Simon Whistler from Megaprojects (after a broad geopolitical Cold War overview) here and above clearly explains:
3:38 - summary of Russian Typhoon class SSBN
4.22 - a few words on US Seawolf Project
6:58 - gets down to detail (specs and all) on US Seawolf Project.
Debris of (or from) KRI Nanggala recovered. The following is based on this report.
On April 24, 2021, the Indonesian Navy announced the finding of debris, including a part associated with torpedo tubes, a coolant pipe insulator, a bottle holding periscope grease, and prayer rugs.
Because the debris was found within 10nm of the
point of last contact and no other vessels were believed to be in the area, the
debris was believed to have come from KRI Nanggala, hence the submarine was
declared sunk.
Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy, Admiral Yudo Margono stated that a sonar scan had shown Nanggala at a depth of just under 850m ie. fatally below its crush depth of about 500m.
On 25 April, after a more accurate sonar and
magnetometer scan by KRI Rigel (933) (an Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Assistance Ship with more powerful sonar
equipment) the Indonesian Navy confirmed that all 53 of Nanggala’s crew were
lost.
Underwater scans have identified parts of the
submarine, including the rudder, external parts of the pressure hull, diving
plane, anchor, and other miscellaneous items such as the MK11 submarine escape
suit. The remotely operated vehicle (ROV) from Singapore Navy's MV Swift Rescue also made visual contact with the wreck and determined that KRI Nanggala had
split into three parts (broken up in fragments). Nanggala is located at a depth of 838m at coordinates
7°48′56″S 114°51′20″E Coordinates: 7°48′56″S 114°51′20″E."
KRI Nanggala's oxygen runout time has passed (at 3am in Jakarta, Indonesia time (4am in Bali. Indonesia) Saturday 24 April 2021. The lack of oxygen on KRI Nanggala (402) (if it is intact on the seafloor) means survivors are highly unlikely.
--------------------------
Submarine Matters' special Southeast Asia correspondent, "Shawn C" advised just over 5 hours ago:
"No seismic activity [that could have been caused by KRI Nangalla imploding at extreme depth] was detected around the time of Nanggala’s disappearance.
----------------------------------
Here is the naval hymn for submariners in memory of KRI Nanggala's crew.
Peter Coates
Director, Submarine Matters
Reporting to Australia and the US.
On April 21, 2021, the Indonesian Navy reported that its submarine KRI Nanggala (402) disappeared in waters about 95km north of Bali.[16] Nanggala had been conducting a torpedo drill, but failed to report its results as expected.[17] The navy stated that Nanggala had requested permission to dive to perform firing of a SUT torpedo[18] at 3am (Indonesian time) Wednesday April 21. Around an hour after being given clearance, Nanggala lost contact with surface personnel.[20][21] The Indonesian Navy subsequently sent a distress call to the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office to report Nanggala missing and presumably sunk.[22] The Indonesian Navy stated it was possible that Nanggala experienced a power outage before falling to a depth of about 700m.[20]
No usual radioing-in from Nanggala to Indonesian ships, naval bases or satellites or other distress signals (eg. flares) have been heard or seen. Based on a similar case, that of Argentine submarine ARA San Juan, in 2017, total loss of contact of a sub, usually indicates it has been lost with all hands (ie. no hope for Nanggala's 53 officers and crew).
On April 23 it was reported that magnetic anomaly sensors had detected an object of "high magnetic force" floating at a depth between 50m and 100m near to where Nanggala was last seen. Hopes are that this is Nanggala.
Indonesia has requested assistance from the Singaporean and Australian Navy submarine rescue ships which can deploy deep diving rescue submersibles. Indonesia has an agreement with Singapore for submarine rescue. The Singaporean Navy's MV Swift Rescue has already departed Singapore's Changi naval base and can be seen on this marine satellite tracking site.
Significantly KRI Nanggala is 41 years old - a German built TKMS (was HDW) Type 209 conventional diesel-electic submarine. It was commissioned into the Indonesian Navy in 1981 and its last reported major maintenance/overhaul was in South Korea, in 2011.
