tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post4317305442012642060..comments2024-03-30T00:14:23.992+11:00Comments on Submarine Matters & Australian Nuclear Weapons: 2016 Defence White Paper: Submarine Matters Much Across Sub Issues RaisedPete2http://www.blogger.com/profile/06134037393078707072noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-1190617527944160292016-02-28T13:08:50.472+11:002016-02-28T13:08:50.472+11:00Hi KQN
Yes "regionally superior" over C...Hi KQN<br /><br />Yes "regionally superior" over Chinese SSNs is a spurious Turnbull claim.<br /><br />Your observations on the 1.5+ year refueling requirements for Barracuda SSN's are very useful.<br /><br />Refueling means it cannot be done in Australia. Instead France's nuclear fuel facilities and routine-expert refuelers would have to do it. Australian Barracudas having longer than French average mission transits would probably mean more frequent refueling more often. French SSNs apparently rarely visit France's distant South Pacific areas.<br /><br />This probably also means other heavy maintenance work for Australian Barracudas would more logically take place in France. France is a long way from Australia. So this may rule out Barracudas as a viable SSN option for Australia.<br /><br />The Astutes have had build and major performance problems (including low (for SSNs) maximum speed) meaning Australia should be wary of Astutes.<br /><br />So we are back to looking at the Virginias as a "regionally superior" submarine. No major build problems, don't need refueling, US range-transit patterns would be similar to Australia's, heavy maintenance maybe possible at comparatively nearby Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_52/PearlHarborShipyard.html <br /><br />Regards<br /><br />PetePetehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-47902767963814343802016-02-26T22:14:28.012+11:002016-02-26T22:14:28.012+11:00Operating an SSK is very different from operating ...Operating an SSK is very different from operating an SSN. The support logisitcs for a nuclear reactor is very different. French nuclear reactors used in their SSN and their CDG are based on a commercial design so it needs to be refueled. Refueling is not a trivial $B task and it takes a long time. Their CDG will enter dry dock next year for a refueling which will last at least 1.5 years if all things go well.<br /><br />In my view an SSN choice s totaly a different choice and program than this SSK decision. Do not fell into the endless feature creep.<br /><br />I find it rather puzzling the claim of parity with Chinese SSNs. The latter are hardly the reference standard in SSN.<br />KQN<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-50891151838980130132016-02-26T21:05:40.168+11:002016-02-26T21:05:40.168+11:00Hi Anil
The two decade sweep of White Papers also...Hi Anil<br /><br />The two decade sweep of White Papers also allows governments to say changed circumstances and mismanagement by previous opposition parties means grand plans cannot be honoured. Especially competing expenses (health, education, welfare, need for nuclear weapons or DF-21D like missiles?) might intercede.<br /><br />A typical dynamic for Australian submarines is for the Government to state that 10 are needed, then 8 then the standard 6 (as for the 6 Oberons then 6 Collins). It seems that the high up front costs and maybe the expense of finding sufficient crews makes Governments see reality. This will be even more true of the Future submarines being 50% heavier than the Collins (with proportionate higher upfront costs).<br /><br />Yes Paragraph 4.29 is important:<br /><br />"During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."<br /><br />Certainly transitioning to 6 Barracuda SSNs would be facilitated by first choosing 6 Shortfins. <br /><br />Hopefully a Australian Defence or Naval Attache in Delhi is talking to the Indian Navy about the in and outs of French provision.<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />PetePetehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-68712022194664117002016-02-26T16:55:23.712+11:002016-02-26T16:55:23.712+11:00Hi Pete,
