Great Aussie Convened Survey of SSBN & SSB Deterrence, Feb 2020.

A great new publication for SSBN-submarine and nuclear deterrence aficionados is:

“The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey”. Edited by Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Frühling and James Goldrick. Published by ANU National Security College; February 2020, downloadable for free at
https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2020-02/the_future_of_the_undersea_deterrent.pdf

[Summary]

"Amid rapid geopolitical change at the start of the 2020s, nuclear weapons manifest grim continuity with the previous century. Especially persistent is a capability that has existed since the 1960s: the deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines. The ungainly acronym SSBN represents nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines: the most destructive armaments carried on a supposedly undetectable, and thus invulnerable, platform.

In the new nuclear age, many nations are investing in undersea nuclear deterrence. In the IndoPacific region (the centre of strategic contestation), four major powers – the United States, China, India [see details below] and Russia – have SSBN programs, while Pakistan and North Korea are pursuing more rudimentary forms of submarine-launched nuclear [SSB] firepower. This complex maritime-nuclear dynamic brings deterrence but also great risk. Yet the intersection of undersea nuclear forces, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), geostrategic competition, geography, and technological change is not well understood. This has a major bearing on peace and security, in terms both of crisis stability and arms race stability.

To illuminate these critical issues, the National Security College at The Australian National University, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, is conducting an international research project on strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. The project’s focus is on new technologies and risks relating to undersea warfare and nuclear deterrence over a twenty year timeframe. The present volume is the project’s second publication, bringing together the insights of leading international scholars and next-generation experts to produce a comprehensive and authoritative reference. The edited volume examines the interplay of strategic issues, including nuclear strategy and deterrence; maritime operational issues, including ASW; and technology issues, including new and disruptive technologies and potential game-changers in relation to deterrence. 

This volume represents a significant contribution to the field of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Its 22 authors span seven countries, and reflect world-leading academic and operational experience across nuclear strategy, deterrence and arms control, maritime operations, and the trajectory of emerging technologies.

This volume will help to advance critical conversations about undersea nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific – a region of intensifying complexity, and uncertainty – and is of value to the policymakers and governments who must chart a course through these dynamics. 

Support for this publication was provided by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York." 
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INDIA SPECIFIC CHAPTERS 

within “The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey” at:

https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2020-02/the_future_of_the_undersea_deterrent.pdf

on India are:

-   Chapter 10 “India’s Deterrence Posture and the Role of Nuclear Strategy” pages 36-38,

    by C. Raja Mohan

[Dr C. Raja Mohan is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He is one of India’s leading analysts of India’s foreign policy and an expert on South Asian security, great power relations in Asia, and arms control. He is the founding Director of the India Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a foreign affairs columnist for The Indian Express newspaper and has served as a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. He has a Master’s Degree in nuclear physics and a PhD in international relations. His most recent books are Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (2015) and India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (2016) (co-edited with Anit Mukherjee). His other books include: Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (2012) and Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (2009).]

and

-   Chapter 11 “Atoms for Peace? India’s SSBN Fleet and Nuclear Deterrence” pages 39-42
     by Sudarshan Shrikhande

[“Rear Admiral Shrikhande retired in 2016 after 36 years in the Indian Navy. In flag rank he headed Naval Intelligence; was Chief of Staff/SNC; served in HQIDS and Strategic Forces Command among other positions. He is a graduate of the Soviet Naval War College in ASW weapon and sonar engineering in 1988; Indian Staff and Naval War Colleges and of the US NWC in 2003 with highest distinction. In retirement he teaches strategy formulation, operational art, force structuring, RMA, China, the Indo-Pacific, the Peloponnesian War, leadership and ethics in several military as well as civilian institutions. He writes regularl y for several Indian and foreign organisations. He is associated with the National Maritime, Vivekananda International and Observer Research Foundations as well as the Forum for Integrated National Security. He has participated in Track 1.5 dialogues with China and the US and in a US State Department Indo-Pacific Dialogue and Simulations conference in Sydney. He is studying for a PhD in sea-based nuclear deterrence.”]