A 41 year old submarine, perhaps with decades old torpedoes, can suffer many technical defects.
------------------------
5 POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR KRI NANGGALA's SINKING:
1. Human error and/or failure of torpedo tube equipment in the torpedo firing drill Nangalla intended to conduct. The main danger is to leave the tube's outer and inner doors OPEN simultaneously - thus allowing seawater to rush in. This quickly makes a sub "nose-heavy" with too much weight for Nanggala's usual buoyancy air-tanks to counteract. This would cause Nanggala to sink to around 300m "crush depth", and then imploding, totally destroying, Nanggala.
2. seawater leaks through the snorkel when sucking in surface air at shallow depth. In the 2017 (Argentine submarine ARA San Juan) lost submarine case seawater gushed through the snorkel down to the submarine's 100s tonnes of lead-acid Batteries causing a release of poisonous, highly flammable and explosive hydrogen gas. This sank San Juan. It is possible similar has happened to Indonesia's KRI Nanggala.
See Pete's very early (proven correct) judgement that ARA San Juan was lost with all hands, just a few hours after its disappearance in 2017.
3. Deploying and/or dropping very old "live torpedoes" during test firing always carries risks that the torpedoes' highly flammable/explosive propellent manages to leak. Any sparks/electrical equipment can set the propellent on fire - leading to smoke/poison gas and ultimately catastrophic explosion. This is what happened to the sunk Russian submarine Kursk in the year 2000.
Sidescan sonar and deep sea manned or unmanned submersibles might locate Nanggala, or fragments of it, on the seafloor in the next 24 hours, or longer,
Failing that undersea sensors, belonging to the US Navy,
that are nearby eg. about 100km away from where KRI Nanggala was lost, will be
able to detect any loud sounds, like an imploding submarine hull. Due to
secrecy the US may need to claim that it was the
There is a remote chance Nanggala is intact and on a shallow seafloor, with most crew alive. If that were the case Nanggala's use of its loud-booming active sonar could be heard 100s kms away, by fixed undersea sensors or on surface ships, aircraft or on other submarines. But unfortunately it is unlikely any crew are alive to trigger active sonar pulses from KRI Nanggala.
This is the international naval hymn for submariners to mark Nanggala's sinking.
Peter Coates
Director, Submarine Matters (Australia-US)
Kym Bergmann, editor of Australia's superb Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) on
April 21, 2021 reports:
"UPDATED: First RAAF Triton to possibly be based outside Australia"
"At a media briefing in Canberra [Australia's capital] MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) [photo below] prime contractor Northrop Grumman explained that despite the
delay to the delivery of the first Triton to the RAAF there may still be
opportunities for the first vehicle to demonstrate interoperability with the
USN in the region without impacting the schedule. The initial RAAF Triton is
expected to be completed in Palmdale, California, in 2023 – but since the
infrastructure work at [RAAF Base] Edinburgh will not finish until 2024, the question
arises: where to situate it in the meantime. Northrop Grumman made it
clear that they cannot comment on matters of location – those are decisions
entirely for the RAAF and USN to make.
Leaving a massively capable surveillance platform sitting on the ground in the US would seem to be a huge waste – and while it can fly for a long time it cannot remain aloft for a full year until its Australian home is ready. APDR observes that the USN currently has two Tritons operating from Guam out of a total of six that will eventually be deployed to constitute a complete a flight, or more correctly “Orbit” of the aircraft. Currently, seven Tritons are awaiting transfer to the USN – and some might go to Guam or be deployed to other parts of the world, depending on operational priorities...."
SEE REST OF GREAT APDR ARTICLE
MQ-4C Triton RPVs (Photo coutesy USAF and Northrop Grumman in Australia)
---
Following Australia's Collins-class Submarine Program by Sub Brief of April 20, 2021, GhalibKabir commented/asked:
"To this day I cannot wrap my head around why Kockums and RAN went with Hedemora Diesel instead of a Pielstick or the go to workhorse good ol' MTU..."
