Jive's Sub Brief: Russia's Secret Sonar System

On October 24, 2020 former US sonar specialist submariner, "Jive", uploaded a brief on Russia's new  Harmony Autonomous Seabed Sonar System (built under Project Cephalopod). The video brief is here https://youtu.be/Axvo1LwCEBc and below: 

In publishing the video Jive thanks H.I.Sutton (of hisutton.com) @covertshores and CSIS.org. Jive clarifies a comment made about Malachite to say that it is a Design Bureau not a shipyard.

Broadly speaking there are 2 major types of fixed sonar arrays:

1. the very long, large transoceanic Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS which still exist in all oceans! eg. see Section B.) type that can detect and locate submarines (by triangulation) 1,000s of km away. This type is better for deep, open ocean where there is less sound distortion caused by shallow seabeds, rocks, islands and other landforms.

and

2. Reliable Acoustic Path/Fixed Distributed System RAP/FDS systems (like "Harmony" in the video) which have many more sensor-receivers (and active sonars) per km permitting more acute location of close submarines/UUVs. They are much better suited to sound-distorted conditions (eg. shallow water, littorals, and relatively narrow waters between landforms). They can be combined with fixed or mobile mines/UUVs (which may use lightweight torpedos) to defend high value assets (eg. one's submarine bases). This may involve destruction of snooping enemy submarines or AUVs/UUVs in wartime and perhaps on the approaches to, or in, one's bases/ports/harbours even during cold wars.

Both sonar array types can work together and can detect, then locate, enemy submarines/AUVs/diver delivery vehicles/small boats/or USVs in order to "cue" friendly submarines or other naval, air assets or land-based missiles onto the enemy vessels. 

Enjoy the video, where Jive concludes that systems like Harmony are now sensitive enough for the Russians to hear Western reconnaissance submarines coming.

LIB costs & numbers for Japan’s Oryu, Toryu and Taigei Submarines

Following the October 19, 2020 article on Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) numbers Anonymous reported, on October 27, 2020, further information on LIB costs, numbers and arrangements for Japan’s most recent 3 submarines.

Japanese Soryu Mk 2 submarines Oryu (27SS) equip with 640 LIBs (battery modules) (=320 LIBs x 2 groups [1, 2] ) and Toryu (28SS) with possible 679 LIBs [3]. First of the new submarine class Taigei (29SS) may equip with 672 LIBs (=336 LIBs x 2 groups [3] ) and has somewhat improved power compared with 27SS or 28SS.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is developing a new power storage and supply system [4]. Onsite testing of the system might be conducted by using Taigei as a test ship. 

[1] http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/SMC-8B%20P_9_s.png

[2] Battery modules in a group are presumably consisted of two sets i.e., 240 and 80 battery modules.

[3] The price of LIBs (all of the new “SLH” type made by Japanese company GS Yuasa) are:
- 8.3 Billion Yen (US$80 million) for Oryu 28SS,
- 8.6 B Yen (US$83 million) for Toryu 29SS and
- 8.4 B Yen (US$81 million) for Taigei 30SS.
Price of defense equipment usually goes down every year. But, in 29SS, price of LIBs went up compared with 28SS suggesting increased number of LIBs. If 28SS equips with 640 LIBs, then perhaps the estimated number of LIBs in 29SS is 679 [=640 x 8.6 /(8.3 x (8.4/8.6))]. Then, the most likely number of LIBs for 30SS is 672 (=28 columns x 12 rows x 2 groups) based on pricing, cancellation of stray magnetic field and so on.

[4] Research and trial production of high-efficiency power storage and supply system for submarines. Trial production (budget 8.2 billion yen (US$79 million)) and offsite testing will be conducted in 2019-2022 and 2023, respectively.

From the LIB information above see the estimated number of LIBs and their known cost of LIBs (in Billions Yen) for 28SS, 29SS and 30SS in the Table below.

Japanese Submarine Table as at October 28, 2020. 

