"
When a Russian naval task force appeared to our north at the
time of the Brisbane G20, I was told that neither of our two deployed
submarines could shadow it. They simply
couldn’t get there in time.
It was a
stark reminder of the limitations of a strategic deterrent comprising just six
conventional submarines of which two are in deep maintenance, two are in
training, with only two available at any one time – and limited by an
underwater cruising speed of just 10 knots.
...The whole
point of the next submarine acquisition was to avoid the problems of the
Collins – to find the submarine that could be brought swiftly into service with
the least possible modifications – but what we have done so far risks an exact
repetition.
We’ve based
our proposed sub on an existing design but one that will need to be so
extensively reworked that it’s effectively a brand new submarine and our
intention is to build it entirely in Australia.
...A unique
Australian boat is precisely what we wanted to avoid; but it’s exactly what we
now face because of our insistence on a submarine that as well as being large,
and long-range, was also conventionally powered.
The
competitive evaluation process conclusively showed that there’s no such thing
currently in existence. All the
submarines on which the bids were based are excellent for their countries’
needs – but none, it seems, for ours.
The Japanese
sub lacked range.
The German
sub lacked size.
And the
French sub lacked conventional power.
But instead
of changing what we wanted, we’ve decided – again – to bring an orphan
submarine into being.
Instead of
taking a small Swedish submarine designed for the Baltic and seeking to double
its size and range to make it suitable for the Pacific – as with the Collins –
this time we’re proposing to take a French nuclear submarine and completely
redesign it to work with conventional propulsion.
...The resulting
sub will have less power, less range, less speed and less capability than the
existing submarine on which it’s based and it will come into service about a
decade later than would be optimal at a time when strategic circumstances are
changing against us.
Hence the
basic question: why should we spend years designing a sub that’s inferior to
one we could potentially have now?
...a conventional sub takes at least a
fortnight to go from Australia to the South China Sea through which passes more
than 50 per cent of our trade.
...I stress: I
do not want to interrupt the process of acquiring new submarines given that it
had languished for so long.
The design
process with DCNS should continue and so should the build if that remains our
fully considered assessment of what’s best."
Next week Submarine Matters will republish Abbott's comments on the need for Australia to acquire "regionally superior" NUCLEAR attack submarines.
