October 30, 2020

Jive's Sub Brief: Russia's Secret Sonar System

On October 24, 2020 former US sonar specialist submariner, "Jive", uploaded a brief on Russia's new  Harmony Autonomous Seabed Sonar System (built under Project Cephalopod). The video brief is here https://youtu.be/Axvo1LwCEBc and below: 


In publishing the video Jive thanks H.I.Sutton (of hisutton.com) @covertshores and CSIS.org. Jive clarifies a comment made about Malachite to say that it is a Design Bureau not a shipyard.

Broadly speaking there are 2 major types of fixed sonar arrays:

1. the very long, large transoceanic Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS which still exist in all oceans! eg. see Section B.) type that can detect and locate submarines (by triangulation) 1,000s of km away. This type is better for deep, open ocean where there is less sound distortion caused by shallow seabeds, rocks, islands and other landforms.

and

2. Reliable Acoustic Path/Fixed Distributed System RAP/FDS systems (like "Harmony" in the video) which have many more sensor-receivers (and active sonars) per km permitting more acute location of close submarines/UUVs. They are much better suited to sound-distorted conditions (eg. shallow water, littorals, and relatively narrow waters between landforms). They can be combined with fixed or mobile mines/UUVs (which may use lightweight torpedos) to defend high value assets (eg. one's submarine bases). This may involve destruction of snooping enemy submarines or AUVs/UUVs in wartime and perhaps on the approaches to, or in, one's bases/ports/harbours even during cold wars.

Both sonar array types can work together and can detect, then locate, enemy submarines/AUVs/diver delivery vehicles/small boats/or USVs in order to "cue" friendly submarines or other naval, air assets or land-based missiles onto the enemy vessels. 

Enjoy the video, where Jive concludes that systems like Harmony are now sensitive enough for the Russians to hear Western reconnaissance submarines coming.

October 28, 2020

LIB costs & numbers for Japan’s Oryu, Toryu and Taigei Submarines

Following the October 19, 2020 article on Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) numbers Anonymous reported, on October 27, 2020, further information on LIB costs, numbers and arrangements for Japan’s most recent 3 submarines.

Japanese Soryu Mk 2 submarines Oryu (27SS) equip with 640 LIBs (battery modules) (=320 LIBs x 2 groups [1, 2] ) and Toryu (28SS) with possible 679 LIBs [3]. First of the new submarine class Taigei (29SS) may equip with 672 LIBs (=336 LIBs x 2 groups [3] ) and has somewhat improved power compared with 27SS or 28SS.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is developing a new power storage and supply system [4]. Onsite testing of the system might be conducted by using Taigei as a test ship. 

[1] http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/SMC-8B%20P_9_s.png

[2] Battery modules in a group are presumably consisted of two sets i.e., 240 and 80 battery modules.

[3] The price of LIBs (all of the new “SLH” type made by Japanese company GS Yuasa) are:
- 8.3 Billion Yen (US$80 million) for Oryu 28SS,
- 8.6 B Yen (US$83 million) for Toryu 29SS and
- 8.4 B Yen (US$81 million) for Taigei 30SS.
Price of defense equipment usually goes down every year. But, in 29SS, price of LIBs went up compared with 28SS suggesting increased number of LIBs. If 28SS equips with 640 LIBs, then perhaps the estimated number of LIBs in 29SS is 679 [=640 x 8.6 /(8.3 x (8.4/8.6))]. Then, the most likely number of LIBs for 30SS is 672 (=28 columns x 12 rows x 2 groups) based on pricing, cancellation of stray magnetic field and so on.

[4] Research and trial production of high-efficiency power storage and supply system for submarines. Trial production (budget 8.2 billion yen (US$79 million)) and offsite testing will be conducted in 2019-2022 and 2023, respectively.

From the LIB information above see the estimated number of LIBs and their known cost of LIBs (in Billions Yen) for 28SS, 29SS and 30SS in the Table below.

Japanese Submarine Table as at October 28, 2020. 

