Here and above is a video recorded address by Captain Christopher "Chris" Skinner RAN (Retired) concerning "Nuclear Powered Submarines and other AUKUS technologies for the [Australian Defence Force] ADF." This authoritative and concise presentation was hosted by the Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales, on January 25, 2022.
Up to 19:35 into the Youtube Chris Skinner describes AI, LDUUVs and other AUKUS agreement technologies.
19:35 Chris Skinner begins to discuss the issues and advantages of SSNs.
45:45 - Part of the training of nuclear propulsion scientists, engineers (including engineering officers to serve on SSNs) requires a land based "light" [ie. miniature] nuclear propulsion reactor. Australia's small "OPAL" reactor at Lucas Heights, Sydney, has the wrong characteristics. Australia will need a land based reactor of the type that will actually go into its future SSNs.
49:35 Chris Skinner displays the SSNs for Australia "Nuclear Propulsion Roadmap" below:
- the Collins Life of Type Extension (LOTE) rebuilds to begin 2026
- the first Australian "SSN01" to begin building in 2030, and
- the simultaneous lease of 3 US or UK SSNs by 2036.
Jumping forward in the Youtube
55:10 Question from the floor to Chris Skinner: “You mentioned leasing [nuclear subs] from the UK and US with their own actual crew. Would [those leased nuclear subs] be HMAS, HMS or USS?
55:28 Chris Skinner “No they’d by USS and HMS. They’d be commissioned boats of that country, which we are paying for them to base in Western Australia [Australia’s main submarine base at HMAS Stirling aka Fleet Base West, just south of Perth] and to offer training billets in those submarines for Australian submariners to achieve the qualifications we need for our own nuclear submarines.
Jumping back in the Youtube
51:45 Chris Skinner says:
“If, as I think we
will, go with the UK Astute class” “It figured, by the way pretty heavily, [in the AUKMIN Talks Joint Statement January 21, 2022 see paragraphs 5 and 6]. Its right up front in the
Joint Ministerial Statement."
"The Astute has a number of advantages. Its smaller
crew.
It runs to a UK culture which the Australian Navy still follows etc.
We expect that the UK would build the reactor and the propulsion plant. That’s
all the after part of the submarine.
The US would build the Combat System gear
and probably
why not get Lockheed Martin to rollover from the Attack-class to
building these,
and we put it all together and assemble it in South Australia.
That’s doable."
56:04 Chris Skinner “I’m not insisting on Chatham House Rules”
1:01 Chris Skinner words
to the effect - extra diesel submarines for Australia (in addition to the
Collins LOTE process) are a distraction which has been ruled out at the highest
levels in Canberra. We have other ways of dealing with the force structure. [Chris may
be implying part interim Australian use of LDUUVs, ASW surface ships and ASW aircraft...to fill any perceived submarine gap.]
1:04:07 Question from the
floor to Chris Skinner: What of “the media reporting that the US and the US
don’t have nuclear submarines to lease”
Chrs Skinner response to the effect Money,
time and strategic need would make it possible. The SSN purchase process is not determined by elections but
money to submarine building companies like BAE, talks.
--------------------------
In much more detail Here is the RUSI NSW's "INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS [of Chris Skinner's address [PDF 4 pages] The Significance of the Tri-Partite AUKUS Agreement A paper based on a presentation to the Institute in Sydney on 25 January 2022 by Captain Christopher Skinner, RAN (Retired).
8 comments:
BENEATH THE OCEAN WAVES - AUKUS
Hello Pete
Good to see somebody in the know (Captain Skinner) speaking about :
(a) the UK having a leg up over the US in the race to secure any RAN
contract to build Australia’s first nuclear powered submarines
(due to the UK reliance on smaller crews for its own SSNs, the
similar scale of their future submarine forces and the closeness
of RAN/RN naval cultures);
(b) the benefits of the RAN simultaneously leasing multiple UK (else
US) nuclear submarines to prepare the RAN to operate its own SSNs;
(c) the need for hands-on SSN training to kickoff sooner, not later;
(d) the wisdom (and partial recovery of sunk costs) of rolling over
LMA as the combat system, sensors and weapons integrator (from
the cancelled Shortfin Barracuda project);
(e) the option to structure Australia's future UWW force with -say-
many LDUUVs and ASW aircraft, rather than fewer AIP submarines,
for appropriate second tier UWW missions; and
(f) the pragmatism (and programmatic good sense) in the UK building
the whole aft of the RAN's eight submarines (i.e. the reactor
and machinery) that would be joined with Australian built SSN
front ends in Adelaide.
Australian political realities would likely demand that the UK 'return
the favour' by importing the entire front end of its own next eight SSNs
from (a BAe yard in) Australia.
What would have been nice to know was Captain Skinner's views on the quid
pro quo (if any) for Australia for importing so much expensive kit from
the old blighty.