These are just two chapters in a much broader work for SSBN, submarine and nuclear deterrence scholars everywhere.

Comments on Malaysian and Mainly Singapore Naval Issues

Shawn C has commented on Malaysian and mainly Singapore navy issues below – including Singapore’s Invincible class (Type 218SG) submarines might sport a mix of 533mm and 650mm torpedo tubes. Comments in square brackets [...] by Pete:

Drawing from Shawn C’s comments 1. on May 24, 2020 and 2. on May 25, 2020

1. Frankly speaking - Malaysia is too much of a close economic partner with Singapore and I don't think they are seen as strategic competitors, especially in terms of defense. The last decade has widened the gulf between the military capabilities of the two, and niggling border [maritime, water and aviation] issues aside, Malaysia benefits from a neighbour who is willing to help them in terms of data fusion and ISR, particularly around the Malacca Straits and parts of the SES[?]. [See this December 2018 Youtube Video on maritime dispute].

127,724 square mile Malaysia is very large compared to 280 square mile Singapore.

---------------

Some of the Singapore-Malaysia disputes in late 2018

-------------

That is not to say that Singapore doesn't ignore any Malaysian 'posturing'. There's plenty of stories by Singaporean National Servicemen of some of the 'mobilization exercises' they've gone through.

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/saf-holds-largest-mobilisation-exercise-since-1985-with-8000-troops-700-vehicles

Singapore is a signatory of the NPT and does not have a nuclear industry - also no place to put a nuclear plant with a 30km safety zone.

It's a certainty that Singaporean and Israeli submariners have 'bumped into' each other during the construction of their respective submarines at TKMS, but what systems are shared is of course conjecture at this time, and I don't think the Israelis would let sailors of other nations into their super-secret subs. More likely the Singaporean crewmen trained on Type 212 boats.

We know from launch images of the RSS Invincible/Type 218SG [and see Wiki link] that while the sub has a family resemblance to the Dolphin II, the sail is located centrally, there are four X- rudders instead of the seven (four rudders and three fins) on the Dolphin II, and a broader keel that runs almost the whole length of the submarine.

What wasn't shown in the images, was the Invincible's eight torpedo tubes, and it may be that, like the Type 212, they have an asymmetrical torpedo tube layout, and could even be a mix of 533mm and 650mm tubes [like the Dolphin 1s and 2s!], which would make a lot of sense for special forces and UUV use, amongst other things.

Did TKMS torpedo Kockum with Australia and Singapore? The Swedes think so.
https://www.thelocal.de/20131015/52407

Ultimately Kockums was removed from the SEA 1000 project because "they hadn't built a submarine in twenty years". In a What If scenario - TKMS-Kockums get awarded the A26 project in 2010, and in 2012, with some delays, cuts steel on the first boat. In 2013 Singapore signs in for a customised version, so Kockums now has a 4 submarine order book. This keeps them in the SEA 1000 downselect.https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/sweden-barred-australia-sub-program-105608893.html

2.  [Pete never mentioned any Scorpenes had AIP. Only the 3 DCNS (now Naval Group) designed Pakistani Navy Agosta-90Bs have DCNS MESMA AIP. It was Wikipedia that wrongly implied MESMA AIP on Scorpenes here and in Wikipedia’s right sidebar]. 

You might be interested that the Republic of  Singapore Navy (RSN) trains in the Andaman Islands with the Indian Navy https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/a-rare-look-at-rsn-submarine-training-crew-can-now-take-out-adversary-within-minutes

The Chief Trainer of Submarine Forces RSN, is a Perisher graduate:
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/why-whiskey-was-the-last-thing-on-rsn-submarine-commanders-mind-during-gruelling-perisher

Checked up on the Polish A17 story, and I think there's a lot of unsubstantiated conjecture in the article, specifically with Sweden 'buying back' the Archer class submarines in 2023.
https://www.defence24.com/is-sweden-willing-to-maintain-its-submarines-and-their-potential

The RSN currently operates two Challenger class and two Archer class subs. The Challenger boats are over fifty years old [originally launched in 1968 and 1969] and in RSN commission for twenty years, so their replacement by the first pair of Invincibles is urgent. With the Archers its a little more complicated - they were extensively modernised over five years and have been in service for about 9 years, which means they should be able to remain in RSN commission till 2030 without any major life-extensions needed.

