In response to Anonymous' February 24, 2022, comment:
I agree about the US Virginia submarine part of your comment:
"Further
to my comments above that we need SSNs more than ever, I no longer have a
strong view on whether they should be Astute/SSNR or Virginia Blocks IV, V or
VI.
We
should build whichever design we can reliably get in the water fastest.
Anything else is a dangerous distraction now, as the geopolitical risks for
Australia are too great."
Pete Comment
However, at this moment I think that I'm cautious about the UK's troubled past developing the way overbudget, very late Astutes. The UK eventually needed considerable US General Dynamics Electric Boat assistance to sort out UK Astute production problems.
[Writers of Wiki record] "In
August 2002 the [Astute] programme was estimated to be over three years late
and hundreds of millions of pounds over budget.[9] BAE Systems issued a profit
warning on 11 December 2002 as a result of the cost overruns and delays.[14]
BAE Systems and the [UK Ministry of Defence] MOD subsequently renegotiated the
contract, with an understanding that the MOD had to share some of the financial
risks.[9] In December 2003 the contract modifications were signed, with the MOD
agreeing to add another £430 million to the programme and BAE Systems assuming
£250 million of the cost overruns.[15]
The
MOD also enlisted the advice and expertise of General Dynamics Electric Boat
through a U.S. Navy contract.[16] Eventually, a General Dynamics Electric
Boat employee became the Astute Project Director at Barrow.[9]
Input from General Dynamics helped resolve many of the software issues associated with 3D CAD;[9] General Dynamics was also responsible for the introduction of vertical outfitting and other construction techniques."
I think further Astute
production (after HMS Agincourt) with its older style PWR2 reactor, is not a
serious option. ie. new Astutes aren't an option for Australia. The more modern PWR3, or even a future PWR4, would define a new SSN.
If Australia chose a UK SSN(R) aka SSNR, it could not "reliably get in the water fastest." Instead Australia would need to wait more than a decade for the UK's relatively limited nuclear submarine design and construction workforce to permit the first Dreadnought class SSBN to be commissioned. That is expected in the early 2030s. Only after that could full UK attention be focussed on the SSN(R) intended to enter service with the UK RN "in the 2040s". Another source expected "The SSN(R) is likely to be delivered in the 2040s or 2050s.[10]"
Even then the UK SSN construction drumbeat is 2 years or longer. So, faults in the operational performance will take longer to be revealed/detected than the US Virginia drumbeat which with the Block IVs is 2 subs a year or 6 months.
The US, continuously building Virginia's, probably for the next 20+ years, won't be upset by the US's new SSBN development/production (ie. the Columbia class). This is made possible by the US' much larger design, development and construction workforce. Also continuous build of its SSNs promotes higher efficiency.
I would say the US would
allow Australian continuity of choice, with a larger pool of US labour/expertise available to assist Australian
engineers and shipyard(s). And in any case, it can be taken as given around 33% (of the work or effort) of an Australian build will be the pre-existing US-Australian Combat System (ie. sensors, databases and
weapons). All this in a Indo-Pacific environment where most of the Australian
SSN inter-operation will be with US subs and broader USN rather than with UK
subs and broader RN.
So, for Australia, the US's larger submarine labour force and higher efficiency, enables continuity of SSN production, with it a higher drumbeat.
Also, if a UK SSN design were chosen one UK corporation may have too much market power over Australian shipbuilding. This is because BAE Systems, already the main foreign contractor for our Hunter class frigates, would also be main foreign contractor for Australia's SSNs. This is noting BAE Systems states: “We design, manufacture, and support complex surface ships, submarines…”.
6 comments:
Pete
This is a valid concern. We seem to be left with a choice between a sacked contractor that went too slowly, a likely contractor that may have too much work on, and a desirable contractor (EB) that definitely has too much work on.
The Senate inquiry into Australian Naval Shipbuilding handed down its second interim report recently. As the title indicates - “A Shambles: We Don’t Think, We Know” - it is not flattering of the whole process.
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Navalshipbuilding/Second_Interim_Report
OOPS - I spotted two (big typos !) Please use this version if you think it of value.
BL.
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ALL CHANGE AT ODESSA
If you had a crystal ball and, somehow, KNEW that the over-comfy, over complacent western world would be looking (to an authoritarian dictator) like soft, ripe fruit to be plucked within the next five years - then which national security policies and what specific force development priorities would you take to the Australian public at the 2022 election ?
Up until the AUKUS announcement, the RAN was to get twelve 4,000 tonne submarines - probably with pump jets, more reloads, lithium batteries, nicer bunks and an improved wine selection. Not fundamentally a bad choice of future submarine force structure, but hardly transformative.
After AUKUS and the associated Australian SSN project were unveiled last year, many of us thought we were dreaming. Yes, the range and endurance of an SSN can't be beat, but does Australia really want eight 8,000 tonne submarines with an IOC of 2038 and FOC in the distant future ? UK / US submarine industrial choke points and, hence, lead times mean that is the best offer Australia is likely to get.