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio currents	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993 2 x 12V25/25S  diesels for all Oyashio class (each diesel  2,000kW)	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios  10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu/ Dragon class  Mk I	8116 Sōryū dragons	SS-501	¥60B FY2004 all Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki  12V25/25SB  diesels may total (6,000kW sidebar) see and + 4 AIP SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
21SS LIBs Concept Research Project			No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	12 Mar 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryū	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014 last SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	18 Mar 2019	KHI
27SS a Soryu "Mk II" as it has LIBs. 1st Soryu Mk II	8126 Oryū 11th Soryu	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015  with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,200kW)  SMC-8B motor Cost of estimated 640 LIBs is ¥8.3B	LIBs only (SLH type)	Nov 2015	4 Oct 2018	5 Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Soryu Mk II, 12th & final Soryu	8127 Toryu	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016 still 12V25/25SB.  "2,900t" surfaced Cost of estimated 679 LIBs is ¥8.6B	SLH LIBs	Jan 2017	6 Nov  2019	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First of new class Taigei (Big Whale) Class Correlation of Whales and Ghosts in Japanese Mythology	8128 Taigei	SS-513	¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29) Higher ¥76B  budget being first of class  with  new 12V25/31S  diesels (2,500- 2,800kW?)   New Combat System features. Cost of estimated 672 LIBs is ¥8.4B	SLH LIBs	2017?	14 Oct 2020	Mar 2022	MHI
30SS  Second of Taigei Class		SS-513	¥71.5B FY2018  (Heisei 30) 12V25/31S diesels	SLH LIBs	2018?	2020?	2022?	MHI?
01SS?  Third of  Taigei Class	8029?	SS-514	¥B? FY2019 (Reiwa 01) 12V25/31S  diesels	SLH LIBs maybe 960+	2019?	2021?	2023?	KHI?
02SS?   Fourth of  Taigei Class	8030?	SS-515	¥B? FY2020 (Reiwa 02) Improved SLH LIBS 2 x Diesels uprated 12V25/31S or newer  (each likely 3,000+kW?)	Impro ved SLH LIBs	2020?	2022?	2024?	MHI?
03SS	8031?	SS-516	¥B? FY2021	LIBs	2021?	2023?	2025?	KHI?
04SS	8032?	SS-517	¥B? FY2022	LIBs	2022?	2024?	2026?	MHI?
05SS	8033?	SS-518	¥B? FY2023	LIBs	2023?	2025?	2027?	KHI?
06SS	8034?	SS-519	¥B? FY2024	LIBs	2024?	2026?	2028?	MHI?
07SS	8035?	SS-520	¥B? FY2025	LIBs	2025?	2027?	2029?	KHI?
08SS	8036?	SS-521	¥B? FY2026	LIBs	2026?	2028?	2030?	MHI?

Key to Table: Table information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 

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Australian Navy Shifts Focus from Middle East to China's Asia-Pacific

Foreign Affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic and Defence Correspondent Andrew Greene, of Australia’s Government owned ABC News, reported, October 23, 2020:

“Australia no longer sending Navy to the Middle East, shifts focus to Asia-Pacific, China”

A three-decades-long Australian naval presence in the Middle East [under Operation MANITOU] will come to an abrupt end this year as the Federal Government grapples with an increasingly uncertain strategic environment closer to home.

Defence Minister Linda Reynolds [a former Brigadier!] has announced Australia will no longer send a Royal Australian Navy ship to the Middle East every year.

The last Australian Navy ship deployed to the region, HMAS Toowoomba, returned to Australia in June this year.

Australia will also withdraw from the United States-led naval coalition patrolling the Strait of Hormuz at the end of 2020.

That means around 30 years of Australian maritime operations in the Middle East — largely focussed on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations — will soon come to an end.

In a statement, Senator Reynolds said the Government's priorities had shifted.

"This year alone has seen [the] Navy respond to the bushfire and COVID-19 crises, a five-ship deployment throughout South-East Asia and the Pacific, a continued commitment to initiatives under the Pacific Step Up, and several highly successful activities with our regional partners," Minister Reynolds said.

"We now face an increasingly challenging strategic environment which is placing greater demand on ADF resources closer to home."

"As a result, the Australian Defence Force will reduce its naval presence in the Middle East to enable more resources to be deployed in our region."

The shift was flagged in the Government's recent Defence Strategic Update, which declared that deteriorating strategic circumstances would force the military to focus more sharply on the Indo-Pacific and Australia's immediate region.

China has engaged in a massive naval build-up over the last decade, as well as asserting increasing control over the contested waters of the South China Sea by building a series of military fortifications.

The relationship between the United States and China has also become increasingly hostile, sharply raising the risk of conflict in the region.

Australia has participated in a growing number of naval exercises in the region with a series of allies and partners, including the United States and Japan.

Earlier this year Australian warships encountered the Chinese Navy while sailing near contested islands claimed by Beijing on their way to trilateral exercises.

[Inset: If [Australian Prime Minister] Morrison's defence strategy sounds like war talk, that's because it is.]

Next month the Australian Navy will also re-join the Malabar naval exercises with the US, Japan and India after a hiatus of more than a decade.

Senior officials, military officers and Morrison Government ministers have been contemplating the shift away from the Middle East for several years.