While most commentators see the RSN's intent is to replace the Archer's with the second pair of Invincibles, this won't happen till the boats are delivered in 2024-2025 (not 2023). The RSN may also be planning to expand its submarine forces to six submarines, and keep the Archers in commission while ordering a third pair of [Invincible class] Type 218SG boats for delivery later in the decade.

Hanks "Greyhound" Submarine movie on small screen(?) "digital debut"

As usual I was perusing (not WashPost nor NYT) but the higher profile news website of the West African country of Ghana (BusinessGhana, of course!) which reports, May 21, 2020:

“Tom Hanks Submarine Drama ‘Greyhound’ Skips Theaters to Debut on Apple TV Plus...” see whole BusinessGhana article 

COMMENT

This is a shame, because I wanted to see Greyhound (on now COVID-19 cancelled June 12) on the big cinema screen.

Checkout this trailer video:

Pete

Sweden's Loss was Germany's Submarine Selling Gain

After Sweden made the grave error of selling its submarine maker (Kockums) to the Germans 

1999-2014 the Germans hobbled Kockums submarine export-ability. This was particularly evident in Germany's sale of Type 218 Invincible class subs to Singapore. Singapore hitherto being a regular buyer of Swedish submarines (Challengers and then Archers).

Even since Sweden's Saab bought Kockums back in 2014 Sweden has been desperately trying to renew exports - to such markets as Australia, Poland and the Netherlands by feeding news/sales  updates like.   

No Swedish luck so far, although a sale of 2 secondhand submarines to Poland may be in the offing. The Germans, Russians, South Koreans, Chinese and French have maintained a lead in conventional submarine sales, but Sweden keeps on trying.

Pete

India’s INS Arihant SSBN compared to US Ohio-class SSBNs

In this short Youtube India’s first generation INS Arihant SSBN is compared to the US sixth generation Ohio-class SSBNs.

China's JL-3 SLBMs utilise carbon fiber booster casings for longer range

As usual I peruse Beijing’s Chinese language SINA News Agency website for submarine articles. I have translated the article below into better military technical English to give it a wider audience outside China. 

JL-3 SLBMs utilise carbon fiber booster casings for longer range of May 12, 2020 at https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2020-05-12/doc-iircuyvi2662473.shtml. [I added the links in the text.]

The outside world believes that the domestic “new generation of giant wave submarine missiles [JL-3  SLBMs (Chinese: 巨浪-3; pinyin: Jù Làng Sān; literally: “Giant Wave 3”] may be equivalent or similar to the French M51 SLBM.

On May 11, 2020 at the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) announced the Selection of the Second National Innovation Competition Award for the underwater solid fuel launch vehicle development team. The outside world believes that this move indicates that the new JL-3 has been successfully developed, and "we have added a sharp sword".

As is widely known the first-generation domestic JL-1 submarine missile was tested in the 1980s, and the second-generation JL-2 submarine missile was first tested at the early 2000s. The JL-1 is nearly 40 years away, and JL-2 is close to 20 years. Obviously, these older JLs would not have been selected for the national innovation competition award. Therefore, the outside world speculates that this award is for the new JL-3.

The key characteristic of the Chinese produced JL-3 is larger diameter. The length of SLBMs are limited by the diameter of a submarine’s pressure hull. The larger the diameter of the pressure hull, the higher the technical difficulty and cost. Therefore, the length of the SLBM is higher than the diameter. Previously, the length of the JL-1s and 2s exceeded the diameter of China’s Type 092 and Type 094  SSBNs. Therefore, their missile compartments protruded beyond the hull, distorting the SSBN’s smooth cylindrical shape. This increased hydro-dynamic noise and drag.

