Shawn Chung drew my attention to the CRS Report below, which itemizes China's naval threat and then suggests US responses to this threat. Reading excerpts of this very recent report there will be increasing strains on the USN Virginia force. I conclude there will be increasing USN demand for more than currently the projected numbers of 66 Virginias. Hence there will be fewer or no Virginias available for Australia's RAN.
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report RL33153:
China
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues
for Congress, October 19, 2023, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/275 .
Page 18 indicates:
"Submarines Overview
China
has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines
are now built to relatively modern Chinese and Russian designs.43
Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines might not be as capable as Russia’s
newest submarines,44 but compared to China’s earlier submarines, which were
built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.45 An
August 2023 Naval War College Report on China’s submarines states
After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was
commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class
nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting,
sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s
Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump
jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and
12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack
cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see
significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare
favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy [Borei] class SSBN in the areas of propulsion,
sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting.
If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096
would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security. [46 – from Christopher
P. Carlson and Howard Wang, A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear
Submarines Nuclear Submarines, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S.
Naval War College, August 2023, p. 1.]
A
September 2023 Naval War College report on China’s submarine industrial base
states
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards…. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets. [47 from - Sarah Kirchberger, China’s Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, September 2023, p. 1.]
5 comments:
I seriously reckon Australia needs to reconsider its submarine policy.
Virginias are delayed, and once they will be available to Australia, they’re already an old design that will be superseded by SSN(X). The US is still facing ‘cadence issues’ where small problems can bottleneck their entire production schedule https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/11/09/us-navy-eyes-two-submarine-delivery-rate-in-2024-after-schedule-upset/
UK submarine build times have extended pass ten years for the last two Astutes, while the Dreadnaught SSBN will each take over 13 years of construction.
With SSN-AUKUS, I feel that Australia should stop acquiring Virginias and buy 8 of these boats - start construction at ASC once the design is finalised. Use the next five to ten years to improve infrastructure and training locally, then start building the first boat in the early 2030s - place early orders for long lead time items, such as with RR for the PWR3.
Pete
If the Virginia risks are as real as stated, then yes, Australia would be better off with 8 x SSN AUKUS.
- one SSN class in RAN. has many advantages:
- one supply chain; one lot of spare parts
- easier and cheaper for base staff to maintain
- easier and cheaper to train and interchange RAN crews for one SSN class
- agree much greater potential for economies of scale building eight, better price
- far greater ability to repair locally in event of conflict
The big IFF is whether BAE and Rolls Royce are on time with the design and reactor supply. They have been terrible of late.
Hi Shawn at 11/13/2023 6:50 PM
Thanks. Your comment has promped me to write:
"SSN-AUKUS's better bet than Australian Virginias" of Nov 14, 2023
at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/11/ssn-aukuss-better-bet-than-australian.html
But also see my response to Anonymous of 11/15/2023 1:38 PM below.
Cheers Pete
Hi Anonymous of 11/15/2023 1:38 PM
Yes I agree with the theoretical advantages of Australia buying 8 x SSN-AUKUS particularly "train and interchange RAN crews" which could be broadened, as in past Oberon days, to years of mixed crews and secondments from the late 2030s onwards.
But yes, sadly SSN-AUKUS being mainly designed-initially built by BAE and RR(Reactors) involved major risks for Australia given:
- unexpected major maintenance or repairs means not transpoting or sailing these Aus SSNs to nearby US facilities in Guam or Hawaii but far further to the UK.
- BAE and RRs delays and cost overruns in the first decade of the Astute SSNs program should give grounds for Australian caution
- as should BAE/RRs poor performance for the deep maintenance of HMS Vanguard which took 7 years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Vanguard_(S28)#Overhaul_and_refueling
Also we cannot forget BAE and the "mature design" Type 26. Which has delayed and added complexity to the Hunter-class future frigate. Though too few VLS was also an Australian fault. If Australia took the existing-design US Constellation approach or a variation on Navantia Air Warfare/frigate we'd have done better.
One thing in BAE's favour in that by 2035-39, towards the end of the Dreadnought SSBN class build, there will be an experienced currently skilled UK workforce to shift to SSN-AUKUS. Aklthough the US will continue churning out Virginias without interruption through to the 2040s.
Yet if we don't recieve a first Virginia in 2032 it may be 2045 (or 13 years later) an Osborne SSN-AUKUS build can occur. Also where the SSN-AUKUS's reactor half will be constructed (probably in UK) and met up with the Osborne front half (Aus or UK?) are problems NEVER encountered in nuclear sub construction.
Regards Pete
Pete
Your concewrns re BAEs recent performacne are valid. The Type 26 is running late in UK, ASC (Hunter) and Canada (CSC). I still think one class is far safer over the thirty years we will operate these SSNs.
I mentioned before that one prudent precaution the RAN culd take is to hire GDEB as a supervising engineering firm over BAE in the same way the UK MOD brought them in when the Astute program was floundering in the early 2000s.
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