Following September 16's, 2021 future Aus-N Sub announcement surprise, my good friend Gary Brown has penned the following excellent article. Gary has been knowledgeable about and written about submarines and regional geo-strategic issues longer than your humble sub-human (moi).
"In science there’s a maxim that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. In strategic studies, one might paraphrase this to be: extraordinary decisions require extraordinary circumstances to justify them.
The Government’s decision to embrace nuclear propulsion – not weaponry – for the next generation of our submarine fleet, paralleled by the decisions of the United States and Great Britain to grant us access to this technology, is certainly extraordinary.
In the past I have been highly critical of Australia’s management of major defence acquisitions. In retirement I have largely held my peace, leaving such issues for later generations of analysts to deal with. But those interested could scrutinize my detailed submission to the Australian Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee in 2003, which is submission no.12 at this site:
One of my key criticisms at that time was the mulish pig-headedness which led to “good money being thrown after bad” – that is, persisting with an acquisition which has begun to go off-track despite mounting evidence. This behavior was driven by an unwillingness to admit that a mistake had been made in the first instance. Numerous major projects ended up costing far more for less than was expected: two of the most notorious being the Over-The-Horizon radar network (then called JORN) and the Collins class submarines. The latter required extensive extra investment to get them up to acceptable levels of performance and safety.
The current Government’s submarine decision, radical and controversial though it be, certainly breaks this paradigm. It has been apparent for some time that the French had misled Australia as to its level of industry participation in their conventional submarine design. Straws in the wind suggested that there might also be other operational deficiencies.
In sending the French packing the Government has certainly made a “courageous” (in the Yes Minister sense) choice. It was also a correct one: bailing out before good money followed bad down the French black hole. The Government will simply have to wear the criticisms (already coming, as they ought, from the Opposition) that its 2016 decision to take the French option was wrong, and is going to cost a significant, though still unknown, sum to escape from.
That said, the decision to go nuclear-powered is one of the most fundamental made by any Australian government. This decision was taken in a context of a deteriorating strategic environment driven chiefly by the aggressive, unrepentant and dangerous ambitions of the Chinese tyranny led by “President for Life” Xi Jinping. This megalomaniac dictator has proven by his conduct that China can no longer be expected to operate in a rules-driven strategic context. Its rejection of an adverse decision by the International Court in the Hague against its ludicrous South Seas claims was of course inevitable, but it does demonstrate that as far as Beijing is concerned might makes right. The mass incarceration of Uyghur Muslims is a human rights crime that likely would have gotten one hanged at Nuremberg in 1946. China’s casual disregard for assurances given at the time of the return of Hong Kong, so that in Hong Kong now there is no longer freedom of speech or assembly, likewise demonstrates the regime cannot be trusted to keep its word.
I think that Canberra had little choice but to do as it has. The French are a lost cause: more importantly, the operational advantages of nuclear propulsion over conventional are obvious. With the former, the time a boat can stay submerged is ultimately limited not by fuel, but crew endurance (somewhere around four months is usual before crew stability could become an issue, and of course submarine crew members undergo extensive vetting: it is no place for claustrophobes, to give an obvious example).
But this decision is all about deterrence. It will undoubtedly improve Australia’s regional strategic position and capability, and by doing this we firmly integrate ourselves into a coherent western strategic framework in the region.
The Australian Labor Party has already said it will support the decision subject to three conditions:
· No requirement of a domestic civil nuclear industry.
· No acquisition of nuclear weapons.
· The agreement will be compatible with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
These conditions are reasonable and ought to be met. It is to be hoped the government does not try to use them to “wedge” the Opposition. To do so could derail our long-term submarine program at a time when we already behind schedule due to time wasted on the French deal.
There is one vital caveat to all of this: the strategic context in which we have taken this decision is one of coherent and consistent US policy in the Asia-Pacific. Perhaps the greatest threat to the success of this arrangement would be the election of another Trumpist administration in 2024. Its isolationism, general ignorance of and disinterest in multlilateral cooperation could place Australia in a very difficult situation. If Trump or a lookalike again turns US policy into the chaotic mess it become in Trump’s time, we will have a serious problem.
There are other matters to consider too. The most important of these will surround the construction and operational support of these nuclear-powered boats. Where will they be built? Where will the power reactors be installed? Where will we go for refueling and (hopefully not) repair of the reactors? Will we have priority access or simply have to get in the queue of US nuclear-powered attack boats awaiting maintenance? And so on.
And then there’s the overarching threat the whole human race faces: climate change and its consequences. Climate change will come looking for the Chinese just as surely as it threatens us, and China is immensely vulnerable. There will be huge costs for the regime as it tries to deal with the effects. Maybe they won’t have time or incentive to indulge in foolish military adventurism. There’s oil in the disputed South China Sea region? So what? When the world goes to electric cars and renewable energy, what price oil then and how much risk is it worth taking to acquire it?
Debate over this decision will doubtless be extensive and passionate. The nuclear pill is a bitter dose to swallow, but I fear that without it we could find ourselves at a significant regional strategic disadvantage. We are small: we depend on technology to give our armed forces the capabilities they need to remain credible in an increasingly dangerous strategic environment.
One last point. As I said, this is about deterrence. Given that a failed military adventure would likely destabilize his regime and maybe cost Xi Jinping his life if he had to be removed by some sort of coup, the best way to keep the peace is to keep him and his advisors worried: he will not risk a conflict unless he is certain of success. We are doing our bit to make sure he never will be certain."
10 comments:
Deterrence by definition implies nuclear weapons.
