SS
8125 Shyuriyu
SS-510
LABs + AIP
2014
6 Nov 2017
Mar 2019?
KHI
27SS First
Soryu Mk 2
8126
SS-511
LIBs only
2015
2018?
Mar
2020
MHI
28SS  Second
Soryu Mark 2
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
LIBs only
2016?
2018?
Mar 2021?
KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3
(1) (3)
8128
?
¥76B FY2017
LIBs only
?
?
2023?
MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3 (2)
8029?
?
¥71.5B FY2018
LIBs only
?
?
2024?
KHI?
Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
---

By Anonymous

January 15, 2018

INS Arihant's Temporary Sinking Explains Arighat's Launch & Aridhaman's Delay

It seems the Indian Navy and broader government thought it wise to launch INS Arighat on November 19, 2017 in the then secret knowledge that INS Arihant has sunk at its moorings during a test in February 2017. The Arighat (very similar to Arihant in size and design) launch can be seen as a means of deflecting the political embarrassment and recriminations of the Arihant sinking.

INS Arihant.
---

Arihant sank at India's major east coast naval base of Visakhapatnam . The cause - allegedly a hatch left open during an Arihant submersion test.

Given the apparent lack of such a hatch on Arihant (reports India's Economic Times, Jan 12, 2018) and likelihood of sensors to avoid major accidents the official "hatch left open" explanation seems suspicious. Maybe instead, sabotage by a disgruntled or bribed crewman or technician? Even Chinese or Pakistani agent involvement?

India's Visakhapatnam east coast naval base. Naval vessels can be seen halfway up the harbour. This is to the right of what looks like the submarine repair and SLBM loading shed that INS Arihant will need to use, or is already under repair at. 
---

Repairing, or if need be, replacing Arihant's reactor is likely to be a Billion dollar exercise. Involving Arihant being placed in drydock, moved to Visakhapatnam repair shed then being vertically cut open, basically in half.

The Arihant accident not only involves major repair costs but delays India's SSBN and broader indigenous nuclear submarine technical modification/learning program. It also delays training of the  officers and crew who will transition to a full size Aridhaman SSBN around 2020(?).

Compounding the problems is subsequent damage to India's other nuclear submarine, INS Chakra, in early October 2017. Russian built Chakra (ex Nerpa) has been 10 year leased to India. Chakra is used by India as a training platform and technology transfer (including its nuclear reactor) asset.

In fact these negative impacts (repair cost, technical improvements and training program) of the Arihant accident may have delayed Aridhaman's launch by a year or two.

Pete

January 14, 2018

False Alarm - Missile toward Hawaii - Emergency employee "feels bad"

False Missile against Hawaii warning - sent to Hawaiian, USA cell phones. More information on sensor or alarm chain of command errors will appear as it becomes available.
---

From Australia's ABC News January 14, 2018, first details:

[On January 13, 2018 (Hawaii time) a false alarm was sent out to Hawaiian residents and tourists] "Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill."

It might sound like something straight out of a horror movie, but for 38 minutes terrified Hawaiian residents thought the world was going to end.

...Why did it take 38 minutes to correct the error?

Many have been left asking why it took so long for emergency management to reveal it was a false alarm, with some residents only finding out it was sent in error because of a tweet sent in the interim by US Representative Tulsi Gabbard.

A revised alert informing of the "false alarm" did not reach mobile phones until about 40 minutes after the first warning was sent.

Hawaii's Emergency Management Agency administrator Vern Miyagi said "there was no automated way to send a false alarm cancellation".

"We had to initiate a manual process. And that was why it took a while to notify everyone," he told a media conference.

When asked if that was why it took 38 minutes to notify people, he again replied it was due to the "manual process to provide notification on the smartphones and cellphones".

"We did have other notification that occurred much, much sooner than that," he said.

The agency had tweeted there was no threat about 10 minutes after the initial alert, but residents who were not on Twitter did not see the correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reported January 15, 2018

EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBLE 'FEELS BAD'

While the message was a false alarm there was one part that was kind of true. It wasn't a drill, it was simply the result of a guy pressing the wrong button.
And that guy, a [Hawaii Emergency Management Agency] employee who was involved in a warning test of the state's emergency alert system — the wireless emergency alert — now "feels terrible".

Hawaii's emergency management administrator Vern T Miyagi yesterday indicated the man responsible was dealing with some deep regret.
Pete

January 12, 2018

Was it actually a North Korean submarine that entered Japan's contiguous zone?

Japan's Mainichi News reported January 11, 2018 that:

"TOKYO (Kyodo) -- A Chinese frigate and an unidentified foreign submerged submarine were spotted Thursday just outside Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands [near Miyako Island] in the East China Sea, the Defense Ministry said, prompting Tokyo to protest to Beijing over the sailing..." 

