See the funky new Anduril video here and above.
More details are dated September 12, 2024, and at Anduril's Website https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-unveils-barracuda/
I'm publishing news about subs and other issues at a slower tempo. Unlike more advanced countries Australian submarine changes are slow: first LOTE by 2030? 1 used Virginia by 2036 or later? But missiles and novel warheads always tempt. My 3 contributors are free to publish Completed articles on SubMatts. Cheers Pete
See the funky new Anduril video here and above.
More details are dated September 12, 2024, and at Anduril's Website https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-unveils-barracuda/
On the 12th of September 2024, Naval News reported (by H I Sutton) that a Turkish-operated merchant vessel, the MV Aya, was hit by a Russian KH-22 anti-ship missile, approximately 75km south of Snake Island in Romania’s Economic Exclusion Zone.
Image: KH-22NA by David Holt @ Wiki Commons |
The initial news came from the X account of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and shows two images of damage done to the ship’s deck and port side. No crew was injured.
Russian missile against a wheat cargo bound for Egypt. Tonight, Russia launched a strike on an ordinary civilian vessel in the Black Sea right after it left Ukrainian territorial waters. Fortunately, there were no casualties, according to preliminary reports.
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 12, 2024
Ukraine is one of… pic.twitter.com/nNCqNDVfJV
MV Aya left the Ukraine port of Chornomorsk on the 11th of September, carrying 26,550 tons of grain for Egypt, and after this attack, the vessel altered course to the Romanian port of Constanta, before resuming its journey to Egypt, clearing the Bosphrous by the 13th of September.
What is really strange about this reported event is that the KH-22 ASM is a heavy Cold War ASM designed to attack USN aircraft carriers and battlegroups. The missile, which is now only carried by the TU-23M3, has a reported 600km range, a maximum speed of Mach 4.5, and carries a 960kg warhead.
Image: MV Aya from vesselfinder.com |
A KH-22, travelling at Mach 4.5, hitting a 43,00 tonne bulk carrier should result in the vessel sinking immediately. How the MV Aya was able to resume its journey after a brief stop for repairs is as yet unexplained, but from a gCaptain report that a hold and a crane were damaged, I surmise that the missile struck the ship high on the side, resulting in most of the warhead dissipating itself above the vessel's hull.
Russia has used the KH-22 missile in the Ukraine ‘Special Military Operation’ to attack incredibly difficult targets such as two shopping malls and two apartment buildings, with almost 100 civilian deaths, but this is the first time the KH-22 has been used in its anti-shipping role in this conflict.
This attack has again heightened tensions in the Black Sea, although the MV Aya was outside Romania’s territorial waters when it was struck. In the short term, we should see merchant vessels staying within Romania’s territorial waters as they transit between Ukraine and Istanbul, but we could also see Ukraine retaliating against Russian commercial shipping with USVs - a crude oil carrier burning off Novorossiysk or the Kerch Straits would make for a significant reply.
A final blow to German hopes occurred on
September 10, 2024 when Naval Group and Dirk Beljaarts, Minister of Economic
Affairs of The Netherlands, signed an industrial cooperation agreement related to the contract for the Orka Program. Orka is more formally known as
the Replacement Netherlands Submarine Capability (RNSC) program.
Media Release: office of richard marles (australian deputy prime minister and defence minister)
Independent review into the Woomera
Prohibited Area
16 August 2024
The Albanese Government is undertaking an independent review into the settings of the Woomera Prohibited Area in South Australia, to ensure it remains fit for purpose and meets Australia’s national security requirements.
The Woomera Prohibited Area, north-west of Adelaide, is a critical Defence site used for the testing of advanced and emerging Defence capabilities. It is also a place of national significance for Aboriginal cultural heritage, and home to pastoral and mining operations, while also hosting significant scientific and environmental research, prospecting and tourism.
