Inspired by Bureaucratus Lex's June 11, 2022 comment I, in contrast, think the following:
AUSTRALIAN AUKUS PROGRAMS OUT TO THE 2070s:
This starts with the Collins Life of Type Extension (LOTE) to be done by ASC from 2026 to 2035 on the 6 Collins. Sweden's Saab will probably assist, in part due to Saab's experience updating Sweden's Gotland-class subs (with many similarities to the Collins). Lockheed Martin might also assist updating the Collins' Combat System hardware, eg. introducing optronic masts.
The LOTE will be:
- extensive eg. replacing the existing problematic diesels with MTU diesels, and
- expensive. probably between 1.5 to 2 A$Billion per Collins.
Still compared to the 12 to 15 year delay acquiring "interim" submarines (which would be below Australia's long range-endurance-at speed-large crew needs) the LOTE is the only viable way to avoid a manned submarine gap.
This LOTE will mean 5 Collins in service up to 2034 - then steadily down 1 every 2 years to 1 Collins in service until 2043. These Collins will also benefit from the vast amount of computer, subsonic Tomahawk and perhaps hypersonic missile technologies discussed under AUKUS.
INTERIM CAPABILITIES
By 2030 very large semi-Autonomus UUVs, under AUKUS "undersea capabilities" will have matured to be a useful Australian unmanned weapons system type. A major example is the now grown to 80 tonnes Orca AUVs (already with a 7,000nm range and getting longer). Orcas will do much of the Collins' intelligence gathering job, like towed array sonar and can be part weaponised with smart mine laying. Orcas could be launched from the Northwest Cape Point Murat pier, significantly shortening transit routes to operational tasks.
Also Australian and shared Australian-US ASW and anti-ship assets can do many submarine jobs. Assets like P-8s, large UAVs, satellites, warships and fixed undersea sensors.
All the above weapons and sensor platforms, UUVs, hypersonic, "counter-hypersonic" missiles and fixed sensors will be recipients of the artificial intelligence and quantum technologies under AUKUS.
AUKUS SSNs
All this during acquisition of:
- Virginia Block VIs or VIIs from the 2040s
or
- UK SSN(R)s from the late 2030s if Australian money speeds up UK plans. Aus SSN(R)s can fit Lockheed Martin integrated US AN/BYG-1 Combat Systems) that the RAN is already using.
Noting much US compatible Combat System software (including databases and sensor views) are already aboard UK nuke subs sharing the Atlantic with the USN sub force. US weapons on Aus SSN(R)s can also be worked out.
Australia can operate Orcas and these SSNs out to the 2070s. From Aus SSN contracts being signed to the 2070s Australia will need to increase defence spending from the current 2% of GDP to 3%.
Thats the
plan. Some context see
11 comments:
So.....if Australia ends up going for some kind of interim SSK capability, how would the Japanese Soryu class (with LiB) shape up for that?? Mainly thinking that with their continuous build strategy they could either build them in Japan, or provide blocks / components for ASC to put together in Adelaide??
Hi Anonymous [at Jun 13, 2022, 1:11:00 PM]
My article isn't talking about interim SSKs however much they look like a silver bullet:
So if you read my article...
I am talking about
- undertaking the LOTE ie. extending the lives of better SSKs, the Collins, than Soryus/Taigeis. Those Japanese SSKs would take 15 years (ie. 2037) to redesign and produce for Australia and be less capable than the Collins.
Which is why I AM talking about, if you read my article...
about very large unmanned underwater vehicles, particularly the 80 tonne version of the Orca and all the weaponised platforms and sensors as the INTERIM capabilities
until Australia can, maybe, obtain SSNs in the late 2030/mid 2040s.
Hi again Anonymous: A SECRET "LAW" OF SSN HISTORY
It is relevant that the principal reason that ALL countries (US, Russia, UK, France, China and India) have launched/leased SSNs
is to protect their nuclear tipped ballistic missile firing SSBNs. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic_missile_submarine
So without an AUSTRALIAN SSBN protection intention Australian SSNS won't represent value for money.
The money being A$200 Billion in 2022 dollars ballooning to A$500 Billion, counting inflation, that these SSNs will cost through to the 2070s.
What's the Opportunity Cost of spending that A$500 Billion elsewhere in the defence and civilian sectors?!
Regards Pete
Pete
I don't doubt the secret law (SSNs justify SSBNs), but equally I am suspicious of large round numbers like "$200 billion" or "$500 billion" as the cost of SSNs. It is less.