With Boris and Scotty so close to their use-by dates, a fast, tough decision to get two Astute boats under the Australian flag on extended wet lease from the RN, on (pretty much) any terms the UK Government could conjure up, will have passed from being 'not bloody likely' to being 'damn near impossible'.
The choice between a UK Astute(ish) or US Virginia boat attracted a lot of excitement; but choosing whether to have manned submarines at all gets no ink. Choosing whether to push hard (i.e. budget whatever amount is needed) to bring SSN FOC forward gets no ink; just as giving the RAAF an extra 100 F-35s and defending all its bases with the CEA equivalent of AEGIS Ashore is outside of mainstream discussion.
But after Putin's forces crossed the Ukraine border - the horizon for defense preparedness just grew far closer. Can we really foresee no credible threats to Australian sovereignty for the next 5 years, let alone the 15 years it would take to get SSNs into the RAN ?
Recapitalizing Australia's submarine fleet was, probably, the right thing to do . . . until (as in post-complacency Germany) realization set in that the post 1945 rules-based system of international relations is being quickly supplanted by an old style power-based system and that the bitter fruits of that change are likely to hit like a tsunami; i.e. very, very fast with little or no warning.
It might now be too late to get SSNs into RAN service before such a transformation in the Navy's ability to operate outside the range of RAAF air cover comes too late to matter. Too late to deter authoritarian adventurism and its lethal brand of armed policy coercion.
Hopefully, there is somebody around who will soon brief the potential post election leaders of this fair country that any new kit or additional resources (eg. a much upsized strategic fuel reserve) that can't be ready to go by 2028, not 2038, are the wrong defense capability to prioritize in a changed world while Russian troops are marching on Odessa.
BUREAUCRATUS LEX March 03, 2022
Thanks Anonymous [at Mar 2, 2022, 10:27:00 PM]
See my response to your comments - at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/03/aukus-sub-us-may-have-more-capacity-alp.html of March 3, 2022.
Regards Pete
Hi LEX
I'll reply to your well couched conumdruns on the morrow.
Cheers Pete
Hi Pete,
Peter Dutton (spell check says that should be mutton) said on ABC Insiders this morning that our subs will have vertical launch tubes. Then said a minute later we are receiving them sooner rather than later.
This can only mean late model or new Virginias. There is no sooner from the UK. The US is scheduled to build an extra Virginia in the next few years showing they have some capacity to ramp up production to more than 2 per year.
Thanks David Candy
1. SSNs - Dutton speaking on video, today, to "The Insiders" indeed includes AUKUS nuclear propelled submarine capability. See https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-06/peter-dutton-flags-australian-military-support-for-taiwan/100886412
35 seconds into the video Dutton states "it allows potentially VERTICAL LAUNCH SYSTEM or some use of missiles"
Pete Comment
This should "mean late model or new Virginias".
Then again once the ball passes to Australian sub-warship selectors they often go the hard route. They choose an option that takes the most effort, highest costs and longest project times, which may mean:
vertical launch on a future class of UK subs "SSN(R)s" that have not even been designed yet.
----------
2. A case in point is Australia's Hunter-class future frigates:
Greg Sheridan, The Australian, March 4, 2022 opines https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/a-wakeup-call-for-the-west-we-need-to-beef-up-our-defence/news-story/5cd7a7370a205ed96cfc9ad540e032b8
"Then there are the nine Hunter-class anti-submarine warfare frigates we plan to build. The [RAN] was told to choose a mature design and make minimum changes.
So it naturally rejected the Italian Fremm, which actually exists and was chosen by the US navy. It naturally rejected the Navantia bid, which would have used the hull we were familiar with building for our air warfare destroyers. Instead, prisoners of their deepest pathologies, the navy chose the British Type 26 frigate, which is still not finished with its design work even today and is not yet in service in the British navy.
We made so many modifications the notional frigate now weighs 10,000 tonnes and will be slow, cumbersome and uncompetitive. It will have a pitiful 32 vertical launch cells to fire missiles and only one helicopter to hunt subs. As an ASPI report observed: “Of all contemporary warships, it seems to be the most expensive for getting missiles to sea.” The project is already delayed by years. It will be a miracle if the first Hunter comes into service by the mid-2030s.
If it weren’t for the diplomatic cost of upsetting the Brits, there is substantial sentiment to cancel the Hunter frigate.
In 2007 John Howard wanted to buy the US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer but succumbed to cabinet and non-navy defence leaders preferring the smaller AWD. The Arleigh Burke is magnificent – 96 vertical launch cells and two anti-sub helicopters. No need for modifications. Whoever wins the next election should scrap the Hunters and buy Arleigh Burkes."
Regards Pete
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