I enjoyed reading your analysis. The pro...Hi Pete,<br /><br />I enjoyed reading your analysis. The problem with White papers outlining ambitious plans over a two decade period often are too ambitious to be realistic in implementation. The rapidly evolving dynamic of the Indo-Asia-Pacific precludes a two decade planning process. I think much will change before even the first boat begins construction. Secondly. the design and operational philosophies of Japanese and European submarines are quite different - so Australia will have to take a very well-informed decision where politics should actually take backstage. The CEP's eventual recommendation will be interesting to observe and thereafter the issues of in-country build, ToT, weapon and sensor integration etc etc will kick in. I agree with 4.29 - Australia might have to seriously start looking at a SSN capability within the next decade or so. As for the Shortfin Barracuda, its still only a concept - dealing with the French is not easy as Malaysia has discovered and even in India despite going in for a proven design (Scorpene), it will be 11 years by the time the first boat is commissioned hopefully by the end of this year. There may be valuable lessons to be learnt from the Indian programme.<br /><br />Regards,<br />Anil<br /><br /> subdriverhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07358975709527829678noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-31169576099519916232016-02-26T14:51:51.699+11:002016-02-26T14:51:51.699+11:00Hi S [at 26/2/16 3:56 AM]
You raise some good que...Hi S [at 26/2/16 3:56 AM]<br /><br />You raise some good questions. The problems still have not been resolved.<br /><br />Japan should be particulary aware that Australia has recently dissolved the expert weapons (including submarine) buying organisation know as the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). The end of DMO means there will be many future problems for the Australian Government's Defence White Paper buying plans. <br /><br />The Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC), which become associated with many failures of the Collins, has shown that its failures continue. This is still being seen in the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project which is $Billions overbudget (200% over world prices) and years late.<br /><br />Unresolved issues with the Collins include:<br />- unreliable diesels for the long range, high transit speeds required, <br />- probably too much salt in the fuel tanks when they take on seawater ballast, <br />- continuing personnel management problems including problems retaining enough submarine Commanders/Captains and key crew positions.<br />- lack of continuous-rolling builds right now which means many experienced sustainers are being sacked or leaving before they have to go.<br /><br />Australia has no powerful equivalent of Japan's Board of Audit and no clear chain of responsibility. Also too many new Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers. <br /><br />Escaping to become contractors, corporate Presidents/CEOs ("arms company" Australia) or Ambassadors is instead the goal of too many public and political officials.<br /><br />So methodical Japan should be careful selling to its launch submarine customer (Australia).<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />PetePetehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-64546563067361416592016-02-26T13:43:46.919+11:002016-02-26T13:43:46.919+11:00Hi Ztev Konrad [26/2/16 7:35 AM]
Very true.
I&#...Hi Ztev Konrad [26/2/16 7:35 AM]<br /><br />Very true. <br /><br />I'll do a post on that this arvo.<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />Pete<br />Petehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-19220096258085566582016-02-26T13:20:27.906+11:002016-02-26T13:20:27.906+11:00Hi GA [at 26/2/16 8:35 AM] Shortfin is no SSK with...Hi GA [at 26/2/16 8:35 AM] Shortfin is no SSK with SSN capabilities.<br /><br />Thanks. It is true that only DCNS can offer an evolution project from 6 x SSKs in the 2020s/30s to a second build 6 x SSNs in the 2040s. <br /><br />Re "From all the proposals, the Shortfin Barracuda B1a is the only sub which can be at the level of China's SSNs."<br /><br />Assuming Shortfin Barracuda B1a is a large SSK it will be inferior to Chinese SSNs on critical range/speed + whole of transit/mission discretion. <br /><br />The key advantages of SSNs to Australia would be the ability to complete Fully Submerged the whole transit from Fleet Base West 6 weeks operation "up north" and transit back still fully submerged - all up 2 months with no snorting. <br /><br />Fully submerged (no snorting so no diesel running) discretion is what an Australian submarine should be able to do. Average speed through all that of 16 knots would be ideal.<br /><br />No SSK from any country, now or projected, can move fully (ie. no snorting) submerged at 16 knots for 2 months.<br /><br />Vendor claims that the Shortfin SSK has the "capabilities of an SSN" fall short of this website's usual standards.<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />Pete Petehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-58492914958051087592016-02-26T12:18:11.890+11:002016-02-26T12:18:11.890+11:00Hi ONeil Padilla
Thanks. I keep extended hours.