Therefore, a solution is to reduce the SLBM’s length as much as possible. But increasing the range requires increasing the internal volume to accommodate more propellant, so increasing the diameter becomes the first choice. The early American Polaris A2 SLBM was 9.3 meters long and 1.3 meters in diameter. The length of the Trident I SLBM increased only to 10.3 meters, but its diameter increased to 1.9 meters. Judging from overseas data, the JL-2 is about 2m in diameter, about 13m in length, and has a range of about 8,000-10,000 kms (the range of the missile will also vary depending on the payload).

The largest diameter (beam) of the pressure hull of the competing US Ohio-class SSBN is only about 13 meters. Taking into account factors such as technical difficulty, cost and price, the diameter of the pressure shell of China's next-generation Type 096 SSBN should not exceed 13 meters, so the length of the JL-3is estimated to be controlled at about 13 meters. The JL-3’s range is bound to increase if its diameter increases. So larger diameter for the JL-3 is the key characteristic.

It has been speculated by the outside world that the JL-3 SLBM is about the same as or similar to the French M51 SLBM, which is 13m long and 2.35 meters in diameter. The M51 submarine missile can carry up to 12 MIRVs, but in most cases only 6 are carried. At this time, the maximum range is 13,000 kms. In 2019, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation completed the test run of a domestic large-diameter solid [fuel] rocket engine. Its diameter has reached 2.65 meters [see photo below], which has exceeded the diameter of the M51 submerged missile. Missiles are not difficult.

The domestic 200-ton solid rocket engine has a diameter of 2.65 meters, and the black shell indicates that it uses carbon fiber

M51 submarine missile is made of carbon fiber winding.

China’s 200-ton thrust solid [fuel] rocket motor has adopted a number of advanced technologies, one most notable is the large-diameter carbon fiber winding composite material shell technology. This should be the first time that we have mastered the large solid rocket motor carbon fiber winding composite material shell technology. This technology is also one of the key technologies of the M51 submarine missile. It makes the missile lighter providing a longer range.

According to overseas sources, the shell of the JL-2’s solid fuel rocket engine is made of aramid, which is lighter than metal but heavier than carbon fiber. Since the year 2000 Chinese carbon fiber has advanced by leaps and bounds. T800 grade carbon fiber has achieved a production capacity of 1,000 tons, T1000 has reached 100 tons, and M60J grade carbon fiber has also been successfully developed, which shows that domestic carbon fiber has three important directions (high strength, high modulus, high Strength and high modulus) have achieved breakthroughs, which laid a solid foundation for the use of carbon fiber on domestic missiles and launch vehicles. Therefore, it can be speculated that China’s JL-3 SLBM solid fuel rocket engines also use a carbon fiber shell, for lighter weight and longer range.

From here, we can roughly speculate that the JL-3 is equivalent to or similar to the French M51 submarine missile, using a large-diameter solid rocket engine and a carbon fiber shell. In the case of carrying 6 MIRVs, the range reaches 13,000 kms or more, and it can cover the main targets of the strong enemy in China's offshore waters. After this type of missile is in service, our strategic counterattack capability will be significantly enhanced to better safeguard national security and rights.

See the article in its original Mandarin and initial translation. 

Some Comments on Taiwan's Political and Strategic Environment

Anonymous on May 9, 2020 commented:

The US may very well use the claims by other countries as a means to push back on China in an unofficial way. I think that is a dynamic that the South East Asia countries in general are aware of and try so sort of learn towards a balancing between China and the US. If the US uses Taiwan's claim in that way as well, it still falls short of supporting Taiwan to the extent of enabling it to declare independence. Taiwan's defense capabilities rely much on the Foreign Military Sales Agreement with the US.

The number of Taiwanese workers in the PRC has decreased tremendously since 2016. Currently at around 400,000. (see https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3839550 )

The rise to 1,000,000 coincided with Taiwanese President Ma Jing-geou who had a pro-China policy approach. He was President from 2008 to 2016, winning a second term. But China in that period was still a question mark in the geopolitical sense. Many other countries have been expanding trade with China at that time as well, including Australia.

