Indonesia's armed forces are dominated by a large army which is still influential in Indonesian politics and in the operation of army reliant businesses. The army's main role is maintaining internal security including preventing Indonesia (a country of many islands) from splitting up. Meanwhile compared to the army the air force and navy are relatively small maintaining good relations with nearby Singapore and Australia and somewhat more complicated relations with Malaysia and the Philippines. Chinese naval forces are too powerful for Indonesia to take on, without US help.
Indonesia has a rapidly growing (just over 5% GDP growth annually) mixed economy from a base of having the world's 16th largest economy (by nominal GDP). Much of Indonesia's wealth is on outer islands or under the sea - something other countries or separatist groups might covet.
As the good wiki says: The Indonesian Navy is, of course, the naval branch of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. The Navy was founded on 10 September 1945 and has a role to patrol Indonesia's lengthy coastline, to enforce and patrol the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. The Navy also protects Indonesia's maritime strategic interests, protects the islands surrounding Indonesia, and defends against seaborne threats.
Indonesia's Submarine Force is gradually growing from a token force of two, old, Cakra class submarines to a viable force of six modern Nagapasa class submarines (3 exist now and 3 more will be built by 2026) see Table yesterday.
One point of friction is whether Malaysia, Indonesia or both own undersea Ambalat oil and gas pockets just to the northeast of Kalimantan (better known as Borneo - see Map A. below). I reported on ongoing Ambalat friction 2009-2012. Indonesia's submarines could monitor Malaysian naval movements over Ambalat and instil uncertainty in that navy. It is unclear whether Ambalat friction has been resolved as at 2019.
Indonesia has tried to better address strategic/economic naval competition and to recognise that the outer islands of Indonesia are more than just a support system for the major commands/bases at Jakarta and Surabaya on Java. Indonesia is addressing this by building a tri-service Armed Forces base on the island of Natuna-Besar. Natuna is just to the west of central Borneo and on the southern periphery of the disputed South China Sea. A forward base for Indonesia's submarines is part of the Natuna plan. Army, air and naval forces in Natuna are/will be closer to all other countries of Southeast Asia. Natuna's surrounding EEZ lies astride China's notorious South China Sea "Nine-Dash Line" (in red on Map B below).
That is a very brief description of Indonesia's broad strategic picture. What Indonesia submarines do - sometimes interacting with Australian naval forces - will be revealed next week.
Pete
Indonesia has a rapidly growing (just over 5% GDP growth annually) mixed economy from a base of having the world's 16th largest economy (by nominal GDP). Much of Indonesia's wealth is on outer islands or under the sea - something other countries or separatist groups might covet.
As the good wiki says: The Indonesian Navy is, of course, the naval branch of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. The Navy was founded on 10 September 1945 and has a role to patrol Indonesia's lengthy coastline, to enforce and patrol the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. The Navy also protects Indonesia's maritime strategic interests, protects the islands surrounding Indonesia, and defends against seaborne threats.
Indonesia's Submarine Force is gradually growing from a token force of two, old, Cakra class submarines to a viable force of six modern Nagapasa class submarines (3 exist now and 3 more will be built by 2026) see Table yesterday.
One point of friction is whether Malaysia, Indonesia or both own undersea Ambalat oil and gas pockets just to the northeast of Kalimantan (better known as Borneo - see Map A. below). I reported on ongoing Ambalat friction 2009-2012. Indonesia's submarines could monitor Malaysian naval movements over Ambalat and instil uncertainty in that navy. It is unclear whether Ambalat friction has been resolved as at 2019.
Indonesia has tried to better address strategic/economic naval competition and to recognise that the outer islands of Indonesia are more than just a support system for the major commands/bases at Jakarta and Surabaya on Java. Indonesia is addressing this by building a tri-service Armed Forces base on the island of Natuna-Besar. Natuna is just to the west of central Borneo and on the southern periphery of the disputed South China Sea. A forward base for Indonesia's submarines is part of the Natuna plan. Army, air and naval forces in Natuna are/will be closer to all other countries of Southeast Asia. Natuna's surrounding EEZ lies astride China's notorious South China Sea "Nine-Dash Line" (in red on Map B below).
Map A. All red distance lines point to the central strategic position of Indonesia's Armed Forces Base island of Natuna . See https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/08/14/defending-territorial-integrity-over-natuna-islands.html which sums up Natuna's importance well.
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Map B. The South China Sea and conflicting national territorial water claims including China's "Nine-Dash Line" in red.
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That is a very brief description of Indonesia's broad strategic picture. What Indonesia submarines do - sometimes interacting with Australian naval forces - will be revealed next week.
Pete
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