Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) continues to be a unique source (or I haven't seen details elsewhere) on problems with the Australia's Attack-class Future Submarine Program.
For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
A problem with a unique source mentioning 6 horizontal torpedo tubes (for Attack-class) is that the information cannot be corroborated (so far) using other sources.
For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
"If [Australia's Defence Department] wanted
to make the task for Naval Group far less costly and risky, they might want to
change their approach to the layout of the torpedo tubes. The Barracuda has a 2
+ 2 arrangement, but the RAN has a fixation on six torpedo tubes in a horizontal
plane. Why this is the case, no one knows – even experienced ex submariners
believe that four torpedo tubes are adequate. That is what the USN Virginia
class attack submarines have. It would also be a considerable cost saving, with
two less active discharge systems, two less handling systems – and a lot more
room in what is a very crowded compartment.
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The Collins submarine's 6 torpedo tube
horizontal arrangement can be seen above. Above the torpedo tube room likely
sits the large Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar (aka "Thales Underwater Systems TSM
2233 Scylla active/passive bow array" (see
page 9)).
---
PETE COMMENT
A problem with a unique source mentioning 6 horizontal torpedo tubes (for Attack-class) is that the information cannot be corroborated (so far) using other sources.
It could be that if the RAN wants to carry over the Collins submarine's "Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar" to the Attack-class then a 2 + 2 torpedo tube arrangement may not be practical. Still, if the Attack class will involve such major differences of torpedo tube and bow sonar arrangements there will be a a major flow of other rearrangements required within the Attack class' interior.
This is on top of all the other Attack-class rearrangements required to fit the 4 to 6 diesel engines, diesel fuel tanks, and compensating seawater ballast tanks etc.
All these Attack-class interior changes mean this class has very little in common with the Barracuda SSN, the purported basis of the Attack-class. The marketing name "Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A" which helped sell the Naval Group concept submarine, is but a redundant memory.
The Australian political narrative that it is Naval Group that has caused over budget, missed deadlines, is inadequate. If the Australian Department of Defence and RAN want major redesigns (like the bow in this case) over budget, missed deadlines are guaranteed. It takes two to Tango.
The Australian political narrative that it is Naval Group that has caused over budget, missed deadlines, is inadequate. If the Australian Department of Defence and RAN want major redesigns (like the bow in this case) over budget, missed deadlines are guaranteed. It takes two to Tango.
Pete
12 comments:
What is the timeline capability for launching those initial 6 torpedoes? IE can launch all 6 at once, must be staggered by 30 seconds, etc.
During a wartime type patrol, would all 6 tubes have active torpedoes in them ready to fire?
Thanks!
It's not good sign to me that they have bought a 'design' and don't know how many donks are going in.
6 tubes seems the only way to go. PLAN will soon be deploying large US style task groups. You are only going to get one chance before you cut and run.
Hi Anonymous [March 17, 2020 at 3:09 PM]
Re your Question:
"What is the timeline capability for launching those initial 6 torpedoes? IE can launch all 6 at once, must be staggered by 30 seconds, etc. During a wartime type patrol, would all 6 tubes have active torpedoes in them ready to fire?"
The Answer is most probably Classified.
And if I knew I wouldn't tell ya :)
Cheers
Pete
With too many cooks , spoiling the broth, it seems that all the buffoonery that befell the Collins is back and as unnecessary as first time around.
Hi Pete,
You placed the emphasis on having the 6 horizontally aligned tubes and the reason i asked the question about launching was along the lines of what Steve had said.
Overall i was wondering if the 6 horizontal tubes is for a type of one shot and leave the area of operations asap
Hi Lee McCurtayne [at March 17, 2020 at 7:24 PM]
So true.
But more cooks and added costs and deadlines ultimately mean more jobs-pay for all involved in project management and building in Navy, ASC and other submarine builders, French unions, French Government = Naval Group, many contractors at all levels in Australia, France and US.
More retirement jobs for RAN + Defence senior and technical officers. And for some luckies, better to live-work in France, than in Germany or Japan.