...Hi ONeil Padilla <br /><br />Thanks. I keep extended hours.<br /><br />If time permits I'll do a Defence White Paper (DWP) article on anti-submarine mentions, today - including P-8As of course.<br /><br />The web is currently awash with snap analyses of the DWP.<br /><br />I'm extracting sections, in detail, by subject, as an aid/record that will be useful to researchers long after this weeks' snap analyses are forgotten.<br /><br />P-8s<br /><br />The vulnerability of P-8s to SAMs including head-on means that P-8s (with Anti-Ship missiles) are useful in warfare against lower resourced enemies but far less so China. <br /><br />P-8s are probably most useful in ASW, signals collection (on land and sea), search n rescue and finding Refugee Boats (a major issue for Australia).<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />PetePetehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02624742078679760819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-82418426546446260912016-02-26T10:05:14.266+11:002016-02-26T10:05:14.266+11:00Morning Pete,
You've must've burnt the mid...Morning Pete,<br />You've must've burnt the midnight oil last night.<br />Good news about the subs but hopefully the cost & risks can be worked out once the Govt. picks a design.<br />Oddly my favourite part of the DWP was:<br /><br />4.37 Eight P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft will<br />be introduced in the early 2020s, with seven additional aircraft to be<br />acquired in two tranches to bring the total to 15 aircraft by the late<br />2020s<br /><br />Jez I would've been happy with 12! but 15 that's brilliant.<br />Now all we have to do is integrate the LRASM & JASSAM-ER on the P8's and you have one potent strike asset. (oh yes and make sure it's ASW is up to scratch too :)_)<br /><br />Ok I know they (The Govt.) may change their minds on this one and possibly cut back the order but Boeing has good track record of delivering on time and budget so that's why I'm hopeful.<br /><br />Look forward to your views on the DWP. <br />Let's Hope the Country has the money to pay for it.<br />ONeil<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01647646945803452501noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-78980358524027359602016-02-26T08:35:22.951+11:002016-02-26T08:35:22.951+11:00Thanks Mr. Coates, for your short analysis of the ...Thanks Mr. Coates, for your short analysis of the extracts concerning submarines in the Defense White Paper. <br /><br />When I read that "the government will ensure that the future submarine project provides a regionally superior capability and value-for-money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian defense industry",<br /><br />I understand the same thing that you noticed : the Australian government wants better subs than China's SSNs. This is the condition for the superiority, and it is very difficult for an SSK to reach the supremacy of an SSN (even the simplest). <br /><br />So, I also understand that the DCNS proposal has one step ahead in the CEP.<br />From all the proposals, the Shortfin Barracuda B1a is the only sub which can be at the level of China's SSNs.<br />Mainly because it is a lightened conversion of the last SSN development which is one of the best SSN (with Astutes and Virginias), and which will soon be commissioned in the French navy.<br /><br />Everybody seems to agree on the technical superiority of the Shortfin Barracuda B1a, and on the ability of DCNS to work with the local industry to share the construction and the technologies of these subs, as they do with India and Bresil for example.<br /><br />GAGAnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-61411419676333798892016-02-26T07:35:35.312+11:002016-02-26T07:35:35.312+11:00You have forgotten the most important word for thi...You have forgotten the most important word for this White paper- which is of course not mentioned- Election.<br />It seems that someone has dusted off some old Menzies papers and put in Submarine instead of F-111.<br />This White paper has been been kicking around for so many years due to the turmoil in the PMs office suite over the last 4 years that it seems no one has noticed you cant afford it.Ztev Konradhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06553128132098513643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19245896.post-84915755111061340592016-02-26T03:56:31.543+11:002016-02-26T03:56:31.543+11:00Hi Pete
We can make a plan and prepare resources ...Hi Pete<br /><br />We can make a plan and prepare resources (personnel, budget, etc.) to achieve the plan. But, if we do not check implementation status of the plan and do not correct the failure properly, the bad result will be repeated.<br /><br />As a possible stakeholder, there are so many questions on management of Collins remained. Was the reason of bad performance of Collins submarine thoroughly analyzed and corrected? Were needed resources such as trained personnel, education and equipment were properly provided? How RAN managed ASC? Were responsibility and authority adequately estbalisted? Did correction system or the Australia Board of Audit properly work? Were these issues on management system fixed?<br /><br />Regards<br />S<br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com