In response to Anonymous' March 2, 2022, comment.
1. I would say that the UK's BAE Systems is limited, not only by the shortage of UK manpower (completing the Astutes and building the new Dreadnought-class SSBNs). It is also limited with the UK's submarine assembly facilities, being all at Barrow (see History section). These will be packed out building Dreadnoughts (into the 2030s). After that SSN contruction, that Australia might rely on, will need to wait until BAE manpower and facilities are freed up.
The US says its submarine building facilities are fully committed to US Navy needs. But the US may still have more men and space to assist Australia than the UK can offer.
This is noting that as well as GD EB building Virginia's there is also HHI building Virginias.
---------------
2. Thanks Anonymous for bringing up the ALP dominated Senate inquiry into Australian Naval Shipbuilding report titled “A Shambles: We Don’t Think, We Know” at https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Navalshipbuilding/Second_Interim_Report
From the report I suspect that the ALP's "bipartisan" support for the Coalition's AUKUS sub intention may not be a solid as currently advertised.
The Committee's ALP versus Coalition tone and structure speaks
adversarial rather than
"bi-partisan".
The tentative nature of the ALP's support is evident in the
(mainly ALP's) comment:
"1.19 The committee notes the bi-partisan support for the AUKUS agreement and the procurement of nuclear submarines. Notwithstanding that bi-partisanship, the committee can only conclude that Australia's submarine acquisition program to replace the Collins-class is a shambles."
The ALP already seems to be conveying the possibility that the AUKUS sub intention may turn out to be shambolic.
I'm pessimistic that an ALP Federal Government can work with the much higher foreign content and (especially US nuclear) labour involved in building a nuclear sub. Traditional ALP priorities that act as shipbuilding impediments (including ALP factional balancing) will re-emerge.
The anti-nuclear Left faction will want its voice heard if/when the ALP is actually in government. The ALP will no longer need to be a bi-partisan follower of Coalition nuclear submarine policies.
The heavily redacted/trimmed public version and much larger Secret version of the Taskforce's Report will need to be finely worded indeed when/if its to be served up in April 2023 to an ALP Federal Government and to we ordinaries.
10 comments:
Pete
I have no idea what both sides are planning after the next election. I would still say that Labor, even the left, will find it hard to back out of building submarines at Osborne soon.
Another reading of the Senate report is that if Labor wins they probably intend to put the Defence bureaucracy through the wringer over the attack contract when in power. Defence kept them in the dark for most of the last term. This may not have put them in Labor’s good books, plus the delay to shipyard jobs has been criticised by just about every Labor MP in South Australia. If they feel defence was too close to the former government and not independent, a lot of heads could roll.
For all the talk about ideology and real politic I still find a lot of politics is personal; Morrison reportedly bases a lot of his decisions on personal relationships within his party. I think Labor will want to do something with Naval shipbuilding, but I am concerned they may decide to change plans (again!) just to put their own stamp on it.
I am growing concerned it has been a mistake for Defence not to announce more details of what AUKUS SSN options are being considered before the election. The danger of this approach is that if it stays vague, with no public expectation of any particular outcome, it iwill be easier for Labor in government to kill it off. We shall see.
Hi Anonymous [at Mar 3, 2022, 7:05:00 PM]
One element, adding to SSN uncertainty is that Osborne, Adelaide shipbuilding workers will be busy building the 9 Hunter-class frigates from 2022-2030s. "The Program is expected to cost AU$35 billion" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-class_frigate
So with likely Hunter delays/cost overruns, the SSN Program might be assigned a low project profile for Osborne until, say 2032?
Yep, if the ALP wins the May 2022 Election senior heads in DoD sub-ship building project management and Chief of Navy, RAN, may "roll" for being "untransparent" to Senate Committees etc.
Indeed, Labor (in the Liberal PM tradition) might want to stamp its imprimatur on the submarine program. eg: limiting the LOTE and entertaining an interim sub idea (Collins II development or TKMS off-the-shelf?)