Everyone is happy except the Australian taxpayer, non-submarine defence sectors and opportunity costs for Australians involved in, or who desperately need, health, education and welfare, etc.
The early Combat System, ultra-expensive, electronic stuffup with the Collins may be equalled by the torpedo room rearrangement (weapons system part of the Combat System) with the Attack-class.
Cheers
Pete
With the Hunter class frigates we know exactly what we are going to get for the money, but it isn’t the case with the Attack Class. All we have is question marks, $80 billion and we start from scratch, apparently no mention of LI, AIP and how many, how many engines, confirmation of pump jet, it just goes on and on. It seem buy the time we start the second sub “She’ll be right” , so 2035 and we still don’t have a “Regionally Superior” Submarine, yes you were right, when the Attack class was picked, the French know how not to deliver.
Hi Lee McCurtayne
While the situation and timelines with the Hunter class may be better than the Attack Class Australia does not "know exactly what we are going to get for the money" with the Hunter class.
Steel was cut on the first UK Type 26 (a new design) on which the Hunter class will be based, only in July 2017, with the first Type 26 expected to enter serice in the mid (perhaps late) 2020s. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_26_frigate
There's a lot that could go technically wrong, overtime, over budget, with a new design (the Type 26) and that could flow on to the Hunter class https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-class_frigate (for which steel may be cut 2021/2022?)
Much of Australia's choice of the Type 26 may be as a down-payment on the nuclear UK alliance - prompting occasional recent UK frigate/detroyer, future QE aircraft carrier and maybe more frequent but more secretive SSN patrols in the seas between Australia and China and in the Indian Ocean.
Also Australia wanted a pre and post Brexit induced discount. Australia again becoming an important trade ally with UK while UK-EU trade diminished a tad.
Pete
Hi Pete,
You can of course put the Torpedo-tubes vertical also. The video has English subtitles it's about the Marine museum's submarine hall.
/Kjell
Hi /Kjell
The US Virginia class, the 4 Ohio SSGNs and some Los Angeles SSNs have Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) (tubes) for Tomahawk missiles. Also some Russian SSGNs for their SLCMs.
A big drawback is that these vertical tubes cannot be rearmed at sea. There is also no scope for selecting missiles, torpedos, mines and UUVs in the same way torpedo rooms (manned or unmanned) can do it.
But a 2,000 ton sub with 30 vertical tubes may become the future system of choice - especially good for cruise (SLCMs) or small SLBMs.
Pete
The Australian predicament seems to illustrate the need to have a suitable platform to demonstrate “RISK” to an enemy or potential naval threat at significant distance. We are experiencing a “Capability Gap” to deter that very threat. I am stating the obvious of course, but if talks could be actioned with our prime ally in procuring a temporary lease of nuclear powered assets, then the national anxiety could be significantly reduced. Deterrence is the greatest of weapons.
Australia would only need two relevant nuclear submarines with full capabilities to put an immediate stumbling block in any plan to threaten our position. Just leasing two “Los Angeles “ class submarines would be a significant threat to any naval force mounting a threat in our region. Those two subs would create a significant message needed while the Attack Classes comes to fruition.
These Subs are gradually being retired and could be a comparable filler while our capability gathers momentum. Stationing them in our waters alone sends a very strong message to anyone contemplating action.
Hi Lee McCurtayne [your February 16, 2021 question]
"Leasing US SSNs" has been a moot point (what we call a furphy) for a decade.
Its not going to happen because:
1. the USN including submarine service repeatedly insist the US needs every SSN (old LA class, Seawolfs, and Virginias) it can keep and retain. So none for allies.
2. The USN sees all its subs as high tech, hence non-exportable, non-leasable weapons, like the F-22.
3. Nuclear reactors don't just stay inert on the shelf. The LA SSN's reactor need 2 years of refueling after about 16 years at a cost of around US1.4 Billion a refuel and major overhaul (of other items). It would be much more expensive for foreign customers, figures haven't even been calculated.
4. If Australia did manage to lease LA SSNs we would still be leasing much US manpower, knowledge and US industrial base
and taking the risk that in times of US national emergency the US wouldn't recall those subs back to the USN to defend the US.
Post a Comment