Last year there was debate inside the Federal Government when the Trump Administration asked Australia to join a US-led naval coalition to protect ships in the Strait of Hormuz near Iran.

In the end, the Morrison Government agreed to send a surveillance aircraft and a frigate to join the mission.

But one Government source told the ABC the decision was "pretty hotly contested."

The [Australian Defence Force’s] Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, said the change announced by the Government was "historic" and Senator Reynolds declared Australia could be "proud" of its naval contribution.

"For over 30 years we have supported freedom of navigation, maritime security and the free flow of commerce in the Middle East," she said.

"In cooperation with our partners, our commitments have been invaluable in disrupting global drugs trade, supporting the reduction of funding lines to terrorism activity and building the capacity of regional forces."

Singapore's Chinook Helicopters Qualify on Australia's LHDs

See Australia's Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) article, of October 26, 2020, at

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/australia-singapore-works-on-joint-helo-exercises/

RN's Future Dreadnought OR USN's Columbia SSBN Better?

Should the video title "Which is better !! Royal Navy’s Dreadnought vs US Navy’s Columbia, Future submarines" be asked at all? 

The video, uploaded by "HUF HACK" October 20, 2020, is here https://youtu.be/vCyRPxqzR08 and below:

Comparing China's and the US's Combat Power

I think Australia’s ABC News video title “How China is flexing its military muscle under the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping” is off the mark.

Also ABC’s comparison of China and US power shows limitations. For example implying a Chinese aircraft carrier can be compared 1-to-1 with an American one? Comparing recent, large scale, operational experience?

The video is here https://youtu.be/sK89YutzjBQ and below. What do you think?

"Jive's" Sub Brief: India's INS Arihant class SSBN Project

 "Jive" (an ex-USN electronic warfare (sonar) specialist submariner through to the 2000s) here https://youtu.be/stoYRQKhKtQ and below 

provides a briefing on India's nuclear submarine Arihant class/"Advanced Technology Vessel" project. From the video:

1:40 -  Project 932 (for a submarine reactors and nuclear subs (SSBN and SSNs) began in the 1970s.

2:10 - in the early 1980s the top Russian military leadership announce and commence Transfer of Technology (ToT) of nuclear subs especially reactors to India. 

3:00 as a technology and training demonstrator, Soviet Charlie-class SSGN, is leased to India for 4 years from 1987 being called INS Chakra I.

4:15 another demonstrator, a Russian Akula class SSN, is leased to India for 10 years from 2012, called INS Chakra II. At end of lease in 2022 it is expected India will buy it outright.

5:20 Jive is wrong in saying the keel of INS Arihant was laid down in "2009". 2009 was the year Arihant was launched - see here "July 26, 2009" and here. Meanwhile INS Arighat's keel was laid down 2011. Both "very short" for SSBNs, so have few meters/little space for missile compartments.

7:00 Bow of Arihant very similar to Kilo class, according to photos Jive presents. Jive then assumes  Arihant has the bow of the design and size/beam of a diesel electric Kilo sub. Jive assumes Arihant therefore has 6 x 530mm torpedo tubes (capable of launching "Kalibr" [or Klub?] land attack SLCMs.

8:12 Jives assumes the Arihant has an USHUS-2 indigenous bow sonar system, based in Russian Rubicon-M

8:42 The sail and non (hull) penetrating masts (eg. photonic) etc. Non penetrating reduces flooding risks.

10:40 Arihant's ballistic missile capacity is minor, but a good start.

11:45 Combat system (Russian derived?) and steering/diving

13:50 Exterior. "INS Arihant at sea."

Jive concludes India developing several SSBNs and SLBM types is a "huge advance" done quickly and in line with non-proliferation treaties [except for proliferating the nuclear weapons? Noting some international reactions to 1998 nuclear tests.].

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Submarine Matters has numerous articles on Arihant, Arighat, submarine reactors, SLBMs and India's whole submarine fleet since 2009.

Naval Group to repair French ‘Perle’ SSN damaged by fire

By chopping Perle in half! 

See https://www.defensenews.com/smr/euronaval/2020/10/22/naval-group-will-repair-french-perle-nuclear-sub-damaged-by-fire/

Japan maintains Plutonium stockpile: Useful for Nuclear Weapons

PETE COMMENT

It appears Japan has maintained a large Plutonium stockpile because Plutonium, being the most common, modern, nuclear explosive, gives Japan a future option of a nuclear weapons capability.

Alternatively Japan maintains such a high profile nuclear breakout capacity to encourage continuing US maintenance of the nuclear deterrent umbrella against Japan's possible enemies (North Korea, China and Russia). 

