January 19, 2021

Inauguration Security: Rioters to Start at Andrews AFB?

Joe Biden's Inauguration from 3am Thursday 21 January Sydney, Australia time will be screened live on SBS TV. The actual swearing-in occurs at 12noon Washington time, Wednesday 20 January.

Trump has organised 2 distractions hours before the Inauguration:

1. A military parade at nearby Andrews Air Force Base  (see map below) to which a Trumpster crowd is invited. The crowd are due to assemble from 11.15pm (Sydney Time) Wednesday 20 January. Trump may well do more crowd incitement. Trump's timing allows several hours for this crowd to travel to central Washington, to do their worst during the Noon (US time) Inauguration. As Andrews Air Base is about 15 miles southeast of the Inauguration at the Capitol Building Trumpsters could even start a riot distraction within the Andrews area itself.

During Trump’s 6 January Insurrection many Trumpters appeared to have military training in coordinated action. So riots drawing the attention of security forces (Secret  Service, FBI, National Guard and police) may be coordinated with more deadly shooting and bombing incidents.

Trump's possible next riot incitement to be held at Andrews Air Force Base complex (in about 11 hours time), just outside the Beltway and about 15 miles (by road) southeast of the Capitol Building where Biden's Inauguration is to be held in about 15 hours time.
(Map courtesy
WashPost via Twitter).

2. Instead of attending the Inauguration (as is customary) Trump will fly from Andrews Air Base to one of his palaces, just north of Miami Florida. This will establish an alibi before the likely riot in Washington. It is also possible Trump may incite a crowd in the Miami area.

Additional scenarios to Trumpster violence in/around Washington are Trumpster Riots of Opportunity in US State Capitals and other major US cities. These may happen while most US security attention is focused on Washington.  

If any violence happens this will dominate Aussie morning news, on Thursday 21 January. The most sustained reporting for us, is likely to be "ABC America World News" 12.30pm Sydney time, on SBS TV. This will be immediately followed, at 1pm, by "PBS NewsHour" on SBS TV. 

Here's hoping nothing violent happens. 

More at.

Netherlands New Sub: Swedish Entrant Cheaper Than German?

Following the January 11, 2021 article - on January 16, 2021 Anonymous kindly commented (with edits by Pete for improved English and clarity) that:

Sweden's SAAB (with a submarine entrant based on the A26) and Germany (with the TKMS Type 212CD E (see video below) are competing for the Netherlands Walrus replacement program. The cost of the submarines is, of course, one of the decisive factors in the tender. Cost (for each of 4 new submarines) is estimated very roughly on the design/material of pressure hull, AIP and combat system. The A26 entrant may be considerably less expensive (perhaps as low as a 1,000 million USD?) than the Type 212CD E. 

As Germany's Siemens Fuel Cell AIP technology does not generate carbon dioxide it is not restricted in diving depth (in the sense water pressure would prevent carbon dioxide being emitted). [Pete comment: This is in contrast to Swedish Stirling AIP which does suffer the carbon dioxide emission restriction]. But, fuel cell AIP and its peripheral technologies (metal hydride for hydrogen source, hydrogen/oxygen storage and supply system, etc.) seem to be very expensive (more than 100 million USD in a future Type 212CD E?).

Strength of pressure hull steel relies on Yield Strength (given a number) and on the strength contribution of other support structures. This may be:

-  magnetic steel (see Sweden's  "Strenx700" at Table 1") maybe based on the existing design of the Gotland/Blekinge class for the A26 entrant 


-  Germany's non-magnetic stainless steel (see 1.3964 or 1.3974 at Table 2.) maybe a new design? for the Type 212 CD E.

Pressure hull material, if 1.3964 or 1.3974, is much more expensive (30million USD in a 212CD or more) than Strenx700 (1). [Pete comment: However the non-magnetic nature of the German steel should make it harder to detect.]

AIP: Stirling generators vs fuel cell 30 million USD for Stirling generators versus around 100 million USD for fuel cell? (2)

(1) Price of Nitronic 50 (=1.3964) plate is 1,500INR/kilogram (20USD/kilogram) and assumed 1500ton of 1.3964 stainless steel is used for 212CD. Judging from composition of steel, 1.3964 stainless steel seems to be 10 times expensive than Strenx700.

(2) Four Stirling generators four x Kawasaki Kockums V4-275R for the Soryu class submarine cost 20 million USD, where costs of alloy for LOx tanks and other systems are excluded.

Video uploaded December 2, 2020. Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’ (TKMS) proposal for the Netherlands Submarine Replacement Project: the Type 212CD E (Expeditionary). “The video shows the general...212 CD E design characteristics without sharing details due to security classification matters.”