The AUKUS announcement will have major implications worldwide on nuclear nonproliferation. It may not be known to many that weapons grade highly enriched uranium is exempt from IAEA inspection when a nation state claims it is for marine nuclear power plant, like a US nuclear submarine. So Iran for example can now make that claim and be perfectly legal to produce and keep HEU. Any other nations wanting to do the same?
The French Barracuda circumvents the nonproliferation issue of HEU by adopting an LEU power plant. Prospects of France selling Barracuda to India or other nations likely have improved tremendously with the US opening this pandora box.
KQN
Naval Group had ridiculed Australia too much.
Good read, I agree with most of the points, especially about the value of deterrence. I think it's worth pointing out though that the majority of oil is not used for energy production, but rather for chemical processes (creating polymers, plastics, etc.). The rise of the battery industry to support EVs and other "green" technology fields might actually give oil a new breath of life.
Agree with Gary Brown.
Australia's number one strategic concern for the next generation or so is the threat of Chinese expansionism. In that time frame, China is likely stronger than any combination against it, except with (questionable) US help. Australia's only meaningful option, other than hoping they are outside of China's area of interest, is to add to deterrence, and here getting off-the-shelf SSN is clearly the better military option. Yes, politics are more complicated, but failure to deter is by far the worst option. Threat may be in a decade, but by then it will be too late to act.
If the past century is any guide, the cost of fighting an aggression once it breaks out greatly exceeds the cost of deterring it.
Agree with Gary Brown: (continued)
Also assuming the focus of the policy is to deter Xi Jin Ping, Australian SSN's are only part of the solution. Something is needed to make an attack on Taiwan prohibitively risky, or at the veryleast make a quick victory uncertain.
This is harder to do: Australia (and many other relevant countries) are too economically dependent on China, so some low profile strengthening of Taiwan would be in order.
Taiwan must not become the hole in the "Cordon Sanitaire". If it were, Chinese political/diplomatic pressure on other South China Sea would become irresistable.
To KQN aka Anonymous @ 4:20AM
I doubt India would be interested in acquiring Barracuda SSN lock, stock & barrel. Yes it's a technologically advanced boat, but India's submarine infrastructure at present in formed around the 40% enriched HEU (on Arihant-class SSBN) and wants to move towards 90-95% enrichment for the future SSBN & SSN classes.
The French LEU reactor doesn't fit into this.
What India IS likely to receive (and be happy to) is probably the various formative technologies that MAKE the Barracuda so good - namely the sonars, pumpjet propulsion, optronic masts, combat management & noise-reduction elements. None of these are nuclear or strategic in nature in of themselves, so no big deal either way if talking about N-proliferation.
Remains to be seen what France is willing to provide, but now India is the only big player left if France continues to want an "in" on the Indo-Pacific.
Yeah, I forgot that the reactors use HEU as fuel. GE will have to set up shop in Australia if the reactors are locally made. If Australia were shrewd, it would purchase 3-6 ships from either the US or UK and then build the next generation or block. The latter might be more preferable for the experience and knowledge gained and implemented immediately, but the former gives Australia time to create the necessary infrastructure and supply chains.
Why would any SSN be a deterrent if it does not have nuclear weapons? Can someone explain how?
Neither FONOP nor an SSN, not even an SSBN or for that any vessel or submarine, will be able to change China's 9-dash line, which they claim as their maritime boundaries.
At least a coast guard vessel can show the flag and mark its territory. No one wants to start a war, for sure the American people today are not yet on board, so at best you can only stare at each other.
A submarine is useful in wartime but in peacetime, it is under water so no one even sees it.
The US focuses lacks a global economic strategy for Asia, and in the next 10 years, it is the economy that tilts the balance.
KQN
Tokyo welcomes Canberra’s decision [1].
[1] https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/e9d73c25fd3896860a2a8d179e8eed1b834d6d7e.
On Sept/17/2021, Japanese government source (=Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) said "Japan has more room for joint action, if Australia's range of action after owning a nuclear submarine with technical cooperation from the United States and Britain expands to the East China Sea and the waters around Japan."
Regards
AUKUS is a strategic alliance. The SSN program is a significant means to strengthen an alliance that has a common threat in the Indo Pacific. China is an existential threat whether we choose to acknowledge it or not. Australia has decided in the interest of its own national security to align itself closer to the U.S./UK. The alternative is to submit to China. China does not believe in a peaceful rise. Its actions to-date demonstrates such a behavior.
I believe that there is significant precedence that both shaped and guided the US/UK toward this strategic arrangement with Australia.
In 1958,the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement which authorized the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology between the allies created two enduring effect. This cooperation had a major impact on the strength and cohesion of the U.S.-U.K. alliance. U.S.-U.K. cooperation on the U.K. SSN program in the 1950s helped the UK assume a bigger role in allied blue-water operations to counter the Soviet Union at sea. The UK was able to contribute more to allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the Soviet navy farther from U.K. shores because of the added endurance and sensor capabilities of its SSNs. The two countries used their advanced capabilities to great effect: “The U.S. and U.K. together built a data base on every Soviet submarine class and every hull within each class. Speed, depth, operating characteristics, and crew performance could all be observed
and recorded. The superior stealth of well-handled U.S. and U.K. submarines
permitted penetration of the most sensitive and dangerous areas to observe and
record weapons trials. (Source: Anthony Wells, A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and Strategy in the United States Navy and Royal Navy, 1960–2015 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).
Such an alliance in AUKUS is following a pathway that has delivered dividends before and hopefully will do so again in the the Indo Pacific.
Brumby
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