A support group in Australia, without any real knowledge of Kockums' troubled Collins history, frequently ask why Australia doesn't cancel the Naval Group submarine contract and return to Swedish Kockums (now absorbed into Saab) instead.
Sweden imposing the Hedemora diesel motor (on the Collins) is one of the primary reasons Australia did not/does not want to return to Saab-Kockums. Supporters regularly advocate building a "Collins 2" aka "Son of Collins".
Some History - in the mid-2010s Kockums was a poor risk, in corporate turmoil, for Australia to buy its submarines. Kockums from 1999 was owned by the Germans and in no position to build submarines.
In 1999, following the acquisition of Celsius AB by Saab, Kockums was sold to the German shipbuilding company HDW. In 2005, HDW was bought by the German industrial conglomerate Thyssen Krupp.[2] The time after 1999 was rife with conflicts between Kockums' only Swedish customer, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), and Kockums' German owners. ThyssenKrupp insisted that Kockums ought to discontinue large submarine construction and to focus on the development of small submarines. Meanwhile, anonymous sources from inside Kockums claimed that ThyssenKrupp's goal in acquiring Kockums was never to reach synergies with HDW, but only to eliminate its main competitor.[2]
On 14 April 2014 about 200 employees had left Thyssen Krupp for Saab and it was reported that Saab and Thyssen Krupp had started to negotiate about selling Kockums.[32] In June 2014 Thyssen Krupp agreed to sell Kockums to Saab.[33 ]During a visit to Kockums facilities on 30 June 2015 the Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, announced that two submarines will be ordered for a cost of 8.2 billion SEK (US$ 867 million).[36] The two submarines will be delivered to the Swedish Navy in 2024 and 2025 [37]
Technical experts have demonstrated Kockums' actions and corporate instability was far deeper and more significant than Swedish cop-outs that "Kockums didn't deserve the "dud sub" tag".
In the 1990s Kockum's mishandling of the then Swedish company Hedemora's diesel problems, perhaps the main continuing defect of the Collins, was reason enough to exclude Sweden from the mid 2010's SEA 1000 shortlist. Also in the mid-2010s when Australia was compiling its shortlist Saab had never managed an order for new submarines - not even from its own Swedish Navy.
A submarine's diesel motors are a major propulsion component that can kill a submarine. Efficiency and reliability are key. Submarine motors are thus expected to be tried, tested and mature pieces of technology - built to handle a customer (like Australia's) mission conditions. Diesels need to be big business, for the builder to have the money and expertise to tailor the diesels to customer needs.
Simply put - Hedemora, when under Swedish ownership, had built submarine diesels for the Swedish Navy's Baltic Sea conditions. This was more than unhelpful for the Australian Navy's warmer, saltier and rougher, Indian and Pacific oceanic conditions.
See https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contentshttps://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents which explains:
"The Collins boats are the only diesel submarines [in the world with this particular 18 cylinder Hedemora] engine....In 1998 a liaison with ASC visited Hedemora [in Sweden] to try to resolve some of the problems with [these] engines and was shocked to see [Hedemora] only had 35 employees and was up for sale. Hedemora's ability to assist [the Australian Submarine Corporation] ASC was minimal, and Australia had to deal with the responsibilities of operating and supporting a unique engine that was a key to the submarines' success."
Someone had to buy Sweden's Hedemora, the only builder of the Collins' diesels, before Hedemora went broke.
Furthermore, Peter Yule's and Derek Woolner's 2008 book The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin on page 225 explains, in part:
"The problems with the [Hedemora] diesels led many to question the choice of Hedemora engines...[As early as 2008 Hans Ohff] believes Hedemora should never have been involved in the project because it was a small and declining company that lacked the resources to develop and support submarine engines of the size required for the Collins, or to remedy any defects."