SS
No.
Diesel Type
Motor
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥
Billions FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi
ssioned
Built
By
5SS Oyashio
8105 Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B FY1993
2 x 12V25/25S 
diesels for all
Oyashio class
(each diesel 
2,000kW)
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios 
10 subs
SMC-7?
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 15SS Feb
2004
15SS
Nov
2006
15SS
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS
Dragon
class  Mk I
8116
SS-501
¥60B FY2004 all Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki 
12V25/25SB 
diesels may total
(6,000kW
sidebar)
see and + 4 AIP
SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
21SS LIBs Concept
Research
Project
No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
   


22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
12 Oct   2016
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
last SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
2014
6 Nov 2017
KHI
27SS a Soryu
"Mk II" as it
has LIBs. 1st
Soryu Mk II 
8126
Oryū
11th
Soryu
SS-511
¥64.4B FY2015 
with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,200kW) 
SMC-8B motor
Cost of estimated
640 LIBs is ¥8.3B

LIBs only
(SLH type)
Nov
2015
4 Oct
2018
2020
MHI
28SS Soryu
Mk II, 12th &
final Soryu
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
still 12V25/25SB
"2,900t" surfaced
Cost of estimated
679 LIBs is ¥8.6B
SLH
LIBs
Jan 2017
Mar 2021?
KHI
29SS
First of new
class

Taigei
(Big Whale)
Class

Correlation of
Whales and
Ghosts
 in
Japanese
Mythology

8128
Taigei
SS-513
¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29)
Higher ¥76
budget being
first of class 
with  new
12V25/31S 
diesels
(2,500-
2,800kW?) 
 New Combat
System features.
Cost of estimated
672 LIBs is ¥8.4B
SLH
LIBs

2017?

14 Oct
2020 
Mar 2022
MHI

30SS 
Second of
Taigei Class

SS-513
¥71.5B FY2018 
(Heisei 30)
12V25/31S
diesels
SLH
LIBs
2018?
2020?
2022?
MHI?
01SS? 
Third of 
Taigei Class
8029?
SS-514
¥B? FY2019 (Reiwa 01)
12V25/31S 
diesels
SLH
LIBs
maybe
960+
2019?
2021?
2023?
KHI?
02SS?  
Fourth of 
Taigei Class 
8030?
SS-515
¥B? FY2020 (Reiwa 02)
Improved SLH LIBS

2 x Diesels uprated
12V25/31S or newer
 (each likely 3,000+kW?)
Impro
ved SLH
LIBs
2020?
2022?
2024?
MHI?
03SS
8031?
SS-516
¥B? FY2021
LIBs 
2021?
2023?
2025?
KHI?
04SS
8032?
SS-517
¥B? FY2022
LIBs
2022?
2024?
2026?
MHI?
05SS 
8033?
SS-518
¥B? FY2023
LIBs
2023?
2025?
2027?
KHI?
06SS
8034?
SS-519
¥B? FY2024
LIBs 
2024?
2026?
2028?
MHI?
07SS 
8035?
SS-520
¥B? FY2025
LIBs
2025?
2027?
2029?
KHI?
08SS 
8036?
SS-521
¥B? FY2026

LIBs
2026?
2028?2030?
MHI?
Key to Table: Table information exclusively provided to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIB= Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B
 = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 
---

October 27, 2020

Australian Navy Shifts Focus from Middle East to China's Asia-Pacific

Foreign Affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic and Defence Correspondent Andrew Greene, of Australia’s Government owned ABC News, reported, October 23, 2020:

“Australia no longer sending Navy to the Middle East, shifts focus to Asia-Pacific, China”

A three-decades-long Australian naval presence in the Middle East [under Operation MANITOU] will come to an abrupt end this year as the Federal Government grapples with an increasingly uncertain strategic environment closer to home.

Defence Minister Linda Reynolds [a former Brigadier!] has announced Australia will no longer send a Royal Australian Navy ship to the Middle East every year.

The last Australian Navy ship deployed to the region, HMAS Toowoomba, returned to Australia in June this year.

Australia will also withdraw from the United States-led naval coalition patrolling the Strait of Hormuz at the end of 2020.

That means around 30 years of Australian maritime operations in the Middle East — largely focussed on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations — will soon come to an end.

In a statement, Senator Reynolds said the Government's priorities had shifted.

"This year alone has seen [the] Navy respond to the bushfire and COVID-19 crises, a five-ship deployment throughout South-East Asia and the Pacific, a continued commitment to initiatives under the Pacific Step Up, and several highly successful activities with our regional partners," Minister Reynolds said.

"We now face an increasingly challenging strategic environment which is placing greater demand on ADF resources closer to home."

"As a result, the Australian Defence Force will reduce its naval presence in the Middle East to enable more resources to be deployed in our region."

The shift was flagged in the Government's recent Defence Strategic Update, which declared that deteriorating strategic circumstances would force the military to focus more sharply on the Indo-Pacific and Australia's immediate region.

China has engaged in a massive naval build-up over the last decade, as well as asserting increasing control over the contested waters of the South China Sea by building a series of military fortifications.

The relationship between the United States and China has also become increasingly hostile, sharply raising the risk of conflict in the region.

Australia has participated in a growing number of naval exercises in the region with a series of allies and partners, including the United States and Japan.