Japan and the US both realize that if Japan moved toward building its own nuclear deterrent this would severely destabilize the power balance in East Asia, eg. leading North Korea and China to rapidly enlarge their nuclear arsenals. Also South Korea and Taiwan might be tempted to follow Japan's indigenous nuclear weapons lead. 

So the US is better off maintaining the nuclear umbrella so Japan doesn't need to build its own.

ARTICLE

MARI YAMAGUCHI for Associated Press, has written an excellent article, dated October 21, 2020, at https://apnews.com/article/cabinets-recycling-yoshihide-suga-energy-policy-japan-66218c8a44a498a1535380066da466e9 .

“Japan sticks to nuke fuel cycle despite plutonium stockpile”

TOKYO (AP) — Japan’s government said Wednesday it will pursue its nuclear fuel recycling program that would involve extracting plutonium from spent fuel, despite international concerns about the country’s already huge plutonium stockpile and lack of prospects for effectively consuming it as nuclear fuel.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato, at a meeting with the governor of Aomori prefecture, home to Japan’s pending nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, reaffirmed that new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government will pursue the country’s nuclear energy policy.

“The government will firmly promote our nuclear energy policy and fuel cycle programs,” Kato said. He said Japan will make effort to reduce volume and toxicity of high-level nuclear waste, and extract plutonium from spent fuel from a resource conservation point of view.

But critics say continuation of spent fuel reprocessing only adds to Japan’s already large plutonium stockpile. Japan also lacks a final repository for high-level nuclear waste.

Wednesday’s meeting came after the Nuclear Regulation Authority granted a safety approval this past summer for the Rokkasho fuel reprocessing plant, operated by Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., located in northern Japan, for a planned launch in 2022. The authority also gave a preliminary permit for the Rokkasho MOX fuel production plant, also planned for completion in 2022.

Japan now has 45.5 tons of separated plutonium — 8.9 tons at home, and 36.6 tons in Britain and France, where spent fuel from Japanese nuclear plants has been reprocessed and stored because Japan lacks a plant to produce MOX fuel containing plutonium at home. The amount is enough to make about 6,000 atomic bombs.

Despite security concerns raised by Washington and others, the stockpile is hardly decreasing due to difficulties in achieving a full nuclear fuel recycling program and slow restarts of reactors amid setbacks from the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

Japan reprocesses spent fuel, instead of disposing it as waste, to extract plutonium and uranium to make MOX fuel for reuse, while the U.S. discontinued the costly and challenging program. Allowed under international safeguard rules, Japan is the only non-nuclear weapons state that separates plutonium for peaceful purposes, though the same technology can make atomic bombs.

Japan has pledged not to possess excess plutonium and to put a cap on the amount of extraction from spent fuel. The Rokkasho plant operator rules out any proliferation risks, citing tight safeguards and close monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency."

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Follow Mari Yamaguchi on Twitter at https://www.twitter.com/mariyamaguchi

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FURTHER READING

See Submarine Matters' articles on Japan’s nuclear weapons capabilities written in 2008,  2012, 2013, 2016 and 2018.

Indonesia rejects US P-8 ASW&ISR aircraft on Natuna Islands

Reuters reports, October 20, 2020 on the Indonesian rejection: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-usa-exclusive/exclusive-indonesia-rejected-u-s-request-to-host-spy-planes-officials-idUSKBN2750KX 

Indonesia's Natuna Islands (see map below) are strategically located on the southern edge of the South China Sea and contain a dual-use civil-military airport/base (photo below) that could take US, Australian and New Zealand P-8 Poseidons. The location and runway make it highly likely that this is the Indonesian base that Indonesia could use to cater for US P-8s. The base could refuel and provide  low level (some spare parts) maintenance for US P-8s. Indonesian navy ships and submarines can already visit Indonesia's small naval base on the Natuna Islands. See details here and here.

The map above marks Indonesia's Natuna Islands (point 4) which are geographically at the center of Indonesia’s seaspace claim into the South China Sea – a claim which partly overlaps with China's so-called nine-dash line that envelopes most of the South China Sea. (Map courtesy Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative via the Sydney Morning Herald)

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Above is the Indonesian civil-military airport on Natuna Besar.
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Both the map and photo are from James Massola’s and Amilia Rosa’s, Sydney Morning Herald article of June 27, 2020, reporting an ongoing geopolitical Indonesia-China standoff, at https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/natuna-an-idyll-on-the-front-line-between-indonesia-and-china-20200617-p553g2.html.