On October 9, 2023 retortPouch commented along the lines:
I agree with Pete that it's difficult to really figure out the design heritage [of Taiwan's just announced Hai Kun-class aka "Narwhal" (TSS-3s) because the Japanese Uzushio-class onwards and Dutch Zwaardvis-class diesel submarine families are quite explicitly export Barbel-class derived]. They share very similar design features. Taiwan's Hai Lung-class (TSS-2s) are indigenized Zwaardvis class subs, which can provide a design template.
However it is known that Japanese manufacturing technical asst. was provided in the form of very critical welding technology by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI).
As for the TSS-2s’ and
TSS-3s’ usefulness, I suspect they are particularly useful, and not too late, in
contradiction to the PRC’s Global Times article. Taiwan’s subs are/will be indeed inferior in indiscretion ratio to the PRC's Stirling AIP equipped Yuan-class subs.
But the growing presence of an expanding fleet of credible Taiwanese subsurface
platforms provides many options to counter PLA-N maritime action. This concerns
especially Taiwan’s options in the periods of tension prior to war when there
is PRC political threats of blockades, even if not actually executed. During the
buildup to war Taiwan and the PRC may both launch special operations,
electronic intelligence gathering and seabed operations (eg. cutting undersea
telecommunications cables and smart mine laying etc.). This is a set of ops
which Taiwan finds difficult to execute right now. Taiwanese submarine and
seabed operations would complicate PRC planning, and provides exploitable
opportunities to effect large changes in the battle situation.
The fact that the Global Times comes out to mention the undersea war should flag notice.
I am not very confident in
Taiwan's ability to fend off a PLA "takeover" scenario right now.
However, I reckon things
are slowly going on the right track, especially since the end of the Administration
of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s President from 2000 to 2008.
It is hard for me to tell if [Taiwan’s military strengthening, in particular building TSS-3s] is happening fast enough. This is because the CCP, via the PLA, itself has a limited risk appetite, and cannot simply charge headlong into a painful, costly and embarrassing campaign. The balance right now is complex... making it more complex is the subs' job.
5 comments:
I've mentioned undersea data cables before, as it should concern Vietnam more than Taiwan - Vietnamese land data cable routes go through China, Cambodia and Laos. For Taiwan, it has a host of cables running to Kaohsiung and Taipei, which is connected directly to Japan and the US. https://www.ft.com/content/89bc954d-64ed-4d80-bb8f-9f1852ec4eb1
There is now an official investigation into a Taiwanese opposition politician, who is accused of leaking info to the South Korean government that led to the arrest, in South Korea, of six engineers. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5014979
Hi Shawn at 10/13/2023 9:57 PM
Very interesting how dependent Vietnam's land data cables are on good relations with China and with increasingly Chinese influenced Cambodia and Laos. China could also cut undersea data cables between South Korea, Japan, Taiwan (as you point out), Australia, Hawaii, US Pacific coast even trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean cables. One method is trawlers with cutting equipment. Other more secret methods are modified submarines and remotely piloted UUVs.
In, or just before, a war China, with missiles/rockets, could shoot down US GPS satellites and LEO and geo-stationary Communications satellites as well as "spy" satellites.
Regards Pete
Hi again Shawn at 10/13/2023 9:57 PM
Regarding your "There is now an official investigation into a Taiwanese opposition politician, who is accused of leaking info to the South Korean government that led to the arrest, in South Korea, of six engineers. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5014979"
its too mind bending a matter for me to comment on the particular matter.
Other than to repeat: I've long commented Taiwan is likely saturated with PRC agents (especially non-diplomatic status "Illegals"). This is given PRC Illegals look the same and share the common language (Mandarin) with Taiwanese people.
Millions of Taiwanese have lived/worked in the PRC over decades. This has given PRC intelligence (MSS) ample opportunities to "turn" PRC resident Taiwanese. Once Taiwanese (who are PRC agents) return to Taiwan, Taiwan's ability to keep secrets from the PRC declines.
Many South Koreans might also spy for North Korea, China or Russia because all 4 countries share contiguous land borders and agents can also be smuggled by boat or submarine across the near seas.
Hmm.. there’s some differences between simplified mandarin and traditional mandarin, which is used in Taiwan.
Also, just as you can tell the difference between an Aussie and a New Zealander, I can tell the difference between a Taiwanese person and a mainlander… https://youtube.com/shorts/z37HdiECb24?si=IOwTY73DSj-qKU9V
Hi Shawn at 10/16/2023 2:32 AM
If the Russian foreign intelligence services can remodel good Russian speaking gals into newly minted American teenagers (in looks, dress, mannerisms, English language, accents and writing) then a PRC to Taiwanese makeover would be a cinch :) Don't cha reckon :)?
I don't doubt differences in Mandarin and appearance between Taiwanese and PRC Chinese.
My point is that the good officers of the PRC's MSS foreign intelligence service and PLA-Intel could strive like good Commies to select potential Illegals (natural cover agents):
- with as many Taiwanese physical features as possible. Some plastic surgery and a groovy harcut may help.
- teaching a PRC person the right accent, expressions and appropriate written lnguage/style.
- ideally, persuading an actual Taiwanese chap to spy for the PRC would be even better
Cheers Pete
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