Even though in 2008, the Charter 08 by Chinese intellectuals was shot down by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo was arrested, Beijing had the 2008 Olympics. The general mood internationally was "if China develops a middle class, they will naturally evolve into greater openness and democracy". So its kind of hard to hold Taiwan to account in increasing workers in the PRC in these years.

The US and others let the PRC onto the World Trade Organisation (WTO) around in 2001. So the gates of open market/economy forces were opened. And the PRC will naturally try to entice Taiwan into unification sentiments under CCP rule.

Additionally, even US military equipment includes parts from Taiwan, if I recall correctly, Taiwanese bits are in the Patriot 3 missile system. Some computer chips of Chinese origin are used in other US military equipment. It is a questionable knotty mess. But instead of having that be used as a point to discredit efforts within Taiwan to keep unofficial independence and to discredit Taiwan's efforts to achieve official nation status, it should be a point used to reduce the interlocking of parts and businesses in the PRC-Taiwan-US supply lines.

But later, PRC activities around the Senkaku islands and Sarborough Shoal around 2012 and then later with the Hong Kong umbrella movement in 2014, and the beginning of the massive island making in the Spratly island group in 2014/2015, Liu Xiaobo remaining in prison up until his death in July 2017, the PRC buying an old aircraft carrier from the Ukraine [also see] on the basis of "turning it into a floating casino" in 1998 instead becoming a fully operational carrier with fighter jets setting sail as a carrier group with recently mass produced frigates and destroyers by 2016. Obviously the sentiment surrounding the Beijing Olympics in 2008 has proven to be wrong. And Taiwan has responded, electing Tsai in 2016 and reelecting her in 2020."

What forward bases and support modes might best service Australia’s submarine needs

There’s an ongoing discussion (here and here) at Submarine Matters about what forward bases, submarines numbers, sizes and support modes would best service Australia’s submarine needs.

At ASPI Strategist former submarine commander Denis Mole has written an excellent article
“The Royal Australian Navy needs a support ship, not a fixed base at Manus Island” of April 30, 2020 at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-royal-australian-navy-needs-a-support-ship-not-a-fixed-base-at-manus-island/. (It was republished by the Australian Naval Institute on May 3, 2020). Parts of the article are:

"...In 2018, the US and Australian governments announced that that they would work with Papua New Guinea to redevelop the naval base on Manus Island to support Royal Australian Navy, US Navy and PNG Defence Force operations. However, little has emerged since then on what is being contemplated.

Manus Island has an excellent natural harbour and is strategically well located to provide forward support for RAN ships operating in the western Pacific, including the South China Sea. As a forward operating base, its weaknesses are that fixed infrastructure on Manus would be more vulnerable than fixed infrastructure at home bases and that access could be withheld if PNG assessed it was in its national interest to avoid being drawn into a conflict.

Both these weaknesses could be mitigated if all or most of the support the base provides was aboard a ship and mobile, rather than on land and fixed. A purpose-designed ship could provide fuel, storage and treatment for oily and brown-water discharge, stores and provisions, munitions, workshops and medical facilities. Ships and submarines would berth alongside such a vessel.

In the event of a direct threat to Manus Island, the ship could be relocated to other protected waters in PNG. If the PNG government no longer welcomed RAN ships, the support ship could relocate to another Pacific nation or to north Queensland, Broome or Darwin.

A large fleet support ship wouldn’t necessarily be expensive to buy or to run. It could be built to commercial standards and operated by a core civilian crew, similar to current navy support ships Sycamore, Besant and Stoker. RAN personnel and contractors could be embarked as ‘special personnel’, not crew, on a fly-in, fly-out basis. As a government-owned commercial vessel, it would fall outside the naval shipbuilding plan and could be built offshore like the new Australian Antarctic supply and research vessel, RSV Nuyina, which, despite being delayed, is nearing completion in Romania.

While such a ship could support destroyers, frigates and small vessels, it could be designed primarily to support the Attack-class submarines.

A support ship could enable these conventionally powered submarines to conduct back-to-back patrols without returning to home bases. It would have specialised berthing facilities, battery-charging capabilities, battery and mast workshops, an air supply for submarine escape systems, and the ability to embark and support Australia’s submarine rescue system.

