Israel's Realpolitikal Concern About Syria





 

Results of Israel's mid May 2013 airstrike(s) on Damascus, Syria

 

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Rough location of Israel's January 2013 airstrike(s) on Syria.

 



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Israel's late January 2013 airstrike(s) perhaps on a Syrian convoy with missiles for Hezbollah and/or on a Syrian chemical weapon research-production facility.

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The following is an excellent commentary on Israel's recent historical and current concerns about Syria. The commentary is by Professor Itamar Rabinovich, Vice Chairman of the (Israeli) Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Board of Directors, former president of Tel Aviv University and a former Israeli ambassador to Washington. Commentary is at http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=11464

“The Devil We Know” Revisited: Israeli Thinking on the Future of the Assad Regime  INSS Insight No. 427, May 19, 2013 Rabinovich, Itamar

 

On May 17, 2013, The Times of London quoted “Israeli intelligence sources” who argued that “an intact, but weakened, Assad regime would be preferable for the country and for the whole troubled region.” The paper went on to quote “a senior Israeli intelligence officer” in the north of the country: “Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there.” We do not know who the Israeli sources were, but the Times story provides a window into the deliberations and disagreements within Israel’s national security establishment as to the country’s priorities with regard to Syria.

 

The expression “the devil we know” was famously used by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 when he explained to President George W. Bush why he opposed the US President’s desire to topple Bashar al-Assad. President Bush became hostile to the Syrian President who supported the rebellion in Iraq against the US occupation and opened his borders to jihadi infiltrators and military equipment in support of the rebellion. While not enamored of the Syrian President, Sharon thought that from Israel’s perspective it was preferable to have a familiar regime in Damascus rather than face an uncertain future and the prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood, the only organized opposition in Syria, taking over the country. Assad was Iran’s ally and provided it with a land bridge to Hizbollah in Lebanon and supported Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But he did maintain a quiet border in the Golan Heights and inherited his father’s reputation as a familiar, and on the whole, predictable enemy. Throughout his political career and his five years as prime minister, Sharon opposed the idea of a settlement with Syria and withdrawal from the Golan that was part and parcel of such a settlement.

 

Israel’s perspective changed in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War. For Prime Minister Olmert, who succeeded Sharon, the war demonstrated the severity of the threat posed to Israel by the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis. The conclusion he drew, with the support of the defense establishment, was that it was a high priority for Israel to dismantle this axis and to do it primarily by pulling the Syrian brick out of the Iranian dominated wall. To this end, in early 2007 he began a Turkish mediated effort to explore the prospect of an Israeli-Syrian settlement. The negotiation lasted until its collapse in December 2008, although it was temporarily suspended in September 2007 when according to foreign sources Israel destroyed the North Korean-built Syrian nuclear reactor in al-Kibar. It could be argued that there was no point in negotiating a settlement with a Syrian president capable of such radical action, but Olmert calculated that this was all the more reason to defuse the conflict with Syria. He and others were also impressed by the fact that Assad displayed maturity and self control when he refrained from retaliating after being humiliated by the attack.

 

Another Syrian-Israeli negotiation was conducted in 2010-2011, during the final two years of Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous tenure, through mediators on behalf of the Obama administration. According to these mediators, this was a very serious negotiation, Netanyahu’s public rejection of a withdrawal from the Golan Heights notwithstanding. The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011 put an end to this negotiation as well.

 

The Syrian crisis, which began as a series of demonstrations and developed into a brutal civil war and a sectarian conflict, transformed Israel’s view of Assad and his regime. The Syrian civil war soon became a focal point of regional and international conflict. On the regional level, it became a conflict between Iran and its adversaries. Iran and its proxy, Hizbollah, have invested huge efforts to protect this strategic asset. Iran’s rivals such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan have extended support to the opposition. Internationally, Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are providing the Assad regime with a defensive shield in the Security Council and other forums. Russia also continues to provide Assad’s regime with sophisticated weapon systems. For Russia, protecting its investment in Syria and preventing it from falling into the US orbit is a high priority.