You could buy the entire UK or French nuclear sub industry (shipyards, SSN and SSBN programs) for less than that. The total cost of the Dreadnought program (including design and shipyard upgrades) is 31 billion pounds ($54 billion Au). You can buy BAE (world wide, all divisions) for $47 billion Au. Naval Group is worth less.
The more I see such numbers, the more I am convinced that Defence does not understand the real cost of SSNs, and is guessing, stating large numbers for budgeting simply so they have some wriggle room in case of future cost overruns. The danger is it leads to overspend and waste.
I increasingly think one of the things we need to get to the bottom of this issue is transparency - detailed, honest reporting of project costs by Defence. They don't want to do it because it enables reviewers to see more easily when costs blow out. We need reporting like this:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf
The Rand corporation analysis of Australian shipbuilding found there was a cost premium for Australian built. But it was about 30%, not double. Likewise some of the supporting costs are less than assumed. ARPANSA costs about $30 million per year to operate. You could double it in size for $30 million.
Whereas the ASPI Defence cost report recently stated Defence was spending about $150 million on the SSN task force over 18 months(!). How? Any other department would have to tender an amount that size. It sounds like a slush fund to hide Defence salaries and consultant fees.
Hi Anonymous [at Jun 14, 2022, 10:03:00 AM]
The A$200 Billion (2022 dollars):
- recognises that unlike the UK (with 63 years of running nuclear sub programs) Australia is starting almost from scratch
- covers Aus SSN operations out to the 2070s
- construction of Aus SSNs
- infrastucture improvements to Adelaide shipyard
- infrastucture improvements to Fleet Base West
- construction of an East Coast Nuke Sub Base
- a whole new university equivalent training of 1,000s of Aus nuclear sub scientists, builders, other techos and submariners
Australia, the UK and US are now experiencing significant inflation, which may mean A$200 Billion (2022 dollars) will inflate to A$500 Billion (2070s dollars)
Pete
It seems that Australians and Japanese dream of a different 'vision of the future'.
https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/enecho/denryoku_gas/genshiryoku/kakushinro_wg/pdf/001_08_00.pdf
https://xtech.nikkei.com/atcl/nxt/column/18/00001/06917/
Hi Pete
An opinion from a French guy with MN exemple
The biggest problem in my opinion is the people . The rest is a matter of time and money
Submariners : 8 N subs means at least 5 operational with 2 crews (to maintain 220 to 280 days posture at sea and shore training/time off.100 p. crewX10 means typically 1000 people and a graduation rate of about 250 people/year..A tough call for motivated , technical graduates,very average paid, with the right physico/psycho profile. The US Navy and the French MN deploys a lot of effort.Not obvious . (in The US special naturalization pathway ? may be a rumour). This explain the trend toward reduced crew and female submariners
Engineers: allow long term careers for engineers in the yards, in the subcontractors , incl Nuclear,and in the maintenance probably 15000people directly. This is one of the reason Naval ,(but as well, other Fr suppliers such as Dassault , MBDA,Airbus Helo ect keep exporting. Insure a steady flow of engineering projects to keep the R§D and Infrastrucure people
Hi Anonymous [at Jun 14, 2022, 2:38:00 PM]
The 2 documents you've provided don't indicate much.
Can you find better documents (not a pdf in Japanese thanks) to better prove your point.
This may help you https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/06/japanese-nuclear-propulsion-1-mutsu.html
Pete
Thanks Anonymous [at Jun 14, 2022, 9:45:00 PM]
You present very useful information on the enormity of nuclear training effort required to support a nuclear submarine navy.
I'll do an article on French nuclear submarine issues soon.
Regards Pete
Pete
This 2019 article may be of interest on the French Suffren SSN program. It gives reasonable detail on the systems and amount of system testing to get an SSN fully operational.
https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/focus-france-s-next-generation-ssns
Thanks French Anonymous [at Jun 15, 2022, 11:31:00 PM]
For https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/focus-france-s-next-generation-ssns 2019 article
1. That article shows what huge undertakings SSN construction and operation are.
2. The crew number requiremets and all the personnel training costs will be:
- vastly larger for 8 two x 100+ crew AUKUS SSNs
- compared to 6 two x 63 crew Suffren-class Barracuda SSNs
3. The article vindicates my Jun 13, 2022, 9:31:00 PM contention, above, that the role of SSNs are:
"First, protection of SSBNs on nuclear deterrent force (FOST) patrols..."
© Mer et Marine https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/focus-france-s-next-generation-ssns
Regards Pete
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