Earlier this year Australian warships encountered the Chinese Navy while sailing near contested islands claimed by Beijing on their way to trilateral exercises.

[Inset: If [Australian Prime Minister] Morrison's defence strategy sounds like war talk, that's because it is.]

Next month the Australian Navy will also re-join the Malabar naval exercises with the US, Japan and India after a hiatus of more than a decade.

Senior officials, military officers and Morrison Government ministers have been contemplating the shift away from the Middle East for several years.

Last year there was debate inside the Federal Government when the Trump Administration asked Australia to join a US-led naval coalition to protect ships in the Strait of Hormuz near Iran.

In the end, the Morrison Government agreed to send a surveillance aircraft and a frigate to join the mission.

But one Government source told the ABC the decision was "pretty hotly contested."

The [Australian Defence Force’s] Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, said the change announced by the Government was "historic" and Senator Reynolds declared Australia could be "proud" of its naval contribution.

"For over 30 years we have supported freedom of navigation, maritime security and the free flow of commerce in the Middle East," she said.

"In cooperation with our partners, our commitments have been invaluable in disrupting global drugs trade, supporting the reduction of funding lines to terrorism activity and building the capacity of regional forces."

October 26, 2020

RN's Future Dreadnought OR USN's Columbia SSBN Better?

Should the video title "Which is better !! Royal Navy’s Dreadnought vs US Navy’s Columbia, Future submarines" be asked at all? 

The video, uploaded by "HUF HACK" October 20, 2020, is here https://youtu.be/vCyRPxqzR08 and below:


Comparing China's and the US's Combat Power

I think Australia’s ABC News video title “How China is flexing its military muscle under the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping” is off the mark.

Also ABC’s comparison of China and US power shows limitations. For example implying a Chinese aircraft carrier can be compared 1-to-1 with an American one? Comparing recent, large scale, operational experience?

The video is here https://youtu.be/sK89YutzjBQ and below. What do you think?


October 23, 2020

"Jive's" Sub Brief: India's INS Arihant class SSBN Project

 "Jive" (an ex-USN electronic warfare (sonar) specialist submariner through to the 2000s) here https://youtu.be/stoYRQKhKtQ and below 


provides a briefing on India's nuclear submarine Arihant class/"Advanced Technology Vessel" project. From the video:

1:40 -  Project 932 (for a submarine reactors and nuclear subs (SSBN and SSNs) began in the 1970s.

2:10 - in the early 1980s the top Russian military leadership announce and commence Transfer of Technology (ToT) of nuclear subs especially reactors to India. 

3:00 as a technology and training demonstrator, Soviet Charlie-class SSGN, is leased to India for 4 years from 1987 being called INS Chakra I.

4:15 another demonstrator, a Russian Akula class SSN, is leased to India for 10 years from 2012, called INS Chakra II. At end of lease in 2022 it is expected India will buy it outright.

5:20 Jive is wrong in saying the keel of INS Arihant was laid down in "2009". 2009 was the year Arihant was launched - see here "July 26, 2009" and here. Meanwhile INS Arighat's keel was laid down 2011. Both "very short" for SSBNs, so have few meters/little space for missile compartments.

7:00 Bow of Arihant very similar to Kilo class, according to photos Jive presents. Jive then assumes  Arihant has the bow of the design and size/beam of a diesel electric Kilo sub. Jive assumes Arihant therefore has 6 x 530mm torpedo tubes (capable of launching "Kalibr" [or Klub?] land attack SLCMs.

8:12 Jives assumes the Arihant has an USHUS-2 indigenous bow sonar system, based in Russian Rubicon-M

8:42 The sail and non (hull) penetrating masts (eg. photonic) etc. Non penetrating reduces flooding risks.

10:40 Arihant's ballistic missile capacity is minor, but a good start.

11:45 Combat system (Russian derived?) and steering/diving

13:50 Exterior. "INS Arihant at sea."

Jive concludes India developing several SSBNs and SLBM types is a "huge advance" done quickly and in line with non-proliferation treaties [except for proliferating the nuclear weapons? Noting some international reactions to 1998 nuclear tests.].

---------------------------

Submarine Matters has numerous articles on Arihant, Arighat, submarine reactors, SLBMs and India's whole submarine fleet since 2009.

October 22, 2020

Japan maintains Plutonium stockpile: Useful for Nuclear Weapons

PETE COMMENT

It appears Japan has maintained a large Plutonium stockpile because Plutonium, being the most common, modern, nuclear explosive, gives Japan a future option of a nuclear weapons capability.

Alternatively Japan maintains such a high profile nuclear breakout capacity to encourage continuing US maintenance of the nuclear deterrent umbrella against Japan's possible enemies (North Korea, China and Russia). 

