July 29, 2019

COSMOS Summary piece on Orca/Echo Voyager XLUUV

It is useful to read Drew Turney's excellent article for COSMOS: THE SCIENCE OF EVERYTHING. That article is Orca will change US undersea battle-readiness, of July 29, 2019, at https://cosmosmagazine.com/technology/orca-will-change-us-undersea-battle-readiness. The following are excerpts from the article:

“...with Boeing’s new Orca we’re entering the age of the XLUUV – the Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle.

...Unmanned submarines are not only deployable in far more dangerous waters, they’re ultimately disposable. And without all those life support systems, they seem to be far cheaper [than manned submarines].

Boeing, the company contracted by the US Navy to provide four craft under the Orca program, is charging just US$43.2 million...The first [UUV] was developed at the University of Washington in 1957, and since then they have taken almost every form, come in almost every shape and size, and done everything from scientific research to mapping the seafloor for oil and gas prospecting.

But the Orca will be in a class all its own. It’ll be based on an earlier craft from Boeing called the Echo Voyager, a 50-tonne missile-shaped craft the company said was a test case for further development.

Like the Orca will, Echo Voyager runs on a hybrid combination of batteries and marine diesel generators and can be deployed and recovered from a pier – removing the need for a launch and support ship in dangerous or hard-to-reach places. Land-based crews can control the fleet, issuing orders on a set-and-forget basis...[Echo Voyager, now Orca] can surface to get a fix on its position via GPS and both send and receive findings, orders and other data via satellite.

Even though Orca will be a war-fighting tool, it will use the same modular design as its predecessor. It can carry equipment weighing up to eight tonnes in the cargo bay, and there are also dongles to attach other instruments or weapons to the outside of the hull.

...Whether you’re testing the extent of an oil spill, deploying a mine in a hostile port or undertaking any number of other tasks underwater, the hardware/payload system and open software architecture means you can not only configure the Orca for very different purposes, you can redeploy it for another application quickly.

For the US Navy, that means “mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, electronic warfare and strike missions”.

That covers a lot of ground (or sea, as the case may be), from launching missiles to finding enemy ships by sonar and reporting their positions to nearby forces.

....the physics involved in underwater travel imposes several stumbling blocks. For one thing, water distorts the transmission of radio signals – if you’re in a dry airspace even a few metres down your mobile won’t work – so operators need confidence the [Orca] is following instructions (or [as an AUV] figuring out the best way to do so by itself ) without being able to communicate or report on progress. It needs the autonomy to detect and avoid contact with objects that could damage it – anything from a large rock on the sea floor to a passing whale.

...The Orca is scheduled for delivery by June 2022."

BEST TO READ THE WHOLE COSMOS ARTICLE HERE

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Separately the above 2016 Boeing Youtube on Echo Voyager is still highly relevant.
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Pete

July 26, 2019

Iranian submarine life expectancy in war very short


As indicated on July 24, 2019 Iran's main naval base is at Bandar Abbas just inside the Strait of Hormuz. See map above. But Bandar Abbas is at a chokepoint easily blockaded by US and UK SSNs and aircraft covering the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has attempted to give its navy more room to manoeuvre by building up a dual-use civilian/naval base at Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman. But the Gulf of Oman is also a chokepoint easily blockaded.

Blockade activity is expedited by mobile passive sonars on US and UK SSNs and probably the more efficient use of sonar on USN Echo Voyager extra large UUVs. Several networks of fixed undersea sensors are also likely (in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, Strait of Hormuz, broader Indian Ocean, Arabian, Red and Mediterranean Seas). UK/US mobile and bottom rising mines, SSN and aircraft dropped ASW torpedoes would provide weapons backup for all these sensors in the sinking of Iranian submarines. 

Israel and the Sunni Arab nations (especially Saudi Arabia and UAE) astride the Persian Gulf may also be prepared to make ASW contributions against Iran.  

All this means that however numerous Iran's broad selection of  submarines (3 Kilos and about 17 to 31 medium-small-minis) the life expectancy of Iranian submarines in a medium level war in and around the Persian Gulf might be 2 hours at most

Another factor weighing against Iranian submarine survival is the narrow and shallow seabed of the Persian Gulf (average depth 50m with a few small holes down to a mere 90m (see right sidebar and also depth map below. Additionally narrow-shallow channelisation of the Strail of Hormuz would make the movement of all but the smallest Iranian submarines highly predictable/detectable. 

Still, the sinking of a South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010 by a North Korean sub perhaps as small as 130 tons suggests that even Iran's mini-subs might prove dangerous if they fired a torpedo or two at warships or tankers. 

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This interesting English narrative (from 38 seconds in Youtube) displays all 3 of Iran's 26 year old 
Kilo class medium size subs and 3 of Iran's 14 to 23 small-mini Ghadir class (120 ton, 2 torpedo) submarines.
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The narrow, shallow, waters of the Persian Gulf area make life especially dangerous for Iranian submariners. Although the Persian Gulf's oceanography would probably keep the US and UK's much larger 7,000+ ton SSNs well away in the Arabian Sea.

 Pete

July 25, 2019

Boris Winning Poetry of Power

Putin, Xi, Boris, Trump
Conservatives all, rightwing rump

Left lost in leftwing waltz
Weak politicians despair in schmaltz

Who’s to label rightwing wrong
When the political art is cynically strong

All causes: climate, rich, poor, cannot be served
Good intentions $$$ rationed curbed

Artists purport to humane left
Lack of impact leaves poor bereft

The art of politics is to win
Noble failures have no kin

Those in power
Good works shower

Those who lose
On failure booze

So though we moan swings to right
Won elections
Trump all 
Good night.

By bro Pete

July 24, 2019

Vast Western intelligence gathering against Iran


Following mounting Iranian drone and naval activity against Western shipping since May 2019 (map above courtesy UK Daily Mail)) the UK and US are deploying a wide range of intelligence collection methods against Iran. 

The UK's widely advertised deployment of an Astute class SSN to Iran's region is just a very small part of a much larger Western intelligence effort - much of it existing long before this latest Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz crisis.  

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

In the Strait of Hormuz Iran would deploy undersea sensors (fixed on seafloor, tethered, and mobile (on Iranian subs and surface craft). This would likely make Western submarine movement within narrow (and shallow) waters of the Persian Gulf/Hormuz too risky. It is likely US and UK SSNs  would by stationed in the Arabian Sea near Iran. Western subs are also integral defenders of Western naval surface ships and civilian tankers.

Iran would be mindful of the extreme danger the UK's (3 active Astute and 3 still active Trafalgar class) SSNs and US SSNs pose to Iranian naval ships and tankers. Iran's admirals would fear the kind of action that led to the sinking by a UK SSN of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano in the 1982 Falkland's War. All of these UK/US SSNs (and US SSGNs) have Tomahawk land attack missiles which could destroy most of Iran's air defence and nuclear facilities. 

THE MUCH BROADER INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The UK and US SSNs and many other intercept platforms can forward Iranian voice and data intercepts via satellite to GCHQ/NSA Farsi (Iranian language) interpreters regionally, and in the UK/US, for near real time translation into English. Just about any Iranian emission on la
nd, sea and air can be intercepted. All this provides operationally actionable intelligence against Iranian threats to shipping, aircraft, Western land bases in the Middle East and further afield. The identification, cueing and downing of the Iranian "drone" that flew too close to USS Boxer may well have been at the end point of the UK/US intercept chain.


In more detail, intercepts can also be gathered by UK, US and Israeli "spy" satellites, aerial drones, manned aircraft, naval surface ships and land intercept stations. Of particular interest are a veritable order or battle (ORBAT) of "intelligence targets" to intercept including:
-  signals emanating from the center of Iranian military and political decision-making in Tehran and
   then orders from Tehran down the Iranian chain of command 

-  satellite collection of images via (radar sensors for night and bad weather) and electro-optical 
   images and signals collection from Iran's main naval base at Bandar Abbas (on Hormuz) including
   port comings and goings
-  particularly Iranian (or "unidentified") naval and air approaches to Western shipping
-  put another way, movements of Iranian naval ships (including minelayers), submarines and
   
Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) boats,
-  activity at Iranian air bases (eg. Iranian aerial drone and strike aircraft takeoffs) and airports
   (to avoid another unintentional shootdown of an Iranian civilian airliner).
-  status of Iranian medium range missile bases and coastal anti-ship missile batteries covering the
   Persian Gulf, Hormuz and Arabian Sea
-  suspicious activity in Iranian land force bases (especially IRGC), and
-  suspicious activity of Iranian "diplomats/spies" "illegals" "terrorists" and "militia" within Iran, Iraq,
   Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere (globally) including Iranian embassies.  

It would appear that Iran has been added to the list of entities in the War on Terror (that is, in addition to the Taliban, al Qaeda  and Islamic State).


Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) released this footage of their capture of UK oil tanker, Stena Impero, in the Strait of Hormuz. Their operation involved IRGC special forces (probably Quds), speedboats and a helicopter to take control of Stena Impero and its 23-man crew. This is all part of the broader West vs Iran confrontation.
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Pete

July 22, 2019

One’s first spy novel not hurt by Philby surname, but...

This concerns publication of a first spy novel, titled The Most Difficult Thing, by one of Kim Philby's descendants.

Having Kim's surname probably wouldn't hurt sales of one's first spy novel.

Kim Philby rose to head the Counter-Intelligence and anti-Soviet section(s) of MI6/SIS (reportedly organising the killing of many Russians who sought help from MI6). He also did damage as main liaison man in Washington DC between MI6 and the CIA. Kim Philby infamously worked for the KGB as a sleeper, long-term mole then occasional lecturer at KGB college, during his privileged career from 1933 until his death in Moscow in 1988.

In an interview the new novelist recalled that her father/Kim’s son “never said anything against Kim”. Why the hell not?! 


One of Kim Philby’s most infamous acts was making possible the torture and death of up to thousands of anti-communist nationalists in the late 1940s/early 1950s in the Soviet Bloc. This occurred in the Baltic states, Ukraine (then Soviet territory) and Albania (the last under MI6/CIA Operation Valuable). 

Of Albania one of many an incidents in the early 1950s is reported in a 1994 article “Profits and losses of treachery: Victims of Kim Philby's betrayals are staking a claim to the cash realised...” In that article communist Albanian police acting on Kim Philby’s information to the Soviets, ambushed 12 young anti-communist nationalists parachuted into Albania under Valuable...

“the [Albanian] police were waiting for them with open arms. Four were burnt to death in a house, six were shot dead and...[another agent] was caught, tortured and put on public trial in...October 1951. [The Albanian anti-communist nationalist exposed by Kim Philby] “spent decades being starved and beaten in various prison camps. And now, 43 years later..." [in 1994 he was reportedly still alive and living in Albania.]

The Baltic states, Ukraine and Albania are now mercifully free of the Soviet backed communists who tortured and killed so many anti-communist nationalists - after Kim Philby so brutally informed on these nationalists. 

I wonder how many of the tortured are still alive?

July 19, 2019

Marines on USS Boxer JAMMED Iranian Drone to down it


The Iranian drone brought down in the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz) area on July 18, 2019 was brought down by electronic jamming rather than by kinetic missiles or shells. It has now been reported Marines on amphibious assault carrier USS Boxer used "Marine Corps' Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS) (legalelectronic jamming equipment. This is mounted on a Polaris MRZR dune buggy (similar to the buggy above) with the jammer used to bring down the fixed-wing (ie. not rotary-wing) Iranian drone. 

When a drone (unmanned aerial vehicle/system) threatened USS Boxer an intrepid Marine technician drove the jammer-buggy combination along 41,000 ton USS Boxer's large "flat-top" deck. Presumably US super-carriers in the Middle East region are similarly protected by Marine or US Navy driven jammer buggies. 

Hence USS Boxer's various kinetic anti-air capable defences (RIM-116, and RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles, 20mm Phalanx CIWS 25 mm and 50 calibre machine gunswere NOT used.