The Woomera Prohibited Area Rule 2014 (the Rule) underpins the coexistence arrangements that seek to balance the interests of all users in the Woomera Prohibited Area. In accordance with the Legislation Act 2003, this Rule will sunset in October 2026.
The Government has appointed Ms Rebecca Skinner to lead a review into the Woomera Prohibited Area Rule, to ensure the coexistence arrangements meet the contemporary needs of the Australian Defence Force into the future, and serve the requirements of all stakeholders.
Ms Skinner, formerly the Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia and senior executive in the Defence Department, will provide unique strategic insights and expert advice to Government.
The review will involve comprehensive consultation with stakeholders with interests in the Woomera Prohibited Area, as well as close engagement with the Government of South Australia. This will include written submissions.
It is anticipated the review will be handed to Government by mid-2025.
Further details are available here: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/review-woomera-prohibited-area-coexistence-framework
[Separately see Australia investing in sovereign rocket program
of September 16, 2024 at
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/australia-investing-in-sovereign-rocket-program/ ]
Quotes attributable to Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Richard Marles MP:
“The National Defence Strategy made clear that in response to our strategic circumstances, we must accelerate capability development and acquisition, including long range strike, and investment in emerging technologies for the ADF.
“In the 10 years since the Woomera Prohibited Area Rule and coexistence framework were first introduced, our strategic environment has shifted dramatically and we must ensure that we can develop, test and evaluate these capabilities in a fit for purpose environment.
“The Albanese Government is committed to ensuring these arrangements are in the interests of all users, including local indigenous communities and the economic and cultural opportunities in the region.”
Media contact: dpm.media@defence.gov.au 02 6277 7800
++++++++++++++
MEDIA RELEASE: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEFENCE [DEPARTMENT]
Review of the Woomera Prohibited Area
Coexistence Framework
The Woomera Prohibited Area Rule 2014 (the Rule) underpins the coexistence arrangements that seek to balance the interests of all users in the Woomera Prohibited Area (WPA). The WPA is a critical Defence site used for the testing of advanced and emerging Defence capabilities. It is also a place of national significance for Aboriginal cultural heritage, and home to pastoral and mining operations, while also hosting significant scientific and environmental research, prospecting and tourism.
The 2024 National Defence Strategy made clear that, in response to our deteriorating strategic circumstances, Australia – and in particular Defence – must accelerate capability development and acquisition, including of long range strike, and investment in emerging technologies.
Prior to the Rule sunsetting on 1 October 2026, the Australian Government requested a review be undertaken to ensure the Rule and supporting coexistence arrangements are fit-for-purpose. The scope of the review is set out in the Terms of Reference.
Review of WPA Coexistence Arrangements Terms of Reference (PDF, 540.58 KB) [BELOW]
Scope
3. The review will assess the current WPA coexistence framework to determine whether it remains
fit for purpose in the current strategic environment. It will consider national security, economic
and cultural perspectives, and make recommendations to balance competing views in the
national interest, including to:
a. inform remaking of the WPA Rule before it sunsets on 1 October 2026; and
b. update coexistence governance arrangements.
4. In making these recommendations, the review should acknowledge the precedence of Defence’s
use to advance strategic priorities and capability development to protect our national security,
and opportunities to minimise regulatory burden and costs for third-party users.
Key tasks
5. The review should make qualitative and quantitative assessments of the balance of national
interests over the short and medium (10-year) term, including but not limited to:
a. the WPA’s contribution to current and future Defence capability, including the financial and
other benefits deriving from Australia’s ability to share knowledge and technology with
allies, particularly in light of new and emerging technologies, and the subsequent value of
the WPA to the US Alliance and other key international relationships; [AUKUS PILLARS 1 AND 2?]
b. anticipated future Defence needs in the WPA, in particular any potential changes in
frequency and scope of activity;
c. current and future potential economic value of mineral deposits and other economic
activities in the WPA, including potential impacts on employment and government revenues,
and use of emerging technologies;
d. the extent to which mining and economic activity is compatible with Defence use of the
WPA, and any inherent limits to future coexistence, including issues posed by foreign
ownership or control; and
e. appropriate coexistence governance arrangements, including the ongoing role of the WPA
Advisory Board, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth of
Australia and South Australian Government.
