See former UK Royal Navy nuclear submarine Commander, Robert Forsyth's 's excellent essay of July 31, 2019 at ASPI's The Strategist website, at
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/counting-the-costs-of-an-independent-nuclear-deterrent/
Comment
Inspired by the essay an independent (of France, the UK or US) Australian nuclear deterrent (using submarines) would be totally unaffordable with Australia's much lower technical, financial and personnel resources than the 6 SSBN/SSN powers. And also considering the UK dependently used/uses US designs and build methods for its nuclear (submarine) reactors, all the SLBMs (Polaris through to Trident D5) and the SSBNs and SSNs themselves.
Necessities for an independent Australian nuclear deterrent
- developing (maybe A$200 Billion?) and building 4 ultra modern, discrete, SSBNs, with a SSBN 40
year program life cost of another A$300 Billion?
Would be even more unaffordable for Australia as a whole system of support forces and communications are required, including:
So due to development time and the astronomical figures above an independently developed and built Australian nuclear deterrent using nuclear submarines is impossible.
If Australia were ever to have SSBNs, SLBMs and SSNs they would need to be developed and most probably built overseas, with the only choices being France, the US or UK.
Pete
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/counting-the-costs-of-an-independent-nuclear-deterrent/
Comment
Inspired by the essay an independent (of France, the UK or US) Australian nuclear deterrent (using submarines) would be totally unaffordable with Australia's much lower technical, financial and personnel resources than the 6 SSBN/SSN powers. And also considering the UK dependently used/uses US designs and build methods for its nuclear (submarine) reactors, all the SLBMs (Polaris through to Trident D5) and the SSBNs and SSNs themselves.
Necessities for an independent Australian nuclear deterrent
- developing (maybe A$200 Billion?) and building 4 ultra modern, discrete, SSBNs, with a SSBN 40
year program life cost of another A$300 Billion?
Would be even more unaffordable for Australia as a whole system of support forces and communications are required, including:
- developing and building our own nuclear (submarine) reactors (even France has major problems
doing that), SLBMs, associated space-launch system, nuclear warheads, specialised satellites for
navigation, targeting and communications systems. (A$300 Billion?).
doing that), SLBMs, associated space-launch system, nuclear warheads, specialised satellites for
navigation, targeting and communications systems. (A$300 Billion?).
- a more isolated new west coast Australian base (A$20 Billion?
minimum) or at least heavily rebuilt
submarine base (at HMAS Stirling, Fleet Base West, Rockingham) would be required.
submarine base (at HMAS Stirling, Fleet Base West, Rockingham) would be required.
- due to the distance to Australia’s east coast, strategic redundancy, and possibility
of SSBN or SSN
breakdown a new secondary east coast submarine base may need to be built (being politically
realistic it would probably be in Queensland, A$15 Billion?).
breakdown a new secondary east coast submarine base may need to be built (being politically
realistic it would probably be in Queensland, A$15 Billion?).
This is because the current secondary base in Sydney Harbour would be
unsuitable. This is due to lack of space
(for nuclear submarines AND nuclear weapons) and especially due to reactor leak safety concerns and the inevitable public/political rejection of
nuclear propelled, nuclear armed submarines in the harbour of Australia’s
largest city.
To protect each of the 4 SSBN being rotated an SSN, at least
one surface ship and maritime patrol aircraft would be required.
- this requires (development and building) a force of at least 6 ultra-modern SSNs.(A$500 Billion?)
There would also be consequent huge and growing strains on the
conventional forces of the Australian Navy and also a major drop in financial and
personnel resources for the Australian Army and Air Force.
Conclusion
So due to development time and the astronomical figures above an independently developed and built Australian nuclear deterrent using nuclear submarines is impossible.
If Australia were ever to have SSBNs, SLBMs and SSNs they would need to be developed and most probably built overseas, with the only choices being France, the US or UK.
Pete
6 comments:
SSBN’s in the Australian context is & always has been a non starter. I don’t understand why some people keep raising the idea. Both UK & France struggle to afford their SSBN fleet, such as it is. They are massive subs & massively expensive before you even think about missiles. SSN’s though such as Astute or Baracuda could be attained if you wanted to spend the money. This would get you nuclear propulsion but not nuclear armed. The cheapest way to go nuclear armed is the old fashioned drop bomb or something like the air launched JASSM-ER. This would get you tactical nukes, rather than strategic nukes, but really there is little point to strategic nukes anyway (how many times can you destroy the world).
If you wanted a SSN, the easiest way is Baracuda. Since the hull is basically the same as Shortfin, we could even build it here & ship in the reactor from France (France has even hinted at the possibility). But that is about it. Even then I would not go all SSN. There are things you can do with a SSK that you will struggle to do with a SSN (& vice versa). Personally I would not even look at a Uranium based reactor. Thorium, maybe.
Hi Anonymous
Thanks for your Australian SSBN, SSN, reactor comments.
Yes, the cost of SSBNs and the SSNs (whose main job is to protect SSBNs) are hugely expensive for major powers (UK, France and India) let alone middle powers like Brazil (planning an SSN but struggling) and Australia.