The downed Iranian “drone” (unmanned aerial vehicle/system) that approached within 900 meters of USS Boxer may have been a:

·       H-110 Sarir (UAV)
·       Hazem (UAV)
·       HESA Ababil
·       HESA Karrar
·       IAIO Fotros
·       Qods Mohajer (eg. the Mohajer-6)
·       Shahed 129 or a
·       Yasir UAV



Trump on USS Boxer downing the Iranian drone.
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Pete

July 18, 2019

Teaching the Russian S-400 to detect F-35s


Franz-Stefan Gady has written an excellent article at the The Diplomat paysite. The article is an interview with Mauro Gilli, a senior researcher in military technology and international security at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. The article titled “Mauro Gilli: Selling the F-35 to Countries Operating the S-400 Is a Bad Idea” is dated July 3, 2019. Subscribers can read the full article at

[Franz-Stefan Gady askes] "How [the Russian S-400 system issue is] related to the sale of the 
F-35 aircraft to countries such as Turkey or, perhaps less realistically, India?

[Mauro Gilli's responds] "To use the previous analogy, by possessing both the F-35 as well as the
S-400, Turkey or India could figure out how to change the color of the F-35 from light blue to black, and in part how to change the color of the background from light blue to white. To put it more precisely, stealth technology is aimed at reducing the observability to radars operating at specific angles and at specific frequencies. By modulating the frequencies and angles of operations of multiple S-400 systems, one could find the weak spots of the F-35 and, more important, its unique radar returns. By feeding such data into signal processing software, the chances of detection increases markedly – one country would be able to more accurately ignore false positives and more carefully avoid false negative[s]. In other words, if you know what you are looking for, you can more easily find it."


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 17, 2019 Al-Monitor.com reported:
The “Trump administration said today it would formally kick Turkey out of the F-35 program after Ankara took delivery of a [S-400] Russian air defense system that could threaten the American fighter’s stealth capabilities.
In a White House statement sent five days after Turkey began taking deliveries of the Moscow-made S-400, [on July 12, 2019] press secretary Stephanie Grisham said the F-35 “cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.”
Pentagon officials had long said the Russian system, which is not compatible with NATO counterparts, could train its powerful radar on any F-35 jet operated by Turkey to uncover its stealth protections....”

July 17, 2019

Losharik's Intentional Flooding and Functions

Many readers would be aware that on July 1, 2019, 14 of Losharik’s estimated 19 crew were killed in a fire (burns, blast, smoke inhalation) as Losharik was in the process of docking in Orenburg’s belly (“moon well” floodable chamber). Some of the following links are in French or Russian - which may translate to English automatically after 15 seconds or right-click mouse, then "Translate to English".

Few may be aware that it has been reported that Orenburg’s crew intentionally “floodedLosharik to prevent the fire/explosions spreading to Orenburg. So some of Losharik’s crew may have been sacrificed to save Orenburg's crew.

The details below mainly drawing from excellent articles by:

Igor Delanoë (working in Moscow) “Losharik: drama in the depths” July 10, 2019,

and also

Pavel Felgenhauer (also in Moscow) "‘Losharik’ Submersible Disaster Handicaps Russian Naval Operations” July 11, 2019, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 99, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/losharik-submersible-disaster-handicaps-russian-naval-operations/ in square [...] bracket’s :



Losharik (bottom) and above it Orenburg "mother sub" (a "Delta III Stretch BS-136). (Diagram courtesy TechnologyNewsWorld July 2, 2019).

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First described as nuclear submarine “AS-12”  Losharik turned out to be the AS-31, deep diving special operations submarine which operates from the belly of the much larger “mother sub”
BS-136 Orenburg  (modified from Delta III class SSBN K-129 in 1994).

What is Losharik used for? 
Using her underwater mechanical hands/manipulators and floodlights, Losharik is designed to carry out many sensitive, often risky missions:


Seizing and destroying submarine cables and tapping the cables with listening devices are 2 of the functions of LosharikFor example...in March 2016, the French press reported the presence of a Russian SSBN sitting on the bottom of the Bay of Biscay.  In fact of SSBN could well have been the Losharik-Orenburg combination spotted in an area where many vulnerable submarine cables are on the seafloor.