 

As a neighbor with a high stake in Syria’s future, Israel must decide on its own preferences. Early on, Israel chose a passive stance. Whatever its preferences, it calculated, correctly, that its ability to affect the outcome of the civil war was limited. It has no influence on Syria’s domestic politics and if it were to extend any support to the opposition it would play into the regime’s hands. Assad and his spokesmen argued from the outset that this was not a genuine domestic rebellion but a conspiracy hatched from the outside, and the regime would seize the opportunity to embarrass the opposition by pointing to any Israeli link or support. At the same time, Israel made it clear that it had its own red lines vis-à-vis Syria. It announced that it would interrupt the transfer of sophisticated, game changing weapon systems to the hands of terrorist groups, be they Hizbollah or the jihadi groups that have come to play an important role in the Syrian armed opposition. In January 2013, Israel reportedly destroyed a cache of missiles in the Damascus area en route to Lebanon. In order not to embarrass the regime and to minimize the risk of retaliation, Israel took no credit for this action. But in May 2013, Israel acted twice and in a manner that could not be secret. Clearly, Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah were upping the ante. So was Russia, which is about to provide Syria with sophisticated S-300 missiles whose entry into the Syrian-Lebanese arena is unacceptable to Israel. Israel may find itself in a cycle of violence in which it acts again and again against arms transfers via Syria to Hizbollah, eventually triggering a response, whether by Syria or by Hizbollah. It was in this context that an Israel official stated last week to the New York Times that should Assad retaliate, Israel will topple his regime, meaning that the destruction of Assad’s air force and armor by Israel would lead to the opposition victory. Be that as it may, Israel finds itself deeply involved in the regional and international conflict over Syria’s future as well as in the question of the regime’s future.

 

Indeed, there is a debate within the Israeli defense establishment as to the desirable outcome of the Syrian civil war. Some argue, in line of what was said to the London Times, that at the end of the day is it better for Israel that Assad remain in power, probably as a weakened ruler over part of the country. Their argument is that given the strength of the jihadi and Islamist elements among the militias fighting against the regime, a jihadi or Islamist takeover or a state of anarchy with jihadi elements free to launch terrorist activities is the most severe threat to Israel’s security. Against this backdrop, Assad once again becomes “the devil we know.” Others argue that the continuation of Assad’s regime in the service of Iran and in close partnership with Hizbollah presents a graver threat to Israel’s national security. They further argue that it is of course not desirable that jihadi groups take over Syria of parts of Syria, but that Syria is not the Sinai and Israel would be able to act if confronted with terrorist threats from Syria.

 

This latter school of thought is the more convincing. Bashar al-Assad demonstrated his ability to take radical dangerous actions when he built a nuclear reactor in league with North Korea. He demonstrated his willingness to brutalize his own population and use missiles and chemical weapons against it. He is now purely a tool in the service of Iran. This, however, does not mean that Israel should come out openly against Assad and the future of his regime. Israel’s recent entanglement in the Russian-American conflict over the future of Syria is a negative development. While protecting its vital security interests, it should seek to return to the policy it pursued during most of the civil war, i.e., refrain to the best of its ability from being drawn into the crisis and into Syrian politics, and protect its vital security interests firmly, but cautiously and discretely."

Pete

Indian Agni-6 range will cover all of Europe and Australia

Agni-6 above - perhaps to be test flown with MIRV in 2017-2018

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Agni-6 (or VI) - click to enlarge. See white lines for Agni-6's potential range (above) with light payloads - covering all of Europe and Australia.

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Agni-5 video (above) dated April 2012 dubbed by Indians as "India's China killer"

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Agni-5 research details from DRDO.

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Ajai Shukla of India's Business Standard reports from New Delhi,  May 8, 2013 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/advanced-agni-6-missile-with-multiple-warheads-likely-by-2017-113050800034_1.html :

"Advanced Agni-6 missile with multiple warheads likely by 2017

Agni-6 Missile

 

Ending worldwide speculation about the futuristic Agni-6 missile, the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) has briefed Business Standard about the direction of India's ballistic missile development programme after the Agni-5 enters service, probably in 2015.

DRDO chief Dr VK Saraswat, and missile programme chief Dr Avinash Chander, say the Agni-6 project has not been formally sanctioned. However, the missile's specifications and capabilities have been decided and development is proceeding apace. Once the ongoing Agni-5 programme concludes flight-testing, the defence ministry (MoD) will formally okay the Agni-6 programme and allocate funding.

Chander says the Agni-6 will carry a massive three-tonne warhead, thrice the weight of the one-tonne warhead that Agni missiles have carried so far. This will allow each Agni-6 missile to launch several nuclear warheads -Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Warheads (MIRVs) - with each warhead striking a different target. Each warhead - called Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV) - performs evasive maneuvers while hurtling down towards its target, confusing enemy air defence missiles that are trying to destroy them mid-air.

The DRDO is at an advanced stage of developing these warhead technologies. But the difficult challenge is building a booster rocket that can propel a three-tonne payload to targets 5000 kilometres away. This weighs almost as much as the satellite payload carried by the Indian Space Research Organisation's much larger and heavier Global Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV).

"Our ballistic missiles must be compact and road mobile, even the Agni-6 with its heavy payload. We will do this by building the first stage with composites, fitting the Agni-6 with India's first composite 40-tonne rocket motor. This is a technical challenge but we have good capability in lightweight composites," says Chander.