Japan and the US both realize that if Japan moved toward building its own nuclear deterrent this would severely destabilize the power balance in East Asia, eg. leading North Korea and China to rapidly enlarge their nuclear arsenals. Also South Korea and Taiwan might be tempted to follow Japan's indigenous nuclear weapons lead. 

So the US is better off maintaining the nuclear umbrella so Japan doesn't need to build its own.

ARTICLE

MARI YAMAGUCHI for Associated Press, has written an excellent article, dated October 21, 2020, at https://apnews.com/article/cabinets-recycling-yoshihide-suga-energy-policy-japan-66218c8a44a498a1535380066da466e9 .

“Japan sticks to nuke fuel cycle despite plutonium stockpile”

TOKYO (AP) — Japan’s government said Wednesday it will pursue its nuclear fuel recycling program that would involve extracting plutonium from spent fuel, despite international concerns about the country’s already huge plutonium stockpile and lack of prospects for effectively consuming it as nuclear fuel.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato, at a meeting with the governor of Aomori prefecture, home to Japan’s pending nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, reaffirmed that new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government will pursue the country’s nuclear energy policy.

“The government will firmly promote our nuclear energy policy and fuel cycle programs,” Kato said. He said Japan will make effort to reduce volume and toxicity of high-level nuclear waste, and extract plutonium from spent fuel from a resource conservation point of view.

But critics say continuation of spent fuel reprocessing only adds to Japan’s already large plutonium stockpile. Japan also lacks a final repository for high-level nuclear waste.

Wednesday’s meeting came after the Nuclear Regulation Authority granted a safety approval this past summer for the Rokkasho fuel reprocessing plant, operated by Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., located in northern Japan, for a planned launch in 2022. The authority also gave a preliminary permit for the Rokkasho MOX fuel production plant, also planned for completion in 2022.

Japan now has 45.5 tons of separated plutonium — 8.9 tons at home, and 36.6 tons in Britain and France, where spent fuel from Japanese nuclear plants has been reprocessed and stored because Japan lacks a plant to produce MOX fuel containing plutonium at home. The amount is enough to make about 6,000 atomic bombs.

Despite security concerns raised by Washington and others, the stockpile is hardly decreasing due to difficulties in achieving a full nuclear fuel recycling program and slow restarts of reactors amid setbacks from the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

Japan reprocesses spent fuel, instead of disposing it as waste, to extract plutonium and uranium to make MOX fuel for reuse, while the U.S. discontinued the costly and challenging program. Allowed under international safeguard rules, Japan is the only non-nuclear weapons state that separates plutonium for peaceful purposes, though the same technology can make atomic bombs.

Japan has pledged not to possess excess plutonium and to put a cap on the amount of extraction from spent fuel. The Rokkasho plant operator rules out any proliferation risks, citing tight safeguards and close monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency."

---------------- 

Follow Mari Yamaguchi on Twitter at https://www.twitter.com/mariyamaguchi

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FURTHER READING

See Submarine Matters' articles on Japan’s nuclear weapons capabilities written in 2008,  2012, 2013, 2016 and 2018.

October 21, 2020

Indonesia rejects US P-8 ASW&ISR aircraft on Natuna Islands

Reuters reports, October 20, 2020 on the Indonesian rejection: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-usa-exclusive/exclusive-indonesia-rejected-u-s-request-to-host-spy-planes-officials-idUSKBN2750KX 

Indonesia's Natuna Islands (see map below) are strategically located on the southern edge of the South China Sea and contain a dual-use civil-military airport/base (photo below) that could take US, Australian and New Zealand P-8 Poseidons. The location and runway make it highly likely that this is the Indonesian base that Indonesia could use to cater for US P-8s. The base could refuel and provide  low level (some spare parts) maintenance for US P-8s. Indonesian navy ships and submarines can already visit Indonesia's small naval base on the Natuna Islands. See details here and here.


The map above marks Indonesia's Natuna Islands (point 4) which are geographically at the center of Indonesia’s seaspace claim into the South China Sea – a claim which partly overlaps with China's so-called nine-dash line that envelopes most of the South China Sea. (Map courtesAsia Maritime Transparency Initiative via the Sydney Morning Herald)
---


Above is the Indonesian civil-military airport on Natuna Besar.
---

Both the map and photo are from James Massola’s and Amilia Rosa’s, Sydney Morning Herald article of June 27, 2020, reporting an ongoing geopolitical Indonesia-China standoff, at https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/natuna-an-idyll-on-the-front-line-between-indonesia-and-china-20200617-p553g2.html.