SUMMARY
The following 8 articles refer to "Crypto" encoding-decoding machines made by Swiss company Crypto AG and distributed to 120 customers/countries. All the machines were allegedly compromised for the benefit of some large Western signals intelligence agencies. In 2018, Crypto AG was liquidated but much of its equipment, business associations and corporate culture appear to have been carried over in its descendent companies.
The current descendents of Crypto AG appear to be based in Switzerland and Sweden. If you are a foreign customer for their very expensive encoding-decoding machines you would expect assurance that your private, sensitive messages are not being read by other entities, ie. compromised. For example not being read by those entities who appear to have read the messages of 120 country/customers of Crypto AG since 1970.
The descendent companies may have a credibilty problem owing to Crypto AG's 49-50 year tradition of compromised machines. To restore credibility simple consumer protection arrangements may be inadequate. Actual contracts between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden that are meant to protect the secure-ness of machines sold in Switzerland and Sweden might be more effective than shallow contracts that regular consumers accept when they are buying standard laptops.
The home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and Sweden should protect the machines from having easily penetrated "backdoors or keys" such as hardware or software that expedites breaches by large third party foreign international agencies. Actual contracts between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden should best carry more legal, political and sueable clout than vague "laptop" contracts.
Given the many US$Billions involved in selling machines and the cost of sensitive data/conversations compromised, breaches of contract should be regulated by senior court decisions, eg: international criminal courts. Or in the spirit that American exceptionalism has permitted the US to try foreign leaders and large non-US corporations perhaps China should establish an international criminal court for compromised communications? This might relate to China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardization of January 2020 and this.
This is on the basis the ITU has been unwilling or unable to fine members for long-term breaches of customer-consumer rights. Perhaps 1. below could be called Next of kin of Argentine soldiers and sailors killed who relied on "secure" Crypto AG Machines vs Crypto AG.
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1. Latin America's El Snorkel submarine website reports March 27, 2021:
“The communications of the Argentine Navy were intercepted and decoded by the British during the [1982] Falklands/Malvinas War: The British managed to break Argentina's encryption keys with the help of the United States National Security Agency (NSA)”
During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, Argentine Navy communications were regularly intercepted and decoded by British intelligence at the GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters, as the Crypto AG [see details below] machines used by the Argentine army were not secure.
The GCHQ
learned of the movement of Argentine submarines in the theater of operations,
including the names of the areas in which the ARA San Luis submarine operated.
A [UK] nuclear submarine and frigates were sent to intercept the
Argentine submarine based on this information obtained by intelligence.
The British managed to break Argentina's encryption keys with the help of the United States National Security Agency (NSA).
The communications may have been picked up by listening stations
on Ascension Island, New Zealand, Chile and, according to rumours, by the US
Embassy in Buenos Aires.
A communications interception satellite called the Vortex,
launched in 1981 by the United States, was also used to support the British
during the conflict.
In the image below, is a British report indicating the status of all
Argentine submarines on
April 16, 1982, during the Falklands/Malvinas
War.
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Compromised Crypto AG Machines
2. Separately US website IntelNews March 3, 2020, reported :
Switzerland’s Federal Department of Finance has filed a criminal complaint “against persons unknown” over media reports that a leading Swiss-based cryptological equipment manufacturer was secretly owned by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The complaint relates to Crypto AG, the world’s leading manufacturer of cryptologic equipment during the Cold War, whose clients included over 120 governments around the world. Last month, the Washington Post and the German public broadcaster ZDF appeared to confirm reports that had been circulating since the early 1980s, that Crypto AG was a front for American intelligence. According to the revelations, the CIA and West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) secretly purchased the Swiss company in the 1950s and paid off most of its senior executives in order to buy their silence.
The secret deal, dubbed Operation RUBICON, allegedly allowed the US and West Germany to spy on the classified government communications of several of their adversaries - and even allies, including Austria, Italy, Spain, Greece, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The revelation about the secret deal has shocked Swiss public opinion and embarrassed the government of a nation that bases its national identity and international reputation on the concept of neutrality. For this reason, the Swiss Federal Department of Finance has filed a criminal complaint about the case. The complaint was announced by the Office of the Swiss Attorney General on Monday, following reports in the Swiss media. It said that it received a criminal complaint by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is the part of the Finance Department that authorizes exports of sensitive software or hardware. SECO officials argue that they were deceived into authorizing the export of Crypto AG’s products without realizing they had been compromised by the company’s secret agreement with the CIA and the BND. Accordingly, the secret agreement violates Swiss federal law governing the regulation of exports, SECO officials claim.
The Office of the Attorney General said it would review the criminal complaint and decide whether it warrants criminal proceedings. Meanwhile, a probe into the alleged Crypto AG-CIA-BND conspiracy, which was launched by the Swiss government last month, is already underway, and is expected to conclude in June. The Swiss Federal Assembly (the country’s parliament) is also expected to launch its own investigation into the alleged affair.”
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EXAMPLE OF LATE MODEL CRYPTO AQ MACHINE – SECURITY NOW IN
DOUBT?
