ASIO and AUKUS Submarine Security

Australia's security intelligence concerns include how the intelligence services of China, Russia and even more friendly proxies are trying to find cracks in the security architecture protecting AUKUS secrets. Major AUKUS submarine Top Secrets include the US S9G reactor and UK submarine reactors and the US's huge AN/BYG-1 Combat System (nuclear version) that would go into an Australian Virginia-class SSN.

Security intelligence is a topic the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is naturally also interested in - in its Counter-Espionage and Protective Security missions. 

For example, note the following:

The ASIO Annual Report 2021-22 under sub-heading “Threats to our way of life”

“Espionage and foreign interference has supplanted terrorism as our principal security concern.

Multiple countries are aggressively seeking information about Australia’s strategic capabilities, economic and policy priorities, world-class research and development, and defence technologies.

We anticipate hostile foreign powers and their proxies will be particularly interested in obtaining information on AUKUS, the Quad and their associated initiatives.”

See mention of AUKUS in the ASIO Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment 2022 

“For decades, foreign spies have been seeking information about Australia’s strategic capabilities, economic and policy priorities, world-class research and development, and defence technologies. 

Obviously the capabilities and decision-making around AUKUS fall squarely into that category. Foreign intelligence agencies will have already added them to their collection requirements—just as ASIO is already working to thwart them. That should surprise no one; it’s one of the reasons I’m flagging a more proactive approach to our security advice and engagement.”

Also see mentions of AUKUS in the ASIO Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment 2023  namely: 

"As we progress AUKUS, it’s critical our allies know we can keep our secrets, and keep their secrets."

and

"Since the announcement of AUKUS, there’s been a distinct uptick in the online targeting of people working in Australia’s defence industry."

 
Further Comments

The US has a complex International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory regime that makes it easier to export some arms technologies to the UK and Australia and restricts arms exports to such countries as Russia and China.

Implications of that include:

-  ASIO officers are increasingly being embedded in Australia's Defence Department to oversee AUKUS security measures

-  the likelihood that there is an AUKUS security committee that includes ASIO, the FBI,  MI5 and other bodies as needed. They might regularly communicate by secure audio-visual link, a link that itself needs high level security protection.

Vetting

-  it is likely ASIO and other Government bodies (eg. the Defence Security and Vetting Service) participate in the vetting process of those wishing to have access to more sensitive  AUKUS technologies. 

-   it would be difficult for someone born in Russia or China gaining Top Secret (Compartmented) Clearance to work with AUKUS arms technologies. I held equivalent clearance.

China has a reputation of "getting at" relatives remaining in China by threatening to lower their Social Credit Score. That could be used to coerce or blackmail former citizens of the PRC who gain Australian citizenship who wish to have access to sensitive AUKUS technologies. 

-  Also, for very thorough necessary vetting it would be difficult for Australian vetting investigators to go ask, face-to-face, friends and relatives in Beijing or Moscow about the character and background of prospective defence employees applying for sensitive Australian government or company defence jobs. 

-  The alternate method of ASIO contacting other nations' security services to establish a potential  employees bona fides wouldn't work as intended (quite the opposite for AUKUS security) if those other security services are China's MSS or Russia's FSB.

-  UK and Australian citizens in Government or Companies working with more sensitive AUKUS technologies would likely need to satisfy US clearance methods including polygraphing. In any case some Australian companies have adopted polygraphing for civilian company Commercial-in-Confidence clearances. There are polygraph companies practicing here like Polygraph Australia and Australian Polygraph Services. Presumably there are inhouse government services.