Regards Pete
Pete
Why do you think the Frigate build will crowd out the SSN build? The plan was always that they would build in parallel with separate workforces. The valley of death related to the shipbuilders from the AWD. They were never going to be the sub builders. Hence the Arafura program was tacked on. Now with the first Arafuras finished at BAE and the Hunters years late the same problem has arisen for them.
The build sites at Osborne are adjacent by separate, with further room to expand if required. The ship lift is 150 metres/9000 tonnes and capable of expansion up to 20,000 tonnes. With the Hunter program only under construction ASC is half full at most.
Several of the SSN skillsets (welding HS steel for hulls, reactor, stealthy high-grade mechanicals) are pretty specialized and beyond what would normally be needed for surface ships. This second workforce is what delays in Attack Class meant were never really fully recruited. Hence there has been a large shortfall in promised jobs. Conversely there is no valley of death for the sib construction jobs, because apart from a few hundred with Naval, most have yet to be recruited.
Pete you can see the scale of the Osborne site in this photo. There is ample room for parallel builds, with room to expand.
https://defencesa.com/precincts/osborne-naval-shipyard/
Hi Anonymous [at Mar 5, 2022, 6:00:00 PM and Mar 5, 2022, 6:02:00 PM]
Rather than "crowd out" the SSN build I think the Hunter class will mostly be developed without a parallel Aus SSN build at Osborne.
The Hunter class is due to be laid down this year, 2022, and first one commissioned 2031
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-class_frigate#Ships .
Given usual submarine lead times of 15 years (1st design to commission of 1st sub) + the nuclear aspect that is outside Australia's shipbuilding experience the first Aus SSN may cut steel at Osborne in, say, 2030.
So "parallel" builds might only kick in in 2030. Thanks for https://defencesa.com/precincts/osborne-naval-shipyard/
However the Collins' Life of Type Extension (LOTE) may be the main activity of the Aus submarine construction/re-construction workforce.
Depending on the May 2022 Election Results, determining political value of Adelaide and Perth electorates, the main LOTE activity might be in Osborne, Adelaide or Henderson, Perth or both.
Regards Pete
Pete
That would be a giant program stall. At Senate hearings in November the Aukus program head said they were looking at an existing mature design. Even starting from scratch it was four years from start of the Astute program design to commencement of construction. The Attack program envisaged construction starting in first 2023, pushed back to 2024. Pushing it back to 2030 is a large further delay. New facilities may be needed but you can build an entire shipyard in around three years.
If the intended delay is that large I would question both major parties’ commitment to the Aukus program (and national security).
Hi Anonymous [at Mar 6, 2022, 8:53:00 PM]
Given the complexity and long lead times (an Aus SSN in 2038!!) grand defence plans are always difficult for the ALP and Coalition to gain political advantage.
But ScoMo's headline today may buy some votes while em-buggering the Greens and ALP https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/03/naming-possible-east-coast-nuke-sub.html
Cheers Pete
Hi Pete, my question is, is the ASC capable of building a Collins 11, that being the involvement of SAAB to produce something in the vane of an A26ER with an eventual nuclear power plant?. Possibly 4 conventional Collins 11s and pathway to nuclear propulsion?
The complexity of any suitable submarine contender with all the political shortcomings and consequential production cap@bility truly is a “Mission Impossible Bridge Too Far”. We don’t even have a weapons capability strike package designated, which is why one would even pick a submarine.. It does seem completely “A” up.
Hi Lee [at Mar 13, 2022, 12:04:00 AM]
I think over 15 years Australia (including ASC) and SAAB (and other smaller contractors) could build a Collins 2.0 But they would likely be commissioned from 2037, too late to be Interim Subs before the 2040 AUKUS subs
I don't think there is any reasonable "pathway to nuclear propulsion" outside of allies already building nuclear subs ie. US, UK and France. Not India as India is reliant on Russian nuclear technology.
Regards Pete
Post a Comment