[Losharik can reportedly sabotage the US’ SOSUS [seafloor listening device arrays] in the Atlantic [Pete addition: Pacific, Arctic and Indian] Oceans. Atlantic sabotages would allow Russian submarines to break out of their Severomorsk base into the open Atlantic undetected (RBC, July 9).] [Just before the fire Losharik’s][...crew may have been searching for intelligence-gathering equipment potentially planted by the US military on the seafloor to monitor activities in the North Sea.]

Losharik also recovers Russian warheads, other weapons systems and sensors lost (or broken) at sea. For example, if new torpedo or UAV trials fail they need to be retrieved by Losharik before they fall into the hands of a foreign power [Pete addition: probably US, UK or China]. [Just before Losharik’s fire][...the Russian navy itself had lost something during exercises. Another possibility is that this was a mission to test some new equipment, which may explain the presence of a defense industry civilian specialist on board Losharik (RBC, July 9, 2019).]


Losharik can also recover the remains of foreign warheads and other weapons systems lost at sea [[Possible targets for Losharik or other Russian retrieval submersibles could be the] US RQ-4 Global Hawk drone...shot down by the Iranians in the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019. The Iranians gathered some floating debris, but there is surely a treasure trove left scattered on the seabed. In April 2019, a Japanese US-made F-35A crashed in the Pacific. Again, some floating debris was recovered, but more valuable technology could still be found underneath (Interfax, April 15).

 Losharik's many mechanical hands/manipulators, floodlights and additional helper submersibles are evident. (Artwork courtesy TechnologyNewsWorld July 2, 2019)
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Technical Details for Losharik include:

Displacement: 1600 tonnes (surfaced), 2100 tonnes (submerged)
Length:            60 m or 70 m (unconfirmed)
Propulsion:      1 nuclear reactor E-17 [details eg. kW or MW, unknown]
Complement:  19 to 25
Estimates Diving Depth:  6,000 metres.

See Submarine Matters' earlier Losharik reporting here.
Pete (with thanks to Starshiy for spotting some references).

July 16, 2019

Australia's Future Submarines Likely To Keep Lead Acid Batteries.

Australian submarine expert Derek Woolner and Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) expert David Glynne Jones have warned that Australia’s future Attack-class submarines could be inferior on commissioning in the 2030s if they don’t use LIBs. This has been reported in more detail here and here

Those countries with “superior” LIBs for submarine include Japan which is building LIBs submarines right now. South Korea and China are likely to build LIBs submarines within the next 15 years.

Bio Details

Derek Woolner co-authored The Collins class submarine story: steel, spies and spin. He has performed contractual services for Australia’s future Attack class submarine program.

David Glynne Jones is an advocate of transport electrification using renewable sources, including those hooked up to Lithium-ion batteries.

COMMENT

It appears that the Australian Government and Naval Group intend to build the future Attack class with old style, but proven, lead-acid batteries. The Australian Government are concerned that LIBs for submarines are unproven operationally and there are safety concerns that LIB batteries have a higher chance (than lead-acid batteries) of overheating, burning and even exploding if not managed properly.

The advantages of LIBs are that:

-  they can be recharged more quickly meaning quicker/more discrete snorting periods

and

-  can be hold more electrical power than lead-acid batteries. LIBs have a greater average
   charge/discharge efficiency of
85% (see LIB sidebar) compared to lead-acid batteries which have a
   lower
average of around 72.5% (see lead-acid battery sidebar). Submarines with LIBs
   might 
prudently (ie. always retaining 50% battery capacity for rapid tactical movement
   /emergencies) snort every 5 days or more. Estimates are vary
variable. That would mean longer
   fully 
submerged submarine operation of 5 days or more. This is compared to every 1 to 2 days
   prudent snorting for subs with lead-
acid batteries.

The Attack class will use an unknown number of MTU 4000 or, perhaps less likely MTU 396 diesels.


The Australian Government has implied that it may adopt LIBs in future. Pete Comment - However this is unlikely for the first batch of 6 Attack class as LIBs require whole new space and buoyancy solutions and new electrical fittings throughout a submarine.