....A submarine support ship could be located in Sydney at least until the long-term composition and disposition of the submarine force is clear. Once the future is clearer, the support ship could be relocated elsewhere on the east coast or deployed to Manus Island.

A submarine support ship would perform its role in port or anchored in sheltered waters, so performance at sea wouldn’t drive its design characteristics. Because it would rarely be at sea, the ship would be less vulnerable to attack than fixed infrastructure since it could be relocated from an emerging threat location to a lower risk operating position.

Darwin isn’t suitable [as a forward base] because it is too far from deep water. Although large submarines can operate in water as shallow as 40 metres, that’s only after they have submerged and their trim has been balanced. When a submarine has refuelled, or replenished its stores or weapons, a theoretical trim is calculated and applied in port. For their initial dive after leaving port, large submarines require a minimum depth of about 100 metres to allow for variation between estimated and actual trim.

The distance from Darwin to water 100 metres deep is approximately 250 nautical miles. A submarine departing Darwin would need to transit on the surface for more than 24 hours before diving, which would leave it vulnerable to attack by mines, torpedoes, missiles or aircraft.

Darwin and Broome are roughly equidistant from the South China Sea. 

Broome [in northern Western Australia] might be suitable as a forward base as it’s about 84 nautical miles from water 100 metres deep, but the West Australian town has limited port facilities and, like Manus Island, would require a support ship."
AUTHOR

Denis Mole served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 35 years, commanding submarines and attaining the rank of commodore. He has recently retired from the commercial marine and defence support sector.

Read Denis Mole's whole excellent essay HERE.

Palantir (US Defense Intelligence Data Company) hires ex-politician from Australia - extra links

Defense Correspondent Andrew Greene at Australian Government funded ABC News reports, on May 10, 2020 reports https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-10/outgoing-labor-mp-mike-kelly-takes-new-job-security-company/12229842

[non-ABC News links added and bolded by Pete. US spelling for "Defense" is used.]

"Data company that 'helped locate Osama Bin Laden' recruits former Labor MP Mike Kelly

A United States tech giant with close links to Western intelligence agencies has appointed former Federal Labor MP Mike Kelly to help drive its rapidly expanding operations in Australia.

...The ABC can reveal Dr Kelly has taken up a job with the Silicon Valley based tech giant Palantir Technologies, just days after retiring from Parliament on health grounds.

Founded in 2004, Palantir specialises in the shadowy practice of data mining, and in January its growing global business was privately valued at $US20 billion ($30.61 billion [Australian dollars]).

"I am not in a position to retire and have no desire to," Dr Kelly told the ABC when approached about his new role.

"I have been fortunate to be able to take up a job offer with Palantir Technologies Australia that will enable me to work within my physical limitations but still be in a position to make a difference in relation to the issues that matter to me."

On at least two occasions in recent years, the soldier-turned-politician has publicly praised the work of Palantir, including its reported role in helping track down terrorist Osama Bin Laden.

"Companies like Palantir for example effectively vectored Osama Bin Laden's location so these are companies and capabilities that we need to work with," the decorated Army veteran told Federal Parliament in 2018.

In the same year the Labor backbencher informed Parliament's powerful Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security that Palantir was "providing a massive $US12 billion international effort on security issues".

Late last month, the 60-year-old held back tears as he announced his resignation in a move that has forced a by-election in the marginal New South Wales seat of Eden-Monaro.

"I don't believe I can continue to do the job to the extent — and with the commitment and the physical demand — that I would want to," the former colonel said in April.

Over the past six months, Dr Kelly has undergone 10 medical procedures to address damage to his renal system, caused by severe dehydration during military tours in Iraq, Somalia and East Timor....

Kelly expected to grow Palantir's security and defense business in Australia

American spies are known to use Palantir software to link together the huge cache of data gathered by security agencies such as the...CIA and ...NSA.

Palantir software has been used by Australia's Defense Department since 2011, and the company has secured millions of dollars in contracts with security agencies such as the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC).