The road mobile Agni-6 would also have stringent limits on its length. "It must be carried on a standard size trailer that can move from one part of the country to another, turn on our roads, cross our bridges and climb our heights. As the payload weight increases, we will require more advanced technologies to keep the missile's length constant," explains Chander.

Coaxing higher performance from smaller rockets becomes especially important in submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can be no longer than 13 metres so that they can fit into the cramped confines of a submarine. Even long-range SLBMs that can fly 14,000 kilometres, like the Chinese JL-2, are built no longer than 13 metres. The DRDO faces this challenge as it develops the K-4 SLBM for the country's Arihant-class nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Eventually the Agni-6 will be no taller than the Agni-5, i.e. about 17 metres, says Chander. It will, however, be heavier and thicker - slightly over two metres - which will cater for the different shape of the MIRV payload.

"The timeframe for developing a new missile system is about five years and the DRDO has mostly achieved this in the Agni programme," says Chander. Calculating five years from April 2012, when the Agni-5 had its debut launch, the first test of the Agni-6 could happen in 2017.

The DRDO says the Agni-6 will have a longer range than the 5,000-kilometre Agni-5, but is not mentioning figures. "The MARVs and MIRVs will give us extended range. I will not be able to tell you how much because that is secret," Saraswat told Business Standard.

Ballistic calculations, however, suggest that at least some of the MIRV warheads on the Agni-6 would reach at least 6,000 kilometres. In a missile that travels 5,000 kilometres, the last MIRV warhead released flies an extra 1,000 kilometres.
 

Agni-5 Missile
 

Currently, the DRDO is readying for the second test next month of the Agni-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. This will be fired in the same configuration as its debut test a year ago, in order to establish the missile's reliability. A third test by end-2013 will see the missile fired from a canister.

"We will conduct at least five-six more Agni-5 tests before the missile enters operational service. After the repeat test this month or the next, we will conduct two test firings from a canister. Then the military units that will operate the Agni-5 will conduct two-three test firings as part of the induction process. Even after induction, the users conduct test firings as part of the Strategic Forces Command training plan," says Avinash Chander.

The Agni-5 is a three-stage, solid-fuel missile but its first stage consists of a metallic rocket motor, while the second and third stages have composite motors."

 

Comment

 

Connect with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/04/latest-news-of-agni-v-test-may-be.html concerning the April 2012 first test of the Agni-5 where I raised the issue of MIRVs.
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Pete

 

A second Agni-5 test in May(?) or June (?) 2013

 

Agni-5 (aka Agni 5 and Agni-V) presentation at DRDO.

 





Comparing Agni-5 (Agni-V) with Agni I, II and III.

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Agni-5 video (above) dated April 2012 dubbed by Indians as "India's China killer"

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Agni-5 research details from DRDO.

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Ajai Shukla of India's Business Standard reports from New Delhi,  May 8, 2013 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/advanced-agni-6-missile-with-multiple-warheads-likely-by-2017-113050800034_1.html . Excerpts relevant to Agni-5 include:

...the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) has briefed Business Standard about the direction of India's ballistic missile development programme after the Agni-5 enters service, probably in 2015.

Once the ongoing Agni-5 programme concludes flight-testing, the defence ministry (MoD) will formally okay the Agni-6 programme and allocate funding.

Eventually the Agni-6 will be no taller than the Agni-5, i.e. about 17 metres, says Chander. It will, however, be heavier and thicker - slightly over two metres - which will cater for the different shape of the MIRV payload.

"The timeframe for developing a new missile system is about five years and the DRDO has mostly achieved this in the Agni programme," says Chander. Calculating five years from April 2012, when the Agni-5 had its debut launch, the first test of the Agni-6 could happen in 2017.

The DRDO says the Agni-6 will have a longer range than the 5,000-kilometre Agni-5, but is not mentioning figures. "The MARVs and MIRVs will give us extended range. I will not be able to tell you how much because that is secret," Saraswat told Business Standard.

Currently, the DRDO is readying for the second test next month of the Agni-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. This will be fired in the same configuration as its debut test a year ago, in order to establish the missile's reliability. A third test by end-2013 will see the missile fired from a canister.

"We will conduct at least five-six more Agni-5 tests before the missile enters operational service. After the repeat test this month or the next, we will conduct two test firings from a canister. Then the military units that will operate the Agni-5 will conduct two-three test firings as part of the induction process. Even after induction, the users conduct test firings as part of the Strategic Forces Command training plan," says Avinash Chander.

