The response to my article of May 11, 2022, on Australian Proliferation, was laudable.
On May 12, 2022 Anonymous
argued :
“Pete a few thoughts;
Firstly on training reactors, you are correct, SSN operators have always had them. However to date SSN operators have always had a nuclear power industry. If Australia reached a training agreement with the UK RN or USN for the nuclear-trained engineers to serve on RAN SSNs, it is not clear to me that Australia would need a training reactor. We will need Australian know how expanded, but in ARPANSA, ANSTO and ANU (ANU Arts was one of Pete’s Alma maters :-) the kernel of that knowledge base already exists. It needs expanding (about doubling in size in fact.)
Second on Indonesia I agree with Ghalib. Indonesia has not yet built even small research reactors comparable to Lucas Heights in Sydney. Past Indonesian proposals have involved Chinese or Russian help and have all fallen through. So they are far behind India in expertise.
The other thing that
still concerns me with Admiral Mead's comments is timing. It bothers me nobody will nominate a start date for construction of
SSNs in Australia. Without that how can industry plan to assist? I think we
should do what the UK MoD did at the start of the Astute program and bring Electric Boat in as a managing contractor to run the ASC shipyard [at Osborne, South Australia]. [Electric Boat] got [BAE Systems] up to speed [building the Astutes] in
about three years.
Pete Comment
As the AUKUS submarine project will cost more than A$170 Billion (being bandied about) planning preliminaries are not as fast as we submarine commenters would hope.
The Australian Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce needs to deliver (probably about April 2023, if Labor wins, maybe sooner if the Coalition wins) its all-encompassing report to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Hopefully a public version of the report will be released.
Meanwhile the Federal Government has to go into the multi $Billion budgeting exercise for AUKUS subs. This will probably involve most government departments. Hopefully milestones and figures will be in the May 2023 Budget context.
4 comments:
Thanks Pete
I stand by these comments that Australia should bring in an experienced SSN builder (EB is the obvious choice) to oversee both the upgrading of ASC to a nuclear engineering standard and the initial stages of construction for at least the first SSN built at Adelaide.
There are many reasons for this :
- no other company knows both US and UK SSN engineering standards as well as EB.
- looking at recent Australian naval shipbuilding failures dating back to the Collins Class, the problem has rarely been the quality of the shipbuilding. It has been lack of specification clarity, too many design changes, or failure to coordinate modules in a modular process. All of those need a skilled engineering manager. Defense should not attempt to fill that role for a project as complex as SSNs.
- EB is fully occupied in terms of building resources on the USN program but they would only need to provide a few experienced engineers for this role.
- they have done this role before successfully with BAE Barrow, who at first performed poorly on the Astutes.
- since BAE are in Adelaide it is quite likely they will get the RAN SSN build contract. EB would be a much more knowledgeable oversee of their work than Defence could possibly be.
- as BAE Adelaide and Defence gain experience, EBs role could be wound back. But even then, it would be useful to have a skilled third party to verify the quality of Australian SSN work. It is hardly something we should leave to chance.
- even if this added 5% to costs, it would be cheap insurance given the cost and critical importance of the project.
- in practice, EBs involvement in UK reduced costs. Fewer mistakes means less costly rework.
- to be clear, I suggest that Defence should appoint a supervising engineering contractor (EB) regardless of whether Australia selects the Virginia or Astute design.
Pete
I take it you have read the two articles about the AUKUS negotiations in the SMH Saturday and Sunday.
These are
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/radioactive-inside-the-top-secret-aukus-subs-deal-20220510-p5ak7g.html
And
https://www.smh.com.au/national/aukus-fallout-double-dealing-and-deception-came-at-a-diplomatic-cost-20220513-p5al95.html
I will leave the political debate over rights and wrongs to others but note some important negotiation details reported here:
- getting bipartisan political support in USA (Democrat and Republican) and Australia (Liberal and Labor) was an important pre-requisite before Biden would agree to AUKUS.
- US NPT officials felt use of the French SSN option would breach the NNPT.
- Boris Johnson offered for UK to build (full?) SSNs for Ausralia
“ The British were keen to proceed. Johnson even told Morrison that the UK would be prepared to build nuclear-propelled subs for Australia.”
- Morrison reportedly saw this as his preferred approach:
“ Morrison started to think of a British sub - smaller than the American nuclear-powered subs (SSNs) - as the working model for Australia’s fleet. The British also have a different training system for submariners to the Americans. It would be useful to be able to learn from two nations.”
Thanks Anonymous [at May 15, 2022, 6:57:00 PM]
Truth to tell my Google widget that routinely picks up any article that even makes one mention of "submarine" failed to pick up the 2 Peter Hartcher articles that each have many "submarine" mentions.
Those Hartcher articles being, as you've pointed out:
May 14, 2022's "Radioactive: Inside the top-secret AUKUS subs deal: Secret meetings and subterfuge over many months shored up Australia’s “40-year fantasy” of a mighty nuclear marriage with the US and the UK"
at https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/radioactive-inside-the-top-secret-aukus-subs-deal-20220510-p5ak7g.html
AND
May 15, 2022's "AUKUS fallout: double-dealing and deception came at a diplomatic cost"
at https://www.smh.com.au/national/aukus-fallout-double-dealing-and-deception-came-at-a-diplomatic-cost-20220513-p5al95.html
1. I agree with the points you make adding building the Aukus subs in the US or UK may be the only way to deliver them in under 2 decades.
2. As the May 21 2022 Election becomes distinctly "cost of living" the likely AU$200+ Billion (noting soaring inflation) cost of the decades long Aukus subamrine program may become distinctly unpopular with voters.
3. Labor's chief, Albanese, has accepted the Aukus sub decision. However, with Labor likely to win the May 21 Election the Aukus sub decision is a ticking time bomb that could wreck Labor unity, expediting a 3 year, one Labor term in office.
Concerning the 2 lengthy Peter Hartcher, Sydney Morning Herald, articles below.
Unfortunately they've come at the wrong time for me to analyse and comment on in any depth. "Wrong time" being buried in this pre-Electoral week of distraction, noise and drama in Australia.
Particularly if "Albo", ie. Labor, wins on May 21, 2022, the two articles below will be informed by a different defence policy approach than the one agreed by Morrison with AUKUS partners.
So I'll hold off commenting on the articles till May 23, 2022, if not later if the Election is so close that pre-poll and postal votes are still being counted to get a definitive result.
_____________________
The 2 articles being:
May 14, 2022's "Radioactive: Inside the top-secret AUKUS subs deal: Secret meetings and subterfuge over many months shored up Australia’s “40-year fantasy” of a mighty nuclear marriage with the US and the UK"
at https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/radioactive-inside-the-top-secret-aukus-subs-deal-20220510-p5ak7g.html
AND
May 15, 2022's "AUKUS fallout: double-dealing and deception came at a diplomatic cost"
at https://www.smh.com.au/national/aukus-fallout-double-dealing-and-deception-came-at-a-diplomatic-cost-20220513-p5al95.html
Pete
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