Pete

July 15, 2019

Dry "Launch" of France's First Barracuda/Suffren SSN - K15 Reactor?

On July 12, 2019 (Naval Group advises) a ceremony, presided over by French President Macron (above), "launched" the first Barracuda named Suffren. Suffren is the first of 6 Barracuda SSNs being built in Cherbourg for the French Navy. The 6 Barracudas will replace the 6 much smaller Rubis class SSNs (operating since 1983).


COMMENT

The "launch" of first of class vessels (including subs) is a highly political act (hence the French President participated). The first is generally "launched" remaining on dry land (wheeled out of its shed for the ceremony - then back in the shed again after the ceremony) not truly launched into the water. This is for a variety of reasons, including: safety, need for continued assemblage inside the sub (including fully installing the reactor). Many other technical issues (eg. electronics software and hardware and weapon systems) would still need resolution. 

First of class submarines typically take between 2 and 5 years from launch till full commissioning/operating in a navy. Commissioning follows all necessary tests and resolution of the many inevitable technical problems - especially the reactor. So Suffren might not be fully commissioned into the French Navy until 2023-24 if major problems are encountered.

ARTICLE

At the Barracuda/Suffren (hereinafter called "SSN") launch ceremony Hervé Guillou, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Naval Group, thanked all the entities involved in building the SSN, including the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) and
 TechnicAtome

COMMENT

These 2 French naval reactor builders may have resolved the main reason for the program's delay, ie. the development of the miniaturised (for SSN) version of the existing K15 naval reactor (mainly in Cadarache, southeast France (see map)). See Submarine Matters' previous articles on the K15 problem here and, much more detailed, here. The K15 has presumably been fitted into the SSNGuillou said the K15 reactor will first be tested (run critical?) in Cherbourg shipyard "in the coming weeks".   


The long delayed [Suffren was laid down 2007] launch is reassuring for builders of the Australian Attack-class (was the "Shortfin") conventional diesel-electric (SSK) version of the SSN. Reassuring because many of the hydrodynamic efficiency and acoustic stealth characteristics for the SSK must be first tested during the SSN's full scale submerged trials (which may begin 2021-22). Also many of the Naval Group staff (managers, designers and builders) hitherto assigned to SSN development will gradually become available for Australia's SSK development. Although we must keep in mind that many of the Naval Group's SSN staff will now also be reassigned to the new SSBN program (known as 3rd Generation SSBN - known as 3G SNLE (or SNLE 3g)) to replace France's Triomphant SSBNs (operating since 1997).]

ARTICLE - Technical Characteristics
  
The technical characteristics of the Barracuda Suffren-class SSNs, provided by Naval Group's 12 July 2019 Media Release, are:


  • Surface displacement: 4,700 tonnes
  • Diving [submerged] displacement: 5,300 tonnes
  • Length: 99 metres
  • Diameter [beam]: 8.8 metres
  • Armament: naval cruise missiles, F21 heavy-weight wire-guided torpedoes, modernised Exocet SM39 anti-ship missiles, [mines, weaponised UUVs and Naval Cruise Missiles (NCM - MdCN) for long range land attack, armed Special Forces - divers using wet or dry diver delivery vehicles/minisubs].
  • Hybrid propulsion: [propulsor-pumpjet with a secret structure, hence shrouded at launch ceremony] and pressurised water reactor derived from the [K15 (150 MW) reactors on board the Triomphant-class SSBNs [see right sidebar] and Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier [right sidebar], two propulsion turbines, two turbo generators and two electric motors
  • Crew: 65 crew members + commandos [Special Forces]
  • Availability: > 270 days per year [K15s need refueling every 7 to 10 years. There is also shorter term and longer term "deep" maintenance for many other parts of the SSNs generally.]

  • YOUTUBE



Above is an excellent (less than 7 minute) Youtube with commentary (1 minute, 3 seconds in) by Xavier Vavasseur, Chief Editor, Naval News. As well as the French President and officials Xavier mentions the presence of the Australian Defence Minister [Senator Linda Reynolds] and Australian military.
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Pete