UNDER AUSTRALIAN OWNERSHIP HEDEMORA HAS IMPROVED - BUT THE COLLINS' PROBLEMS ARE NOT OVER
Some history - Hedemora Diesel is a trademark to the Swedish company Hedemora Turbo & Diesel AB [which] used to produce diesel engines for ships, locomotives, and oil rigs along with backup generators to hospitals. The company later shifted its focus to supply existing engines with spare parts and service. In February 2006 Hedemora Diesel was bought by the Australian company Coote Industrial Ltd.[1] The Collins' diesels are now called Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub (VB210) 18-cylinder diesel motors.
__________________________________
SOME CONTEXT - SWEDISH KOCKUMS' PROPULSION PROBLEMS
Regarding the Collins submarines trials in the 1990s:
The fuel tanks were backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some of that seawater leaked into the Hedemora diesel engines, stopping compressed diesel fuel from igniting. But cylinders and pistons did compress, wrecking them. The whole process, of course, stopped the engine(s). This problem has never been completely fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutouts of top rear Collins hulls to remove the diesels for regular Total Overhauls (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water) has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving depth. This contributes to the total overall, overhaul, cost for the Collins submarines being about A$700 million per year.
“During trials of the first [Collins] submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a variety of reasons.[93] Most failures were attributed to the fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due to a combination of poor design, gravity separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator error resulting from poor training.[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures, and adding biocides to the fuel.[94]”
Shaft seals did not align properly during construction, causing seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost sunk a Collins sub, perhaps HMAS Dechaineux. Quick action by a crewman permitted this sub to rapidly move to surface to remove the pressure on onrushing water.
“Propeller shaft seals were a significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10 litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.[95] ASC claimed that solving these problems could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose, but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.[95] It was found that the problem could be temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for 100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.[95] New suppliers were found, with modified seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.[96]
“The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements, the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions; the dispatch of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the [SWEDISH] company's legal action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual property rights to the submarine's design.[100]
“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was attributed to the removal of a flywheel and to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing problems with the turbines and turbochargers).[101] The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.[102]
1:17 The
proposal for a new type of submarine to replace the Oberon class
submarines began in July 1978, when the RAN director of submarine policy
prepared a paper detailing the need to start considering a replacement for the
6 ageing Oberons with a new class of subs, to be built in
Australia (Aus), supported by Aus
shipyards, equipped with advanced tech, long life-span of greater than 20 years
service, must have peace time (intel gathering, covert insertion, periscope and
electronic monitoring, etc) and hunter killer (mainly torpedo and anti-ship
missile) capability.
2:41 May 1983, development begins. An initial list
of 6 SSK/SSG builders considerd. Also Rockwell proposed a new Combat System (CS)(sensors, database, weapons amounting
to about 30% of project).
3:12 May 1985 German vs Swedish main foreign
contractor designs shortlisted. Rockwell vs Signaal (notional competitor (group
of some US companies)) shortlisted for CS.
Sweden’s Type 471 design and Rockwell’s (always the favoured company’s) CS selected. Budget was A$4 Billion in
1986.
4:34 June 1987, Osborne Ship and Submarine yard
built for all Collins subs to built in Aus (instead of normal practice on
winner (Sweden) building first hull in Sweden).
5:26 Aus’s future submarine class was named in
honour of Vice Admiral Collins (1899-1989) with first of class. HMAS Collins, launched by his widow on August 28,
1993
6:14 Collins class Specs: built 1990-2003, 3,100
tonnes (surfaced), 77m long, 7m beam, 3 x Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub
18 cylinder diesel engines, 3 x Jeumont-Schneider Generators 1,400 KW each. the
GIH diesel engines turn the JS Generators which in turn charge the batteries.
which in turn spin the propeller
7:42 more specs – same as on right sidebar here
9:11 Feb 1990 keel laid, and other milestones. Rockwell’s
advanced CS, with each crew station
meant to see all, was ahead of its computer power time, and was never completed to
specs,
10:25 Construction problems continue including non
release of software for Rockwell CS
11:15 Computer Sciences Corporation takes over CS software development problem.