3. A January 16, 2020 article reports :
“...Currently, Crypto AG offers the HC-9300 Crypto Desktop, which is a futuristic looking touchscreen device that performs the encryption of telephone, fax, VoIP and e-mail communications. This device is available at least since 2015 and is approved by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to be used for inspections for example.
Maybe the Swiss diplomatic network already uses the HC-9300
to secure its fax messages, but in general, government agencies tend to be
rather conservative and stick to older versions, also because new crypto
equipment has to undergo rigorous testing before it may be used to protect
classified information.”
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“The HC-9300 is based on a seamlessly integrated security
architecture that has already proved its effectiveness in thousands of cases.
Maximum security is therefore ensured for all its applications and security
management procedures. The actual encryption is performed in a separate
hardware module. The encryption process is based exclusively on symmetric and
secret algorithms profiled by your security manager. Multiple keys can be
defined in the system, allowing hierarchically arranged user groups to be set
up. Access to the platform is protected with passwords and identity-based user
accounts to deliver maximum security. All users are granted individual rights
in keeping with their responsibilities and security clearance.”
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5. Feeling of secure-ness may have been put into doubt by many February 2020 onwards media exposes including The Washington Post’s February 11, 2020’s article which, in part, states:
"Crypto’s products are still in use in more than a dozen countries around the world, and its orange-and-white sign still looms atop the company’s longtime headquarters building near Zug, Switzerland. But the company was dismembered in 2018, liquidated by shareholders whose identities have been permanently shielded by the byzantine laws of Liechtenstein, a tiny European nation with a Cayman Islands-like reputation for financial secrecy.
Two companies purchased most of Crypto’s assets. The first,
CyOne Security, was created as part of a management buyout and now sells
security systems exclusively to the Swiss government. The other, Crypto
International, took over the former company’s brand and international business.
Each insisted that it
has no ongoing connection to any intelligence service, but only one claimed to
be unaware of CIA ownership. Their statements were in response to questions
from The Post, ZDF and Swiss broadcaster SRF, which also had access to the
documents.
"CyOne has more substantial links to the now-dissolved
Crypto, including that the new company’s chief executive held the same position
at Crypto for nearly two decades of CIA ownership.
A CyOne spokesman declined to address any aspect of Crypto
AG’s history but said the new firm has “no ties to any foreign intelligence
services.”
Andreas Linde, the chairman of the company that now holds
the rights to Crypto’s international products and business, said he had no
knowledge of the company’s relationship to the CIA and BND before being
confronted with the facts in this article.
“We at Crypto International have never had any relationship
with the CIA or BND — and please quote me,” he said in an interview."
[In a less than convincing tone of hurt honor, for a hard-nosed businessman, he continues.]
“If what you are saying is
true, then absolutely I feel betrayed, and my family feels betrayed, and I feel there will be a lot of employees who will feel
betrayed as well as customers.”"
6. Did a subsequent corporate rebirth, later in 2020, remove all personnel involved pre-2020 with intelligence agencies? That would be unreasonable in the security industry, no?!
Is there a continued relationship with Swiss or Swedish home/parent signals intelligence agencies or with pre-2020 identified foreign ones? Leopard changing more than spots?
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ACCOUNTABILITY OF PAST & CURRENT CRYPTO AG PROVIDERS
The current descendents of Crypto AG appear to be based in Switzerland and Sweden. If you are a foreign customer for their very expensive encoding-decoding machines you would expect assurance that your private, sensitive messages are not being read by other entities, ie. compromised. For example not being read by those entities who appear to have read the messages of 120 country/customers of Crypto AG for decades (see 2.).
Consumer level equipment assurance, box-ticking, disclaimer, by Crypto AG descendents that the equipment they are selling you is not compromised has been demonstrable inadequate since 1970. A contract between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden might be more to the point.
The accountability of home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and Sweden is because equipment sold in or from their borders should not have easy "backdoors". That is such hardware, software (or wetware employees "in-the-pay-of") that can be breached by large third party foreign international agencies.
In contrast it is understandable that home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies have rights to read messages from or to their borders on national security matters like counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, money laundering (especially kept track of by Switzerland...)(for organised crime, etc) and many other law enforcement uses.
7. Contractural assurance from Switzerland's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) that encoder-decoder equipment sold by Swiss equipment makers is not compromised, may carry more legal, political and sueable clout. For example Switzerland could be sued by international criminal courts. Alternatively as US courts have a history of taking up international disputes could not China (a rapidly growing communications equipment provider) also build a legal structures to handle international equipment disputes? This is presuming the ITU is too toothless, slow and gentlemanly to sue members $USmillions to Billions for gross, long-term, breaches of customer-consumer rights.
8. Equally contractural assurance from Sweden's "NSA" the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) that encoder-decoder equipment sold by Swedish equipment makers is not compromised may carry more legal, political and sueable clout.
8 comments:
Hey Pete, I'm new here (born & raised in NZ) and I'm loving the content on your blog! I don't know much about submarines but I'm eager to learn. So I just have one question that I hope you can answer for me - there's a lot of information out there about Australia's Attack-class but I can't seem to find it conclusively stated one way or the other anywhere, or maybe I'm just bad at looking for stuff...