The Agni-5 is a three-stage, solid-fuel missile but its first stage consists of a metallic rocket motor, while the second and third stages have composite motors."

 

Comment

 

Connect with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/04/latest-news-of-agni-v-test-may-be.html concerning the April 2012 first test of the Agni-5 where I raised the issue of MIRVs.
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Pete

 

Australian Defence White Paper 2013

This Dance of Three Collins Submarines reflects Australia's lack of direction in deciding on a Future Submarine design to replace the Collins. There are insufficient defence funds for the foreseeable future to build a new submarine.

Here's an interesting commentary in The Conversation from Andrew Phillips, Senior lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at University of Queensland. I've bolded the parts most relevant to India:

"Defence White Paper: super-sizing Australia’s strategic geography for the Asian Century

May 7, 2013

Australia’s new Defence White Paper http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf [PDF 3 MB] reflects a revolution in the way in which Australia thinks about its strategic geography.

The “Indo-Pacific” has now decisively displaced the “Asia-Pacific” as defence planners’ preferred term for describing our neighborhood. India’s robust economic growth and likely future military heft provides a powerful reason for this change.

So too does the Indian Ocean’s growing importance as a maritime superhighway connecting “factory Asia” with resource hubs including East Africa, the Middle East and North-Western Australia. But radically expanding Australia’s strategic horizons also risks a loss of focus and spreading our resources too thinly.

The problem of priorities

The greatest danger of the Indo-Pacific concept lies in treating the Indian Ocean and East Asian regions as of equivalent strategic importance.

While the resources trade linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans is growing in importance, the inter-state conflicts that most immediately impinge on Australia’s interests remain concentrated in East and especially northeast Asia.

An increasingly poisonous Sino-Japanese relationship, and a nuclear armed North Korea, threaten stability in that part of Asia that continues to be the primary engine of Australian prosperity. Short of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war, no security challenge west of the Strait of Malacca comes close to threatening Australia’s interests as seriously as does the spectre of a Northeast Asian Great Power conflict.

For Australia, the main security and economic game will remain centered on the Sino-Japanese-Korean triangle for at least the next decade. Thus the language we use to describe our strategic landscape should reflect this reality as faithfully as possible.

The problem of planning

In lumping the Indian and Pacific Ocean theatres together, the White Paper’s authors conflate two very different environments.

Since the 1970s, Australia has pursued a strategy in East Asia based on participation in America’s “hub and spokes” system of bilateral alliances and engagement with an ASEAN-centred regional security architecture.

The Indian Ocean presents a more complicated challenge for Canberra. It lacks a coherent US-centred alliance system for Australia to plug in to, or a local equivalent of the veritable “alphabet soup” of multilateral security fora now present in East Asia.

Australia must engage the Indian Ocean region, and the White Paper rightly prioritises turbo-charging bilateral partnerships with India and Indonesia as a means of achieving this goal. But a mere extension of Australia’s tried and tested “dual track” technique of regional order-building from an Asia-Pacific to an Indian Ocean is likely to fail.

The problem of perception

Finally, the most recent White Paper has won praise for abandoning a needlessly provocative approach of casting China’s rise as a potential source of regional instability.

But Canberra’s focus on the Indo-Pacific risks undermining this progress. This is because Australia-watchers in Beijing will be aware of the concept’s early association with voices that advocated containing China through the formation of a league of maritime democracies including India, Australia, Japan and the United States.

To be fair, most Indo-Pacific boosters – both within and outside of government – have consistently and correctly repudiated ambitions to contain China as being both unrealistic and counter-productive.

Nevertheless, in the likely event that the Indo-Pacific becomes a permanent part of Australia’s defence and foreign policy, a special effort will be needed to privately reassure Beijing that the concept includes an inclusive vision of regional order, as opposed to a dog-whistle to partisans agitating for an anti-China “Axis of Good”.

Australia’s strategic environment is changing rapidly, and the White Paper’s authors have shown considerable intellectual élan in trying to capture the changes now re-shaping our region.

An exclusively East Asia-centric conception of Australia’s strategic space increasingly sits uneasily with India’s rise, a growing Indonesia and the undeniable importance of the Indo-Pacific “energy superhighway” to regional economic development.

Nevertheless, stretching Australia’s strategic geography out to an Indo-Pacific scale carries dangers as well as opportunities – the concept requires further intellectual refinement. This is especially so in a time of tight budgets, and when Australia’s political leadership cravenly refuses to educate the public on the necessity of funding the increased defence and especially diplomatic regional capabilities we urgently need to secure our safety and prosperity.

Ultimately, unless finance and political leadership are provided, broadening Australia’s strategic focus may merely further dilute our limited resources and compromise our capacity to shape our region in the Asian century."