January 18, 2021

Sonobuoys from MQ-9A Block V Reaper: pre SkyGuardian

The SkyGuardian (aka Sky Guardian) might turn out to be cheaper than relying on  sonobuoys only dropped from manned P-8s. See this DefenseNews report of
January 18, 2021.

Australia has selected the Sky Guardian UAV.  Presumably the US military would also buy it, if its a successful sonobuoy dropper, fixed sensor and (maybe) weapons carrier.

Artwork of future Sky Guardian dropping a sonobuoy. It appears to be networked with a P-8 in the upper left corner. (Courtesy DefenseNews)

Chinese NUCLEAR Subs Newly at Yulin a Taiwan Beatup

Reading between the lines it appears Taiwan is behind the beatup (over the last week) that Chinese nuclear submarines are newly, or in the last 12 months, berthed at China's Yulin/Longpo Naval Base Complex. Yulin/Longpo, China's southernmost submarine base, is on China's Hainan Island (see Map below).

To give newly a bit of US credibility Taiwan seems to have ascribed the information to US site, GlobalSecurity. See two such reports at VOA here and "WW3 fears..." here.

This beatup appears specifically timed as a "crisis" for the incoming Biden Administration.

The problem is the widely respected, accurate strategic website, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reports, on its Type 094 SSBN nuclear submarine page :

"In late 2007 or early 2008, the first TYPE 094 deployed to Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea."

Meanwhile the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief July 21, 2017 advised: 

"Most recently, geospatial analysis conducted by AllSource Analysis has recently revealed four Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at Longpo [Yulin complex] Naval Base on Hainan Island...". (see image below)

Photo of a Type 094 SSBN (nuclear submarine) at Yulin/Longpo Naval Base complex, Hainan Island from the 2017 report. (Photo courtesy Google Earth with one image going as far back as 2013, via Jamestown Foundation)

January 13, 2021

South Korea's SLBM Tests Continue

 UPI's Elizabeth Shim has reported on January 13, 2021, in part:

South Korea is developing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] and has tested the weapon at the Agency for Defense Development's Anheung test site [just southeast of central Seoul], according to a local press report.

Newsis reported [January 13, 2021] the SLBM was test launched from a ground platform and next-step underwater tests are scheduled for March [2021]. South Korea's military also conducted other SLBM tests in 2020 "several times," both on land and underwater, the report said.

The report of Seoul's domestic SLBM, described as a modified version of Korea's short-range, solid-fueled Hyeonmoo-2B [see Submarine-launched Variat sub-heading 800km range with 500kg payload] ballistic missile

...South Korean military sources did not deny domestic SLBM development on [January 13, 2021], according to Newsis. Sources told the news service Seoul has "secured hi-tech power" to "support peace on the Korean Peninsula, by building up strong military power," the report said.

In March [2021] Seoul is expected to carry out an underwater SLBM test by deploying a 3,000-ton Dosan Ahn Changho-class [KSS-III] submarine. The South Korean submarine is equipped with six vertical launch tubes that can eject SLBMs..."

US Strategic Framework Indo-Pacific: Russia our Friend?

Here is a newly (days ago?) declassified SECRET/"NOFORN" (ie. US Eyes Only) document titled "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific". It is a US national security briefing prepared by White House staff. 

The document contains a Cover Letter and US National Security Council further action description that were missing when the "US Strategic Framework..." 000174 Attachment was released by the White House on January 5, 2021. The Cover Letter refers to some documents that may be still classified, such as "U.S. Campaign Plan for Countering China’s Malign Influence in International Organizations." Much in the Attachment is worth discussing.

The White House released the whole document on January 13, 2021 to Australia's ABC "7.30 Report". The US aim may be mainly to show Trump/the White House did have a working Indo-Pacific alliance strategy after all. 

Reading the document reveals the alliance objective is mainly to contain China. 

Russia is America's greatest nuclear opponent in the Indo-Pacific, with a nuclear capability vastly larger than China's and North Korea's put together. This includes Russia's Pacific Fleet SSBNs, other SSBNs on call, central Russia based ICBMs and nuclear bombers that threaten the US mainland. Yet the only mention of Russia in the document is: “Russia will remain a marginal player in the Indo-Pacific region relative to the United States, China, and India." Trump's personal relations with Putin have possibly downgraded strategic reality.

India, Japan, Australia, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines and Thailand are all mentioned in this document. It is useful to use the search function in it - to identify country mentions.

Here is an Australian ABC News summary of the document.

An excellent account from the Australian perspective by Joshua Mcdonald at The Diplomat (paysite).