[Downer added] “Give South Australia some
compensatory money, but honestly, it’s just a huge waste of the defence budget
to be building the submarines here in Australia. “We don’t build F-35s in
Australia for good reason. “When it comes to defence, focus on defence, don’t
focus on votes in Adelaide suburbs.”
About subs, military/naval, missiles, nuclear weapons & politics. New Aussie subs have been just talk since 2009. Collins LOTE 2028-2040? of partial help. UUVs help more. POTUS may cancel AUKUS Virginias in 2031 as the USN needs all SSNs to the 2040s. Australian Gov ignores US higher priority to Columbia SSBNs (one/year being commissioned 2029-2041). Meaning minimal Virginia production until 2043. Shawn C and Gessler are excellent authors.
September 4, 2026
"Huge waste’ of defence budget to build AUKUS-class submarines in Australia"
Australia's The Weekly Times on September 4, 2026 reported :
..."Former [long term] foreign minister Alexander Downer believes that building AUKUS-class submarines in Adelaide is a “huge waste” of Australia’s defence budget.“In time the AUKUS-class submarine…will be built, we may as well just buy them off the shelf from the UK where they already have the capacity to build nuclear submarines rather than spending a 30 per cent or 40 per cent premium building them in Adelaide,” Mr Downer told News24 host Chris Kenny.
September 3, 2026
Japan's Type-25 HVGP & HCM Hypersonic Weapons: Japan hypersonics in Australia
Japan’s new Type 25 hypersonic missile family are changing the operational picture in the region from the 25SSM hypersonic cruise missile to the 25HGP hypersonic glide variant.
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Comments by wispywood2344 from Japan on August 29, 2026 and September 1, 2026, August prompted me to conclude Japan is rapidly maturing hypersonic weapons.
I then researched this subject using AI Google analysis on September 3, 2026. Using and presenting AI effectively and critically takes experience:
Japan has begun deploying its first stand-off hypervelocity weapons while actively developing advanced hypersonic glide and cruise missile technologies.
Key Weapon Systems
- Type-25 HVGP (Block 1)[aka 25HGP ] : Japan deployed this hypervelocity gliding projectile for island defense, featuring a range of several hundred kilometers. [1, 2]
- HVGP Block 2: An advanced variant with an extended range targeting roughly 2,000 kilometers, scheduled for deployment in the 2030s. [1]
- Scramjet Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) [aka 25SSM ] : Japan is researching scramjet-powered engines for future compact, high-speed cruise missiles, including potential underwater launch applications. [1]
Strategic & Technological Developments
- Underwater Launch Plans: Japan's FY2027 defense budget request includes unpriced funding to research submarine- or modular unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)-launched long-range strike and hypersonic capabilities. [1, 2]
- Testing in Australia: Japan and Australia announced a [new hyperlink bilateral agreement ] allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces to test [see 5(d)] long-range stand-off and hypersonic missiles on Australian military ranges over the coming decade. [1, 2]
- Space-Based Tracking: Japan is developing low Earth orbit (LEO) infrared sensor payloads (such as pathfinder experiments aboard JAXA's HTVX1 spacecraft) to continuously detect and track manoeuvring hypersonic threats. [1]
The specific strategic implications for regional security
1. Complicating PLA Operations in the First Island Chain
- Targeting Amphibious Fleets: Japan’s hypersonic weapons are optimised for anti-ship strikes. This directly threatens China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) surface combatants and amphibious assault groups. [1, 2]
- Disrupting Taiwan Conflict Planning: In a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, Japan could hold PLA naval forces at risk from a distance, restricting their freedom of movement within the critical First Island Chain and the Miyako Strait. [1, 2]
- Mitigating Airbase Vulnerability: Japan faces a severe shortage of hardened aircraft shelters, making its air forces vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes. Deploying mobile, ground-launched HVGPs to areas like Kyūshū, alongside stealthy underwater-launched hypersonic variants from submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), ensures a highly survivable strike capability that China cannot easily suppress. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6]
2. Shifting the Interconnected Threat Dynamics (China, Russia, North Korea)
- Breaking the "Shield Only" Posture: For decades, regional adversaries operated under the assumption that Japan would act only as a "shield" while the United States acted as the "spear". Japan’s ability to conduct independent, high-speed, precision strikes against launch sites or command nodes fundamentally alters adversary risk calculations. [1, 2]
- Countering Coordinated Pressure: Tokyo views the military activities of China, Russia, and North Korea as an interconnected security challenge (such as joint Sino-Russian strategic bomber patrols and North Korean missile tests). Hypersonic weapons provide a flexible, rapid-response option to counter multi-front intimidation. [1]
3. Escalation Risks and Compressed Decision Windows
- Incentives for Pre-emption: Because hypersonic missiles travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and follow unpredictable, maneuvering flight paths, they leave adversaries with virtually zero reaction time. This compresses the decision-making windows for all regional actors, which analysts warn could increase the risk of miscalculation or spark pre-emptive strikes during a crisis.
- Intelligence Dependency: For the immediate future, Japan remains heavily reliant on US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for mid-flight targeting coordination in access-denied areas. This deepens bilateral operational integration but anchors Japan firmly within the US-led alliance's escalatory ladder. [1, 2, 3, 4]
4. Anchoring Multi-National Mini-Lateral Alliances
- The Australia-Japan Defense Axis: Japan’s decision to test its long-range stand-off and hypersonic missiles at remote military ranges in Australia marks an unprecedented expansion of security ties. This shifts their relationship from diplomatic alignment into an integrated, practical defense partnership.
- [new hyperlink] AUKUS Pillar II Integration: Japan's rapid domestic hypersonic advancements reinforce the momentum to formally integrate Tokyo into AUKUS Pillar II. This collaboration accelerates the co-development of advanced underwater capabilities, artificial intelligence, and next-generation hypersonic technologies among Australia, the US, the UK, and Japan. [1, 2]
September 2, 2026
French Hypersonic Weapons Maturing
Key Hypersonic Programs
- ASN4G Missile: The French Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) officially commissioned MBDA to develop the ASN4G (Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4ème Génération), a scramjet-powered, air-launched nuclear cruise missile designed to fly at hypersonic speeds (expected around Mach 6–7). It is planned to enter service by roughly 2035 and be carried by the Rafale F5 fighter. [1, 2, 3]
- V-MAX Demonstrator: France previously launched the V-MAX (Véhicule MAnoeuvrant eXpérimental) experimental maneuvering glider program, managed by ArianeGroup under the DGA, to master hypersonic glide vehicle technologies through flight tests. [1]
Would you like to know more about the Rafale F5 integration or the difference between scramjet cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles?