Where have the Indonesian Kilo submarines gone?

Several countries operate Kilos - main users being India (pictured), China, and of course Russia.

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The various planners of Australia's future submarine project (known as "SEA 1000") are researching the current and future capabilities of submarines and anti-submarine forces in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. As Australia's nearest neighbour capable of fielding submarines Indonesia is of close interest.
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Indonesia currently has two HDW 209s (Type 1300) of the Cakra Class. These are KRI Cakra and KRI Nanggala, both were launched around 1977 and entered Indonesian service in 1981. Both boats have been non-operational for long periods since 1981. Cakra had a refit in South Korea in 2006 so should be in good condition for a few years. The condition of Nanggala is unknown.

Submarines have a limited service life of usually 30 years or less. This is due to salt water induced corrosion, expansion/contraction causing metal fatigue, other technical problems and obsolescence compared to other submarines. The latter is particularly regarding stealthy characteristics (eg. acoustic noise). So Indonesia has been casting around for replacements for her 30 year old subs.

Indonesia's non-aligned status, experience receiving Russian arms in the 1960s and a generous offer in 2007 from Russia set Indonesia in the direction of buying Russia's reliable Kilo submarine at a cheap upfront price. Presumably Russia would recoup the low selling price by padding out the deep service, upgrade and spare part costs during the Kilo's service life.

In 2007 the head of the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Hugh White, said a Kilo submarine purchase would "significantly complicate" Australia's naval planning as they would represent a real threat to surface warships. "These are Russia's highest quality conventional boats; they would significantly increase Indonesia's capability," he said. "It is most strategically significant for Australia; if there was any conflict with Indonesia these submarines would massively complicate the use of Australian surface ships." [Australian Navy Admirals see this as overstating the potential threat from Kilos].

In 2007 Russia agreed to extend a $1.2 Billion line of credit to Indonesia to buy Russian weapons including two Kilos. However information on this deal no longer appears making one suspicious that it has lapsed.

Lapsed because Russia probably cannot afford to extend the credit. The sub-prime crisis and consequent drop in the price of oil (Russia's main export) has moved Russia from an oil boom economy in 2007 to being cash strapped in 2009.

Indonesia probably still wants the Kilos (they would probably be cheaper up front than competitors) but Indonesia can't currently afford to pay for them. Russian credit is required because the World Bank or other western or Chinese banks won't finance Indonesia to buy Russian arms.

Supporting the theory of a postponement of the Russian deal is this article from Jane's, July 31, 2009:

"Indonesia's plan to procure at least two diesel-powered submarines has been delayed by two years owing to insufficient defence procurement funds, a senior Indonesian defence official has announced.

Rear Marshal Eris Herryanto, the Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) director general for defence facilities [procurement] was quoted by state media as saying on 29 July: "Although the government will increase the funding allocation by 20 per cent in the 2010 state budget, the increase is not enough to purchase ... submarines and new jet-fighters."

[Herryanto] added: "We will continue to study producers [of submarines] from countries from where we would purchase [them] but we will not [be able to] realise it in the near future because the purchase is postponed until 2011."

Is Indonesia merely holding off to get the best deal from competing supplier nations?
RIA Novosti, August 11, 2009 reported:

"Russia has been shortlisted for a $700 million contract to deliver two submarines to Indonesia, the Indonesian Navy commander said on Tuesday.

"Of the four bidders for the submarines, Russia and South Korea have reached the final round, passing France and Germany," Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno said.

Russia's bid is the Project 636 diesel-electric submarine (export agent Rosoboronexport) while South Korea's is the U-209 [HDW 209 variant] sub manufactured by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering under German license.

"One of the principal conditions [of the contract] is, among other things, the transfer of technology," Purdijatno said.

The successful bidder is expected to be named by the end of August [2009 - we'll see].
The Indonesian defense minister has said the submarines are to be delivered in 2011"

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Comment

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The RIA Novosti article contradicts the flow of previous information. RIA Novosti is implying that the 2007 Kilo offer was never a done deal and that Russia in competition with three other countries is bidding for an Indonesian tender. All very puzzling.

$700 million ($350 million per boat) is a remarkably low price for two Kilos. This may indicate that Russia may still be offering credit or that Russia wants to simply offer operation or reserve Kilo's from its own navy (ie. significantly or slightly used). Used boats generally need to be upgraded.

It may be significant that Russia is replacing the Kilo Class with the Lada Class conventional submarine. Ladas are highly advanced developments of the Kilo. A re-equipment of the Russian conventional fleet may present Indonesia with the opportunity to acquire two slightly used Kilos cheaply.

However as India has discovered upgrading Kilo's is a complex, frustrating and expensive business taking years. Indonesia, without India's industrial base, would need to rely heavily on Russia to do any upgrades, probably in Russia. This would make the $700 million (if it is an upfront cost) a very small part of the overall cost - BEFORE Indonesia receives modernised boats.

Basically Russia can provide an attractive upfront cost but that advantage is frequently lost on upgrades costs and poor after sale service.

If Indonesia is operationally and technically satisfied with its existing HDW 209s then South Korea's U-209s [HDW 209 variants] may be a better choice in terms of continuity.

Background on Indonesia's Navy
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Information drawn from this site dated 1992 is useful:

The Indonesian Navy became a separate service in 1946, after the Indonesian National Revolution (ejecting the Dutch) began. It was initially stocked primarily with craft once operated by European or the Australian navies. Beginning in 1959, the navy began to acquire a large number of craft from the Soviet Union and East European nations.

In the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup, however, the navy suffered a decline in influence within the armed forces and the nation because of suspected involvement in the coup attempt (particularly by the marine corps) and because of its small size in comparison with the army.

A large portion of its vessels of Soviet or East European origin were quickly rendered non-operational owing to a lack of spare parts and maintenance expertise. Until the late 1970s, the only major replacements were four frigates acquired from the United States Navy in 1974.

Since that time, the navy has embarked on an upgrading program designed to develop a balanced fleet suited to operations in archipelagic waters. The navy's mission was to act as a territorial force responsible for the patrol of Indonesia's immense coastline. The vast majority of operational ships are stationed at the main naval base at Surabaya, East Java. Whereas the 1970s saw an increase in the fleet's ship inventory, the 1980s witnessed a major effort to improve the navy's armament posture through the purchase of the Harpoon weapons system and the MK-46 torpedo.

Structurally, the navy comprises the headquarters staff at Jakarta under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet commands (the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya, the Western Fleet in Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military sealift command.

In the early 1990s, naval warships generally were not deployed to a particular region but were grouped in mobile flotillas, to be dispatched where needed. One mission concerned patrolling the strategic straits through which foreign ships enter and exit the Indian Ocean, particularly the Strait of Malacca. The other mission centered on halting smuggling and illegal fishing, considered to be problems particularly in the areas near the Natuna Islands and in the seas between Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. In support of the second mission, the navy announced plans to construct a number of limited-role bases in isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national territory. Patrol activity also increased in connection with the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia, particularly in the area near the Natuna Islands.

Some of Indonesia's admirals have visions of the Indonesian Navy consisting of "10 submarines and 260 surface ships in the longer term." Ten submarines are clearly -unrealistic given the difficulty in buying two.
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Indonesia's main naval priorities are probably anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, refugee boat interception, and protecting territorial boundaries and undersea oil claims against neighbours like Malaysia. This suggests low intensity conflict patrol boats of 100 to 500 tons should represent the vast bulk of surface ships.
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This list of Indonesia Navy vessels is useful. It indicates that its frigates are 40 to 50 years old and many corvettes around 30 years.
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The most recent major acquisitions appear to be:

- the four modern, Dutch built (Sigma) corvettes of the Diponegoro Class commissioned between July 2007 and March 2009 and consisting of KRI Diponegoro, KRI Hasanuddin, KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda and
KRI Frans Kaisiepo.

- four KRI Makassar Class landing platform dock ships each displacing around 11,000 tons full load and able to take 5 helicopters.

- Dated but also significant was the Indonesian purchase in 1992 of 16 ex East German Parchims anti-submarine corvettes now given the Indonesia classification Kapitan Patimura Class.

Submarines provide a relatively inexpensive (asymmetric) way to undertake blue water (open ocean) tasks. Their stealth makes up for the raw combat power of more numerous surface ships (which are greater in tonnage and cost). As with Australia Indonesia's submarines would represent the major means of middle (major war) to high (nuclear) intensity warfare as well as peacetime intelligence gathering.
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Indonesia's current HDW 209s and possible future Kilos are thought to be no match for the six larger Australian Collins Class SSKs but 209s and Kilos would be a major threat to surface shipping.
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Pete