[Scroll a third way down Palantir's Website to see that Palantir has offices in Canberra (Level 4/71 Northbourne Ave, Canberra), Sydney and Melbourne Australia. See Palantir's "Defense" and "Intelligence" solutions,] 

Dr Kelly has described his new employer as "amazing organisation" saying it was "populated with some of the finest talent and quality personnel in the world".

"At the moment, for example, they are working in over 30 countries in the fight against COVID-19," Dr Kelly said."

Naval Group awards Australian taxpayer-funded bonuses despite being behind schedule

Defence correspondent Andrew Greene for Australian Government owned ABC News has written an excellent article of May 6, 2020 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-06/french-submarine-builders-get-taxpayer-bonuses-despite-delays/12217534

"Submarine builder Naval Group Australia hands out taxpayer-funded bonuses despite being behind schedule"

"The French-owned company building Australia's future submarine fleet has granted employees taxpayer-funded pay rises despite fears the project is already billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule.

Key points:

• *   Naval Group Australia [website] has given staff early financial bonuses to "support them
•      during the unprecedented COVID-19 period"
• 
  *   In January [2020 the Australian] the auditor-general concluded Naval Group's design was running
       nine months behind schedule
• 
  
• *   A senator says paying the bonuses at a time when other Australians are losing jobs is  
•      offensive"

In 2016 Naval Group, then known as DCNS, won a lucrative international competition to design and build 12 new submarines to replace Australia's ageing Collins Class fleet.

The massive defence project, which is expected to cost at least $90 billion, has faced regular criticism including from the auditor-general who concluded in January the design was running nine months behind schedule.

In a statement, Naval Group Australia confirmed its recent cash windfall for staff was approved by the Defence Department and awarded on an "individual performance basis" while taking into account "external market remuneration conditions".

"Naval Group Australia recently completed its annual remuneration review in line with our remuneration policy," a company spokesperson told the ABC.

"Bonuses paid were linked to the 2019 performance year and were brought forward by three weeks to support our workforce during the unprecedented COVID-19 period."

"Our first priority during this period has always been the safety and wellbeing of our people, clients, suppliers and their families. Nothing is more important to us today and always," the spokesperson added.

It is not known what proportion of Naval Group's future submarine workforce received pay rises and bonuses, and the company has declined to reveal what the increases were worth.

Defence has refused to reveal who in the department approved the remuneration changes and referred all questions on Naval Group's employment conditions and pay to the company.

"The Strategic Partnering Agreement outlines that Naval Group Australia employee salaries and bonuses reimbursed by the Commonwealth in aggregate are appropriate and in line with market conditions and industry benchmarks," a Defence spokesperson said.

Senator calls for examination of 'offensive' bonuses

South Australian crossbench Senator Rex Patrick labelled the pay rises and bonuses granted during the coronavirus pandemic "offensive".

Australia's submarine requirements explained

With the winning bidder for Australia's next fleet of submarines announced, attention turns to how it will meet Australia's high-endurance requirements.

"Ultimately it is the Australian taxpayer that pays Naval Group's employees working on the Future Submarine project," the long-time critic of the French company told the ABC.

"In an environment where businesses are shutting their doors and people are signing up for unemployment benefits en masse, and even corporate executives are trimming their own salaries, some would consider this insensitive".

"Noting the auditor-general found that [Naval Goup Australia] have missed deliveries and critical milestones, I think it's offensive".

Senator Patrick stressed his criticism was directed at Naval Group management, not workers, and suggested the Defence Department should examine the recent pay increases.

"Defence have the ability to examine Naval Group's books and it might be worthwhile them taking a look to see whether or not this is appropriate," he said.

Former Defence official Andrew Davies, now a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the payment of bonuses on a troubled project during the COVID-19 economic downturn was questionable.

"Normally when you're managing a major project, bonuses in particular would typically be tied to increased productivity or meeting project milestones, so it's a bit surprising to see bonuses being given out at the moment," he said.”