By melding together the future SSN forces of the UK and Australia, in a
way that the US congress would recoil from if the Biden administration
was rash enough to even float the idea, Barrow in Furnace (sic) could have
a production run of sixteen identical SSN (back ends) and Australia would
crank out sixteen identical SSN (front ends).
With -say- 18 months between each SSN being laid down, the RN/RAN would
gain the much desired continuous build ( or 'drum beat' in UK parlance )
needed to retain critical naval construction skills.
One niggling concern may be Captain Skinner's reference to a land based SSN
training reactor (i.e. a traditional naval PWR). Rather than engage in the
protracted 'lawfare' that would flow from trying to agree where to build a
shore based PWR in Australia, it may be better to send Australian 'nukes' to
be trained alongside their RN colleagues in the UK.
As quid pro quo - Australia could take responsibility for training RN/RAF
crews for other tasks (eg. establish a joint RAF/RAAF P-8A OCU in Adelaide
and relocate RM jungle warfare training to north Queensland etc. etc.).
As you have noted: "Money, time and strategic need would [indeed] make it all
possible".
BUREAUCRATUS LEX APR 7 2022
Pete
Thanks! I have taken a screenshot of the program, which I can email you if you email me.
Lex makes a number of key points such as the need to avoid this land based reactor protoype thing (unlike India, Australia's case is different in terms of access to technology, India had no choice but to use the Russian 'Show me' to learn the ropes)
However, to me, the niggling question(s) we have been discussing for the past 5 years still persists,
1. While time and will can solve many issues, I cannot logically see how BAE can realistically add a line at Barrow In-Furness in light of the facility needed for the Dreadnought class and the fact that extra nuclear engineers don't grow on trees. The first question remains, how will BAE add a SSN line for RAN Astutes in a timely manner?
2. Costs: Besides time and will, money can solve issues is a line that gets trotted out repeatedly, but at what cost? 8-10 Astutes? At a base cost of AUD 5-6 billion per boat at the cheapest? and possibly higher. Not to mention, potential running costs of over AUD 100 billion over 30 year lifecycle for fleet of 8 Astutes for instance. Sample running costs based on US CBO 2019 are attached for reference.
https://news.usni.org/2019/10/10/cbo-navys-next-nuclear-attack-submarine-could-cost-5-5b-a-hull
Then there is this
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/leak-reveals-first-details-of-australias-new-aukus-submarine/
I hope to goodness this is someone's bad idea of a 'trial balloon' and the powers to be in Canberra are not thinking of this contraption, 'nuclear Collins' as I call it...this only means delays and complications substantially worse than the kerfuffle we saw with the Frenchies...goodness gracious... the current dispensation is incapable of organizing a piss-up at a Foster's brewery
GUNS AND BUTTER 101
Hello Pete
Regarding GhalibKabir's perceptive remarks on the (limited) SSN production capacity of Barrow in the UK, it may be that a detailed analysis of SSN production bottle necks is well underway in the bubbling hell pits of Russell Hill and the haunted cloaca of Whitehall.
The APS and naval JOs initially tasked with quickly counting the ceiling beams on the Devonshire Dock Hall might, in time, also be asked to use critical path analysis tools to propose -say- three different ways of getting SSNs into RAN service without too many Australian Department of Finance officials defenestrating themselves in the budget and out-years.
The key to solving the problem may well be a tad too radical for "leadership" to give their own unbiased consideration to; i.e. the regularly canvassed idea of building 16 "aft hulls" (with reactor compartment) in the UK and 16 matching "front hulls" (with the fin) in Australia.
This approach requires a level of trust between the UK and Australia, as naval allies, that is not likely to be achieved between any other two first world countries.
It addresses the problems of time and cost by avoiding any need to -say- double the size of the building halls at Barrow in order to double SSN production capacity there.
It obviates the need for Australia to pour capex into pointlessly duplicating existing UK facilities.
Longer production runs (all other things being equal) make for increased efficiencies, hence lower costs, for the same output. Building sixteen advanced SSNs to a common design is a very big deal in any country - excluding China and the USA.
It halves the time taken to crank out 16 new SSNs, by splitting the work between the different BAe construction yards in two different hemispheres; i.e. if Barrow can build one complete SSN every three years it could be able to build two "aft hulls" in the same period of time. Over the same three year period, BAe in Australia would build two "front hulls". The two yard's product would become HMS Bulldog and HMS Bollocks for the UK and HMAS Bilby and HMAS Bottersnike for Australia - once the four halves were welded together (etc !).
BUREAUCRATUS LEX APR 8 2022
Hi Ghalib and the inimitable BUREAUCRATUS LEX
I shall respond to thee in more detail on the morrow.
All is up in the air thus far:
- with Dutton making it up as he goes along, and
- ScoMo floating overseas builds with the more expensive propulsion half of a UK or US designed sub being built in those countries, whatever happens.
Speaking for mine self, I'm currently negotiating a new car buy for less than
AU$1 Billion.
Cheers Pete
My compliments to Ghalib and BUREAUCRATUS LEX for their comments, which fit my own understanding of Chris Skinner's presentation.
From a purely engineering viewpoint, I think a joint SSN construction enterprise between UK and Australia, with SSN front sections built in Adelaide and reactor/propulsion built in Barrow is feasible and mutually beneficial. This is consistent with the modular approach to construction used for both the Astute and Barrow Classes.
The evening out of workflow to two long term, more consistent and predictable programs that can more easily retain skilled people. Even the huge USN Virginia Class program has found it beneficial to share work on SSN modules between the EB and HI yards. I don't see why we would not do the same.
Modern heavy lift ship capabilities make transporting the hull sections easily feasible. The RAN has already used distributed ship module construction in the AWD program. Whilst full of errors, the lessons learnt in AWD can be applied to SSNs. The Adelaide engineering industry fully uses digital engineering now, which means the same techniques can flow from Barrow to Osborne.
That only leaves cost sharing. That should be possible too, because the Attack Class cost had grown so great ($90 billion Aus construction plus >$100 billion sustainment) that was already more expensive than the entire Astute program, including design, construction and infrastructure. Even if we pay UK half the design cost for the Astute or SSNR (not unreasonable), allowing for inflation and exchange rates that might cost $500 million Aus. That is a bargain compared to the $5.5 billion already spent on design only for the Attack Class.
In the future, if the RN and RAN continue from sharing Astute construction to sharing SSNR construction, sharing development costs will save both navies considerable sums.
So if the Australian government will hurry up and start funding some actual works, this could be a very good solution.
Thanks for your comments Anonymous, Ghalib Kabir and BUREAUCRATUS LEX
There are so many AUKUS sub intangibles, that defy forecasting, particularly:
- who wins the May Election (given ScoMo, expectation he will lose South Australia in the May Election hence he feels comfortable about talking whole build overseas)
- the revised work guidelines the winning Government imposes on the Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce (NPST) eg.
= whole subs built overseas or
= front half built in Australia but not aft reactor propulsion half (which will always be built overseas)
- the findings of the NPST's Public (as against the Secret Aus Fed Gov Eyes only) Report, probably out in JUNE 2023 or later.
- months, even years of negotiations with prospective UK and/or US major contractors
- then Fed Gov Budget Forecasts from 2025 onwards but not before
- the profit margin that UK and US companies expect
- the likely inflation rates being higher than what Australia has been used to these past 5 years
- the UK RN after the Russia-Ukraine and Putin's nuclear war threats may have None of the 7 RN Astutes that can be leased.
= Chris's hope the UK would lease out 3 Astutes (the UK rule-of-thirds whole operating fleet) was always unlikely to happen. Then an even more aggressive Putin has shown his hand.
- increased Russia threat on top of China threat also making the USN less likely to lease out Virginia's and very unlikely 3.
- inevitable changes/tailoring for an Aus SSN (eg. if we choose UK BA a US/Aus combat system will be fitted that has many differences from a UK combat system)
- the UK SSN program being out of sync with Aus needs. eg. the likelihood that an Astute PWR2 design for Australia late 2030s-on will gradually become an Orphan Sub as the UK RN brings in SSN(R)s with PWR3s or as yet not designed PWR4s
Given the above forcasting becomes a very inexact Art, definitely not a Science.
Regards Pete
Hi Pete and dear all,
Yes, there are intangibles with one certain tangible - namely, the near 100% certainty that Lab or Lib, 'Straya's governing political dispensations are going to play the perfect 'dog in the manger' role ensuring 'any process' involving the SSNs will most likely be a 'dog's dinner' prone to frequent bungles.
Theoretically speaking the solution of dividing the 'fore' and 'aft' manufacture between Osborne and Barrow in Furness is a neat solution (assuming BAE and ASC pull off practical seamless operations ensuring the two pieces of each hull form a perfect fit).
However, I fear the path might end up being steeper and thornier than envisaged. The Ukraine dynamics has ensured that an Aussie SSN crew cannot be trained on an Astute any time soon (unless the RN and RAN decide that it is in the best interest of everyone to place a few RAN personnel on RN SSNs on patrol missions to be trained 'on the fly' rather than wait for the first completed sub from Osborne). Again, this will need a level of cooperation not seen even amongst the allies of the anglosphere - even tighter and broader than the US-UK nuke-SSN relationship.
on that rather doleful note... I take your leave sirs.
PS: Looks like the Indian SSN design might be pushed to completion by 2023 and if Modi III becomes a reality in 2024 then we can expect the 75A SSN hull no.1 to be laid down by 2025.
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