...that question is this: Does the Attack-class have an AIP module? If it doesn't, then is it planned to have one in the future?
Thank you in advance!
Hi Limitless
I'm glad you like my blog :)
The Attack class submarine is only a "vaporware" design at this stage see https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/ssg so nothing is included yet.
I have not read or seen anything about the main builder/designer, Naval Group, including an AIP module in the Attack class.
It is a future possibility an AIP module may be included by the time the first Attack class is launched, around 2030.
Regards
Pete
Hi Pete,
Off topic, it seems that Poland's single submarine cannot use its torpedoes ORP "Orzeł" without working torpedo armament
/Kjell
@Pete @LimitlessBuzzkill
Its interesting that the subject of AIP has not been publicly discussed with the Attack-Class, but as Pete mentioned, apart from announced industrial awards to suppliers (for example, the batteries have been subcontracted out to PMB Defense), there is still relatively little known about the Attack-class, and it could end up with Naval Group's Fuel Cell AIP.(https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/07/naval-group-achieves-breakthrough-with-its-fc2g-aip-system/)
Interestingly, Kockums did ship a Stirling AIP module to Adelaide for trials while the Collins-Class was being built, but it was never used - primarily as the first generation Stirling AIP simply didn't have the electrical load to recharge the large batteries on a Collins sub quickly, and the Collins, with its batteries and large diesel engines (when they worked) had the ability to only require snorting 'for less than s few minutes every 24 hours'.
Hi /Kjell
Thanks for your Apr 7, 2021, 2:01:00 AM comment.
Re: https://www.defence24.pl/orp-orzel-bez-sprawnego-uzbrojenia-torpedowego "Poland's single submarine cannot use its torpedoes - ORP "Orzeł" without working torpedo armament"
There are even more major problems:
- the Polish Navy needs at least 2 or even better 3 subs.
- Only one 35 year old "Orzel" Kilo SSK https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ORP_Orze%C5%82_(1986) is of little use.
- It will be non-operational even for non-torpedo tubes reasons, including:
Many other repair issues will keep Orzel in port
- need for crew rest and training will keep Orzel docked
- main source of spare parts is Russia,
- Russia just happens to be Poland's main potential naval opponent, so Russia is unlikely to be very helpful
- as Orzel was designed and built in Russia - then Russia will have the whole "dictionary" database of Orzel's sonar and electronic "signatures" in all conditions
- an Orzel Kilo is quite a large sub, it may be ill-suited to many of the shallows, narrows and seabed holes in the Baltic.
Regards
Pete
Hi Shawn C [at Apr 7, 2021, 3:11:00 AM]
Thanks. Some additional points.
It is thought that all of Australia's submarine classes: the old Oberons, current Collins and future Attacks have the type of very long range mission profile that makes AIP (especially heavy LOx tanks and propellent) a hindrance.
eg. Aus subs need to transit (say 3,000nm) quickly (say 10-11kn) to the norther operational areas and (3,000nm) back. In the total 6,000nm transit phases surface travel or snorting is best. So diesels are best for rapid transit during which time AIP would be a dead weight.
More precise ops may mean just 48 hours (slow moving fully submerged) and then run the diesels out of area. China, its surface ships and subs (the opponent that may want to damage an Aus sub even in peace time) may not be usual targets of interest.
So the need for 2 or 3 weeks on AIP may be a very remote 2-3% chance possibility.
Even Japan with its very short transit missions (say Kure, Honshu base to Okinawa) then south for ops, has decided to discard (Stirling) AIP and Japan did not then opt for Fuel Cell or other advanced AIP.
So Japan is returning to greater reliance on diesel and batteries and Austrralia has never diverged from diesel-battery reliance.
- Japan is prepared to achieve high capacity batteries using LIBs technology
- Australia will achieve high capacity batteries through an unusually high tonnage of conventiuonal LABs (for the first batch of 4 Attacks). Maybe Australia will opt for LIBs or other advanced batteries in the second and third batches of 4 Attacks.
If the advanced battery Japanese (and also South Korean) route is the future then Ausralia might never adopt AIP.
Also if Aus was the first customer for Naval Group second or third Gen AIP then Australia might have to wear an unusually high development cost burden. This is because Naval Group's parent navy (France) doesn't have any SSKs to soak up the costs of any Naval Group advanced AIP or advance battery "bright ideas".
If Australia valued Advanced AIP highly Australia would have chosen the TKMS 216 (with its mature already sunk costed Fuel Cell AIP) or the Japanese Soryu with Stirling AIP in 2016.
Regards
Pete
AIP is of limited value to a long range d/e sub where speed is important ( otherwise you can run out of food before you run out of range). AIP works well if you just want to hang around. If you are not careful though, you can find yourself not capable of hanging around because the low speed they can maintain can be less than the prevalent current. AIP is of little value to Australia. Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, different story.
Hi Anonymous [at Apr 11, 2021, 8:03:00 PM]
Yes indeed I agree.
If Australia did ever decide to buy AIP it would be better to be a mature, highly developed, Fuel Cell AIP (no 200m limit). All that points to TKMS' AIP. TKMS won't sell that to Naval Group.
Cheers
Pete
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