Western intelligence seeking latest Russian weapons in Syria

Western intelligence agencies are supporting some militia (and maybe Kurdish) groups in Syria not only as a counter to Syrian government atrocities but also as a means of obtaining captured Russian weapons. US, UK, French, German and Israeli intelligence agencies are asking some (non-ISIS) militia groups to capture the latest Russian weapons being used in Syria and then hand them on to those agencies.  

Russia is using actual combat zone conditions in Syria for Russian and Syrian forces to test not yet deployed new weapons and new versions of existing weapons types. 

Items on the Western wish list include T-14 Armata tanks, the latest version T-90As, Su-57 stealth jets and the latest Su-35s, KH-101 air launched cruise missiles. Mi-28NM attack helicopters,  BMPT-72 "Terminator-2" armoured fighting vehicles and unmanned ground combat vehicles.

Reasons why Western intelligence seeks examples of the latest Russian tank technogy include: the need to better assess Russian tank division combat power; and to develop better anti-tank weapons (eg. whether Western tanks need to upgun to 130mm or higher).
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On T-14 Armata and T-90 tanks Beijing’s sina News Agency reports April 30, 2020:

Why not bring a T-14 Armata back? US orders Syrian rebels

[some parts have been retranslated into better English] Observers of Russian tank matters are surprised about Russian reports of the “actual deployment of Russian T-14 "Armata” tanks in Syria. The T-14 made its first public debut at the Moscow Victory Parade in 2015. For many years, Russia has hoped to deploy the T-14, but not yet for various reasons. Hence Russian forces are trialling the T-14 in Syria under semi-combat conditions. Russian sources said that Russia has not let loose the T-14 under full Syrian combat conditions because of the need for technological confidentiality.

Russians sources reported that only when the Syrian war situation has stabilized will Russia dare to put the T-14 on the Syrian battlefield. So instead Russia has been supplying [the T-90A] the most advanced T-90 tank to the Syrian government army. A large number of these T-90s have been captured intact by “Syrian militia”[including Syrian Democratic Forces, etc]. Some of these captured T-90s have been bought at high prices by the US and other NATO countries and delivered to them. At this moment, the fate [and location in the West] of the captured late model T-90s are unknown.

According to Russian sources the T-14 often fails technologically and it is impossible to predict the failure rate in actual combat. Due to secrecy only the Russian Ministry of Defense knows how the T-14 has performed. No T-14s have been seen in combat in Syria.

At present, only T-90s can be seen on the Syrian battlefield deployed in the most dangerous areas of the frontline, becoming part of the "fire brigade". Meanwhile the
T-14 might only be a tool for precise [self-propelled artillery-like] shooting and secret missions.

Russian sources reported that after the Russians began trialling T-14s in Syria, the US and NATO allies [mainly UK, Germany and France] ordered a large number of Syrian militia to seize T-14 at all costs. The US and NATO allies have offered US$millions in rewards! However, Russian sources said that that regular Russian troops do not know where the T-14s are kept so Syrian militia cannot find the T-14s.

According to data published by the “Russian Defense Industry Department”[could be this] during the Syrian campaign, the Russian military carried out at least 150 technical modifications to the T-14 tank. All decisions are made by local experts in the Syrian repair shop, or with the help of Russian engineers. Russian experts did not disclose details, but only pointed out that "any war will adjust the design, and the stability of the engine must be determined first."

It should be noted that in Russia, the "Armata" series, including T-14 tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles, has completed a complete development cycle. A large number of T-14s have been sent to serve in Russia's western military region, and some tanks were sent to Russia's southern military region. [The test batch of 100 is to be delivered and deployed to the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, near Moscow, with delivery expected in 2020 or later]. Russian sources stated that the T-14 is still at an early stage of development hence not deployed. So it has not encountered other tanks on the battlefield."
See more on Russian weapons in Syria at The Drive 

T-14 Armata inside, with an unihabited turrent. Instead the crew of 3 are in an internal armoured capsule protecting them if the turrent is blown off by the enemy and/or their main-gun ammunition explodes/cooks off or diesel fuel burns. (Diagram courtesy Quora.com)
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Below is the T-14, Armata exterior at the Moscow Victory Parade, Red Square, 2015 parade (Photo courtesy sina News Agency).

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Pete