6. The review should consider lessons learnt from the 2010-11 and 2018 WPA reviews, including
implementation of their recommendations.
Timeframe
7. The review should be finalised by the end of Q1 2025, with a final date to be negotiated with the review lead. Interim findings related to re-making the Rule should be provided by December 2024.]
Consultation
The review is seeking to engage with all WPA stakeholders to understand how the existing rule and coexistence framework serves their interests, and to ensure these views are heard and considered through the review process.
The review will be conducted with the support of Defence. It will include a comprehensive program of consultation with stakeholder groups with interests in the WPA; and close engagement with the Government of South Australia.
Submissions to the review are invited from all WPA stakeholders and those with an interest in the WPA coexistence framework. Submissions may address one or more of the following themes:
Submissions are due by 5 pm (AEST) Friday 6 September 2024 via:
Email: woomera.review@defence.gov.au
[Probably Too Late for Snail Mail]
Defence will collect personal information as part of this submission processes, including the contact details of submitters (such as name and email). Any personal information provided in submissions received will be only used for:
Defence will not use or disclose personal information without consent, unless authorised or required by law. For further information on how Defence will manage personal information, read the Defence Privacy Policy.
Submissions may be made public at the discretion of Defence, unless the submitter requested otherwise. Defence may not make submissions public for reasons associated with fairness and relevance. Submissions that are made public may also include redactions as Defence considers appropriate.
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 provides individuals with a legal right to request access to documents held by Government agencies. This includes submissions provided in response to this consultation process.
Contacts: woomera.review@defence.gov.au
So INS Arighaat/Arighat [1] commissioned on August 29, 2024, is India’s second Arihant-class [2] small SSBN - known in the trade as a “Baby Boomer”.
The US’s first SSBNs were also Baby Boomers, called the George Washington-class [3]. They carried 9.86m tall Polaris SLBMs with a range of 4,600 km. Modernised Polaris sized missiles could (with lighter booster and warhead casings, smaller hypersonic warheads and more powerful propellants) have an extended range of 6 to 7,000 km.
The estimated 6,000 tonne displacement 1st and 2nd Arihants and even the estimated 7,000 tonne displacement 3rd and 4th [4] Arihants will likely be smaller and cheaper than Australia’s Virginia SSNs and SSN-AUKUSs.
Alternatively Australia could buy 4 x Virginia Block Vs [5] that are to have a much larger VLS missile compartment than Virginia Blocks I to IV. Buying full size UK Dreadnought-class or US Columbia-class SSBNs might one day be other options.
In a modified AUKUS Pillar 1 - if Australia can organise 6 SSNs by the 2040s we would would do well to complete our nuclear submarine fleet with 4 nuclear armed Baby Boomers as the best deterrents against China.
The hypersonic nuclear warheads on Submarine Launched Hypersonic Missiles (SLHMs) could be nuclear shared [6] by the US. The legal and procedural precedent of US-UK pooled Trident II missiles might also be relevant [7]. This would of course involve removing the no nuclear "explosives" portions of the AUKUS agreement [8].
The SLHM boosters might be an Australian invention or a US-Australian invention tested at Woomera weapons test range [9] in outback Australia.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Arighaat
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arihant-class_submarine
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington-class_submarine
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arihant-class_submarine#Ships_in_class
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia-class_submarine#Block_V
[6] https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/01/us-nuclear-weapon-sharing-under-aukus.html
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trident_(UK_nuclear_programme)#Negotiations
[8] https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2024/08/a1-trillion-aukus-ssns-no-nuclear.html
[9] https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2024/09/independent-reviewwoomera-likely-for.html