PETE'S COMMENT

The Japanese Navy has almost automatically assumed (or decided to announce) that because a Chinese (Type 054 or 054A) frigate was detected, the submarine must also be Chinese.

My alternative theory is that the Chinese Navy spotted a North Korean (NK) submarine. China wishing to avoid another Cheonan Incident pursued the NK sub to warn-off that sub. The Cheonan Incident  was when a NK submarine torpedoed a South Korean surface ship in 2010. An NK sub would also be a threat to Japanese surface ships.

The Chinese frigate's actions is part of China's new policy of pressuring NK to be less belligerent in its actions and threats. China wishes to de-escalate NK vs (South Korea, Japan, US) tensions.

Photo of the Chinese submarine that was forced or decided to surface in Japan's Senkaku Islands area, January 11, 2018.
---

Chinese submarine?

Comments, with links, received from readers since the first vague Japanese reports, strongly indicate it was a Chinese submarine that surfaced and showed the Chinese flag (above). The submarine appears to be a Type 093 (NATO designation "Shang" class SSN).

Another conclusion is that Japan is utilising its undersea sensor array to detect NK and Chinese submarines. See array map below. The array includes seafloor hydrophones and other sensors, which is strung from the Japanese home islands, via Okinawa (main) Island and via Miyako (in Japan's Senkakus) Island etc. 

The Chinese action could be a freedom of navigation exercise (FONOPS) against Japan's disputed Senkakus territorial claim. This may also be a Chinese method to test Japan's anti-submarine defences (including sensitivity of the Japanese seafloor SOSUS-IUSS array in detecting the Chinese sub). The Chinese frigate could also detect counter-moves by Japanese patrolling Soryu or Oyashio class submarines.


The map is from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” in Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444. The map may depict past or current locations of the eastern Asia - inner western Pacific SOSUS-IUSS seafloor array. 

Pete

January 11, 2018

Trump’s Latest "Low-Yield" Nuclear War Ignition Policy Raises Questions

Just when people were becoming relaxed about mega-death via nuclear war, Trump alarms US allies, again. Trump appears to be stoking talk of low-yield nuclear weapons, which frequently overlap with the tactical nuclear weapon category. Hopefully this is a rather blunt first-strike warning to North Korea (to not even consider hitting South Korea or Japan with nuclear weapons).

This has been reported as "President Trump’s administration plans to loosen nuclear weapons constraints and develop more ‘usable’ warheads" in The South China Morning Post, January 10, 2018. Key parts of that article are:

"The Trump administration plans to loosen constraints on the use of nuclear weapons and develop a new low-yield nuclear warhead for US Trident [D5 SLBMs] according to a former official who has seen the most recent draft of a policy review....[This is aimed to deter] Russia from using tactical warheads in a conflict in Eastern Europe.

... Arms control advocates have voiced alarm at the new proposal to make smaller, more “usable” nuclear weapons, arguing it makes a nuclear war more likely, especially in view of what they see as Donald Trump’s volatility and readiness to brandish the US arsenal in showdowns with the nation’s adversaries.

...The [Nuclear Posture Review] also expands the circumstances in which the US might use its nuclear arsenal, to include a response to a non-nuclear attack that caused mass casualties.   [It removes] assurances to non nuclear weapons states that the US will not use its nuclear arsenal against them.”

COMMENT

Problems with this new policy include:

1.  making nuclear war against a non-nuclear enemy more acceptable? That is US nuclear weapons
     can be used in a conventional war, not just as nuclear deterrents?

2.  The intended targets of these "low-yield" nuclear weapons won't trust them to be "limited to
     low-yield" or targeted countries won't limit their nuclear response anyway. China, Russia, North
     Korea, or Pakistan could hit the US or US allies (intentionally or in panic) with high yield nuclear
     weapons.

3.  Use them or Lose Them: China, Russia but mainly North Korea, or Pakistan could feel they have
     to use all available nuclear weapons (of any yield) due to the fear they may lose them to further
     US low-yield strikes.

4.  Could another mass casualty 9/11 justify the US responding with low-yield weapons that kill
     vastly more people, cause unintended health effects to US allies and upset the whole global
     balance?

5.  Would, as yet, only conventionally armed countries be encouraged to develop nuclear arsenals to
     deter Trump's latest low-yield policy? and

6.  Firing even low-yield missiles exposes a submarine to enemy satellite or radar detection and rapid
     destruction. Would the destruction of a US Ohio SSBN, its 23 remaining SLBMs (with say 100
     nuclear warheads total) be an acceptable trade-off if the SSBN was ordered to fire just one "low-
     yield" warhead on one of its Trident D5 SLBMs?

Pete