Conventional submarines armed with nuclear tipped cruise or ballistic missiles (hence called SSBs) have always presented an extreme "use your nukes before you are sunk" danger.
An ASW enemy (say India) may just think it is sinking a (say Pakistani) conventional sub rather than starting a nuclear war (once it is realised that Pakistani sub is armed with Babur nuclear tipped cruise missiles). Similarly nuclear armed SSNs present that extreme danger or miscalculation.
Ballistic missiles are the most effective means of a nuclear first or second strike. Other delivery means are too slow, lack range and/or are too easily shot down.
Developing an efficient reactor for submarine is probably the hardest, most expensive, part of nuclear submarine building. UK couldn't afford to develop, so bought/buys US reactor plans and components. France has struggled greatly to develop and build - so, I think, has second rate, frequent need for refuel, reactors. I think China first used Russian reactor plans. India has hired Russian plans and adviser/builders to develop and build India's reactors.
Thorium reactors for submarine would be massive developmental problems that would require huge resources (US, Russia, China only) and then would need to be placed on many subs to achieve economies of scale (amortizing the development costs).
Regards
Pete
A couple of prowling SSNs as part of a Canberra Class led battle group might not be a bad idea, for the rest best to get ocean going LIB or PEMFC DE subs that can also take care of outer EEZ and Inner EEZ patrolling (Barracuda DE complementing Barracuda SSN, ideally HEU fueled, with common sense exception made for fondly held NPT related ideology at Canberra)
I for one still think a stretched A26 or U214 would have made much better sense...proven models and especially the PEMFC is useful thing to have...quick to get and deploy too
SSBNs are prohibitively expensive and for Australia frankly not needed. For us in India sadly we have to deal with a rogue terrorist nuke power on our west and an intractably opposed and bullying China to the east.
Hi GhalibKabir (Aug 16)
Given the high price of SSNs the international trend is they are justifiable as friendly SSBN protecters and enemy nuclear sub killers. It is evident that Brazil hasn't managed to build its long awaited SSN because it has no known pro or anti nuclear submarine roles.
For Australia? Having just 2 SSNs to escort/clear the way for Canberra Class LHD battle groups is the kind of role even india could not justify to build SSNs. I would say, in 1999 the mainly Australian INTERFET East Timor liberation flotilla https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Force_East_Timor#Military_operations was part protected from the Indonesians by an actual or suspected US SSN or two. So it is vastly cheaper for Aus to pay large alliance premiums in return for US SSN protection during pressing times rather than have Aus's own astronomical$$ SSN force.
Re your broader suggestion - On top of having 2 SSNs Aus having a second class of SSKs looks like the mixed SSN/SSK solution only China, Russia and India can afford. Not something the Aus defense budget or requirements could afford.
A Collins 2 in the shape of a large A26 or a large U214 called U216 is something many in Aus have dreamt about. They lack the transition to SSN option that buying the Shortfin-Attack class introduces (note I'm contradicting my earlier SSN/SSK too expensive statement)
True about over expensive future Aus SSBNs. If UK, France and India can hardly develop and afford their own SSBN forces, the little Aus budget is insufficent. Best just to have the option of nuclear warheading the conventional warhead Tomahawks that Aus will eventually buy.
Cheers
Pete
Australia's hand would if at all, be forced by China. It all depends on how China reacts over the next 5-10 years to what it perceives as 'open hostility' to a larger role for itself in international affairs.
If China does take its second island chain defense strategy to its logical conclusion then Australia might have no choice but have a two tier layer of upto outer EEZ covering DE shortfins and ocean going, Canberra class escorting Barracuda SSNs complemented by a very good ASW tools such as MH-60s, P-8s, access to good SOSUS like sensors and dedicated ASW frigates.
Uncle Sam co-patrolling much more extensively from Saipan to the Red Sea will be a necessity by 2025-2030 if things stay the way they are for another one two years. China is pissed as hell and is unlikely to take things lying down. If I am the Philippines, India, or Vietnam, I would watch for a swift bloody nose from China to demonstrate wider intent.
Hi GhalibKabir
Australia already has good ASW tools in the form of MH-60s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_SH-60_Seahawk#Other_and_potential_users , P-3s being replaced by P-8s, access to good SOSUS like sensors, multi-roles ASW capable Anzac class frigates, Hobart class destroyers with Hunter class frigates to be built.
Our 2 Canberra class, even if carrying the full potential airwing of 10 x F-35Bs each, could not defend a task group like US, UK, Chinese, 1 French and India's (scratch the Russian one) carriers. Australia could only augment a US carrier group if in the seas around China.
No country has bought or built SSNs other than to defend SSBNs as their main job. Notice Brazil's SSN plans have gone nowhere for decades without the SSBN imperative.
It may make sense if Australia did buy (never build) SSNs that were also "Baby Boomer" SSBNs capable of firing small Polaris sized SLBMs. This is noting the latest Virginia SSN BlocK Vs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia-class_submarine#Block_V may be increasingly land attack missile orientated.
But the US may want to keep all the Virginia's it builds - so Australia may have to use other nuclear delivery means eg. we have alot of secure space for silos, road-rail mobile and will have many F-35As.
Regards
Pete
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