Integrating 1990s software with 1980s hardware a major headache. Software not
even matured when HMAS Collins goes on sea trials in 1994. See further detail
as CS problems gradually resolved by
CS companies (including Raytheon) used by USN nuclear subs. In fact the AN/BYG-1 Combat System used on Collins and US nuclear subs, will be carried over to the future Attack-class.
[Pete Comment: After CS problems were resolved the Collins Garden Island-Hedemora https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedemora_Diesel (a small Swedish company which terminated diesel making around the 1980s) diesel engines' limitations on use remains the Collins class's major problem.
This is a major reason the Attack
class will adopt MTU diesels - a multinational company that supplies diesels to a wide range of civilian and naval ships as well as submarines. ]
12:36 Big Problems with Sea Trials:
- Jive says the contract Aus expected was basically appropriate for a nuclear submarine, ie. silent and reliably operating at high
speed [ie. in top 10% of its submerged speed tempo], over a long range and with months of endurance. [All this was not appropriate for even a standard-long range diesel-electric sub, like a large Brazilian Scorpene or a "around Africa" Israeli Dolphin 2]. So Aus was bound to be disappointed with the Collin's performance.
- the fuel tanks are backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some
of that seawater
leaks into diesel engine, stopping compressed diesel fuel from
igniting, but cylinders and pistons would compress. The whole process stopping
engine(s). [This problem has never been completely fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutout of top rear hull
has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving
depth. Removal and overhaul of diesels (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water )
from diesels is required each major overhaul. This makes the total annual overall bill for the Collins subs about A$700 million!]
“During trials of the first
submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a
variety of reasons.[93] Most failures were attributed to the
fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt
water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due
to a combination of poor design, gravity
separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator
error resulting from poor training.[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial
contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause
the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by
installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures,
and adding biocides to the fuel.[94]”
- shaft seals not aligned properly during construction causing
seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost
sinking Collins. Quick action permitted sub to rapidly move to surface. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Propulsion_system
“Propeller shaft seals were a
significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10
litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly
misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep
diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.[95] ASC
claimed that solving these problems
could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose,
but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting
efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.[95] It was found that the problem could be
temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for
100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a
permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility
for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.[95] New suppliers were found, with modified
seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely
re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.[96]
- Propeller
problems:
“The propellers themselves were
also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least
one cast at the wrong pitch.[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the
miscast propeller.[98] The material used for the propellers was
also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started
to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office
sent the propeller to the United States
Navy for redesigning.[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems
with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements,
the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions; the dispatch
of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the company's legal
action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual
property rights to the submarine's design.[100]“Bad cavitation problem
causing lengthening of sail.
- Other
propulsion problems: See:
“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor
vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was
attributed to the removal of a flywheel and
to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption
in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing
problems with the turbines and turbochargers).[101] The
propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design
of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings,
and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were
noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence
Science and Technology Organisation.[102]
The periscopes also had problems
with their optics: periscope users reported difficulty in refocusing after
changing magnification, duplication of images, and bands across the field of
vision.[106] These problems were
attributed to RAN demands that the optical view be the first exposed when a
periscope was raised above the water, instead of placing the infrared sensor
and single-pulse radar at the head as on other submarines, requiring the
optical path to be routed around these components.[106] The periscopes were gradually
improved, and were no longer a problem by the time the fast track submarines
entered service.[56]
17:00 July
1996 HMAS Collins commissioned
17:35 - 6 x horizontal torpedo tubes capable of
carrying 22 heavyweight shots, including top mod Mk.48 torpedoes, also Harpoon missiles and UK
mines, no Tomahawk hardware capability. SURTASS towed sonar array, LINK-11 datalink for big picture situational
awareness.
19:22 History of Service. Great Record including October
21, 1999 HMAS Waller inserted Clearance Divers into Oecussi/Ambeno enclave, East Timor.
Lots of exercise sinkings by Collins subs of “enemy” ships and subs (including
Los Angeles class) ,
21:06 In mid 2000s begin some rather early 10 Year Mid-Life Upgrades (totalling 24 months per sub). The Collins class of today much better than Collins class of 2001.